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ARTICLES

American Political Science Review Vol. 88, No. 1 March 1994

LIMITS OF POLITICAL STRATEGY: A SYSTEMIC VIEW OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1993

LUCIUS J. BARKER

Viewing the African American experience through a systemic perspective tells much about the nature and operation of the political system. I suggest that a systemic perspective incorporates a broad range of factors that must be considered in a constitutional context that guides not only the choice of goals and strategies, but also signals the relative chances of success in the outcome of interest conflict. I focus on the capacity and limits of various strategies, and show how the political system generally militates against fundamental policy change. However, on rare occasions such policy change does occur, but it is difficult to implement and maintain, especially regarding the matter of race. Under the circumstances, I suggest that overcoming America's continuing dilemma of race requires extraordinary leadership and people of good will who are determined to see the constitutional–democratic system work.

How to deal with what Tocqueville and Myrdal long ago referred to as the "Negro problem" remains a dilemma for our American polity.[1] Indeed, the overall problem of race and color continues to plague the political system and appears intractable to solution (Bell 1987). It is also apparent that the problem will not fade away; nor can it be long forgotten or ignored. Thus, to address the problem of race and color is to address the nature and problems of American politics.

The overall effort here is to show how these matters can be most profitably addressed through a systemic perspective. Specifically, I shall suggest that a systemic perspective incorporates a broad range of factors (economic, social, cultural, institutional, political, and legal) and that in the development and implementation of public policy, the complex of relationships among these various factors must be considered and balanced in a constitutional context that not only guides the choice of goals and strategies but also signals the relative chances of success in the outcome of interest conflict.

Viewing the African American experience through a systemic perspective might tell us a great deal about how the nature, structure, and operation of the political system facilitates, impedes, or otherwise affects the realization of the democratic promise. That promise, as seen by African Americans and as reflected in the formal contours of our Constitution and laws, is the fair and equal opportunity for each person to develop to full potential, consistent with the clear recognition of the identity, worth, and respect that is due to every person by virtue of their status as human beings.

The focus in this essay is on the African American experience since 1950.[2] Over the ensuing 15 years, we see a convergence of developments (including path-breaking court decisions, a broad-based Civil Rights movement, and the enactment of major civil rights legislation), whose interactive and combined effect spurred the kind of recognition and protection of basic rights that had long been denied to African Americans. Developments such as these dramatically exemplified the strong determination of African Americans to use (like others) a range of strategies (e.g., litigation, direct action, and electoral politics) to promote and protect their policy interests. Of more enduring importance, policies emanating from the 1950s and 1960s now provided a more viable legal framework within which to utilize such strategies.

To be sure, there is a rather rich scholarly literature on the overall nature and functioning of our politics and political system and on how blacks and their allies have attempted to overcome the deleterious effects of racial segregation and discrimination. The scholarly record, however, does not sufficiently delineate (except rarely or by casual discussion) what the African American experience suggests about the relative limits and capacity of various strategies (when viewed in context of the overall political system) to achieve fundamental policy change.[3] In brief, though measurable progress has been made, the African American experience since the 1950s indicates clearly that no matter the individual or collective thrusts of the strategies employed, glaring incongruities remain between democratic theory as expounded in the law and the empirical reality as experienced in everyday life and practice.

This essay projects a continuing hope tempered by empirical reality. It is informed by my research and teaching over some 30 years and enriched—but I hope not blinded—by a lifetime of personal involvement and experience. From a theoretical perspective, we are interested in the differential consequences of various forms and structures of our politics and governing system that serve to maximize or impede the practice and potential for democratic government. The practical importance of our discussion is clearly evident. Developments at home and from around the world demonstrate concretely the urgent need to show how individuals and groups from diverse racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds can be fairly and peacefully united into effective democratic governments and societies.

That we must face such problems is not a matter of choice but one of necessity. Sheer demographics alone illuminate the imperatives for doing so.[4] Indeed, one does not have to be a soothsayer or doomsayer to suggest that dealing with such problems is likely to prove a cutting issue of politics and governance at home and abroad for some time to come. Clearly then, this is an issue to which political scientists should give increased attention. Should we not do so, then we will, in fact, be as irrelevant—or as "merely academic"—as some of our critics so often claim we are.

Let us, then, consider what the African American experience might tell us about the nature and functioning of our politics and political system.

FROM LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO POLITICAL REALITY

Since 1950, policy conflict with respect to the African American experience may well be described as moving along a continuum from the principles and dynamics of moral–legal combat to the realities and vagaries of everyday practical politics. Indeed, during the past four decades, African Americans have used an expanding range of strategies to promote their interests. Different strategies of resource or influence mobilization are substantially dictated by the rules and norms of particular institutions. If the votes are available to offer a hope of winning office, for example, then electoral politics makes sense. If not and appeal to constitutional–legal principles seems more promising (as it did in the 1950s), then the decision of Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP to resort to litigation, rather than electoral politics, appears altogether the sensible course to take.

Litigation as political strategy is inextricably linked to the limits and capacity of courts as governing institutions in the political process. The chief benefits of using courts and litigation for political strategy rest on two major pillars: (1) the responsibility of the federal judiciary to expound ultimately the meaning and limits of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land and (2) the widely held view, no matter what the empirical reality, that we are a "government of laws, not of [persons]." The authority of the judiciary in constitutional interpretation, bolstered by its authority in statutory interpretation, accords the judiciary (especially the U.S. Supreme Court) a highly visible role in our politics and policymaking.

In addition, the resources needed to negotiate and prevail through litigation are far less massive than those needed to prevail in electoral politics. Law and reasoned argument, not popular support and political influence, are the crucial determinants ostensibly needed to prevail in the judicial arena (Barker 1967). This was reflected well by Justice Brennan's widely quoted comment in *NAACP* v. *Button*, where he stated forthrightly: "Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts. . . . Under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances"(*NAACP* v. *Button* 1963, 429–30).

Even so, the capacity of courts remains limited (Horowitz 1977, 17–56). Indeed, some of the benefits that some attribute to courts might likewise serve to limit the use and viability of litigation as political strategy. For example, the nonelective character of the federal judiciary might serve to limit not only the relative legitimacy and acceptance of judicial policy but its nature and scope, as well.

The judiciary is also limited in that, for example, it it not a self-starter and cannot initiate action but, rather, must wait for such action to be brought. Similarly, the nature and scope of judicial policymaking is said to be limited by the particular and limited confines of the case or controversy requirement. Just as with its benefits, however, these limits on litigation are not static or fixed but may be modified or circumvented in accord with the force of dynamics existent under the circumstances involved.

Thus, when viewed in overall context, the use of litigation as political strategy was not chosen by accident by Marshall and his colleagues. They were keenly aware of the dire lack of interest representation that African Americans commanded prior to the 1954 *Brown* decision in both the judicial and the elective–political forums. Indeed, part of Marshall's genius as a litigator was his grasp of the federal judiciary in systemic perspective. He viewed the courts as "part of a system in which various political and legal actors act interdependently, responding to one another within the [opportunities] and constraints of their various constitutional roles" (Barker 1992, 1240).

The legal principle sought and articulated by the Court in the 1954 school desegregation cases effected a revolutionary change in our constitutional law and provided important symbolic and substantive supports with potentially important consequences. This was clearly reflected, for example, by the position of the United States in its amicus brief supportive of the NAACP position in the 1954 *Brown* litigation. The government said: "The subordinate position occupied by Negroes in this country as a result of governmental discriminations presents an unresolved problem for American democracy, an inescapable challenge to the sincerity of our espousal of the democratic faith. . . . We know the way, we need only the will" (*Brown* v. *Board of Education* 1954, 166).[5]

Nevertheless the very success of pro–civil rights interests in the 1954 cases demonstrates both the strength and limits of litigation strategy. Though grandiose in rhetoric and certainly important, a systemic perspective tempers one's assessment of the victory achieved in *Brown*. In 1955, the Court outlined the obviously ambiguous terms under which its new legal policy was to be implemented *with all deliberate speed*. "It is clear," as a former general NAACP counsel put it some years later, "that what the formula required was movement toward compliance on terms that the white South could accept" (Carter 1968, 243).

Other systemic factors contributed to the tenuousness of the Court's policy announced in *Brown*. This was clearly reflected by the equivocal support that the Court received from important political elites, including President Eisenhower himself, and the outright hostility and opposition openly voiced by a host of congressional leaders and state officials.

Indeed, though Marshall's litigation strategy had wrought fundamental changes in the law, there were no corresponding changes in the everyday life and practice of the masses of black Americans. Among other things, this situation illumined clearly the limited nature of judicial efficacy in terms of effecting major social change and served to increase the rising tide of black discontent.

Direct Action Politics: The Civil Rights Movement

The torch of black leadership thus passed from the *legal* lawyer-leadership of a Thurgood Marshall to the political movement–protest leadership of a Martin Luther King. This leadership transformation reflected the urgent need and desire of African Americans to bring about more immediate and far-reaching policy change unrestricted by the legalities, structures, and formalities of courts and litigation. The term *movement* itself is "a language of action" that stresses "the imminence of the crisis," "the magnitude of the stakes involved," and conveys "a sense of dynamic growth and prospective impact" (Salisbury 1989, 29). Indeed, "the political logic that underlies movements is that only large-scale action and demands can get beyond incrementalism to achieve fundamental changes in the structure of social relations, political power, or economic reward" (p. 22). Further, the strength of masses and numbers themselves lends a democratic character to the movement and its cause.

Movement–protest politics provides an attractive option to those who lack the resources needed to make effective use of electoral politics, litigation, or other strategies to achieve their objectives. Direct action movement politics lacks many of the socioeconomic biases that work against involvement of such groups or persons in more "mainstream" forms of political participation, such as electoral politics and interest group and party activity (Schattschneider 1975). In other words, movement politics draws support from the "underaffiliated segments of society" (Salisbury 1989, 25). Movements espouse large-scale collective action and encourage people to press for their appeals not only upon legislators and other policymaking elites but also on public opinion generally. Movement politics, with its marches, demonstrations, and protests, attracts attention of communication media, raises the consciousness of both actual and potential supporters, and (when it succeeds) expands the scope of conflict (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Schattschneider 1975).

But such apparent benefits may also hold some costs. Expansion of the scope of conflict, for example, might well invite sympathizers to become active supporters and apathetic bystanders to become sympathizers. But this very expansion may arouse opposition and engender backlash. Media coverage similarly cuts both ways: it provides exposure and free publicity to movements, but it can also galvanize opposition and may misrepresent and distort the image or goal(s) of the movement and stir leadership tensions within the movement itself (Gitlin 1980, 146–79).

Moreover, political movements constitute attempts to change some basic political and social practices and bring them into line with what some writers have labeled the "American creed" (Huntington 1981; Myrdal 1962, chap. 1). But some of these changes, such as those involving fundamental economic power relationships, fail to attract much support. Not only do these changes call for a redistribution of wealth and power, but they would require Americans to question some components of the "American creed," such as self-reliance and the superiority of free enterprise. This was why, initially at least, the Civil Rights movement did not push the economic issues to the fore, although they were clearly on Martin Luther King's agenda. He had stated that for years the Negro "had lived on a lonely island of economic insecurity in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity" (King 1963, 11).

Movement politics undoubtedly captured the attention of many African American communities, indicating growing unease and discord with the NAACP and a legal approach whose ultimate policy implications were not fully spelled out.

Given the circumstances, resources, and stakes involved, the resort to direct action–movement politics was likewise an altogether plausible strategy. This is reflected well by Martin Luther King, who indicated disappointment with not only the ambivalence of judicial policy but also the response and reaction to the Court's decisions. "The failure of the nation, over a decade, to implement the majestic implications of these decisions, said King, led "to the slow ebb of the Negro's faith in litigation as the dominant method to achieve his freedom. In [the Negro's] eyes," King continued, "the doctrine of legal change had become the doctrine of slow token change and, as a sole weapon of struggle, [has] now proved its unsuitability" (1963, 23). King also stated that "the outburst [of African American discontent]"—his characterization of the 1963 massive march on Washington—was also "rooted in the disappointment with both political parties."

Overall, the congruence of its basic goals with constitutional-democratic norms, plus the practical realities of the existent situation, gave a strength and unity to the Civil Rights movement far beyond what traditional indices of political clout would suggest. And as it evolved, the movement engendered a crisis situation and attracted the kind of mass and elite support that would eventually stir a reluctant America and two presidents to action.

Not unlike litigation, the successes attributed to the Civil Rights movement also revealed its limits and capacity as political strategy. The 1963 march on Washington and the subsequent passage of the civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965 represented the high point of the Civil Rights movement. But once those broad policy goals were achieved, the capacity and limits of movement–protest as political strategy came into sharper focus. Attention began to focus on new directions and on the question, Where do we go from here? Factionalism and tensions once again emerged. Differences over strategy and tactics between and among civil rights organizations provided constant tensions and threatened to jeopardize the strength and objectives of the overall movement, but until the legislation of 1964 and 1965 had been enacted, the appeal for unity prevailed. A movement must continue to advocate stirring goals of broad appeal, and it was not at all clear after 1965 what these might be. In the same spirit, one scholar has recently suggested that once the Nineteenth Amendment was enacted, the organized pressure for maternity and other welfare benefits abated, and those programs quietly faded away (Skocpol 1992). After the vote was fully secured, the "women's movement" lost much of its momentum in respect to other objectives.

Indeed, the wide visibility and media coverage that can help mass movements through activating more sympathizers and supporters might similarly publicize that the movement's objectives have been achieved, thus lessening the imperative for the continuation of the movement. This is particularly a salient point in that many African Americans viewed the right to vote and participate freely in elections as the watershed accomplishment.

From Protests to Politics: Electoral Politics as Political Strategy

Whatever its potential, the Voting Rights Act sparked the decided shift of African Americans from "protests to politics." Perhaps the most salient advantage of using *electoral politics* as political strategy is the widely shared belief in the legitimacy of elections as expressions of the popular will, and thus as the core of democratic government (Grofman and Davidson 1992, 261–317). This belief has been strengthened over time by Court decisions reaffirming elections and the right to vote as fundamental and essential to democratic government (e.g., *Baker* v. *Carr* 1962; *South Carolina* v. *Katzenbach* 1966).

Further, election campaigns tend to engender widespread media coverage, providing visibility to particular candidates and the interests they represent. Even more basic (as already intimated), electoral politics, in contrast to other strategies, provides a built-in legitimizing mechanism (elections) from which elected officials and their policy interests benefit. A system of regular free and open elections gives meaning and vitality to the theory of representative government. But the extent to which these concepts are realized in practice points toward some of the limits of electoral politics.

One such limitation is the prevalence and continued use of electoral structures that are not responsive to desires of large numbers of voters. These structures determine in large measure how votes translate into legislative seats. The legitimacy attached to elections, however, makes it difficult to change established electoral structures, no matter what built-in biases are involved. This was essentially the issue that spurred President Clinton to withdraw his nomination of Lani Guinier as assistant attorney general for civil rights. These situations do indeed raise important questions concerning what can be accomplished through electoral politics (Fraga and Anhalt 1993; Guinier 1991a and b). Consider, for example, questions relating to vote dilution, the continued great underrepresentation of African Americans in our governing institutions, and the impact of racial-bloc voting and racial sterotyping (Williams 1990).

An additional downside to the use of electoral politics as political strategy is that it is indeed difficult to translate votes and elections into policy outcomes. And even should policies result, the monies and taxes needed to implement such policies depend on a confluence of political and economic forces difficult for elected officials, acting alone, to control.

These reservations aside, however, the right to vote is seen by many African Americans and others as both a basic cherished democratic right and a powerful political weapon. Thus, with the vote secured, black voter registration skyrocketed, as did the number of black elected officials. Blacks were elected to political office throughout the entire system, at national, state, and local levels. This movement from "protests to politics" was especially highlighted by the election of a host of big-city black mayors. These developments perhaps reached their apex in the late 1970s and early 1980s, leading many to think that at long last, African Americans were well ensconced in the political system.

But as time passed, the success of blacks in gaining elective office and their experiences there began to illuminate anew and quite vividly the limits of electoral politics as political strategy. This is particularly salient at local levels, where blacks have made their greatest gains in winning elective political office. Holding local office in Detroit, New Orleans, and Los Angeles, however, does not bring with it the resources required to address the needs and heal the wounds of the core city population. But at the state and national levels, where resources might be more readily mobilized for such purposes, African Americans are not nearly as strongly represented, thus making their local political power seem a "hollow prize" indeed (Friesma 1969; Preston 1990).

The fluidity of electoral politics as political strategy has also been demonstrated at the highest level. Eight years under Nixon–Ford led many African Americans to fear continued Republican rule. In particular, President Nixon's "southern strategy" resulted in appointments to the Supreme Court that portended the erosion of recently won judicial and legislative policies supporting pro–civil rights interests. Not unexpectedly, then, in the 1976 elections blacks gave their strong support to Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter, clearly hopeful that he would reverse particular policy trends of the Nixon–Ford era.

But such expectations soon turned to disappointment. Whatever the reason, the Carter administration undertook few policy initiatives regarding minority concerns. (e.g., housing, jobs, education). To be sure, Carter did appoint a number of blacks to important positions, including the appointment of a record number of blacks and minorities to lower federal courts. However, this did not blunt the overall frustration and disappointment felt by many blacks toward the Carter administration.

This general disenchantment was further exacerbated by messages emanating from the Supreme Court that began more fully to reflect the impact of the changing political climate on courts and law. To be sure, certain decisions of the Burger Court relating to privacy and the rights of women served generally to advance rights and liberties. But the record of the Burger Court in other areas, such as school desegregation, affirmative action, and voting rights was decidedly mixed, with uncertainty being reflected between—and even within—decisions. In short, though the Burger Court did not bring about the counterrevolution that some had expected, its overall decisional thrust was to make more uncertain the kind of support and representation that African Americans had come to expect from the Warren Court (Barker and Jones 1994, chap. 5). The 1980 *Mobile* voting rights case especially roused opposition among civil rights interests: the decision's "intent" standard rather than "results" standard clearly threatened the effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—the central foundation upon which blacks based an "electoral politics" strategy. Subsequently, however, pro–civil rights interests did succeed in persuading Congress to pass remedial legislation designed to overcome the adverse effects of the *Mobile* decision.[6]

The Resurgence of "the system": The Central Force of Electoral Politics

The 1980 presidential election demonstrated concretely the increasing popular disquiet over the real or perceived consequences and trends flowing from major policy thrusts of the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the 1980 election (and the 1984 and 1988 elections as well) illuminate once again that electoral politics lies at the center of our politics and political system.

As expected, and given his constituency base, President Reagan gave little support to African Americans and pro–civil rights interests. His legislative agenda and budget priorities brought about "a total redefinition of racial equality": "Throughout government and in the management of many major institutions, the view that further governmental action for racial equality was necessary simply disappeared" (Orfield and Ashkinaze 1991, 205–7).

In general, the national consensus and commitment to civil rights forged during the 1960s was clearly coming apart, to be replaced by policies and officials who assumed that enough had been done, and, as they saw it, had now resulted in policies and practices that were unfair to whites (e.g., affirmative action). During the Reagan administration, key civil rights agencies (e.g., the Civil Rights Commission and the Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice) were headed by officials who shared these views and acted on them.

Ironically, it was through courts and litigation that the Reagan administration brought about changes that are likely to endure for some time. In addition to making an unusually large number of judicial appointments (Goldman 1989; Lyles 1991, chap. 5), Reagan's legacy also reflects his administration's aggressive use of litigation as political strategy. Indeed, as suggested by his former solicitor general Charles Fried (1991), the Reagan administration directed and strongly supported litigation specifically designed to overturn judicial policies favorable to pro–civil rights interests.

Although the Reagan era saw an increase in the number of black elected officials, it was at a slowed rate. Even more, drastic budget cuts reduced the value of many of these offices. This was particularly salient among African Americans whose mayoralty elections in some of the nation's largest cities did not have as much impact on people's lives or conditions as many persons, including blacks, had thought or expected (Preston 1990).

This was the overall political climate that gave rise to the candidacy of Jesse Jackson for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984. The Jackson candidacy, evolving as it did, dramatized well the strategic shift of African Americans from movement–protest to an electoral politics strategy (Barker 1988; L. Morris 1990). And Jackson's candidacy achieved benefits far beyond what traditions and resources would suggest. But it—and his 1988 campaign as well—illuminates vividly some of the limits of electoral politics for African Americans. These limits were clearly illustrated by Jackson's relative lack of resources (e.g., money, experienced staff, policy analysts) needed to run a competitive campaign for the presidential nomination. This situation reflects clearly the underrepresentation of African Americans not only in politics and government but in other major socioeconomic sectors from which money, staff, and other resources needed to negotiate the rigors of electoral politics (and interest group politics generally) would be expected to come. But perhaps of greater importance, the limits of electoral politics were also illustrated in

Jackson's campaigns by the large number of white Americans (about 20%) who indicated that they would not vote for any African American candidate for president, no matter how qualified (L. Williams 1990, 51).

As a candidate, Bush vowed to follow the lead and policies of the Reagan administration, and as president, he made good on this promise. During his campaign, for example (and reflective of his constituency) Bush took strong positions seemingly designed especially to attract and increase the white vote (e.g., the need to revamp the welfare system and to strengthen laws against crime).

Once in office, President Bush continued to take positions and actions that were not supportive of African American interests. This was perhaps most visibly (and importantly) demonstrated when the president nominated Judge Clarence Thomas to replace the retiring Justice Thurgood Marshall. Although both African Americans, Marshall and Thomas represented almost polar opposites in their concept of the judicial role and their posture with respect to civil rights and civil liberties. At bottom, Marshall and Thomas differed in their very definition of the African American predicament and the responsibility of government regarding it. After raucous and suspenseful hearings involving serious charges of sexual harassment leveled against him by black law professor Anita Hill, Judge Thomas eventually won confirmation despite major concern about his judicial competence and strong, almost unanimous opposition from established black political leadership, though (at least during the hearings) not from African American public opinion at large (Mansbridge and Tate 1992). This initial support from the black community may well reflect that the temporary strength of the symbolic ties of race and color was able to overcome, at least initially, the more enduring effects of policy and substance now being reflected in certain court decisions. Indeed, what makes Justice Thomas's appointment to the Court especially crucial even at this relatively early point in his career is that the initial thrusts of certain of his decisions (e.g., with respect to voting rights) could pose threats to basic legal gains fashioned in the 1950s and 1960s.

The 1992 elections afford still another vantage point from which to view the African American experience with electoral politics. Since the mid-1980s, Governor Clinton and his Democratic Leadership Conference were committed to the assumption that to recapture the White House, the Democratic party had to recapture Reagan Democrats. This had to be done by developing a more moderate–centrist party image that would appeal to the middle class, rather than to the poor and lower classes, where blacks and minorities are found in disproportionate numbers. This middle-class focus fits well with the general "mainstream" tendencies of American politics, where compromise and consensus, not conflict and division, are considered the hallmark of good politics.

Clinton's developing candidacy was clearly enhanced by the overriding concern expressed by Democrats generally, (including many black leaders) that a united party was essential to win the election and recapture the White House. This concern affected the campaign and election in significant ways. It probably contributed, for example, to the eventual decision of Jesse Jackson not to enter the contest for the Democratic presidential nomination. And Jackson's decision was important to Clinton. Jackson's appeal had been shown in the 1984 and 1988 campaigns, and it was clear that Jackson posed a real threat to Clinton. Very directly, Jackson's decision helped to subordinate, if not suppress, race as an issue, making it easier for Clinton to hold on to the black vote without jeopardizing the moderate–centrist image believed necessary to recapture Reagan Democrats and appeal to whites generally.

Of course, another significant development favoring Clinton was the rapidly worsening economic condition that caused the high, Gulf War–based popularity ratings of President Bush to plummet, allowing the politics of the economy to further obscure and engulf the politics of race. Thus, Clinton could more readily address many matters in "deracialized" terms, focusing on issues (e.g., unemployment, education, health care) that have disproportionately affected blacks and minorities but that could now be addressed toward the increasingly dire plight of the predominantly white middle class. Clinton also distanced himself from certain leaders (e.g., Jesse Jackson and Senator Edward Kennedy) and took more conservative positions on issues (welfare, crime) so as to avoid too close an identification with "racial" or "liberal" concerns.

In general, Clinton was able to forge a winning coalition relatively free of commitments to specific interests or groups, such as labor and minorities. African Americans, for example, overwhelmingly supported Clinton without exacting any obvious or apparent commitments in exchange for their vote. As with Democrats generally, black electoral strategy and politics in the 1992 presidential election were influenced by the overriding objective of winning the election. They were also influenced by the fact that blacks lacked a meaningful alternative (as has been the case traditionally) and simply had nowhere else to go.

This is all there was to black electoral strategy in 1992, and it remains too early to determine its efficacy. On the one hand, some of Clinton's major appointments demonstrate his repeated commitment to a government that reflects the "diversity" that exists in America. On the other hand, his widely publicized actions in other matters (e.g., the withdrawal of the Lani Guinier nomination and his positions on Haitian refugee policy and such issues as welfare, crime, and gays in the military) reflect the determination of Clinton as president to hold on to his centrist image.

When seen in total perspective, an overview of the African American experience since 1950 suggests that we might need to revisit the theory of American pluralist politics (Hero 1992; Pinderhughes 1987).

Pluralist politics illuminates clearly, for example, that there are always winners and losers in elections and that some interests are furthered and others retarded depending on who wins. But the interdependent and incremental nature of our system usually mitigates the loss of the losers. These matters are considered by Madison in the *Federalist* 10 and 51. Moreover, the degree to which losers are able to protect previous gains is usually related to their size and electoral involvement. But this does not appear to be so with racial minorities, at least not with African Americans. The relationship to the system seems to be the reverse. After the threshold surge in the 1960s, as black electoral involvement became stronger, the policies that would have favored them (at least at the national level) became weaker, having been quite steadily—even systematically—eroded, with the prospects for improvement becoming dimmer (A. Morris 1991).

SOME FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

The phenomena just described may not be unique to African Americans, but it is not the typical pattern in American politics, either. And the consequences seem to be more profound and rather permanent. Let us take a closer look at how the African American experience since 1950 may shed some light on this and other aspects of our politics and the political system.

First, the African American experience suggests convincingly that the overall nature and functioning of our politics continue to advantage certain interests and disadvantage others. For example, those interests strongly represented in our original constitution making (i.e., propertied white males) have been clearly protected and advantaged by the nature and structure of the political system they developed. Conversely, those interests not initially represented (e.g., African Americans and women) have been—and remain—clearly disadvantaged by the nature and operation of that system. But the African American experience also demonstrates that the character of certain principles as embodied in the Constitution, particularly as strengthened by subsequent amendments (e.g., the Fourteenth), are important on their own terms and can be used effectively by excluded or overlooked interests to overcome some of their continuing disadvantages.

The African American experience strongly reinforces the long-held observation that the limits and capacity of particular political strategies and institutions are determined essentially by their interaction with, and interdependence upon, one another. Especially for minorities, however, the choice of strategy cannot be taken as an end in itself. It must be taken in larger context, toward the view of making more enduring changes in the "rules of the game," the process, and the system. Electoral strategies resulting in electing mayors and controlling city councils, for example, mean little unless they work toward bringing about such enduring changes.

Within this context, however, there remains the necessity for groups to forge coalitions and coordinate strategies in order to safeguard and promote their interests. In many ways, this is reflected by the African American experience in the 1950s and 1960s, when a combination of strategies (litigation, direct action, and electoral politics) stimulated and steered major change in our law and public policy. This very example, however, reflects the basic difficulty of bringing about major change in behalf of aspiring interests. Seldom can such forces be brought and held together sufficiently long to bring about fundamental policy change. This could prove even more difficult given the changing nature of the issues involved and the resultant problems that make coalition formation in today's political climate quite different from that during the 1950s and 1960s. Though African Americans, like many others, are amenable to coalition politics, "the problem has been that for the most part they have had few important takers, especially when the agenda concerned economic issues," as it does today (Hamilton 1991). When viewed in this light, Madison's prescriptions, which work so well in many instances to prevent factional mischief, seem not to work so well when it comes to protecting racial minorities, at least in the case of African Americans.

The difficulty of effecting major policy change is exacerbated by the fact that strong supports are needed not only to enact such changes but to implement them effectively, especially when they are designed to overcome the effects of deeply ingrained practices and traditions that continue to advantage the very interests that traditionally and currently remain dominant in our politics and society.

The two broad coalitions that give life and vitality to the governing system—the major political parties—have been unable or unwilling, for the most part, to deal forthrightly with matters of race. Race continues to be a volatile issue in American politics, as evidenced by both public opinion polls and racially inspired outbreaks of violence (Levin and McDevitt 1993). This has resulted in a situation that one political scientist described as follows: "We have become an extremely multi-racial society during a period of political domination by [a] virtually all-white national party, the Republicans, and in a time when political defeat and fear of defeat has rendered the [other] national party (the Democrats) that receives the great bulk of the minority vote, incapable of discussing and acting on problems of racial and ethnic discrimination and inequality" (Orfield 1993, 6–7).

Moreover, we must also recognize that in this day of "privatization," African Americans (and other historically underrepresented groups, e.g., Latinos and women) continue to be grossly underrepresented not only in the public sector but in key areas of the private sector, as well. And it remains the case that outcomes in both sectors favor those whose interests are sustained and advanced by strong and assertive representation. This is especially critical given the intimate relation of our politics and political system to the private sector. This public–private nexus allows us to discern more clearly the nature and influence of private decision making (especially the role of business) in fashioning public policy (Lindblom and Woodhouse, 1993, chap. 8; Nelson 1990, 192–94).

But representation may not be enough and at times might even thwart the possibility of basic change for those who need it most: "In taking up electoral politics, blacks and their leaders have implicitly embraced strategies that preclude the possibility of radical goals" (Tate 1993, 170). At least, this author continues, the elections of black city mayors and city councils "have not produced the radical and profound changes envisioned by the civil rights activists of the 1960s" (ibid.). It must be remembered that these changes, however, were envisioned in large measure on moral–jurisprudential and *constitutional* grounds, not on compromise–practical grounds of electoral politics. To be sure, the shift of blacks from protests to politics and the nature of electoral politics itself minimize attention to these constitutional and moral–jurisprudential considerations and, rather, enhance decisions being reached in terms of "politics as usual," that is, on practical political grounds.

Another observation that flows from the African American experience is the meaning and importance of symbols and symbolism and their relation to the reality and substance of politics (Edelman 1964). Important public acts have both substantive and symbolic dimensions. The symbolism of political practice may be used, however, to promote diverse political interests ranging from incentives for additional accomplishments all the way to what is needed to maintain system stability and satisfaction.

The symbolic elements of the civil rights act of 1964 and 1965 could well be used either to highlight or to obscure the substantive benefits that might reasonably be expected to flow from such important developments. For example, the increase in black voter registration and in the number of black elected officials clearly had substantive importance in certain areas. On the other hand, repeated focus on such numbers might well exaggerate the degree of actual substantive change. Moreover, even with such dramatic increases, black elected officials still constitute less than 2% of all elected officials in the country (Williams 1990, 45).

Even more basic, the focus on numbers encourages us to avoid questions relating to the efficacy of the vote and electoral politics as agents of social change: "The daunting task facing black political actors," as put in a recent volume [is that of] "trying to consolidate their newly achieved positions in the system while at the same time trying to change the system itself." (Barker and Jones 1994, 321; see also Keech 1968, chap. 6).

Martin Luther King's comments with respect to "tokenism" are relevant here and help to put our discussion of symbolism, especially its inhibiting effects, in sharper perspective. Said King:

> Those who argue in favor of tokenism point out that we must begin somewhere; that it is unwise to spurn any breakthough, no matter how limited. This position has a certain validity, and the Negro freedom movement has more often than not attained broad victories which had small beginnings. There is a critical distinction, however, between a modest start and tokenism. The tokenism Negroes condemn is recognizable because it is an end in itself. Its purpose is not to begin a process, but instead to end the process of protest and pressure. It is a hypocritical gesture, not a constructive first step. (King 1963, 20–21)

Two somewhat interrelated strategies—crossover appeal and deracialization—have been offered as ways to overcome some of the continuing dilemmas of electoral politics as political strategy. Crossover appeal focuses primarily on the ability of black candidates to attract white voters. It also, of course, relates to the ability of white candidates to attract black voters. But research suggests that crossover appeal poses severe obstacles, especially for black candidates. Black voters harbor far less racial prejudice and sterotypes and are far more likely to vote for white officials than white voters are likely to vote for black candidates (Williams 1990, 51). Moreover, the higher the office, the more likely it is that whites will not vote for a black candidate.

Deracialization, however, cuts both ways. Black leaders, for example, were willing to follow then governor Clinton in a deracialized campaign because it appeared that taking care of issues affecting the white middle class (health care, jobs, and education) would also cover major issues that have for so long disproportionately hurt blacks. Indeed, given the circumstances, by putting issues in race-neutral terms and appealing to universal values (health care for everybody), a candidate can couch his programs in race-neutral rather than race-specific terms and thus enhance the chances of victory.

But this central strategic purpose of deracialization to circumvent or otherwise minimize controversy over the emotionally divisive issue of race points to one of its greatest problems. To continue to treat lightly or brush aside such problems, especially in the face of serious and continuing opportunities to focus on them, defies reality as well as democracy. The 1992 Los Angeles riots offer a prime example of such a missed opportunity. Another prime example is how ostensibly race-neutral policies (urban budget cuts) can and do have devastating race-specific effects (unemployment). We cannot overlook how less-dramatic—even daily—occurrences reflect the extent to which race continues to inhibit African American progress. To continue to overlook and squander such opportunities tends to raise questions about our professed commitment as a nation to democracy. Indeed, it is difficult to fathom how the broader public interest is served by policies that limit the opportunities of such a substantial segment of the American population (Fraga and Anhalt 1993). Our sense of historical reality should remind us, however, that neither the state nor force of arms can quiet or circumvent such matters forever.

In addition, the African American experience underscores once again the pervasive influence and impact of electoral politics throughout the governmental system, including the courts. A systemic perspective allows us to see how Court decisions on major policy issues (even those articulating the meaning and scope of basic constitutional-democratic values) encounter difficulty—even reversal—when they venture too far from the views of electoral majorities.

The African American experience also shows that when combined with judicial support, movement politics can sometimes go a long way toward influencing elective institutions to take important decisive action. But that experience also shows how electoral politics can, over a relatively short time span, radically shift the balance of forces in regard to such issues. Since 1968, electoral politics, influenced by a number of factors, has brought about a resurgence of "normal" politics, replacing the essentially constitutional—legal framework in which race issues had been fought since about 1950. This shift in contextual emphasis has culminated in clear erosion—even outright reversal—of major policy thrusts emanating largely from nonelective institutions, namely, the courts. These policy thrusts initially supported minority interests, but over time and in the course of their implementation, they are now being interpreted as adverse to majority interests. And that changed interpretation has been spurred mainly through electoral politics. This suggests strongly that notwithstanding its limits as political strategy, electoral politics must attract the fullest possible participation from African Americans if only to prevent the erosion of policy gains achieved elsewhere.

When viewed in systemic perspective, the African American experience points up the importance to minority groups of pursuing multiple strategies to achieve their objectives. The nature of courts, for example, gives credence and weight to the use of litigation as political strategy. Litigation permits raising and deciding fundamental issues in forums generally free from vagaries of majoritarian politics and popular opinion. The strategic use of litigation calls on leadership elites in both the public and private sectors, at least to consider the basic moral and jurisprudential dimensions of the issues involved. It lays bare the gaps between professed constitutional-democratic values and principles and everyday experience and practice. Notwithstanding their limits, the African American experience indicates that favorable court decisions can prove important supports in interest conflict and policy combat. That experience suggests, for example, that Court decisions may prove formidable barriers against popular assaults on minority rights. Thus, though the Supreme Court is not a panacea, neither is it a "hollow hope" (Barker 1967; Rosenberg 1991).

Similarly, the African American experience suggests the importance of direct-action politics, allowing mass publics to articulate and petition for redress of grievances relatively free from the risks of misrepresentation by others. But as I have suggested, movement strategies encounter difficulties, their potency and influence being swiftly reduced once the original broad goals have been achieved. Still further, interest-group bargaining to form coalitions of support in Congress and to bring pressure to bear in executive branch actions is as necessary to minority group success as it is to any other interest in American politics. In this regard, the efforts of the NAACP in Washington and of the Congressional Black Caucus exemplify the continuing importance of these "normal" political strategies in interest conflict. Overall, though varying in their efficacy, not one of these strategies is sufficient or can be ignored. To do so is to overlook the breadth and complexity of the systemic context in which they all operate.

CONTINUING HOPE AND EMPIRICAL REALITY

In my introductory remarks, I suggested that this essay would project a continuing hope tempered by empirical reality. The African American experience does suggest some rays of hope and empirical reality implores us to find them. In my judgment, the constitutional structures and limits outlined by the framers were designed to enhance, not impede, the realization of democratic politics and government. Our discussion of the African American experience offers evidence illustrative of this thesis. That experience, since 1950, demonstrates that fundamental policy change in pursuit of basic democratic goals and values can be achieved within such structures and within what otherwise appear to be intractable limits, depending largely on the nature of the dynamics and circumstances involved (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).

That fundamental policy change was characterized by a confluence of factors including: (1) the perseverance of the aggrieved interests engineered by an extraordinary and resourceful leadership; (2) judicial articulation and support of the fundamental constitutional, moral, and jurisprudential nature of the minority rights at issue; (3) the massive scope of movement-protest that dramatized the serious gaps remaining between professed constitutional-democratic ideals and the realities of everyday life of African Americans; and (4) the unusually strong (though relatively brief) commitment of presidential leadership in support of the cause involved.

When viewed in combination, these factors suggest that the president and the congress took meaningful actions in civil rights "only in response to serious pressure or outright crisis," for "only crisis can normally greatly speed the incremental process" of major policy change (Rodgers and Bullock 1972, 211–13).

This is the major reason why I think that the leadership dimension illuminated in the African American experience should be underscored. No matter what crisis or stimulus is involved, that experience demonstrates clearly the need not only for courage and commitment but for skilled leadership in both public and private sectors. That leadership becomes even more crucial in that today issues of race and color are much more complex than they were in the 1950s and 1960s and have become fused with issues such as inadequate education, housing, and health care, which may now affect many more white Americans than what had or seems to have been the case. For some, this complexity leads to inaction and indifference. For others, it suggests that the problems are too intractable for real solution. To yet others, it may suggest that there is no racial problem. Still others may be convinced that our country has made more progress in this regard than other nations and that we should thus take heart from such accomplishments and strive to do more.

Whatever position one takes, however, and despite the complexities involved, glaring inequities and disparities remain between persons along racial and ethnic lines. In the face of such stark empirical reality, it becomes increasingly difficult to overlook continuing institutional and structural barriers that perpetuate the vestiges of racism. As a result, it is also becoming increasingly clear, for example, that more than litigation, movements, and electoral–politics are needed to achieve equality and justice for all persons.

At bottom, the African American experience suggests that achieving equality and justice for all persons takes extraordinary leadership and people of good will in both the public and private sectors, who are committed to see the constitutional-democratic system work. In discussing the work of the constitutional convention, one student of American politics put the matter in sharp perspective: "Historic opportunity always exists. The difference between then and now is that the founders appreciated their situation, and today's political leaders rarely are able or willing to do so" (Lowi 1976, 78).

But some are. Though himself initially reluctant on political grounds to support civil rights legislation, in the end, it was President John F. Kennedy who perhaps best captured the essence of the attitude that is still needed if we are to deal with the vestiges of race and racism today. On 11 June 1963, in the immediate aftermath of wanton acts of violence perpetrated against blacks and their allies, Kennedy bluntly told the nation:

> Law alone cannot make [persons] see right. We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution. The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated. . . . We face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the streets. It cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It is time to act in the Congress, in your State and local legislative body and, above all, in all of our daily lives. . . . Those who do nothing are inviting shame as well as violence. Those who act boldly are recognizing right as well as reality. (1964, 468–71)

These words remain relevant today. Their continued relevance is evidenced by the dire need to blunt the proliferation of hate groups and hate crimes spurred by racial, ethnic, and religious bias and prejudice. (Levin and McDevitt 1993; Southern Poverty Law Center 1992). Their continued relevance is evidenced by the dire need to overcome such attitudes as those reflected by our relative indifference to the outbreak of racial violence in Los Angeles in 1992. The words remain especially relevant to overcome a political climate whereby both major parties shy away from close identification or ties with civil rights and minority interests, fostering a political mainstream that provides just enough substantive gains to give symbolic accord and effect to democratic norms and values but denies giving reality to major substantive policy change.

The currency of the challenge remains especially salient in view of the imperatives of our rapidly changing demographics and by the obvious continuing quest of peoples around the world for democratic government and society. The challenge remains current to each of us in our respective areas of competence and authority. Whether in government or the private sector or ensconced within the hallowed halls of the academy, the message embodied in Kennedy's words indicates the continuous need for extraordinary leadership to make an extraordinary form of government—democracy—work.

Finally, I have decided that my remarks might come into sharper focus by sharing some personal reflections on what it has been like for me as a black person in our profession and society generally.[7] This is a subject about which I have been asked repeatedly and about which I think the time has come to share my views.

First of all, I fully recognize that many of us might wish to forget about the matter of race or might wish to believe that our current public policy now makes for a truly free and open society where any individual, irrespective of such factors as race, ethnicity, or gender, has a fair and equal opportunity to reach full potential, dependent solely on individual talents and initiative. But so to believe is simply to ignore the objective reality that African Americans, for example, continue to be disadvantaged throughout our socioeconomic system. I am afraid that this dire reality has become so commonplace—so much a part of the everyday landscape—that it has dulled our sense of justice and outrage, leading us to become too accepting of the unacceptable and too tolerant of the intolerable. Unfortunately, such attitudes cut across the entire socioeconomic spectrum, and my many years of participant observation in both faculty and administrative roles suggest that these attitudes are also present in the academy.

My overall basic concern is how some of us, as professors, seem quite willing, for example, smugly to criticize the failures of politicians in civil rights and related matters without recognizing (or perhaps conveniently ignoring) the fact that we, too, are part of the system and can and do perform important roles in this regard. Given the freedom and independence accorded through tenure, we as scholars have a weighty responsibility to pursue the truth in our teaching and research wherever that might lead, irrespective of our own personal or ideological inclinations. Above all, the scholar must be willing critically to analyze even the most volatile problems (such as those involving race) that others might shun or approach reluctantly. Indeed, professors and scholars, particularly those in so-called elite institutions, speak from vantage points that inform and influence, as well as lend authority and legitimacy to attitudes and actions of both elites and masses (Steinfels 1979, 6). To disagree about the problems of race is one thing but to ignore them is unconscionable.

We must begin by looking at ourselves. I trust that we are able and willing to see, for example, both the scholarly and societal value in the *good faith* recruitment, training, and retention of minority graduate and undergraduate students. Similarly, I am concerned about the dire need for more blacks and minorities to become university and college professors—and top administrators as well. The strains on the few of us who are presently in the academy are uncommonly heavy and are in many ways obscured from the view of many of our colleagues. Sometimes, for example, I think I should become an employment agency and charge a fee for the many inquiries I receive asking if I know where they can find "one," or "might you be interested yourself." But at the same time, I am pleased that at least someone is asking, no matter why. And numerous are the requests to serve on committees, to grant media interviews, and to speak on campus and to community and outside groups.

It is not so easy for me to decline such invitations, as some of us—and I include myself—are wont to do. Indeed, I have come to realize that despite my personal feelings, the stakes involved are much too high for me, as an African American, routinely to decline such invitations. I have seen and experienced firsthand, for example, that the presence or absence of extraordinary leadership, both black and white, in teaching, research, and administrative situations can at times make for material differences in outcomes, as for example, in the recruitment and retention of minority students and minority faculty.

Thus, a central concern is that we as a profession, may be overlooking potential and well-qualified faculty because they are not exactly "our kind" in terms of the nature of their research and methodological approaches or in terms of the journals in which they have published or are likely to publish. To make judgments on such surface grounds is to perpetuate the kind of stereotypical behavior that has historically disadvantaged significant segments of our population. Even more directly, continued adherence to such attitudes and actions tend to blunt and jeopardize the kind of free, open, and diverse environment that first-class universities and colleges need to survive and prosper.

Despite such concerns and pressures, however, I have been able to achieve the kind of balance that has allowed me to keep afloat. I have done so by becoming highly selective in what I take on and learning how to harness my energy and resources, with special attention to undertaking projects that might make a difference on things that matter most to me.

That I personally have been able to survive and reach some level of achievement, however, should not obscure the continuing demeaning and inhuman indignities that many African Americans are still forced to endure solely because of race and color. It is sad but true that what the late Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in the 1978 *Bakke* case remains as relevant today as it did them. "It is unnecessary in 20th century America," said Marshall, "to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact."[8] Marshall's observation remains on the mark: statistics and conceptual models may provide information and explanation, but they cannot begin to give life to the hurt that flows from personal experiences that I and many other African Americans encounter, no matter what our achievements or socioeconomic status.

Let me be very direct and personal. I continue to encounter directly—not obliquely or by implication—revolting indignities solely because of my race or color. And these incidents have occurred as late as in 1992–93 in California, not only in the 1950s or 1960s in the deep South, though I encountered them there also. (Barker 1988, 138–40; McClain and Perry 1992, 752–56). Clearly, the demeaning and insulting words used in such encounters and the messages they convey call for a remarkable level of restraint and self-control such as no human being should have to endure. More importantly though, these incidents reflect deep vestiges of a social structure that relegates African Americans to glass ceilings or to certain positions. That ceiling might have been broken a second time by my presidency of this association,[9] for example, but neither that nor anything else had relevance for those who, in the past year or so, referred to me as a "bus driver" or those who asked my wife and me upon answering our doorbell whether we were the "caretakers" of our own home.

Despite such encounters and experiences, however, I continue to hold to the goal of a society where, as Martin Luther King eloquently put it, persons are judged by the content of their character, not the color of their skin. Thus, I have found it rewarding to operate in both predominantly black and white institutions and related professional contexts. But I can assure you that while these can prove challenging, they also hold risks. Performing this sort of bridge function can prove difficult; persons who try to serve as bridges risk the chance of falling off both ends or being stranded and frustrated in the middle. Fortunately and with the help of many persons, I have been able thus far to weather such pitfalls, allowing me an opportunity to carry on such crucial bridge functions as I trust more of us will resolve to carry.

Overall, I continue to be fascinated and excited in my work as a professional political scientist: the last few years have been among the most productive and rewarding of my career. Those rewards and satisfaction become most meaningful, however, when they can help to transform our country and the world into a more fair and just society for all persons. Such a transformation will clearly require extraordinary leadership from our universities and colleges and from our educational system generally. This is also the sort of leadership that is needed to overcome the limits of political strategy and manifest whether the overall political–social system has the capacity and the *will* to eliminate racism and related problems so as to live up to its democratic potential.

Notes

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1. See Tocqueville 1969, esp. 340–63; Myrdal 1962. See also Jaynes and Williams 1989; Willie, Garibaldi, and Reed 1991; and related volumes produced under the auspices of Trotter Institute of the University of Massachusetts, Boston.

Of particular interest is Rogers Smith's recent essay suggesting that "[a] study of the period 1870–1920 illustrates that American political culture is better understood as the often conflictual and contradictory product of multiple political traditions, than as the expression of hegemonic liberal or democratic political traditions" (1993, 549).

2. For a succinct overall history of the African American experience before and after 1950, see Franklin and Moss 1988.

3. Taking account of much of the available literature, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones (1993) provide a perceptive analysis and commentary on the nature and dynamics of fundamental policy change in context of the overall policy process and the political system.

4. The overall census projections, for example, show that by the year 2050, there will be 81 million Hispanics, 62 million African Americans, and 41 million Asian Americans. The overall result is that the total white population will steadily decline from 75% in 1992 to 53% in the year 2050, only slightly more than half of the American population. See United States, Bureau of the Census 1992.

5. For a discussion of the role of the government, including relevant excerpts from its brief, see the detailed narrative account of the overall nature and dynamics of the litigation culminating in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* (1954), found in Barker and Barker 1972, chap. 5.

6. The more exacting standard of proof announced by the Court in *Mobile* v. *Bolden* (1980) was overcome by Congress in its 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act. As amended, section 2 allows the establishment of proof of a violation by showing that the electoral processes in question have a discriminatory *effect* or *result*.

7. In many ways, there are a number of similarities between my own experience and those outlined in a more systematic effort to capture the role and experiences of minority law professors. See Delgado.

8. See *Regents of the University of California* v. *Bakke* 1978, esp. 395–402. Justice Marshall concurs in the judgment at p. 387.

9. The late Ralph Bunche was the first African American elected president of the American Political Science Association in 1954.

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DEMOCRACY AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

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The research reported here develops an explanation for the often-noted absence of international war between democratic states. This explanation is derived from a theoretical rationale centered on universal democratic norms for reconciling competing values and interests. I argue that democratic states locked in disputes are better equipped than others with the means for diffusing conflict situations at an early stage before they have an opportunity to escalate to military violence. Not only is this explanatory logic consistent with the published findings on democracy and war, but it also entails the novel empirical proposition that disputes between democracies are more amenable than are other disputes to peaceful settlements, the hypothesis I examine here. Analyses of contemporary interstate disputes reveal that even when potentially confounding factors are controlled, democratic opponents are significantly more likely to reach peaceful settlements than other types of disputants.

Nearly two hundred years ago Immanuel Kant envisioned a liberal democratic zone of peace resulting from what he thought to be an inexorable evolutionary trend toward republican government. There is indeed a global trend toward democratization, though its inevitability remains open to doubt. And Kant was clearly wrong in his presumption that democracies are inherently peaceful. Nevertheless, the basic outline of Kant's vision is remarkably consistent with the weight of current scientific evidence. We now know, as Kant could only speculate, that over the last two centuries democratic states have rarely engaged one another in violent military conflict and, by some criteria, virtually never in a full-scale war. Yet we also know that democracies are no less prone to foreign conflict and war than states organized under alternative arrangements. Unfortunately, there is considerably less consensus about why democracies behave this way.

The research reported here develops and tests an explanatory account based on shared norms for regulating competition and conflict that are integral to the democratic process. In brief, I argue that democratic states locked in disputes are better equipped than others with the means for diffusing conflict situations at an early stage before they have an opportunity to escalate to military violence. This explanatory logic is consistent with the published findings on democracy and war and also entails an empirical proposition, namely, that disputes between democracies, more than other types of disputes, lend themselves to a form of accommodation I term *peaceful settlements*. Such settlements are but one of several means by which disputing states might manage to avoid escalation to violent confrontation.[1] The hypothesis is thus not merely an affirmative restatement of previous results: it identifies a novel contingent claim that represents a significant departure from previous studies.

I shall briefly review previous empirical work relating democratic governance to foreign conflict, then develop the main theoretical argument motivating the study and discuss the research design and analytic procedures. The empirical domain is a worldwide sample of approximately 250 postwar interstate security disputes compiled by Alker and Sherman (1986) from a list originally developed by Butterworth and Scranton (1976) and others. I present empirical results evaluating the peaceful settlement hypothesis and conclude by providing a summary and discussing the significance of the study.

DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Extensive research on the relationship between democracy and international conflict has revealed two empirical patterns that, taken together, pose a most interesting puzzle. First, democracies are no less likely to become involved in foreign wars, crises, or potentially violent disputes than states organized under alternative governing arrangements (Chan 1984; Domke 1988; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Small and Singer 1976; Weede 1984; Wright 1942). The weight of current evidence thus suggests that democracy per se does not entail any discernable pacifying effect on foreign policy.[2] Yet a second and equally compelling pattern of results shows that democratic states rarely, if ever, fight wars against one another (Chan 1984; Doyle 1986; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Ray 1993; Rummel 1979, 1983; Small and Singer 1976; Weede 1984, 1992). In fact, democracies seldom even engage one another with threats of military violence, and when disputes do arise, they hardly ever result in military hostilities (Bremer 1992, 1993; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993). Taken together, these two empirical patterns have come to be known as the "democratic peace" (Russett 1993).

There is little doubt about the existence of the democratic peace; on this, the historical record has been manifestly clear. What is not yet settled is *why* democratic states behave in this curious way. Efforts to explain this phenomenon have identified a variety of causal mechanisms broadly based either on common democratic norms, values, and practices (e.g., conceptions of legitimacy or conciliatory means of dispute resolution) or on the institutionalized impediments to war and conflict imposed by democratic decision-making structures (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Doyle 1986; Ember, Ember, and Russett 1992; Merritt and Zinnes 1991; Russett 1990).[3] Much recent work on the democratic peace has attempted to articulate competing claims of each approach and to adjudicate them on empirical grounds. Here, however, the historical record has proved much less accommodating, yielding ambiguous and generally inconclusive results (Maoz and Russett 1993; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Wang, Chang, and Ray 1992).

It may well be that the empirical evidence is ambiguous because the theoretical arguments are themselves ambiguous. As Morgan and Schwebach aptly note, "A nation imbued with a democratic culture [i.e., norms] will likely establish a correspondent political system and a state structured to constrain will likely foster a democratic culture" (1992, 318). In other words, norms and institutions go hand in hand and any effort to untangle their causal implications faces serious obstacles. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that most of these studies employ but a single testing ground where questions focus on what democracies do not do (i.e., fight), rather than on what they might do *differently*.[4] But if this phenomenon is already "overdetermined" by overlapping theories, as Ember, Ember, and Russett suggest (1992, 577), then the search for empirically grounded explanation may be more productively conducted elsewhere.

DEMOCRACY, NORMS, AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

My search for a satisfactory explanation of the democratic peace takes the following form. First, I develop a conceptualization of democracy that highlights the role of norms for regulating the competition over material interests and values. I then show how democratic norms can serve a similar function in the international arena when they are shared by both parties to a dispute. This norm-based explanatory logic not only accounts for established democratic peace results but also encompasses the novel proposition that democracy enhances prospects for some form of peaceful settlement.[5] Following the theoretical development I turn to an empirical evaluation of this critical hypothesis.

Democratic Norms of Bounded Competition

To understand what is distinctive about the international behavior of democratic states, it is necessary to begin with a clear conception of democracy.[6] Definitions abound, but most converge on the central role of certain procedural characteristics such as fairly contested elections, virtually universal suffrage, restrictions on government power, accountability of political leaders, and public expression of preferences (Dahl 1971; Lipset 1959; Powell 1982). Yet identification of common governing procedures implies neither identical institutions nor a broad array of shared values. Certainly there are some values common to virtually all democracies, but there are deep differences as well. (Witness, for example, the divergence between social–democratic and classical liberal conceptions of democracy.) This diversity of democratic norms, values, and institutions, highlights the need to focus as narrowly as possible on those features of democratic systems that are both universally shared and causally relevant to foreign conflict behavior. It will not do to explain the democratic peace in terms of a broadly conceived liberal ideology or a democratic political (or civic) culture. Concepts such as these are too strong to encompass all modern democratic forms and at the same time too weak to carry the explanatory load required of them.

What specific features of democracy meet these criteria? Without minimizing the significance of other defining characteristics or essential procedures, I shall argue that special emphasis should be given to the universal trait of *bounded competition*. All modern democracies are openly competitive systems of governance where conflicting material interests and basic political values routinely clash over the proper course of public action. Sometimes the competition is fierce and the dissention deep, sometimes the differences are less than profound, but always there are competing interests and values. Elections are one important arena of democratic competition dealing with what is perhaps the most fundamental question of government, Who will rule? But it would be a mistake to conclude that the full measure of democratic competition is embodied in intermittent elections (Schmitter and Karl 1991). Competitive processes may take a wide variety of forms and involve many types of actors, including the political elites who legislate and execute policy at all levels and the citizens who organize and express their interests through a bewildering array of associative arrangements.

Just as competition is a constant of democratic governance, so too is the presence of rules, procedures, or guidelines for setting its boundaries. It may be a commonplace to characterize democracy as less a battleground than a playing field, but this juxtaposition of images clearly conveys the distinctively circumscribed nature of democratic competition. Democracy is feasible only so long as politicians and citizens implicitly agree on the delineation of these boundaries and constrain their actions accordingly. Some boundaries and rules may be universal while others vary from society to society but all rest on a form of exchange that Schmitter and Karl (1991) call "contingent consent." To take the most ubiquitous example, losers of elections are expected to acknowledge the winners' right to govern and abide by their policy decisions, but only so long as the election was fairly conducted and the winners' fulfill their obligation not to ban losers from future participation. While contingent consent does not deny to democracy a political culture based on deeply held values such as tolerance, compromise, and fair play, neither is democratic culture a necessary condition for contingent consent. Rather, the principle of contingent consent highlights the emergence of "operative guidelines" or "rules of prudence" as the glue holding democracy together (ibid.).

Democratic competition for political office is illustrative of a more general pattern of bounded competition common to all democracies, namely, that political actors, whether inside or outside of government, agree not to employ physically coercive or violent means to secure a winning position on contentious public issues. This is not to say that modern democracies never experience politically motivated violence. My claim is only that the prevailing mode of democratic competition, particularly among politicians and other political elites, is nonviolent. Nor is it the case that democratic states never resort to coercive means within their borders. All states retain exclusive rights to coercion, but democratic states do not ordinarily use coercion for day-to-day management of political competition (though they may do so under extraordinary circumstances). Furthermore, the contingent consent to eschew violence is by no means immutable. Under some conditions, it may even be very fragile and tenuous. Democracy is known to break down. Finally, the claim that democratic actors compete nonviolently in no way implies that they always compete fairly, or nobly, or even legally.

When factions and interests collide in the public realm, as they necessarily must, the resulting conflicts are regulated by contingent consent to follow familiar procedures and practices. The particular form of regulation varies widely from country to country and issue to issue (it may be political or juridical, formal or informal, routinized or ad hoc, authoritative or negotiated), but it is always nonviolent and noncoercive. Although the immediate outcomes of such procedures are by no means certain, unregulated competition and potentially violent conflict risk even greater uncertainty. Contingent consent implies that within democratic societies political actors will prefer to follow nonviolent regulatory procedures and will expect competing actors to do likewise. When actors' preferences and expectations for regularized behavior are widely generalized and reinforced, they frequently become redefined as not merely preferred and expected but also right and proper; that is, they become norms (Axelrod 1986; Opp 1982).

Admittedly, this discussion paints a thin picture of democracy, but it is sufficient for highlighting an essential point. Modern democratic societies foster the internalization of norms for regulating and reconciling competing interests and values in public affairs in ways that are neither violent nor coercive. For convenience, I shall designate this the democratic norm of bounded competition. I follow conventional usage by stipulating norms to be commonly held expectations of acceptable behavior within society. Norms thus have an evaluative component delineating what is regarded as acceptable and a behavioral component encompassing rules or procedures that are regularly followed. My conception of this universal democratic norm is both proscriptive and prescriptive. First, it narrowly proscribes as inadmissible any use of violent, coercive, or forceful means to prevail in contentious public issues or to gain advantage over political opponents. Second, it promotes use of institutionalized procedures for regulating political competition and resolving contested issues, though I necessarily leave vague the precise structures or mechanisms prescribed in order to accommodate the full range of democratic forms.

Although the norm of bounded competition pervades all segments of democratic society, it is likely to be more firmly rooted among politicians and political elites than elsewhere. The competition of interests and values inherent in democratic systems is actually manifested as a competition among the political elites who are responsible for articulating and advocating representative policy positions and political preferences. Political elites thus have more opportunities to act in accordance with the norm and to benefit from its operation, which together serve to strengthen its internalization (Opp 1982). Strongly internalized norms are powerful influences on behavior, but they are not iron-clad laws. Deviations may be rare (else we would not speak of norms); but they surely do occur, which is one reason why democracies so often institutionalize at least some areas of bounded competition by establishing constitutional or other legal mechanisms, along with measures for enforcement.

Democratic Norms and Peaceful Settlement

The preceding conceptualization of democracy acquires explanatory leverage with help from three auxiliary assumptions that bridge the gap between domestic governing arrangements and foreign conflict. First, I assume that all governmental decisions, including those relating to war and peace, are ultimately made by individuals empowered by institutional roles to act in the name of the state. Recruitment to these role positions is highly variable from state to state, though the competitive institutional structures of *democratic* states usually entail a recruitment path limiting such positions to seasoned politicians, career government officials, or experienced elites accustomed to operating in the public realm within the normative standards of bounded competition. Second, I assume that interstate conflicts and wars arise for much the same reason as domestic political disputes—over competing or incompatible material interests and basic values. This is not to imply that foreign policy is nothing more than an extension of domestic politics; for the former is especially characterized by concerns for national sovereignty, security, identity, and the like. All I mean to suggest is that competition of interests and values in foreign affairs is not wholly unlike the competition inherent in the democratic process.

The third assumption is less conventional than the others, though I do not claim original credit. Here I draw from Bloomfield and Leiss (1969) by assuming that conflicts are dynamic situations that evolve over time (see also Alker and Sherman 1982; Sherman 1993). This evolutionary process should not be thought of as continuous movement along some single or fixed trajectory. Most conflict situations consist of relatively static periods of contention punctuated by sporadic transitions marking discernible shifts in levels of antagonism and severity. In the international arena, we usually characterize the severity of conflicts with reference to disputant parties' reliance on military force (Bloomfield and Leiss 1969; Gochman and Maoz 1984). This process need not follow a preordained series of steps or threshold levels. To be sure, some interstate grievances emerge with such severity that military hostilities are initiated almost immediately, but this is relatively rare.[7] Thinking of conflict as a dynamic process unfolding through a series of stages directs attention to transitions between stages and in particular to the question why only some interstate disputes escalate to the point where resolution is sought by military means.

Although a full accounting of this escalatory process is far beyond my present purposes, it is possible to offer some provisional and rather stylized observations. Disputes arise initially because two or more parties clash over competing interests or values. Escalation from initial dispute to crisis typically occurs when at least one of the parties perceives little prospect of a satisfactory resolution and decides to communicate the strength of its resolve by making explicit or implicit reference to the availability of military options. Once threats are public and forces positioned, it seems to be a regrettably small step past the next threshold to the actual use of military violence. Of course, not all interstate disputes necessarily traverse this escalatory path. Sometimes adversaries poised on the brink of military hostilities manage to deescalate the dispute (perhaps with the help of intermediaries) while still leaving the underlying issues unresolved. Sometimes the issues at stake are not sufficiently vital to either party to warrant military threats in the first place. Sometimes these issues are overtaken by other events such as a change in political leadership or even by acts of nature that alter the terms of contention. And sometimes the parties are able to achieve mutually agreeable arrangements that remove from contention some or all of the issues precipitating the dispute. Such arrangements, or *peaceful settlements,* merit special attention because they are directly related to the democratic status of disputing parties.

I earlier asserted that international disputes of democratic states are in the hands of individuals who have experienced the politics of competing values and interests and who have consistently responded within the normative guidelines of bounded competition. In situations where both parties to a dispute are democracies, not only do both sides subscribe to these norms, but the leaders of both are also fully cognizant that bounded competition is the norm, both for themselves and their opponents.[8] Democracy, after all, cannot be conducted in secret. When democracies do confront other democracies, these shared norms of bounded competition will provide a mutual basis for contingent consent, suggesting that disputes between democracies should evolve somewhat differently than do disputes between states not sharing these norms (i.e., between democratic and nondemocratic states or between two nondemocratic states).

Two such differences comprise the core propositions of my argument. First, each party to a purely democratic dispute is secure in the knowledge that its opponent is also normatively proscribed from violent and coercive means for reconciling divergent values and interests, at least in the domestic political arena. These norms are externalized to foreign affairs only if the practices underlying them are sufficiently robust to foster mutual expectations of congruent behavior beyond borders. Accordingly, we would expect highly democratic opponents to be constrained from resorting to violent and coercive means at the earliest stage of their disputes no matter how severe or contentious the underlying grievances. I have already pointed out that relatively few disputes originate with hostile military confrontations whether the parties are democratic or not. Democracies may be somewhat more restrained than others, but the absence of immediate violence is certainly not unique to democratic disputants. Nevertheless, this is an important proposition because it renders purely democratic disputes even less likely than others to commence with military action.

Of course the absence of hostilities at the initial stage of a dispute provides no security against hostilities arising from the sort of escalatory process I have described. Even firmly entrenched normative proscriptions can wear thin when severely contested issues fester unresolved for long stretches of time. But bounded competition also entails a prescriptive element that promotes reconciliation of competing interests and values. Because democratic leaders will be normatively inclined to strive for some form of peaceful settlement so long as they can trust their opponent to abide by its provisions, they will be most likely to succeed when confronting other states whose leaders operate under similar normative guidelines. While disputing democracies can never be assured of quick, easy, or successful resolution of their disputes, they should at least be able to establish the diplomatic communication necessary for a full and measured consideration of possible solutions. Even when democratic states are separated by extremely divergent interests, their common adherence to bounded competition is likely to increase chances of at least some procedural accommodation. In short, democratic disputants are able to diffuse escalatory pressure to military hostilities largely because they are more amenable than others to some form of peaceful settlement.

The preceding rationale offers an unambiguous explanation for the democratic peace based on the role of shared democratic norms in averting military hostilities. This has nothing to do with peaceful predispositions or institutionalized constraints of democratic decision-making structures. It is, rather, that only in the special case of disputing democracies is there a basis for contingent consent. Democratic states confronted by the actual or threatened use of military force from foreign powers will show little reticence to respond in a similar fashion. In fact, such instances are probably governed by their own norms of reciprocity that demand a military response (Axelrod 1986). Nor are democracies unconditionally constrained from initiating military hostilities against others. Thus, the norm of bounded competition accounts for the absence of war between democracies but does not imply that democracies are, on the whole, any more peaceful or any less war-prone than nondemocratic states.

Moreover, this explanatory logic entails a novel and crucial empirical proposition—that shared democratic norms directly enhance the prospects of peaceful settlement. It is crucial in the sense that if the proposition is unable to withstand systematic scrutiny, then my explanatory account fails its most critical test. It is novel in that my emphasis on peaceful settlements represents a significant departure from previous work focusing almost exclusively on the absence of war or militarized disputes. While peaceful settlements do imply a contemporaneous absence of hostilities (at least temporarily), the reverse is not true. Hostilities can be averted by numerous nonsettlement means as well. This is an important point because it establishes the connection between democracy and settlement as a contingent relationship, rather than merely a tautological restatement of previous findings.

Contrary to some restrictive definitions, I do not require that peaceful settlements occur prior to any outbreak of hostilities. I stipulate peaceful settlements to be any written or unwritten mutually agreeable arrangements between disputant parties that at least temporarily resolve or remove from contention one or more—but not necessarily all—of the issues underlying the dispute. This definition has several advantages. First, it does not carry any implication of finality and thereby avoids the problem of specifying a necessarily arbitrary time horizon for distinguishing final settlements from temporary ones. This uncertainty in definition, observes Miall "reflects the real uncertainty in the conflict" (1992, 44). Second, I explicitly recognize partial settlements as diplomatic achievements in which some issues—often the most contentious ones—may be deliberately and skillfully omitted from consideration in order to secure agreements. Finally, this definition also effectively disentangles the act of successfully reaching agreement from the conceptually distinct task of implementing its terms.

I began with a conceptualization of democracy that gave special emphasis to norms of bounded competition. This was joined with an interpretation of conflict as a dynamic process, along with some other assumptions to construct an explanatory logic able to account for previous results on the democratic peace. This logic also implied a novel empirical proposition linking the democratic status of disputant parties to peaceful settlements. The main task ahead is to develop suitable measures and design procedures to systematically test this hypothesis.

Before I can do this, however, one other matter requires attention. By designating the democracy–settlement hypothesis as a crucial test, I have left implicit the notion that confirmation of the hypothesis also entails support for the underlying theoretical logic. This is not necessarily so. In fact, there are at least three equally plausible alternative explanations that could account for an observed empirical relationship between democracy and peaceful settlements. Fortunately each of them establishes this linkage through an intervening factor that can be brought into the analysis design and tested directly. I shall briefly elaborate each of these alternative linkages.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS

My central hypothesis is challenged by three alternative explanations of peaceful settlements that confer causal importance to (1) political or military alignment, (2) efforts of mediators, and (3) an absence of prior military hostilities. Because previous research has established each of these factors as directly linked to the democratic status of disputing parties, an empirical relationship between democracy and settlements is left open to multiple interpretations. While I regard each of these interpretations as plausible alternatives, they are not mutually exclusive, either with one another or with the norm-based account I have given. I provide a schematic overview of these alternative causal paths in Figure 1, using filled arrows to represent hypothesized relationships and unfilled arrows for relationships supported by previous research. Thus my principal hypothesis is depicted by the filled arrow running from democracy to settlements in the central part of the figure. Unfilled arrows connect democracy to alignment, mediation, and hostilities to signify established empirical relationships. The remaining filled arrows on the right portray the three alternative causal linkages. Let us now examine each of these intervening effects.

To begin, I assume that prospects for peaceful

FIGURE 1

Democracy and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes



settlement will depend on alignment, which I conceptualize broadly to encompass the general atmosphere of political relations between disputant parties. Certainly states with historically friendly interactions or those that maintain some areas of amicable relations even while engaged in disputes will find it easier to reach settlements than actors with longstanding or broadly defined animosities (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; Miall 1992). While I am unable to undertake a full assessment of political relations among potential disputants, I can gain some leverage over this hypothesized relationship by narrowing consideration to common memberships in formal alliances. Admittedly this is a rough approximation of the more general notion, though it is one that has been adopted by others to signify the presence of a cooperative, interdependent relationship in the critically important area of national security (e.g., Siverson and Emmons 1991). Moreover, alliance bonds between democratic states have been shown to occur more often than chance alone would predict (ibid.). To summarize, we know from previous research that democratic states are more likely than others to join in an alliance, and we hypothesize that states choosing to ally with one another and to maintain that alliance even during periods of conflict are more likely to reach peaceful settlements than are nonallied states.[9]

An alternative justification of the democracy–settlement linkage is based on the possible presence of third-party mediation efforts. Intermediaries may consist of other states or coalitions of states, international organizations, transnational or subnational organizations, ac hoc commissions, or even individuals with international standing. Although mediation is formally defined in legal practice, actual usage varies widely (Bercovitch 1992). Following Skjelsbæk, I designate as mediation any third-party involvement "that goes beyond facilitation of communication and contacts and includes drafting and promotion of plans for conflict resolution" (1986, 144). Mediation efforts hinge on the willingness of both disputant parties to entrust in third parties at least some measure of responsibility for shaping valued outcomes. While democratic leaders may not always acquiesce to the intercession of third parties, they are probably inclined to do so under a broader range of circumstances than leaders lacking norms of bounded competition. This speculation is supported by a recent study of postwar disputes showing that conflict management—defined broadly but including mediation—is more likely between democratic opponents (Dixon 1993). In addition, formal alliance ties also appear to enhance the likelihood of mediation, thus accounting for the alignment–mediation arrow in Figure 1. Further empirical support for the democracy–mediation relationship emerges from Raymond's (1992) investigation of third-party resolution efforts.

Although the hypothesized relationship between mediation and peaceful settlement has intuitive appeal, the backing of empirical evidence is surprisingly absent despite an enormous literature assessing the efficacy of management and mediation efforts. Even so, mediation may be especially important in the case of democratic disputants. Several studies do agree that mediation efforts in the postwar era have the greatest probability of success when conflicts are neither ideologically divisive nor intensely violent (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; Butterworth 1978; Haas 1983, 1986; Miall 1992). Disputes between democracies meet both criteria: they are obviously not ideologically motivated and the empirical record demonstrates that they are seldom violent. By this account, then, democratic norms have only an indirect effect on peaceful settlement that operates through the intervening presence of third-party mediators.

Finally, I turn to an alternative rationale arising even more explicitly from the empirical findings on the democratic peace. The key finding documented earlier—that democratic states rarely engage one another with military force—is portrayed in Figure 1 by the negatively signed arrow connecting democracy and hostilities. Furthermore, I concur with Miall (1992) that the obstacles to peaceful settlement are likely to become much more formidable once a conflict situation has passed the threshold of major violence. Taken together, the two links in this chain suggest that democracies may achieve peaceful settlements with one another largely because they have managed, for whatever reason, to avoid military hostilities. Inclusion of a control for prior hostilities not only eliminates this particular rationale but also has the benefit of subsuming other rival explanations. Consider, as a prime example, the argument that certain decisional structures of democratic states serve as impediments to war involvement. The structuralist logic does not entail the prediction of a direct democracy effect on peaceful settlements, although it could explain such an effect by appealing to the fact that democracies seldom resort to military hostilities and it is this absence of any prior hostilities that favors settlements. By controlling for prior hostilities, I also eliminate this structuralist interpretation.

OBSERVATION AND MEASUREMENT

This examination of the democracy–settlement hypotheses requires a sample of international disputes over some reasonably long time span along with information about the governing arrangements of the parties to these disputes. For this initial look at the hypotheses, it is necessary only to determine whether or not some form of settlement was achieved during the evolution of the conflict situation. It is also necessary to operationalize the three intervening factors listed in Figure 1. I shall discuss each of these components of the research design.

Conflicts and Conflict Phases

Conflicts are drawn from an evolving list of post–World War II interstate political and security disputes that for two decades has served as a principal source for systematic studies of international conflict management. Conflict situations represented in the data base were originally identified by Haas (1968) and expanded by Haas, Butterworth, and Nye (1972) for their pioneering studies of international organization management practices. Coded attributes of the disputes and a collection of synopses for a modified set of 247 conflicts updated through 1974 were published by Butterworth and Scranton (1976). A subsequent update through 1979 by Butterworth added another 60 conflicts (Butterworth 1980). Further updates and revisions have been undertaken by Haas (1983, 1986) and Sherman (1993), though I here examine only the 1945–79 period from the files compiled by Alker and Sherman (1986).[10]

The Alker–Sherman set has several specific advantages for the present study. First, as Alker and Midlarsky (1985) note, the empirical domain is defined so as to correspond to international diplomatic and legal practice. In following Butterworth (and Scranton 1976, 3), the encoding procedures "included only postwar conflicts that centrally involved specific power-political aims and demands having direct impacts on national behavior, and that were perceived internationally as being focused on political and security affairs. Excluded are domestic issues that did not directly lead to interstate conflict, together with more diffuse antagonisms or instances of general interstate competition." Second, actors on the contesting sides of each dispute are itemized individually at various stages during the conflict situation. This procedure ensures that all primary actors, including members of coalitions, are identified regardless of changes in participation over time. Third and most important, by disaggregating conflict situations into distinct phases, this version of the data incorporates the dynamic element required by the theoretical assumptions stipulated. These latter two features are so distinctive that the Alker–Sherman data are sometimes designated the "phase/actor disaggregated" conflict set. They are also of critical importance to the present effort.

Conflict situations are disaggregated into phases to reflect changing degrees of intensity and antagonism by keying on the potential or actual use of direct military hostilities. The Alker–Sherman set relies on Bloomfield and Leiss's (1969) classification scheme marking six distinct phases through which a conflict may proceed until it is settled or disappears. In recognition that conflicts do not evolve along a single trajectory, the scheme is explicitly nonlinear and iterative by permitting phases to be skipped or repeated as necessary. Phase types include

A. initial *disputes,* or disagreements
B. *conflicts,* in which at least one party exhibits some commitment to military force
C. *hostilities,* during which military force is actually used
D. *posthostility conflicts,* where fighting has ceased but threats of force remain
E. *posthostility disputes,* in which military resolution is no longer a serious possibility
F. *termination,* in which the dispute is resolved or no longer of concern to the contesting parties.[11]

The outbreak of military hostilities thus serves as a kind of watershed phase. Prior to hostilities, phases may cycle between types A and B; after hostilities, cycles may involve types C, D, and E. Type F, termination, may occur at any time. Specific phase transition rules are given by Alker and Sherman (1986, 91).

Phase disaggregation has several important consequences for empirical analysis. In the first place, transitions from one conflict phase to another may also entail changes in certain other attributes of the conflict situation. For example, specific actions taken by the parties to the dispute may vary dramatically from phase to phase, and even the parties themselves may change (though this is relatively rare and usually involves an additional actor's joining one side or the other). Mediation efforts—another factor of central importance to this study—are rarely pursued in every phase of a conflict. Of the 307 postwar conflicts in the Alker–Sherman set, only about 8% exhibit either the presence or absence of mediation in every observed phase, and even this is inflated somewhat, for when we consider only those 265 conflicts with multiple phases the proportion declines to only 5%. Disaggregation by phases thus affords a unique and valuable perspective for examining the shifting conditions that determine the course of international conflict situations.

In addition, my definition of peaceful settlement as at least temporary accommodation on one or more contentious issues is operationally well suited to this disaggregated phase structure. Settlements represent mileposts of stability and reduced tensions along the unfolding course of a conflict situation. Any subsequent change in the situation, whether toward still further reductions in tension or toward renewed hostilities, would trigger the start of a new conflict phase. Of course, some settlements do succeed in bringing about a full and final resolution that terminates the conflict. Others merely mark the boundaries of phase transitions. For this reason, the conflict phase serves as an especially useful observational device for the study of peaceful settlements.

Finally, use of the conflict phase as the basic unit of observation suggests that many conflict situations will appear more than once in the guise of different phases. Although most disputes (70%) transcend no more than three phases, two do cycle through nine phases and three through eight. Multiple accounting of the same conflict situations entails at least the possibility of nonindependent observations, a condition that could have deleterious implications for subsequent estimation and inference. Because this issue is best considered in the context of specific estimation models, I defer further discussion until it will be possible to assess nonindependence through alternative estimation strategies. At present, I simply note that the potential nonindependence of observations does not appear to have any substantial bearing on the main results I shall present.

Peaceful settlement—my dependent variable—is recorded for each conflict phase with a binary indicator variable that assumes a value of 1 if some agreement was concluded during a given phase and 0 otherwise.[12] As noted, I define peaceful settlement with no distinction between comprehensive and partial agreements. The latter category may include cases of agreements that are deliberately crafted around some unresolved issues as well as those in which transpiring events make certain issues obsolete or subordinate them to new issues. Because I stipulate peaceful settlements to be mutually agreeable arrangements, I do not count those instances in which settlements were imposed with the defeat or collapse of one disputant party. In a few very unusual cases, partial settlements occur even as the conflict escalates or spreads. These, too, are omitted. By this definition, peaceful settlements are neither exceptional achievements nor politics as usual. They occur in about 31% of the 927 conflict phases contained in the Alker–Sherman disaggregated set.

Two of the hypothesized intervening variables—hostilities and mediation—are also operationalized in terms of dispute phases. I am able to take account of prior hostilities with a dummy variable signifying whether or not the present phase was preceded by an earlier phase in the conflict situation that had passed the threshold of military violence. Note that by this operational definition, the initial phase in any conflict cannot possibly be designated as having experienced prior hostilities and is therefore automatically scored 0 on this indicator. Although this is a minor point, it will have consequences for later analyses. About 30% of interstate dispute phases were preceded by some form of military hostilities. The presence of mediation is also recorded with a dummy variable. In addition to what is designated as mediation in formal legal usage, I also count the presence of conciliation and arbitration activities. Mediation is somewhat less prevalent than peaceful settlement, with one or more mediation activities present in 22% of the Alker–Sherman conflict phases.

Democracy

A second key feature of the Alker–Sherman disaggregated conflict set is its identification of specific actors comprising the primary parties during each dispute phase. The two sides in the dispute are arbitrarily designated parties A and B as an organizing device. With the identification of disputant actors, it becomes possible to take explicit account of alliance memberships and governing arrangements. For the former, I employ conventional sources and procedures from the Correlates of War Project (Bremer 1992; Small and Singer 1969). Alliance ties are recorded as a dummy variable, with 1 indicating mutual membership in any type of alliance by any state on one side of the dispute with any state on the other. The latter—governing arrangements—requires more extended comment.

While I cannot directly measure democratic norms of bounded competition, I can gauge the competitiveness of national political institutions using the 11-point democracy scale predefined in the Polity II data collection (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989).[13] This instrument is constructed as a weighted summative index combining judgmental codings of four national-level authority traits recorded annually for 134 nations through 1986. Although space does not permit a full presentation of this scale, I can briefly note its four components and their weights. Two of these relate explicitly to the competitiveness of the political system. These include competitiveness of political participation (*competitive* = 3, *transitional* = 2, *factional* = 1) and competitiveness of executive recruitment (*election* = 2, *transitional* = 1). While the other factors also relate to competitiveness, they are more directly concerned with constraints. These refer to the openness of executive recruitment (*open* or *partial election* = 1) and constraints on the chief executive (*parity* or *subordinate* = 4, *substantial limitations* = 2, *slight or no limitations* = 0, with two intermediate categories = 3 and 1). Because the notion of democracy underlying this scale emphasizes political institutions, I follow Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1990) in referring to it as *institutionalized democracy*.[14]

The appropriate institutionalized democracy score is recorded for the primary parties in each dispute phase for the year in which the phase begins. Several specific points require elaboration. First, because conflict phases may span several years, there is a possibility that governing arrangements may change within a given phase period. Visual inspection of the data suggests that this is not likely to be a serious problem, though it does occur on occasion. Second, because my interest is in assessing the effect of institutionalized democracy on peaceful settlements, I confine attention to cases with formally recognized national political institutions. These are cases of strictly interstate disputes, that is, phases in which each party includes at least one nation–state represented in the Polity II collection. This filter eliminates exclusively nonstate actors such as colonial-era independence movements, revolutionary groups, political factions, and the like, as well as a few states failing to meet the Polity II requirement of at least one million population by the mid-1980s. The resulting sample encompasses 264 postwar disputes disaggregated into 718 phases, of which 33% exhibit peaceful settlement.

But strictly interstate disputes are not necessarily bilateral, and this fact raises a third point for elaboration. Nearly 40% of the remaining dispute phases encompass at least one party comprised of multiple-state actors. Others have solved this problem by dismantling coalitions into sets of discrete dyads (e.g., Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russet 1993). While this approach may be adequate for some purposes, I reject it here because it would entail a highly distorted representation of the settlement process. Alternatively, I could rely on some summary value such as the mean of coalition members. The theoretical implications of this procedure are not very appealing either, given that a coalition comprised of equal numbers of highly democratic and nondemocratic states and one of all moderately democratic states might well receive identical mean scores, implying that their behavior would be governed by equally democratic norms. A more theoretically satisfying approach follows from the assumption that the democratic values of the most powerful coalition actor will prevail. Accordingly, I recorded the power of each coalition actor, using the continuous composite indicator of national capabilities compiled by the Correlates of War Project (Singer 1988), and then assigned the entire coalition the value of democracy observed for the most powerful member.[15]

The empirical elements for evaluation of the democracy–settlement hypothesis are now in place. Procedures outlined thus far yield a reasonably comprehensive collection of strictly interstate dispute phases classified according to the presence or absence of peaceful settlements, along with two institutionalized democracy scores, one for each of the two opposing sides. In cases where a party to a dispute is a coalition of states, I assign the democracy value of the most powerful member. I have also established sufficient controls to expose the effects of democratic norms by accounting for the potential intervening effects of alliance bonds, mediation, and prior hostilities.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The central hypothesis claims that democratic disputants are more likely than others to achieve peaceful settlements. Although a multivariate analysis is required to sort out potential intervening effects, much can be revealed by a provisional examination based on simple percentages.

TABLE 1

Peaceful Settlements and the Democratic Status of Participants (%)

	PARTY B		
PARTY A	NON-DEMOCRACY	DEMOCRACY	TOTAL
Nondemocracy	30.9 (278)	33.5 (167)	31.9 (445)
Democracy	31.6 (206)	46.3 (67)	35.2 (273)
Total	31.2 (484)	37.2 (234)	33.1 (718)

Note: Central cell entries display the percentage of dispute phases ending in peaceful settlement under each combination of democratic and nondemocratic disputant parties. Entries in parenthesis indicate the N size of each cell serving as the percentage base.

Provisional Evidence

Table 1 crosses the democratic status of disputant A by the democratic status of B, with interior cells representing the percentage of dispute phases reaching peaceful settlement. Because the 11-point institutionalized democracy measure is much too unwieldy for this purpose, I temporarily resort to a dichotomized version designating democratic governance at level 6 and above. The resulting cell entries reveal that settlements are achieved in 30.9% of phases involving two nondemocratic disputants, a figure slightly below the overall rate of 33.1%. Phases in which only one of the parties is democratic fare little better at 31.6% and 33.5%. These values stand in sharp contrast to the 46.3% of dispute phases reaching settlement when *both* parties are democracies.

This initial evaluation is illuminating on two separate counts. First, these results do provide encouraging provisional support for the democracy–settlement hypothesis, though they must be interpreted with caution in the absence of any controls for intervening effects that could also account for settlements between democracies. Probit regression will be used to establish these necessary controls. Second, the pattern of entries clearly demonstrates that further investigation must faithfully represent the joint effects present only when both parties are democratic. For example, if it were presumed that party A's level of democracy affects the probability of settlement independent of the governing arrangements of B, and vice versa, then it would be appropriate to estimate these effects in a model including democracy scores for each party while controlling for the other. Any presumption of independent effects is quite implausible, however, given the pattern of results in Table 1, a pattern consistent with my earlier characterization of peaceful settlements as requiring both disputants' acquiescence. Thus it is essential for any specification of democracy effects to allow both parties' level of democracy to come into play jointly and simultaneously.

Several forms are capable of representing the joint democracy effect seen in Table 1, but perhaps the most parsimonious procedure is to assume that the norms and expectations most likely to promote or discourage peaceful settlement are those of the *less* democratic party to the conflict. I began with the assumption that democratic norms would induce states to seek out—or at least acquiesce to—peaceful settlements. This implies that more democratic actors are more favorable to settlement than less democratic actors, other things being equal. In addition, it is already stipulated that settlements are mutually agreeable arrangements and thus require at least tacit approval of the active disputants. Taken together, these assumptions imply that the norms most likely to promote or discourage the potential for peaceful settlement are those of the less democratic disputant. This is surely a simplification, though it does not seem unreasonable as an initial approximation. In addition, other things are seldom equal—a matter I shall take up.

Probit Estimation

It is convenient to assume that conflict phases vary in their latent propensity for peaceful settlement and that this propensity can be modeled as a linear function of democracy along with the three intervening factors. Letting S^* symbolize this unobserved propensity for settlement in phase *i*, it becomes possible to represent the democracy-settlement hypothesis as estimable parameters in the following specification. Democracy is symbolized by D, with the notation

$$S_i^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \min(D_{Ai} D_{Bi}) + \beta_2 A_i + \beta_3 M_i - \beta_4 H_i + u_i, \quad \textbf{(1)}$$

where $\min(D_{Ai}, D_{Bi})$ explicitly denotes the minimum value for parties A and B on the full 11-point scale. The estimated sign and value for parameter β_1 is of special interest because it carries the effect associated with minimum democracy. Three additional terms in the specification, A_i, M_i, and H_i signify controls for alliance ties, mediation activity, and prior hostility, respectively. Finally, all parameters (except the intercept) are signed to be consistent with hypothesized effects.

Now let *S* stand for the observed realization of the latent propensity with values signifying the presence or absence of peaceful settlements defined by some threshold on S^*. As is the usual practice, this threshold is set at 0, establishing the relationship

$$S_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \textit{if} \quad S_i^* > 0 \\ 0 & \textit{if} \quad S_i^* \leq 0. \end{cases}$$

This leads directly to a binomial probability model such that the probability of settlement (i.e., Prob[S_i = 1]) can be expressed as some function of the right-hand side of equation 1 with the exact functional form determined by the expected distribution of the error term, *u*. For the present analysis, I assume u_i to be distributed normally, which defines the usual probit model.

I begin the probit estimation by examining minimum institutionalized democracy alone before introducing additional terms to accommodate potential intervening effects. Maximum likelihood estimates are displayed in Table 2, column 1. I report one-tailed significance tests as a guide to the robustness of coefficients because there are clear expectations of the direction of effects. With a parameter estimate of .044—a magnitude more than twice its standard error of .019—it is immediately evident that minimum democracy may well impart a systematic positive influence on the probability of peaceful settlement. Even so, the summary chi-squared value indicates that the fit of this initial model is not particularly strong, suggesting that democracy is probably not the principal determinant of settlements.

In order to infer a role for democratic norms, it is necessary to control for the intervening factors given primacy by alternative explanations. If the democracy estimate represents a causal effect operating entirely through the more proximate influence of alignment, mediation, or the absence of prior hostilities, then the observed model 1 effect should disappear with the introduction of these control variables. Results implementing these controls appear in column 2. Clearly the democracy effect remains undiminished. In fact, it is moderately strengthened in this specification. In addition, the fit is improved substantially and both alignment and mediation are properly signed. The one unexpected result in model 2 is the positive (and therefore nonsignificant) estimate associated with prior military hostility. Although it would be possible to develop a post hoc rationale for the proposition that hostilities actually increase the likelihood of settlements, I believe this result is better explained as a statistical reflection of my coding conventions.

A positive relationship occurs because *prior* hostilities are definitionally absent (hence coded as 0) in the initial phase of every conflict situation. Indeed, close to one-half of all observed phases without prior hostilities are initial phases. In order for hostilities to carry the hypothesized negative effect, settlements would have to be a fairly common occurrence at this initial stage. Yet close to 90% of settlements are reached *after* the first phase, a marginal distribution that masks any underlying negative relationship. The solution is to adjust the prior hostilities estimate by allowing it to vary across the ordinal sequence of phases in the conflict situation. I do this by introducing two additional controls: a sequential phase counter and the product of this counter and the prior-hostilities dummy variable. To simplify subsequent interpretation, I begin the phase counter at 0. Thus the initial phase of each conflict is recorded as 0, the second phase as 1, the third as 2, and so on through a maximum value of 8, indicating nine

TABLE 2

The Effects of Minimum Democracy on Peaceful Settlement

VARIABLE	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3[a]	MODEL 3A[a]
Minimum democracy	.044** (.019)	.058** (.020)	.066** (.021)	.057* (.026)
Alliance between parties	—	.339** (.100)	.391** (.104)	.443** (.119)
Mediation	—	.362** (.118)	.306** (.121)	.171 (.135)
Previous military hostility	—	.517 (.107)	.693 (.221)	.309 (.291)
Sequential phase	—	—	.643 (.084)	.397 (.148)
Previous military hostility × sequential phase	—	—	−.527** (.103)	−.280* (.159)
Constant	−.510** (.059)	−.951** (.091)	−1.493** (.122)	−1.084** (.231)
Chi-squared(df)	5.2(1)*	53.3(4)**	121.2(6)**	32.6(6)**
Log-likelihood	−453.5	−429.4	−395.5	−310.7

Note: Main entries are probit regression estimates; entries in parenthesis are standard errors. All estimations are performed over 718 conflict phases except for model 3A, which excludes the initial phase of each conflict situation and reflects 477 conflict phases.

[a] Estimates and significance tests for previous hostilities and sequential phase must be interpreted conditionally to account for statistical interaction.

*$p \le .05$, one-tailed test.

**$p \le .01$, one-tailed test.

phases.[16] This revised specification models prior hostilities as a conditional effect that is no longer constrained to the positive by the marginal distributions of prior hostilities and settlements. However, this interpretation holds only if the product term produces a negatively signed estimate.

Results for this revised specification are listed in column 3. First note that while there is some modification of the estimates from model 2, the differences are not substantial. Perhaps most interesting is the democracy estimate, which once again exhibits a moderate increase in magnitude. The key result of model 3, however, is the negative and highly robust estimate for the product term along with a doubling of the chi-squared goodness-of-fit measure. The prior hostilities estimate remains positive, although this is no longer a problem because the reported coefficient applies only to the initial phase, in which prior hostilities are definitionally absent and settlements are rare. This interpretation follows from the presence of the interaction term. The prior-hostilities effect must now be assessed at each phase using the expression $.693 - .527P$, where P takes on values assigned to the sequential phase counter. Herein lies the advantage of beginning the phase counter at zero: at the initial phase ($P = 0$), the second term drops away, leaving only the reported estimate of .693. At the second phase ($P = 1$), the hostilities effect is still positive (.166) but no longer significant ($t = 1.0$). However, by phase 3 ($P = 2$), the estimate switches sign ($-.361$, $t = -2.3$) and remains negative and statistically significant at all subsequent phases.

Estimation of prior hostilities as an effect conditioned on the phase sequence thus accommodates both the theoretically expected negative path portrayed in Figure 1 and the marginally constrained positive relationship at the initial phase. Of course *prior* hostilities cannot possibly have any impact during the first phase of a conflict, so this positive effect is better viewed as a statistical control than a result of any substantive importance. This is not to say that the phase 1 positive relationship is in any sense illusory or unreal. After all, phase 1 observations do legitimately qualify as having no prior hostilities, and this coding convention, coupled with the marginal distribution of settlements, is accurately reflected by a positive relationship at phase 1. The model 3 specification explicitly incorporates this relationship as a statistical control to minimize its impact on other variables of interest. An alternative means of control is simply to omit all phase 1 observations from the estimation. Although this procedure sacrifices degrees of freedom and truncates the variance on important variables, it does nevertheless provide a useful supplement to the statistical controls implemented in model 3. Estimates from this alternative procedure listed in the last column (model 3A) no longer show any trace of the significantly positive hostilities effect found in earlier estimations, a finding quite consistent with the account just given. Moreover, with the exception of mediation, the other estimates are not severely affected by the loss of observations. The democracy effect in particular is only slightly diminished from that found for the full set of observed phases.

On the whole, the various estimates in Table 2 are consistent with all four causal paths depicted in Figure 1. There is certainly no evidence to support the view that democracy can only influence the probability of settlements through one or more intervening factors. In fact, the changing magnitudes from models 1–3 suggest that the direct impact of democracy is actually suppressed by these factors, albeit only marginally.[17]

Phase Disaggregation and Estimation

Before relying too heavily on the estimate of Table 2, it should be recalled that the repeated appearance of conflicts in the Alker–Sherman phase-disaggregated set raises the possibility of cross-phase dependence of observations, a condition that can have detrimental consequences for estimation. I have elsewhere argued that cross-phase dependence is analogous to cross-time dependence in least squares time-series regression (Dixon 1993). Cross-phase autocorrelations can be constructed from probit residuals (defined as the difference between the observed binary dependent variable and its predicted probability value) by first lagging across phases within conflict episodes and then correlating these residuals at different lags. Unfortunately, phase-lagged residuals for the model 3 specification of Table 2 confirm cross-phase dependence by exhibiting a high degree of autocorrelation.

The earlier study demonstrated that significant cross-phase autocorrelation could be substantially reduced by inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the probit specification. Maoz and Russett (1993) rely on a similar strategy to contain the nonindependence of continuing conflicts in a pooled time-series analysis over annual observations. Because peaceful settlements do not necessarily terminate a conflict situation, it is feasible to include settlements lagged by one phase on the righthand side of the estimation. This modification produces a strong positive estimate for the lagged term and improves the overall fit with no material effect on the original estimates or conclusions drawn from them. Surprisingly, it also has little effect in attenuating the phase-lagged autocorrelated residuals.

I offer two alternative estimation strategies to assess the impact of this nonindependence on the estimates of model 3. The first assumes that cross-phase dependence is likely to increase in direct proportion to the number of phases parsed from a conflict episode. I performed a weighted probit estimation of the model 3 specification using a weight factor of 1/np, where np represents the *number of phases* in each conflict situation. This procedure gives full weight to nonproblematic observations representing single-phase conflicts and reduces the impact of potentially dependent observations drawn from multiple-phase conflicts. Although a total of 718 phases are used in the estimation, the weighting scheme redefines the N size to be 264, equivalent to the number of conflict episodes. Results from this phase-weighted estimation in Table 3, column 1, remain very close to the earlier estimates. While this exercise has not removed cross-phase dependence from these observations, it has at least diminished its influence and provides a preliminary indication that the estimates and hypothesis tests in Table 2 were not unduly affected by phase disaggregation.

Unlike phase-weighted estimation, the second strategy is able to purge all traces of cross-phase dependence among observations, though it extracts a price for doing so. Here I engage in a series of estimations performed over individual phases based on their temporal sequence in the conflict episode. Results for the first three phases (nothing useful is gained beyond this number) are presented in the columns 2–4. Before turning to these estimates, three implications of this approach merit attention. First, each successive estimation loses degrees of freedom by reducing the number of observed phases. All 264 conflict situations have an initial phase, but only 214 pass on to a phase 2. The decline becomes more rapid at phase 3 and beyond, dropping by about half (129, 61, 28, 14, etc.) at each successive phase. Second, single-phase estimation requires modest respecification. Most obviously, the sequential phase indicator ceases to vary and therefore must be omitted from the right-hand side, along with the phase-hostility product term. In addition, previous military hostility must be removed from the phase 1 estimation, since there could have been no *prior* hostilities during a conflict's initial phase.

Third and most important, limiting attention to single phases is likely to affect the estimates by truncating variances of the right-hand-side terms. This is especially true of the main variable of substantive interest, minimum democracy. According to the theoretical rationale advanced earlier, highly democratic states will be more likely than others to reach peaceful settlements at an early stage in a conflict and such settlements will frequently even terminate a conflict situation altogether. Thus the very effectiveness of mutual democracy in promoting settlements implies that conflicts between highly democratic parties will seldom transcend more than two or three phases. In fact, nearly 80% of observations having a minimum democracy score of at least 6 occur prior to phase 3, and in only one instance does this level of minimum democracy appear in a conflict extending beyond a fourth phase.

This truncation effect is clearly seen in the single-phase estimates in Table 3, where minimum democracy retains a strong positive estimate at phases 1 and 2 that declines virtually to zero at phase 3 (and beyond). This is an important result in two respects: (1) taken in conjunction with the overall estimates in Table 2, it adds further empirical weight to my theoretical account of democratic conflict; and (2) (more germane to the issue at hand) since cross-phase dependence cannot possibly affect these single-phase estimates, we can be confident that minimum democracy does increase the probability of settlement, at least at these early phases. Furthermore, given the larger magnitudes of these democracy estimates compared

TABLE 3

Peaceful Settlements and Phase Disaggregation

VARIABLE	PHASE-WEIGHTED ESTIMATES[a]	SINGLE-PHASE ESTIMATES[b]		
		PHASE 1	PHASE 2	PHASE 3
Minimum democracy	.076** (.035)	.088** (.034)	.109** (.035)	−.088 (.052)
Alliance between parties	.354* (.173)	.245 (.202)	.433** (.182)	.422* (.226)
Mediation	.375* (.198)	.818** (.234)	.508** (.215)	−.023 (.252)
Previous military hostility	.701 (.369)	—	.097 (.245)	−.344 (.226)
Sequential phase	.664 (.138)	—	—	—
Previous military hostility × sequential phase	−.583** (.177)	—	—	—
Constant	−1.413** (.187)	−1.561** (.173)	−.862** (.160)	−.125 (.217)
Chi squared(df) Number of observations	43.0(6)** 264	20.8(3)** 264	21.7(4)** 214	6.1(4) 129

Note: Main entries are probit regression estimates; entries in parenthesis are standard errors.

[a] Phases are weighted by 1/np, where np represents the number of phases in each conflict episode. The 718 observed phases thus reduce to 264 weighted observations for this estimation.

[b] Estimations are over individual phases based on temporal sequence. Thus, the observations in the first column represent initial phases in each of 264 conflict episodes irrespective of phase type.

*$p \le .05$, one-tailed test.

**$p \le .01$, one-tailed test.

to those in Table 2, it appears that the estimation strategy followed in Table 2 using all phases is actually a conservative one and that if cross-phase dependence has any effect on the estimates it is to diminish them.

Further Tests

The previous phase-weighted and single-phase estimations have shown that the evidence of a direct democracy effect on peaceful settlement is not unduly influenced by cross-phase dependence. Here I continue this critical scrutiny by entertaining a series of substantive hypotheses further challenging the results and interpretation of Table 2. These highlight the potential confounding of exogenous influences from economic development, the military balance, and geographic contiguity. I also consider the possibility that underlying relationships are obscured by my treatment of coalitions of actors as disputant parties. In each case, the challenge is posed by the introduction of additional terms that could attenuate the democracy estimate or alter its interpretation.

First, I examine one of the chief rival hypotheses to democracy as a factor discouraging state involvement in serious conflict or war (Bremer 1993; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993). The argument arises from the conventional proposition that economic development is a prerequisite for (or at least a correlate of) democracy (e.g., Lipset 1959). Coupled with the further assumption that prospects of settlement are enhanced when both disputants are highly developed (perhaps due to bonds of commerce, costs of disrupted financial flows, or other ties of interdependence; see Dixon 1984), we are confronted with the possibility that the observed democracy effect is actually spurious, with economic development as the true causal agent. I gauge economic development using logged energy production per capita (for coalitions, it is the maximum level of any single member) drawn from the Correlates of War capabilities data base (Singer 1988). Then, following the same logic as with democracy, I introduce the minimum of the two development measures into the estimation. The results reported in Table 4, column 1, show that economic development fails to reach significance and has little bearing on the previously observed democracy estimate.

The relative power capabilities of disputants is commonly featured in studies of conflict and conflict resolution, though there is little consensus on its most likely effects. Some analysts have found settlements to be more likely between adversaries of roughly equivalent power (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991). Alternatively, from a realist standpoint the chances of a state prevailing in a dispute would be proportional to its power, other things being equal. Thus, the greater the power disparity,

TABLE 4

The Effects of Minimum Democracy on Peaceful Settlement Controlling for Economic Development, Capability Ratio, Geographic Contiguity, and Dyadic Disputes

VARIABLE	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6	MODEL 7
Minimum democracy	.59* (.022)	.055* (.022)	.062* (.021)	.108* (.039)
Alliance between parties	.382* (.107)	.372* (.105)	.409* (.106)	.375* (.105)
Mediation	.306* (.124)	.316* (.122)	.308* (.121)	.318* (.122)
Previous military hostility	.706 (.225)	.694 (.221)	.694 (.221)	.681 (.222)
Sequential phase	.664 (.086)	.648 (.084)	.644 (.084)	.646 (.084)
Previous military hostility × sequential phase	−.545* (.105)	−.529* (.103)	−.528* (.103)	−.525* (.103)
Economic development	.11 (.024)	—	—	—
Capability ratio	—	.018 (.012)	—	—
Geographic contiguity	—	—	−.105 (.120)	—
Dyadic phase	—	—	—	−.009 (.130)
Dyadic phase × minimum democracy	—	—	—	−.056 (.046)
Constant	−1.770* (.212)	−1.488* (.122)	−1.419* (.147)	−1.490* (.147)
Chi-squared(df)	125.2(7)*	123.7(7)*	122.0(7)*	123.5(8)*
Log-likelihodd	−384.5	−394.3	−395.1	−394.3

Note: Main entries are probit regression estimates; entries in parenthesis are standard errors. All estimations are performed over 718 conflict phases except for model 5, where there are 701 phases.
*$p \leq .05$, two-tailed test.

the less likely it is that the stronger actor will acquiesce to a negotiated settlement. Finally, Miall reports "no significant association" between power disparity and settlements from a comparative study of postwar disputes (1992, 120). It is equally unclear how power might be related to democracy. It is true that many powerful states are also democratic, but so are many middle and small powers. Nevertheless, confounding effects could arise if we assume that powerful democracies are more likely to engage in disputes than less powerful ones, based on the extent of their global reach and interests. Power is measured (as before) with the Correlates of War composite capabilities index, with coalitions assigned the highest value of any member (Singer 1988). I arrange individual power scores so as to differentiate the stronger and weaker parties and then take the ratio of the stronger to the weaker as my summary indicator of power disparity. This variable is entered in Table 4, column 2. It too fails to achieve significance and does little to alter the democracy estimate.

Next, I examine geographic proximity, another factor that has traditionally received considerable attention in studies of interstate conflict (Bremer 1992, 1993; Maoz and Russett 1992). Because most wars and militarized disputes are known to occur between contiguous states (Bremer 1992), we might expect proximity to contribute to the seriousness of the dispute and thereby lessen the chances of reaching a settlement. Although this seems the most likely effect based on previous research, it is possible that once states become embroiled in disputes, contiguity might actually have a pacifying influence. This might arise from shared cultural norms and a degree of familiarity that serve to increase the prospects of peaceful settlement. Proximity may confound the democracy–settlement effect because it could also be associated with democracy, not in a direct causal sense, but rather through diffusion processes in which democratic forms are most readily conveyed across the common frontiers of contiguous states. For this analysis, I follow Bremer (1993) in counting states as contiguous if they share direct land and river borders or if they are separated by less than 150 miles of water.[18] This is accomplished with a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if any state on one side is contiguous with any opposing state. The results listed in Table 4, column 3, reveal no evidence that contiguity either enhances or hinders prospects of peaceful settlement.

Finally, I consider a potential problem of specification. Throughout, I have treated coalitions of states as disputant parties in the belief that this procedure better represents actual decision processes than the common alternative of disaggregating coalitions into constituent dyads. The question addressed here is whether or not the observed democracy–settlement effect differs between purely dyadic disputes and those involving coalitions on one or both sides. I examine this question with a dummy variable coded 1 for phases in which both parties are comprised of single states, along with the product of this variable and democracy. The product term estimate is of particular interest because if found to be significant it would imply that underlying the previously observed democracy estimate are two different effects that obtain, depending on the composition of disputant parties. This procedure is equivalent to performing two separate estimations, one for purely dyadic phases and one for all others. However, it has the advantage of incorporating a formal test of the different-effects hypothesis, based on the product term. The dyadic phase dummy and its product with democracy are included in the model 7 results in Table 4, column 4. Although the minimum democracy estimate is augmented slightly in this specification, the product term fails to reach even a minimal level of statistical significance. I conclude from these estimates that the minimum democracy effect on peaceful settlement is unaffected by the existence of coalitions on either side of the dispute.

Democracy and the Probability of Settlement

In all of these tests, the effect of minimum democracy on peaceful settlement has remained remarkably stable. But how should we interpret this effect? The probit estimate of .066 in Table 2, column 2, is not directly interpretable in the same way as a least squares estimate, though it does carry comparable information. For example, the probit estimate can be easily transformed into a slope measuring the effect of changes in democracy on predicted probabilities. In the probit case, however, these probabilities follow the familiar *S*-shaped curve of the cumulative normal distribution. A probit slope, which is calculated as a partial derivative along this curve, must be evaluated at particular values of the variables comprising the probit function. Evaluated at the means, this corresponds to a slope value for democracy of .02 (t-ratio = 3.2). In other words, the instantaneous effect of democracy on the probability of settlement is .02 at the means.

Although the slope may be a useful interpretative device, it is not always intuitive. From a substantive standpoint, what we really want to know is how institutionalized democracy affects the probability of peaceful settlements net of other factors in the model. The qualifying phrase "net of other factors" means to hold those factors constant at some value while allowing levels of democracy to vary. This is exactly what is done in Table 5. The range of democracy scores is listed at the left, and all other columns contain predicted probabilities of settlement at each level of democracy.

Table 5, column 1 holds all variables in the model at their mean values. This range of probabilities begins at .36 for cases in which neither party is judged to have even minimally democratic institutions and rises steadily to just over .6 for cases in which both parties are rated highly democratic. One might argue that there is little to cheer in the fact that even dispute phases involving the most democratic states stand, on average, only slightly better than a 50–50 chance of reaching peaceful settlements. Furthermore, if even the strongest democratic norms can do only marginally better than a coin flip, what does this imply about the explanatory power of a norm-based approach? These are valid concerns, but before they lead us to a final judgment regarding the efficacy of democracy or the explanatory value of norms, two additional points deserve attention.

First, it is important to keep in mind that the overall probability of settlements occurring in any given phase is only .33. The odds of peaceful settlements are thus nearly doubled in disputes between highly democratic states. Second, while means may provide a good overall summary of probabilities, they are not necessarily the most informative values and many times may not be even a realistic representation. Because alliance ties, prior hostilities, and mediation are recorded only as binary indicator variables, their means are equivalent to the proportion of dispute phases in which each factor is present. But by my definitions, these factors must be either present or absent during a phase—information not carried by the mean. The remaining columns of Table 5 rectify this by showing variations in predicted probabilities of settlement under conditions defined by the combined presence or absence of alliance bonds between parties, a prior history of military hostilities, and mediation activity.

Although these eight columns of probabilities contain a great deal of information, the main implications can be quickly summarized. While the range and increments of probabilities remain roughly the same in each column, the marked shifts upward and downward demonstrate that democracy is by no means the only factor influencing settlements. We know from the results of model 3 that the most favorable conditions for settlement occur when disputants are joined in a common alliance, when the conflict has not exhibited prior hostilities, and when some form of mediation activity is taking place. The combined effect of all three conditions is represented in the first column to the right of the mean values. Under

TABLE 5

Predicted Probabilities of Peaceful Settlement at Varying Levels of Institutionalized Democracy

		ALLIANCE				NO ALLIANCE			
		NO HOSTILITIES[b]		HOSTILITIES[c]		NO HOSTILITIES[b]		HOSTILITIES[c]	
		MEDIATION		MEDIATION		MEDIATION		MEDIATION	
DEMOCRACY SCORE	MEAN VALUE[a]	MED.	NO MED.	MED.	NO MED.	PRESENT	ABSENT	PRESENT	ABSENT
0	.36	.54	.42	.22	.14	.38	.27	.12	.07
1	.38	.56	.44	.24	.15	.41	.29	.13	.08
2	.41	.59	.47	.26	.17	.43	.32	.15	.09
3	.43	.61	.49	.28	.19	.46	.34	.16	.10
4	.46	.64	.52	.30	.20	.49	.37	.18	.11
5	.49	.66	.55	.32	.22	.51	.39	.20	.12
6	.51	.69	.57	.35	.24	.54	.42	.22	.14
7	.54	.71	.60	.37	.26	.56	.44	.24	.15
8	.57	.73	.62	.40	.29	.59	.47	.26	.17
9	.59	.75	.65	.42	.31	.62	.50	.28	.19
10	.62	.77	.67	.45	.33	.64	.52	.30	.21

Note: Probabilities are calculated from the estimates in model 3 of Table 2 while holding all variables but democracy constant at the specified value. Med = Mediation.

[a] All variables are set at means except for the sequential phase–hostility product term, which is the product of the means, rather than the mean of the product.

[b] The phase–hostility product term is set at 0 to reflect the zero value on the hostility indicator variable.

[c] The phase–hostility product term is set at the mean for phases coded 1 on the hostility indicator variable.

this favorable combination of circumstances, highly democratic states become quite likely to achieve settlements while even nondemocracies can expect a better-than-even chance. Now compare these probabilities with those under exactly the opposite conditions (no alliance, prior hostilities, and no mediation), listed in the far righthand column. Faced with these conditions, even the most democratic states would be hard pressed to conclude settlements. Moreover, the last two columns on the right are distinctive in that it is only here that the highest levels of democracy fail to achieve at least the overall baseline probability of .33. At the same time, we should note that democratic disputants will seldom find themselves in the circumstances represented by these two columns, because they will seldom, if ever, have resorted to military hostilities.

Another interesting feature of the probability values in Table 5 is the near-perfect linearity in each of the columns, with probability increments varying between .02 and .03 occurring at each step along the democracy scale. Although probabilities calculated from probit estimates often follow an *S*-shaped curve, such a pattern is not strongly in evidence here.[19] Consider the implications of a curved probability distribution: relatively small probability increments to either side of especially large increments would suggest the presence of a sort of threshold effect. But no clear threshold appears to underlie the values in any of the columns. On the contrary, it is evident that the probability of peaceful settlements is expected to improve by about the same amount with every increase in institutional democracy, an expectation that applies with equal force to the least democratic and most democratic states.

CONCLUSION

I began with the recognition of two documented empirical facts: (1) that democratic states engage in wars and violent conflict about as often as other types of states, and (2) that democracies virtually never fight one another. To explain the behavior underlying these observations, I developed a theoretical rationale centered on the universal democratic norm of bounded competition. This rationale not only accommodates both empirical facts concerning war and militarized conflict but also entails the novel prediction that democratic states embroiled in disputes will be more likely than others to achieve peaceful settlements. I evaluated the hypothesized relationship between democracy and peaceful settlement against the historical record of postwar international disputes as a test of this norm-based explanatory logic.

The analysis required a compilation of interstate disputes disaggregated by conflict phases in order to accommodate the theoretical process underlying the norm-based rationale and to capture empirical variation in peaceful settlements. I acquired disputes meeting these requirements from the Alker–Sherman conflict set covering the 1945–79 period. Judging peaceful settlements to be most affected by the less democratic party to a dispute, I assessed democracy as the minimum value on the composite index from the Polity II data collection. I then used probit regression to estimate the effects of this minimum democracy measure on the probability of settlement, while partialing out a series of controls to eliminate alternative explanations based on the potential intervening role of common alliance memberships, third-party mediation, and the absence of prior military hostilities. The empirical results revealed that democracy does carry the direct positive effect on settlement anticipated by the norm-based logic.

The theoretical significance of this study can be stated directly. The democracy–settlement hypothesis examined here rests on an explanatory logic emphasizing norms of dispute resolution held by democratic leaders. Alternative explanations of democratic war involvement (particularly those focusing on decisional constraints) cannot easily account for the democracy–settlement results and would likely be stretched beyond recognition by any attempt to do so. This study thus represents a modest step in the direction of a norm-based theory of democratic dispute resolution. It is also encouraging that others are beginning to report results consistent with the norm-based approach (Maoz and Russett 1993).

Naturally this study alone cannot settle the matter. Certainly improvements are possible in my crude measurement procedures, and we should inquire as to whether these results hold up under a more extensive temporal domain. While the single-phase results reported afford an initial glimpse of how mutual democratic norms impede the escalatory process at an early stage of an evolving conflict situation, the theoretical and empirical implications of this effect surely deserve fuller attention. Perhaps most importantly, additional work is required to flesh out the internal structure and content of a true theory of democratic norms. Such a theory might even help account for other forms of interaction between democratic states, such as trade (Dixon and Moon 1993). Obviously, much remains undone. In the meantime, however, this study has given us further reason to hope for an expanding zone of democratic peace not altogether unlike the one Kant envisioned some two centuries ago.

Notes

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1. Miall makes the point clearly when he observes: "Many conflicts are never settled at all, but simply lapse or become merged into other disputes. Since states are often unwilling to accept outcomes they consider unsatisfactory, but may not wish to actively prosecute conflict, it is common for conflicts to be allowed to lapse" (1992, 44–45). Thus one alternative to my claim that democracies avoid violence by reaching settlements is that democracies avoid violence because their disputes simply lapse.

2. Rummel (1979, 1983) is the most prominent exception, though most now regard his findings of democratic pacifism to be idiosyncratic to the time period studied. More recently, Morgan and Campbell (1991) have shown that decisional constraints common to democratic systems may inhibit war, but only for a relatively small subset of great powers. For states more generally—and particularly for the vast majority of lesser powers—constraints had no effect.

3. These are fairly broad categories of explanation and my characterization is not meant to minimize the diversity within them. For example, while both Doyle's (1986) Kantian liberalism and Rummel's (1979, 1983) libertarian theory emphasize norms and values, they differ dramatically in their interpretation of these key elements. Likewise, rational choice assumptions lead both Lake (1992) and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) to focus on institutional constraints but the former employs a rent-seeking formulation, whereas the latter authors rely on a logic of expected utility and strategic choice.

4. Exceptions are beginning to appear, such as Lake's (1992) examination of success in war rather than war involvement, Leng's (1993) study of influence strategies, and Mintz and Geva's (1993) innovative experimental work.

5. This strategy bears some similarity to Lakatos' (1970) widely quoted criteria for falsifying theories. I do not specifically invoke a Lakatosian justification, for the obvious reason that research on the democratic peace is too theoretically diverse to comprise a coherent research program (see n. 2). For a similar emphasis on expanding the scope of empirical applications, see Lauden 1977.

6. My conception of democracy draws heavily on Schmitter and Karl 1991 but is contoured to the purpose at hand and may well be too narrow for other uses.

7. A survey of 307 postwar disputes compiled by Alker and Sherman (1986) reveals that only about 11% (34) actually began with the outbreak of military hostilities. Another 49% (151) began with less severity but did eventually escalate to military hostilities.

8. This parallels the common-knowledge assumption made by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) and Starr (1992). My emphasis, however, is on this knowledge as a basis for contingent consent rather than as a signal of democratic "dovishness."

9. This reasoning may appear to contradict reports that alliance ties actually increase the probability of war (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). More recent evidence challenges this claim (Bremer 1992), but even if true it is not inconsistent with my proposition that once allies enter disputes they are more likely to reach settlements than are nonallied opponents.

10. This collection is sometimes informally designated the FACS data, meaning Farris–Alker–Carley–Sherman (individuals associated with the project). I refer to the data as the Alker–Sherman set, though this is not intended to diminish the contributions of others, including those noted in the text. The data were acquired from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

11. I use letters rather than Bloomfield and Leiss's (1969) roman-numeral phase designation to avoid any confusion with the ordinal sequence in which phases occur within a conflict situation. I also use *termination,* rather than the original *settlement,* for phase type F to avoid terminological ambiguity with the mutual agreements that serve as my dependent variable. Many conflict situations do end with such agreements, but others do not. Similarly, many agreements address only some of the contending issues and therefore do not terminate the conflict situation. Some further ambiguity may surround use of the terms *conflict* and *dispute.* Throughout, I employ both terms interchangeably when referring to the entire episode inclusive of its phases; the more specific usage will be made clear with appropriate modifiers.

12. This is based on a reorganization of categories from Alker and Sherman 1986, 34.

13. These data were generously supplied by Will Moore. For further details on the component measures and their weights, see Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1989. It is also worth noting that Polity II and its predecessor (Gurr 1974), are routinely used in democracy–war studies (e.g., Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett 1993; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Siverson and Emmons 1991).

14. I generally rely on the full 11-point democracy scale, though I shall be making limited use of a dichotomized version. Maoz and Russett (1993) propose an elaboration of this measure by combining it in an index with similarly constructed Polity II indicators of autocracy and power concentration. Their index has the advantage of discriminating among the many types of nondemocracies clustered at scale points 0 and 1. For my purposes, however, this is a needless complication since my theoretical argument has focused exclusively on the democratic dimension. Empirically, it probably matters little one way or another, given the high correlation (.90) between the two measures.

15. The Correlates of War capabilities index uses a multiple indicator approach to represent military, economic, and demographic dimensions of national power by recording each actor's share of total system resources in each area and then taking the average of all three.

16. The sequential phase registered by the phase counter should not be confused with the phase type, though the two are not completely independent of one another due to the posthostilities requirement of phase types D and E. Thus an initial phase in a conflict could be any one of types A, B, or C.

17. Because I concur with Bollen (1991) that continuous measures of democracy are preferable to simple dichotomies, the Table 2 analyses are based on the full 11-point scale. However, I also performed all analyses in Table 2 with the dichotomous measure used in Table 1. I do not report them in a separate table since for all variables except minimum democracy the results are virtually identical to those in Table 2. The dichotomous democracy indicator parallels its continuous counterpart, yielding statistically significant estimates of .38, .45, .51, and .41 for models 1, 2, 3, and 3A, respectively.

18. I relied heavily on data from Gochman 1991 supplied by Stuart Bremer and on information from Siverson and Starr 1991 supplied by Randolph Siverson. I am most grateful to both.

19. A graph of these values reveals a generally linear shape with only a very slight curvature.

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ELECTORAL COMPETITION WITH INFORMED AND UNINFORMED VOTERS

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I present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies. Informed voters, however, vote based on those policies, so candidates face a trade-off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote. Electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies: particularistic and collective. In the case of particularistic policies, the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high, and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion. The model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages. For the case of collective policies, the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters, and contributions are zero.

Two characteristics of U.S. elections are the substantial campaign expenditures by candidates and the considerable voter ignorance of both issues and candidate positions on those issues. Some campaign funds are used to cover the costs of staff, transportation, supplies, and additional fund-raising, but a major portion of campaign expenditures goes for advertising and other informational activities that may influence or persuade some voters. Electoral competition thus involves candidates who raise campaign contributions from interest groups and individuals through their efforts as well as the positions they take. Those positions also affect the voting of those who are informed about candidate positions.

To investigate the interactions among interest groups and their campaign contributions, candidate positions, and the electorate, two categories of voters are considered: *informed voters* are assumed to know the policy positions of the candidates and vote based on those positions; *uninformed voters* are assumed not to know those positions, and their vote is influenced by campaign expenditures. Campaign contributions thus have a productive role as candidates compete for the uninformed vote by raising contributions from interest groups and others. Those contributions depend on the policy positions candidates choose, and those positions affect the votes of informed voters. To the extent that positions affect voting directly (as well as indirectly through their effect on the raising of campaign funds), candidates face competing incentives to seek the informed and the uninformed votes. Electoral competition is driven by these incentives, and an electoral equilibrium is parameterized by the proportions of informed and uninformed voters.

The median voter theorem (Black 1958) is the basic theory of candidate policy positions in voting institutions. That theorem is based on the assumption that voters are informed about the positions of candidates, and when all voters are informed, campaign expenditures, if they were to be made, would not affect voting or hence the equilibrium positions of the candidates. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) present an alternative theory in which some voters are uninformed and learn how to vote based on information provided in polls. In equilibrium, all voters vote as if they were informed, and candidates choose positions at the median of the voters' ideal points. When voters are not perfectly informed, however, campaign expenditures, as well as polls, are a principal means of influencing voting. As will be indicated, the presence of uninformed voters can cause candidates to separate their policy positions so as to cater to interest groups and thus attract campaign contributions that can be expended to increase the candidate's share of the uninformed vote. Polarization thus can result from the presence of uninformed voters and interest group campaign contributions.

The theory presented here provides a set of testable propositions pertaining to the relationships among a set of endogenous variables (candidate policy positions, campaign contributions by interest groups, and electoral outcomes) and a set of exogenous variables (the proportions of informed and uninformed voters, the amount of public financing, and incumbency advantages). The relationships depend importantly on the nature of the policy dimensions on which the candidates compete. Two types of policies will be considered. The first is a particularistic policy, which provides benefits to particular interest groups and can be denied to noncontributors. To determine whether the presence of uninformed voters affects electoral competition more generally, the second type of policy considered is collective and affects all interest groups regardless of whether they contribute. I shall distinguish in more detail between particularistic and collective policies and their modeling, then introduce the model and address symmetric electoral competition in particularistic policies. I then consider public financing of elections and extend the model to an election in which one of the candidates has an incumbency advantage. Finally, I consider collective policy positions and discuss the results.

POLICY DIMENSIONS AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

Candidates compete for votes and campaign contributions on a number of dimensions, four of which may be identified as *constituent services, particularistic policies, collective policies*, and *majoritarian policies*. Majoritarian policies are those in which interest groups and their campaign contributions have no significant effect on the election outcome. They are not considered here. Constituent service activities include services ranging from those associated with pork-barrel projects to obtaining immigration clearance for relatives of constituents. These constituent services are generally such that either candidate is willing to provide them. Either candidate, for example, is likely to be willing to provide assistance, perhaps in response to a campaign contribution, in obtaining a defense contract for a firm located in the district. These constituency service activities are not considered here, since both candidates are willing to provide them. Instead, the focus is on particularistic and collective policy dimensions, which have the property that a candidate is willing to support a policy that benefits one set of interest groups but is unwilling to support a policy that benefits another set of interest groups.

Particularistic and collective policy dimensions are distinguished here by (1) whether the benefits associated with policies can be denied to interest groups that do not contribute and (2) whether those policies impose costs on other interest groups sufficient to cause them to make countervailing campaign contributions. Particularistic policies are those that provide benefits to some interest groups and impose insufficient costs on other interest groups to induce them to make campaign contributions. Particularistic policies may impose costs on unorganized interests, such as consumers or taxpayers, but those costs are assumed to be more concentrated than the costs of taking political action (e.g., by campaign contributions), so the unorganized interests do not make countervailing contributions. Consumers and taxpayers who are informed, of course, vote based on those policies. Collective policies are those which provide significant benefits to some interest groups and impose significant costs on others. Providing benefits to one set of interest groups can thus induce interest groups on the other side to contribute to the other candidate. It is the consequences for organized interest groups—and the campaign contributions those consequences generate—that distinguish particularistic policies from collective policies.

In the model, interest groups on the left of the policy dimension are assumed to be aligned with the candidate of the party on the left and those on the right with the candidate of the party on the right. In the case of particularistic policies, if the candidate on the left wins the election, the interest groups on the left receive benefits corresponding to that candidate's policy, and the interest groups on the right incur only very small costs. Examples of particularistic policies are special provisions in bills, intervention with the bureaucracy on behalf of the contributor, regulatory exceptions (e.g., an environmental variance), and access to the candidate so that the contributor can present its concerns.[1] In the case of trade policy, a particularistic policy might be a voluntary export restraint that applies only to a specific market or industry and imposes widely distributed costs on other interests, such as consumers. The policy dimension may then be thought of as catering to interest groups, where the candidate on the left caters to interest groups on the left and does not cater to interest groups on the right. For example, a particularistic policy of one candidate of providing a tax break or regulatory exception for small business may not generate contributions to the other candidate by other interest groups. A particularistic policy of providing trade adjustment assistance to labor may not generate contributions by small business to the other candidate. When candidates are willing to cater to any of the interest groups, that is the case of constituency services, which is not considered here.[2]

In the case of a collective policy, if the candidate on the left wins the election, the interest groups on the left receive the benefits and the interest groups on the right incur costs. Such policies are collective because they affect all interest groups in a significant, albeit differentiated, manner. Examples include labor legislation, trade policy that affects both imports and exports, and broad tax policy. The distinction between particularistic policies and collective policies is thus not in terms of the institutional context in which they are provided but, instead, depends on whether a policy that provides benefits to one interest group generates opposition by other interest groups.

The differences among these types of policies are illustrated in Figure 1 in terms of the corresponding distribution of the costs and benefits.[3] A policy dimension that generates both concentrated costs for some interest groups and concentrated benefits for other interest groups is referred to as collective, and each set of interest groups has an incentive to make a contribution to the candidate on its side. An example is corporate average fuel economy standards, which pit automobile manufacturers and the United Auto Workers against environmental interest groups.

In contrast, the lower-right cell of Figure 1 corresponds to alternatives that have widely distributed benefits and costs. Wilson (1980) refers to such policies as majoritarian, and in the context of the model considered here, they correspond to the absence of interest group activity and hence of campaign contributions. An example is the 1986 extension of daylight saving time, which had broad and widely distributed costs and benefits.[4] If the majoritarian policy alterna-

FIGURE 1

Categories of Policies


Benefits From The Political Alternative
concentrated
widely distributed
concentrated
Costs From The Political Alternative
widely distributed
collective policies (CAFE)
constituent services (pork barrel)
constituent services (regulatory exceptions)
majoritarian policies (daylight saving time extension)
particularistic policies

tive is in a single dimension, the median voter theorem is applicable.

If a policy generates concentrated benefits (costs) and widely distributed costs (benefits), taking action to obtain those benefits (reduce the costs) will generate little opposition. When either candidate is willing to provide those benefits, the policy can be thought of as constituent services. Delivering pork, assisting with immigration problems, and seeking exceptions to regulations are in this category.

Particularistic policies can be thought of as a pattern of providing such services to particular sets of interest groups. The diagonal line in Figure 1 is intended to illustrate a dimension of electoral competition in which (1) concentrated benefits are provided by one candidate to one set of interest groups and widely distributed costs are borne by others (e.g., consumers and taxpayers) and (2) concentrated benefits are provided by the other candidate to another set of groups, with that provision also generating widely distributed consequences for consumers and taxpayers. These policies may be thought of as catering to interest groups on the left of the policy dimension by the candidate on the left and to interest groups on the right by the candidate on the right. This catering is assumed to be observable to informed voters who have preferences over which interest group the candidates cater to. In this case, the candidate on the right can compete for the informed vote by moving to the left, but the interest groups on the right will then contribute less because that candidate is not catering as much to their interests.

Particularistic and collective policies are modeled differently in accord with these distinctions. For particularistic policies, the campaign contributions of an interest group are a function only of the policy of the candidate who caters to that interest group, since the policy does not have a sufficient impact on other interest groups to cause them to contribute to the other candidate. For collective policies, campaign contributions of interest groups depend on the policies of both candidates, since concentrated benefits and costs are imposed by whichever candidate wins.

In the literature, models assume a correspondence between particularistic and collective policies and whether the benefits can be denied by a candidate. In the model considered here, particularistic policies can be denied to an interest group by a candidate, whereas a collective policy affects all interest groups regardless of whether a contribution is made. A contribution can be denied in either of two conditions: (1) if no contribution is made or (2) if contributions are made to both candidates. In models of campaign contributions and electoral competition, this distinction is often reflected in the formulation of the model. In the case of particularistic policies, the interest groups are typically assumed to take the probability of a candidate winning as given, rather than as a function of their own contributions. A rational expectations condition is then used to close the model. In the case of collective policies, interest groups are typically assumed to act as if their contributions affect the probability of winning.

In the literature, Hinich and Munger (1989), Morton and Cameron (1991), Snyder (1990a and b) and I (Baron 1989a and b) consider either constituent services or particularistic policies. Denzau and Munger (1986) consider a nonelectoral model in which particularistic policy services in the form of the allocation of a legislator's effort are provided to elicit contributions from interest groups.[5] Austen-Smith (1987), Brock and Magee (1978), Cameron and Enelow (1989), and Edelman (1990) consider models of electoral competition in collective policies. Some models accommodate aspects of both particularistic and collective policies (Baron and Mo 1993; Londregan and Romer 1993; Magee, Brock, and Young 1989, 248–50).

THE MODEL

The model is formulated in a parsimonious manner to highlight the incentives underlying electoral competition as structured by the presence of informed and uninformed voters and the opportunity to generate campaign contributions. To investigate these interactions, the model focuses on candidate competition for votes, rather than on competition for interest groups. Each candidate is thus assumed to be aligned with a set of interest groups.[7] Although the number of interest groups aligned with each candidate is not affected by the choice of positions, the campaign contributions that they receive depend on those positions. Those positions also affect the votes of informed voters. Uninformed voters, however, are influenced only by campaign expenditures. To expose the electoral incentives, campaign contributions by individuals are assumed to be zero. Since the qualitative properties of the electoral equilibrium when individuals make contributions are similar, only the incentives that those contributions create are discussed.

Electoral competition takes place on a number of policy dimensions, but to simplify the model, policies are assumed to be one-dimensional. As indicated, the interpretation of the policy dimension depends on the nature of the policy in question. In the case of particularistic benefits, the policy dimension can have two interpretations. The first corresponds to a general left–right spectrum in which policies on the left provide benefits to interest groups on the left without imposing substantial costs on interest groups on the right.[8] Policies on the right have an analogous interpretation. This policy dimension is thus best thought of as a *catering dimension,* with policies on the left corresponding to catering to interest groups on the left and policies on the right corresponding to catering to interest groups on the right. The location of interest groups on this dimension is consistent with the results of Poole and Romer (1985), who find that interest groups can be arrayed on one dimension and are located at the extremes of that dimension relative to candidate positions.

The second interpretation is that candidates choose positions in different policy dimensions. One candidate chooses a position to cater to one set of interest groups, and the other candidate chooses a position on another policy dimension to cater to a different set of interest groups. The two sets of interest groups could, for example, be those aligned with the parties of the candidates.

With either interpretation, candidate 1 is assumed to choose a position $p_1 \in [0, 1/2]$, and candidate 2 is assumed to choose a position $p_2 \in [1/2, 1]$.[9] The policy position of a candidate is assumed to be meaningful in the sense that the winner will pursue that policy in the legislature. The legislative process is not modeled, but electoral positions would be expected to be correlated with legislative efforts.[10]

A continuum of voters is assumed, with the total number of voters normalized to one. Voters are assumed to be of one of two types. A proportion k of the voters is uninformed about the policy positions of the candidates, and a proportion $1-k$ of the voters is perfectly informed about those positions. Informed voters are assumed to understand the positions of the candidates in terms of whose interests the candidates are serving and the policy positions that they will work to implement. Informed voters have preferences over which interests are served by the candidates; hence their preferences depend on the policy positions of the two candidates. The electoral incentives resulting from the presence of informed voters are the same as those underlying the median voter theorem and lead toward convergence of the candidate positions to the median of the informed voters. The median informed voter can be thought of as preferring that the candidates cater to interest groups located at the center of the policy space. In the terminology of Cox (1990), the presence of informed voters creates *centripetal incentives* for the candidates.

Informed voters include those who are members of interest groups and those who are not. The preferences of those informed voters who are not members of interest groups are represented by a quadratic utility function with an ideal point x_j for voter j. Informed voters are uncertain about how the uninformed voters will vote and hence are uncertain about the election outcome. The beliefs of informed voter j about the likelihood that candidate 1 will win is denoted by w_{j1}. The expected utility $u_j(p_1, p_2)$ of an informed voter who is not a member of an interest group is thus

$$u_j(p_1, p_2) = -\, w_{j1}(p_1 - x_j)^2 - (1 - w_{j1})(p_2 - x_j)^2,$$

where p_i is implemented if candidate i wins. The informed voter will vote for the candidate whose position is closer to his or her ideal point, so those with ideal points to the left (right) of the midpoint $m = (p_1 + p_2)/2$ of the policy positions will vote for the candidate on the left.

Informed voters who are members of interest groups are assumed to have ideal points on the same side of the median of the policy space. A member j of interest group k receives benefits b_{jk} if that interest group is catered to by the winning candidate.[11] The interest group may also assess its members an amount d_{jk}, and the members of the interest group may be thought of as those who have benefits that are at least as great as the assessment. The expected utility of an informed voter who is a member of interest group k is specified as

$$u_j(p_1, p_2) = -\, w_{j1}(p_1 - x_j)^2 - (1 - w_{j1})(p_2 - x_j)^2 + (w_{j1}b_{jk} - d_{jk}),$$

where the last term is the expected benefits from membership in the interest group. The voter then will vote for the candidate on the left if and only if

$$2(p_1 - p_2)[x_j - m] + b_{jk} \geq 0. \qquad (1)$$

To simplify the analysis, the ideal points of both the informed voters who are and are not in interest groups are taken to be uniformly distributed over the policy set $P = [0, 1]$. A proportion α of the informed voters are assumed to be members of interest groups, and their vote depends on the distribution of benefits, as indicated in equation 1. All members of interest group k with ideal points to the left of the midpoint m will vote for the candidate on the left when m is to the left of the median $\mu = 1/2$ of the ideal points of the informed voters. Rather than specifying how the benefits b_{jk} are distributed within an interest group, a proportion ρ_l of those voters with ideal points in $(m, \mu]$ will be assumed to vote for candidate 1. If m is to the right of the median, all interest group members with ideal points to the left of the median vote for candidate 1 and a ρ_r proportion of those with ideal points in (μ, m) are assumed to vote for candidate 1. The number of informed voters who vote for candidate 1 is thus

$$(1 - \alpha)m + \alpha(m + \rho_l(\mu - m)) \quad \text{if} \quad m < \mu$$

and

$$(1 - \alpha)m + \alpha(\mu + \rho_r(m - \mu)) \quad \text{if} \quad m > \mu.$$

To simplify the analysis further, half the voters in the intervals (m, μ) and (μ, m) will be assumed to vote for candidate 1, so $\rho_l = \rho_r = 1/2$. Candidate 1 thus receives s_1 of the informed vote, where

$$s_1 = m + \frac{\alpha}{2}(\mu - m). \tag{2}$$

Uninformed voters are ignorant of the positions of the candidates, and their votes are assumed to be influenced by the messages they receive during the election campaign. Those messages may, for example, provide nonpolicy information about the candidates. These messages are funded by campaign expenditures, which are assumed to persuade uninformed voters to be more likely to vote for the candidate making the expenditure. How the uninformed voters will actually vote is uncertain, so let $\tilde{\nu}$ be a random variable representing the proportion of the uninformed voters who vote for candidate 1. The probability W_1 that candidate 1 wins then is

$$W_1 = Pr\left(k\tilde{\nu} + (1 - k)s_1 \geq \frac{1}{2} \,\middle|\, C_1, C_2\right)$$
$$= G\left(\frac{1}{2k} - \frac{1 - k}{2k} s_1 \,\middle|\, C_1, C_2\right),$$

where C_1 and C_2 are the campaign expenditures of candidates 1 and 2, respectively, and G is the complement of the distribution function of $\tilde{\nu}$. The probability W_1 is assumed to be increasing in candidate 1's expenditures C_1 and decreasing in candidate 2's expenditures C_2.

The specific functional form of G depends on the theory used to represent how uninformed voters decide to vote. Such theories include those based on probabilistic voting (e.g., Austen-Smith 1987; Hinich 1977) and Luce's (1959) theory of choice under incomplete information. A micromodel of how uninformed voters decide to vote will not be presented. Instead, the probability of winning will be specified in a manner intended to expose the incentives in the electoral competition and allow a closed-form characterization of equilibria. The probability W_i of candidate i's winning is specified as

$$W_1 = k\frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2} + (1 - k)\left(m + \frac{\alpha}{2}(\mu - m)\right) \tag{3}$$

and

$$W_2 = k\frac{C_2}{C_1 + C_2} + (1 - k)\left(1 - \left(m + \frac{\alpha}{2}(\mu - m)\right)\right).^{12} \tag{4}$$

The first term in equation 3 represents the effect on the probability of winning of the uninformed vote for candidate 1,[13] and the second term is the effect of the informed vote from (2) for that candidate. The first terms in equations 3 and 4 are frequently used specifications in both the empirical and theoretical literature. Jacobson (1987) and Snyder (1990a and b) use this specification in empirical studies, and Snyder (1989) and I (Baron 1989a and b) use it in theoretical studies. It may be derived from axiomatic theories of (partially) uninformed voting (as presented by Luce) or from theories of probabilistic voting.[14]

ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN PARTICULARISTIC POLICY POSITIONS

In the case of particularistic policies, the policy p_1 of candidate 1 generates contributions from the interest groups aligned with candidate 1, and the policy p_2 of candidate 2 generates contributions from the interest groups aligned with candidate 2. The interest groups are assumed to be of the investment type and to make their contribution based on the return they can expect from their contribution.[15] The benefits—and thus the contributions—depend on the policy, and since the benefits can be denied if the interest group does not contribute, the interest groups and candidates can be thought of as bargaining over the contribution (Baron and Mo 1993). Since the benefits and the contributions depend on the policy, they represent a demand to pull the policy of a candidate toward that desired by the interest groups. Campaign contributions create what Cox (1990) calls *centrifugal incentives*, which are in opposition to the centripetal incentives created by the presence of informed voters.

The benefits to interest group k aligned with candidate i are denoted $b_k(p_i)$, and the total benefits provided by the catering of candidate i are $B_i(p_i) = \Sigma_k b_k(p_i)$. The benefits are provided only if the candidate to whom the contribution is made wins the election, so interest groups discount the benefits by

FIGURE 2

Time Line of the Electoral Competition


candidates choose policies
interest groups make campaign contributions
election
winner works to implement policy
p_i
C_i , w
rational expectations equilibrium
winner i
p_i

the probability of winning. Interest groups are assumed to have beliefs w about the probability that candidate 1 will win. Since there are many interest groups, their beliefs are assumed to be independent of the contribution they make. In equilibrium, those beliefs must be rational, so w must equal the actual probability of winning W_1.

The assumption that the beliefs of interest groups are independent of their own contribution is consistent with the limits on campaign contributions and with some empirical results. Snyder (1990a and b) tests a model based on this assumption and finds that the data support the model. Chappell (1982) finds that the probability of winning does not respond significantly to an individual contribution. The assumption that interest groups take the probability of winning as given requires only a weak informational assumption, since interest groups only need to base their beliefs on publicly available information. For example, the beliefs w can be based on polls.

The bargaining between candidate 1 and interest groups can be thought of as resulting in contributions equaling some share of the aggregate expected benefits $wB_1(p_1)$. To facilitate a closed-form characterization of an equilibrium, the aggregate contributions C_1 are specified as a linear function:

$$C_1 = w(z_1 - p_1). \tag{5}$$

Similarly, the contributions to candidate 2 are specified as

$$C_2 = (1 - w)(z_2 - (1 - p_2)), \tag{6}$$

where z_i is a parameter that is assumed to satisfy $z_i \geq 1/2$, $i = 1, 2$, so that contributions are nonnegative.[16] The specifications in equations 5 and 6 indicate that candidates raise more contributions, the more they cater (lower p_1, higher p_2) to interest groups.[17] This is consistent with Poole and Romer's study of interest group locations.

Figure 2 presents the time line of the electoral competition. Candidates move first by choosing positions, then interest groups make contributions, the election is held, and the policy of the winner is implemented. To focus on the relations among policy positions, voters, and campaign contributors (and not on the policy preferences of candidates) candidates are assumed to maximize their probability of winning the election. An equilibrium (p_1^*, p_2^*, w^*) is thus policy positions and beliefs such that given the equilibrium beliefs of interest groups and the policy position of the other candidate, each candidate's policy maximizes his or her probability of winning. Given those policies, the equilibrium beliefs must agree with the actual probability of winning W_1.

A candidate chooses a policy to maximize his or her probability of winning, taking the policy of (and thus the contributions to) the other candidate as given, as well as taking interest group beliefs w as given. Candidate 1 thus chooses p_1 according to[18]

$$\max_{p_1} W_1 = k\frac{w(z_1 - p_1)}{w(z_1 - p_1) + C_2} + (1-k)\left(\frac{p_1 + p_2}{2} + \frac{\alpha}{2}\left(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{p_1 + p_2}{2}\right)\right).$$

The necessary optimality conditions for interior optima ($p_1 \in (0, 1/2)$, $p_2 \in (1/2, 1)$) for the two candidates are

$$-\frac{kwC_2}{(C_1 + C_2)^2} + \frac{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}{4} = 0 \tag{7}$$

and

$$\frac{k(1-w)C_1}{(C_1 + C_2)^2} - \frac{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}{4} = 0, \tag{8}$$

respectively. These conditions are also sufficient, since the probabilities of winning are strictly concave functions of the candidate's own policy and are strictly convex in the policy of the other candidate.

The conditions in equations 7 and 8 reflect the centripetal and centrifugal incentives. The first term in equation 7 is the centrifugal incentive to move away from the median so as to increase campaign contributions that can be expended to obtain the votes of uninformed voters. The second term in equation 7 is the incentive to move toward the median to obtain a greater share of the informed vote.

These two conditions imply that

$$wC_2 = (1 - w)C_1. \tag{9}$$

Using equation 9 in equations 7 and 8 yields, for $k < 1$,

$$p_1 = z_1 - \frac{4kw(1-w)}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)} \tag{10}$$

and

$$p_2 = 1 - z_2 + \frac{4kw(1-w)}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}. \tag{11}$$

To close the model, substitute equations 10 and 11 into equation 3 and use the rational expectations condition $W_1 = w$ to obtain for an interior equilibrium

$$w = kw + (1-k)\left(\frac{1+z_1-z_2}{2} + \left(\frac{\alpha}{2}\right)\frac{z_2-z_1}{2}\right).$$

This implies that the equilibrium probability of winning is

$$w^* = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{z_1-z_2}{4}(2-\alpha), \tag{12}$$

for those (z_1, z_2) such that $w^* \in [0, 1]$. If $z_1 = z_2 = z$ so that the interest groups aligned with each candidate have symmetric demands for particularistic policies, the probability of winning is $w^* = 1/2$. If $z_1 > z_2$, candidate 1 is aligned with the higher-demand interest groups and thus has an interest group advantage. In equilibrium, that candidate is the more likely to win. The probability of winning is independent of the proportion of uninformed voters regardless of the interest group advantage.

The equilibrium policies for an interior equilibrium characterized by equations 10 and 11 are given by

$$p_1^* = z_1 - \frac{k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}\left(1-(z_1-z_2)^2\left(\frac{2-\alpha}{2}\right)^2\right) \tag{13}$$

and

$$p_2^* = 1 - z_2 + \frac{k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)} \cdot \left(1-(z_1-z_2)^2\left(\frac{2-\alpha}{2}\right)^2\right). \tag{14}$$

At an interior equilibrium, the policies satisfy

$$p_1^* + p_2^* = 1 + z_1 - z_2. \tag{15}$$

If $z_1 = z_2$, equation 15 implies that the policies are symmetric about the median. If $z_1 > z_2$, candidate 1 is aligned with higher-demand interest groups and chooses a policy closer to the median than does candidate 2. The candidate with the higher-demand interest groups is more likely to win and can afford to sacrifice some contributions by moving closer to the median to attract more informed voters. As will be indicated, the equilibrium campaign contributions may also increase even though the candidate caters less to interest groups.

FIGURE 3

Equilibrium Positions



The equilibrium policies thus reflect the two incentives. The centripetal incentives underlying the median voter theorem induce candidates to choose policies closer to the median, so as to increase their share of the informed vote. The presence of uninformed voters, however, creates a centrifugal incentive to raise campaign contributions, and those contributions are greater the closer the policy is to that preferred by the interest groups. The equilibrium positions balance the response to these two incentives, taking into account the position of the other candidate.

These incentives depend on the proportion of informed voters. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium positions for the symmetric case in which $z_1 = z_2 = z$. The higher the fraction k of uninformed voters the stronger is the incentive to obtain campaign contributions, and the candidates respond by choosing policies (weakly) closer to the policies preferred by the interest groups. Consequently, the higher the proportion of uninformed voters, the more the candidates cater to interest groups and the more divergent are their policies.

If the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently low, that is

$$k \leq k^* \equiv 1 - \frac{2}{2+(2-\alpha)(2z-1)},$$

the incentives that underlie the median voter theorem are sufficiently strong that both candidates choose positions at the median. It is not necessary that $k = 0$ for these incentives to dominate. As the proportion k of uninformed voters increases for

$$k \in \left(k^*, k^{**} \equiv \frac{(2-\alpha)z}{1+(2-\alpha)z}\right),$$

the candidates' equilibrium policies move toward those preferred by the interest groups, reflecting the higher electoral productivity of contributions. For $k \geq k^{**}$, the incentive to raise contributions dominates, and the candidates are fully responsive to the preferences of the interest groups.

The equilibrium policies also depend on the interest groups' valuations, z_1 and z_2.[19] For the symmetric case, an increase in z shifts the policies in Figure 3 to the right, indicating that candidates cater less to interest groups, the more valuable their policies are to those groups. That is, the more valuable the catering is to the interest groups, the easier it is to raise campaign contributions, and the candidate can afford to move toward the median. Higher-demand interest groups thus strengthen the centripetal incentive to move toward the median to attract a higher share of the informed vote.[20] Hence, the higher the demand of interest groups for particularistic policies the less responsive, and more independent, are the candidates to interest group preferences.

The higher the proportion α of informed voters who are members of interest groups, the (weakly) farther from the median the equilibrium positions are. A higher proportion of interest group members decreases the centripetal incentives because it is easier to obtain their votes; hence, candidates compete less hard for the informed vote and cater more to the interest groups, so as to generate greater contributions.

The contributions generated in an interior equilibrium ($k \in (k^*, k^{**})$) are

$$C_1^* = \frac{k}{16(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(2+(z_1-z_2)(2-\alpha))^2 \cdot (2-(z_1-z_2)(2-\alpha)) \quad \textbf{(16)}$$

$$C_2^* = \frac{k}{16(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(2+(z_1-z_2)(2-\alpha)) \cdot (2-(z_1-z_2)(2-\alpha))^2. \quad \textbf{(17)}$$

The contributions in equations 16 and 17 are strictly increasing functions of k. Campaign contributions are greater, the higher the proportion of uninformed voters, because campaign expenditures are more productive. Candidates thus have stronger incentives to compete for the uninformed vote by catering more to the interest groups. For the symmetric case, the contributions are independent of the valuation parameter z. In the asymmetric case, the contributions to the candidate with the higher-demand interest groups are increasing in z_i for

$$z_i < z_j + \frac{4}{3(2-\alpha)}, \; j \neq i.^{21}$$

In an interior equilibrium, the contributions satisfy equation 9, which implies that the ratio of the contributions equals the odds ratio for the election, that is,

$$\frac{C_1^*}{C_2^*} = \frac{w^*}{1-w^*}. \quad \textbf{(18)}$$

Consequently, even though the candidates compete for the informed vote, the odds of candidate 1 winning equal the ratio of the contributions. The prediction in equation 18 involves two endogenous variables and has been tested by Snyder (1990a and b). His results support the prediction. Proposition 1 summarizes these results.

PROPOSITION 1. *An interior equilibrium is characterized by equations 12–14: (a) The equilibrium probability of winning is (weakly) greater for the candidate with the interest group advantage, that is, the one aligned with interest groups that have the higher valuations of the particularistic policies.*

- *(b) As the proportion of uninformed voters increases, the equilibrium policies diverge and move (weakly) away from the median.*
- *(c) As the symmetric valuation $z_1 = z_2 = z$ increases, the equilibrium policies move (weakly) toward the median, since the candidates find it easier to raise contributions and need less to cater to interest groups.*
- *(d) The higher is the proportion α of informed voters who are members of interest groups, the more the candidates cater to the interest groups by choosing positions (weakly) farther from the median.*
- *(e) In an interior equilibrium, campaign contributions are a strictly increasing function of the proportion of uninformed voters and for $z_1 = z_2$ are a strictly increasing function of the proportion α of informed voters who are members of interest groups.*
- *(f) The (interior) equilibrium probability of winning is independent of the proportion of uninformed voters.*
- *(g) In an interior equilibrium, the ratio of the contributions equals the odds ratio for the election.*

PUBLIC FINANCING OF ELECTIONS

At the federal level, public financing is limited to the presidential election, although broader public financing is considered regularly in Congress. This section investigates the effect of that financing and shows that the probability of winning becomes (weakly) closer to one-half. Public financing of elections thus makes the election closer. This results because public financing mitigates the interest group advantage of a candidate.

If the government provides a lump sum a to each candidate, the interior equilibrium (p_1^+, p_2^+, w^+) satisfies

$$p_1^+ = z_1 + \frac{a}{w^+} - \frac{4k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(w^+(1-w^+)), \quad \textbf{(19)}$$

$$p_2^+ = 1 - z_2 - \frac{a}{1 - w^+} + \frac{4k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(w^+(1-w^+)), \tag{20}$$

and

$$w^+ = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2-\alpha}{4}(z_1 - z_2) + \frac{a(1-2w^+)}{w^+(1-w^+)}. \tag{21}$$

Note that $z_1 > z_2$ implies that $w^+ > 1/2$.

The following results then obtain.

PROPOSITION 2. *a) In an interior equilibrium, higher levels of public financing result in particularistic policies closer to the median, so that candidates cater less to interest groups and compete harder for the informed vote (in this sense, public financing offsets voter ignorance); b) the (interior) equilibrium probability of winning is independent of the proportion k of uninformed voters; and c) public financing of elections has an "underdog property," since an increase in public financing increases the probability of winning of the candidate with the lower probability of winning—that is,*

$$\frac{dw^+}{db} < (=)(>)\ 0 \quad \text{if} \quad w^+ > (=)(<)\ \frac{1}{2}.$$

The probability w^+ of winning thus is weakly closer to one-half with public financing than the probability w^* without that financing; that is,

$$z_1 > z_2 \rightarrow w^* > w^+ > \frac{1}{2}$$

$$z_1 < z_2 \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} > w^+ > w^*$$

$$z_1 = z_2 \rightarrow w^* = w^+ = \frac{1}{2}.$$

This underdog property holds for both interior equilibria and equilibria with both policies at the extremes or at the median. Public financing thus results in closer elections by mitigating, but not overturning, the interest group advantage (e.g., $z_1 > z_2$) of a candidate.

Proof. The proofs of Proposition 2a and b are immediate from equations 19–21. As for 2c, subtracting the probability w^* in equation 12 from equation 21 yields

$$w^+ - w^* = \frac{a(1-2w^+)}{2w^+(1-w^+)}.$$

Thus, the sign of $w^+ - w^*$ is the same as the sign of $(1-2w^+)$; and the result follows. Q.E.D.

Public financing of elections thus results in closer elections and in less catering to interest groups. In terms of electoral incentives, public financing weakens the centrifugal incentive to provide particularistic benefits to interest groups and strengthens the centrifugal incentive to compete for the informed vote. These results support the conventional wisdom that public financing of elections allows candidates to be more independent of interest groups.

Campaign contributions by interest groups are decreasing in a, but total contributions $C_1^+ + C_2^+ + 2a$ are increasing in a, since at an interior equilibrium

$$\frac{d(C_1^+ + C_2^+ + 2a)}{da} = \frac{4k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(1-2w^+)\frac{dw^+}{da},$$

and the sign of dw^+/da is the same as the sign of $(1 - 2w^+)$. These results are summarized in a formal proposition.

PROPOSITION 3. *Public financing of elections results in higher total campaign expenditures, and the expenditures are increasing in the proportion k of uninformed voters.*

Individuals, rather than interest groups or government, make the bulk of the campaign contributions. Individual contributions affect the incentive to raise contributions from interest groups and hence affect the policy positions of the candidates and the total contributions generated in the election. In a model in which each informed voter not a member of an interest group is assumed to make a contribution to the candidate with the closer policy position, the equilibrium policy positions are weakly closer to the median, as with public financing (Baron 1992). For symmetric equilibria, policy positions are closer to the median with individual contributions than with public financing, because candidates have an additional centripetal incentive to compete not only for the votes of the informed voters but also for their campaign contributions. Indeed, in contrast to public financing, total campaign contributions are decreasing in the amount of individual contributions, since interest groups decrease their contributions at a faster rate than individual contributors increase theirs. Individual contributions thus decrease the dependence of candidate on interest groups more effectively than does public financing. Individual contributions, however, suffer from the free-rider problem.

INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGES

This model is electorally symmetric in the sense that neither candidate has an a priori advantage in the electorate. The model thus may be thought of as corresponding to an open-seat election. If one of the candidates is an incumbent, however, symmetry is not a good assumption. Incumbents have a variety of advantages, two of which are considered here.

One incumbency advantage arises from how much interest groups value the policy efforts of the candidates. A candidate with seniority may have more influence in the legislature and thus be more likely to be successful in legislative matters. In that case, the valuations of their policy efforts by interest groups would satisfy $z_1 > z_2$. As indicated, the policy p_1^* in equation 13 is strictly increasing in z_1, as is the equilibrium probability w^* in equation 12. The incumbent then has a higher probability of winning because he or she can afford to be more independent of interest groups, since those groups value the policy more highly. The incumbent is thus more responsive to the informed voters and chooses a policy closer to the median than does the challenger. Challengers cater more to interest groups than do incumbents, and incumbents are more independent of interest groups. If the incumbency advantage increases with seniority, then, over time, an incumbent caters less to interest groups.

Other sources of incumbency advantage are party identification and name recognition, which might, for example, come from past campaigns or the use of franking privileges. In the context of the model, these advantages do not affect the informed voters, who continue to vote according to the positions of the candidates, but do affect the uninformed voters. The simplest representation of this advantage is to specify the probability of candidate 1 winning as[22]

$$W_1 = k\frac{\beta w(z_1 - p_1)}{\beta w(z_1 - p_1) + C_2} + (1-k)\left(\frac{p_1 + p_2}{2} + \frac{\alpha}{2}\left(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{p_1 + p_2}{2}\right)\right), \quad (22)$$

where candidate 1 is assumed to be the incumbent and $\beta > 1$ parameterizes the incumbency advantage.

For an interior equilibrium, the following results obtain:

$$p_1 = z_1 - \frac{4kw(1-w)\beta}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)(w\beta + (1-w))^2}$$

$$p_2 = 1 - z_2 + \frac{4kw(1-w)\beta}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)(w\beta + (1-w))^2}$$

$$p_1 + p_2 = 1 + z_1 - z_2$$

$$C_1 = \frac{4kw^2(1-w)\beta}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)(w\beta + (1-w))^2} \quad (23)$$

$$C_2 = \frac{4kw(1-w)^2\beta}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)(w\beta + (1-w))^2} \quad (24)$$

$$W_1 = k\frac{w\beta}{w\beta + (1-w)} + (1-k)\left(\frac{\alpha}{4} + (2-\alpha)\left(\frac{1 + z_1 - z_2}{2}\right)\right). \quad (25)$$

The rational expectations condition $W_1 = w^*$ yields

$$w^* = \frac{1}{2(\beta - 1)}(1 - k\beta - (\beta - 1)\eta + \sqrt{(1 - k\beta - (\beta - 1)\eta)^2 + 4(\beta - 1)\eta}),$$

where

$$\eta \equiv \frac{1-k}{4}(\alpha + (2-\alpha)(1 + C - z_2)).$$

Since in equation 25,

$$\frac{w\beta}{w\beta + (1-w)} > w,$$

the equilibrium probability of winning satisfies $w^* > 1/2$ when $\beta > 1$ and $z_1 \geq z_2$. In equilibrium, the incumbent is thus the more likely to win.

The equilibrium w^* is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function of β, so a greater incumbency advantage results in a higher probability of winning. The probability of winning is strictly increasing in z_1 and strictly decreasing in z_2, so a greater interest group advantage results in a higher probability of winning. If there is no interest group advantage, the probability of winning is constant in the common valuation z. The equilibrium probability w^* is a decreasing function of the proportion α of informed voters who are members of interest groups as long as the challenger does not have a substantial interest group advantage; that is, $1/2 < z_2 - z_1$. In contrast to the case with no incumbency advantage, the equilibrium probability of winning is a strictly decreasing function of the proportion of uninformed voters. This results because the challenger can compete more effectively the more productive his or her campaign expenditures are.

To investigate the effect of the incumbency advantage β on candidate positions, consider the case in which $z_1 = z_2 = z$. The policy positions then are symmetric, and as a function of β, those positions respond as

$$\frac{dp_1^*}{d\beta} = \left(\frac{4k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}\right)\left(\frac{w^*\beta - (1-w^*)}{(w^*\beta + 1 - w^*)^3}\right)\left[\beta\frac{dw^*}{d\beta} + w^*(1-w^*)\right]$$

and

$$\frac{dp_2^*}{d\beta} = -\frac{dp_1^*}{d\beta}.$$

An incumbency advantage implies that $w^* > 1/2$; and since $\beta > 1$, the term $(w^*\beta - (1 - w^*))$ is positive, and so is $dp_1^*/d\beta$. A greater incumbency advantage increases the incumbent's share of the uninformed vote, and the incumbent moves toward the median to capture more of the informed vote. The challenger also moves toward the median because contributions are less productive as a result of the advantage of the incumbent.

The ratio of the equilibrium campaign contributions in equations 23 and 24 continues to equal the odds ratio for the election as in equation 18. The contributions C_1^* and C_2^* are strictly increasing and convex in the proportion k of uninformed voters, as in the case in which there is no incumbency advantage. Total contributions, however, are strictly decreasing in β. Campaign contributions are thus greater in closer elections (β close to 1) than in elections in which a candidate has a substantial incumbency advantage.

The following proposition summarizes these results.

Proposition 4. *The probability of the incumbent winning is a strictly increasing function of his or her incumbency advantage and interest group advantage and a strictly decreasing function of the proportion of uninformed voters. The particularistic policy of the incumbent is closer to the median, the greater the incumbency advantage, and the challenger also moves closer to the median. Campaign contributions are decreasing in the incumbency advantage and are increasing in the proportion of uninformed voters. Total contributions are higher, the closer the election.*

COLLECTIVE POLICIES

Collective policies differ from particularistic policies because they cannot be denied to an interest group that does not contribute to a candidate. In addition, collective policies affect all the interest groups, so the contributions by an interest group depend on the policies of both candidates. The policy in this case can be thought of as the scale of a public good provided. For the case of collective policies and informed voters, the median voter theorem implies that candidates choose policy positions at the median. I shall investigate whether this result is robust with respect to the presence of uninformed voters.

Since the collective policy of the winner will be implemented regardless of whether an interest group makes a contribution, the fundamental issue is why an interest group would contribute. Indeed, if an interest group takes the probability of winning as given, there is no reason to contribute. For this reason, models involving collective policies typically make the assumption that the interest group can affect the probability of winning. I shall thus consider the case in which each interest group explicitly takes into account how its contribution affects, at the margin, the probability of winning. Instead of the candidate and the interest groups bargaining over the contribution to be made, each interest group chooses its contribution, taking as given the policies of the candidates. For interest groups to be able to do so, they must know the functional relation between their contribution and the probability of winning. This requires that they have information about the aggregate contributions of other interest groups to the candidates, which is a strong informational assumption.[23] Even with this assumption, for the specifications used earlier, both candidates choose policies at the median and are unable to generate any contributions.

For interest group j, the expected net benefits D_j from contributions c_{ij} to candidate i, $i = 1, 2$, are specified as

$$D_j = W_1\eta(z_1 - p_1) + (1 - W_1)\eta(z_1 - p_2) - c_{1j} - c_{2j}, \tag{26}$$

where η, $\eta > 0$, is a parameter and W_1 is given in equation 22.[24] The interest groups are assumed to take the positions of the candidates and the contributions of the other interest groups as given when they make their contributions. It is straightforward to show that if $p_2 > p_1$, an interest group aligned with the candidate on the left will contribute only to that candidate.[25] The optimal contribution satisfies the first-order condition

$$\eta(p_2 - p_1)\frac{\partial W_1}{\partial c_1} - 1 = 0, \tag{27}$$

where

$$\frac{\partial W_1}{\partial c_1} = k\frac{\beta C_2}{(\beta C_1 + C_2)^2} \tag{28}$$

and $C_i = \Sigma_j c_{ij}$, $i = 1, 2$. Using equation 28 in equation 27 yields the implicit relation

$$\eta(p_2 - p_1)k\frac{\beta C_2}{(\beta C_1 + C_2)^2} = 1. \tag{29}$$

In a similar manner, the optimal contributions to candidate 2 by interest groups aligned with that candidate imply

$$\eta(p_2 - p_1)k\frac{\beta C_1}{(\beta C_1 + C_2)^2} = 1. \tag{30}$$

The expressions in equations 29 and 30 are the (implicit) aggregate response functions of the interest groups aligned with the two candidates. Note that the contributions depend on the difference between the policies of the candidates.

Substituting the response functions in equations 29 and 30 into candidate 1's probability of winning yields[26]

$$W_1 = k\frac{\beta}{\beta + 1} + \frac{1 - k}{4}(\alpha + (2 - \alpha)(p_1 + p_2)). \tag{31}$$

The first term in equation 31 corresponds to the uninformed voters and is independent of the policy positions. Recognizing this, the candidates compete only for the informed vote. Both candidates thus locate at the median. From equation 27, the contributions are then zero, since the interest groups are indifferent as to who wins. This result is summarized in a formal proposition.

Proposition 5. *In electoral competition based on collective policies, if each interest group believes that its contribution affects the probability of winning, both candidates locate at the median, and contributions are zero. Competition for the informed vote thus dominates.*

This result obtains because the contributions to each candidate depend only on the difference in their policy positions. Hence, a movement to the center by candidate 1 decreases both the candidate's and the opponent's contributions proportionately, and the ratio of his contributions to the total contributions remains constant. A candidate is thus unable to influence his or her share of the uninformed vote, because the interest groups adjust their contributions to any change in policy. Being unable to affect their shares of the uninformed vote, the candidates compete for the informed vote, and the centripetal incentives lead them to the median. Contributors thus lose their power in elections in which the competition is on collective policies.

These results are more general than the linear specification of benefits in equation 26. If $v_i(p_j)$ denotes the value of the benefits to the interest group aligned with candidate i when policy p_j is pursued in the legislature, a sufficient condition for both candidates to locate at the median is that the term

$$\frac{v_2(p_2) - v_2(p_1)}{v_1(p_1) - v_1(p_2)} \tag{32}$$

be constant in the policies. Whenever the candidates locate at the median, the contributions are zero for each candidate.

The results for particularistic and collective policies suggest that contributions are generated less by collective policies than by particularistic policies. If collective policies do generate contributions from interest groups, it calls into question one of two assumptions: (1) that the interest groups optimize, rather than bargain with candidates, or (2) either that the contributions do not depend on the difference between the collective policy positions as in the expression in equation 32 or the probability of winning have forms different from those considered here.

DISCUSSION

Most candidates devote considerable effort to raising campaign contributions and recognize that the policy positions that they take affect the amount of those contributions. Those policies also affect the voting of the informed portion of the electorate. Candidates thus must take into account the effect of their policy positions both directly, on the voting of informed voters, and indirectly, through the effect of campaign expenditures on uninformed voters. The two types of policy dimensions considered here are *particularistic policies,* which provide benefits to certain interest groups while imposing widely distributed costs on those who cannot be expected to take political action, and *collective policies,* which yield costs and benefits for all interest groups. These policies are distinguished by two characteristics. First, particularistic policies are provided only in exchange for contributions, whereas collective policies are provided by the winning candidate regardless of whether a contribution is made. Second, for particularistic policies, contributions to a candidate depend only on his or her position, whereas for collective policies, contributions depend on the positions of both candidates.

The model of electoral competition yields a number of testable hypotheses. Any test should, however, be specific as to the nature of the policies with which candidates compete. In the case of particularistic policies, the equilibrium policy positions of candidates depend on the proportion of uninformed voters. If that proportion is low, the dominant electoral incentives are provided by the informed vote. These are the same incentives as those underlying the median voter theorem; hence, both candidates choose positions at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters. This results because when there are relatively few uninformed voters to influence through campaign expenditures, the productivity of those expenditures is low, and candidates compete for the informed vote by moving toward the median, rather than catering to interest groups to raise campaign contributions. If the proportion of uninformed voters is high, however, candidates cater to interest groups and use the campaign contributions received to compete for the uninformed vote. The incentives to compete for the uninformed vote can lead candidates to separate their positions. For intermediate proportions of the uninformed vote, candidate positions are strictly farther from the median, the higher the proportion of the uninformed vote. Polarization can thus result from the conjunction of uninformed voters and interest groups' contributions.

The equilibrium policies and the election outcome also depend on the value of the particularistic policies to the interest groups aligned with each candidate. If one candidate is aligned with higher-demand interest groups, that candidate has an advantage in raising contributions and can afford to choose a policy position closer to the median. The candidate aligned with the higher-demand interest groups thus caters less to interest groups, competes harder for the informed vote by moving closer to the median, and in equilibrium has the higher probability of winning. The candidate aligned with higher-demand interest groups is thus more independent of interest groups in the sense that his or her policy is more centrist. If informed voters cast contributions, in addition to votes, the incentives underlying the median voter theorem are strengthened.

Public financing of elections increases the probability of winning of the candidate who is the underdog, that is, who has the lower probability of winning. The equilibrium locations of the candidates are closer to the median as the amount of public financing increases. Public financing thus results in closer elections and less catering to interest groups, but total campaign expenditures are higher than when there is no public financing.

Most congressional elections involve an incumbent, and incumbents may have an advantage with respect to name recognition, reputation, or party identification. Such advantages presumably pertain to uninformed voters, so the incumbency advantage is modeled in terms of the effectiveness of the incumbent's campaign expenditures in attracting the uninformed vote. In equilibrium, the probability of the incumbent winning is a strictly increasing function of the incumbency advantage, and the particularistic policy position of the incumbent is closer to the median, the greater the incumbency advantage. Because of that advantage, the incumbent has a lower demand for campaign contributions and competes harder for the informed vote by choosing a position closer to the median. The incumbent is thus more independent of interest groups than is the challenger. Total campaign expenditures are decreasing in the incumbency advantage, so expenditures are higher, the closer the election.

Collective policy positions affect all interest groups regardless of whether they contribute. With collective policies, there is no incentive to contribute unless the contributions are believed to affect the probability of winning. If the probability of winning depends on the contribution of an individual interest group and if interest groups maximize the net benefits from their contributions, then in a symmetric election both candidates locate at the median and contributions are zero. This result depends on the relation between the benefits to interest groups and candidate positions, but it suggests that campaign contributions may be raised more by particularistic policies than by collective policies.

The empirical literature on campaign contributions and policies presents a variety of conflicting results, and the model considered here provides an explanation of some of those disparate results. In particular, the model indicates the importance of distinguishing between particularistic and collective policies. For particularistic policies, the model yields the prediction from equation 9 that the probability of winning is equal to that candidate's fraction of the total campaign contributions. Snyder (1990a and b) tests this proposition for contributions by investor political action committees, and the data for open-seat elections in the House and for Senate elections support that prediction. The model also predicts that the same relation holds for elections with an incumbency advantage and with public financing.

The model also provides predictions about the relation between campaign contributions and policies. Those policies presumably are reflected ex post in the winner's legislative voting, so an endogenous relation between campaign contributions and legislative voting is predicted. That relation, however, depends importantly on the type of policy. Chappell (1982) studied policies for which the proportion of uninformed voters should be high and found weak evidence of a relation between contributions and congressional voting.[27] The model presented here predicts that the relation should depend on the proportion of uninformed voters, as well as whether the winning candidate had an interest group advantage or an incumbency advantage. A high percentage of winners are incumbents, and the model predicts that with a strong incumbency advantage the position of the winner could be close to the median, which may provide an explanation for Chappell's findings.

Wright (1990) studied two collective policy issues and found no relation between contributions and congressional voting. The model predicts that candidate policies should be at the median and that no contributions should be raised from these policies. Wright's findings are consistent with the first prediction of the model but not with the second. It is, of course, possible that the contributions are made to obtain access for lobbying directed toward particularistic policies. In that case, the model predicts that contributions would be generated.

Wilhite and Theilmann (1987) studied congressional voting on labor issues and found a positive relation between labor political action committee contributions and congressional voting. If the labor issues are collective, the model indicates that a test should include business contributions as well. The relation between labor political action contributions and congressional voting may reflect the alignment of labor interest groups with a set of candidates on the same side of issues as labor.

The theory presented here warrants at least five types of extension. One is to consider a sequence of elections in which candidates can build seniority and incumbency advantage and incumbents can generate campaign contributions through current, as well as anticipated, actions. Second, a theory of electoral competition involving campaign contributions should be extended to include lobbying of current officeholders. Third, electoral competition on policy dimensions should include more than one category of policy and should be multidimensional. Fourth, the effect of campaign expenditures on the voting of the uninformed electorate should be represented not by a reduced form but rather by a micro theory of voter information and behavior. Fifth, to the extent that campaign contributions are informative, the proportion of informed voters should depend on the campaign expenditures of the two candidates.

Notes

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1. Wright (1990) studied the relationship between campaign contributions, subsequent lobbying, and legislative voting and found that the effect of contributions is through lobbying, which suggests that access is facilitated by contributions. Wilhite and Theilmann (1987) find that contributions by labor political action committees affect congressional voting on labor issues.

2. Equilibrium models of electoral competition based on the constituency service activities are from Baron 1989a and b.

3. This representation is developed from Lowi 1964 and Wilson 1980.

4. See Baron 1993, 125–30. Some interest groups eventually did form on this issue.

5. Denzau and Munger's (1986) model does not include an electoral challenger. They consider an electorate that is rationally ignorant and an electorate that is fully informed, but in contrast to the model here, their focus is on the allocation of a legislator's effort between interest groups and the electorate.

6. Londregan and Romer (1993) consider a model of electoral competition in which parties compete both on a collective policy dimension and on constituent services. The collective policy position is known, but voters receive only a noisy signal about the ability of the candidates to provide services. They find that the more voters value the services, the more separated are the candidates' policies on the collective dimension. In an election in which one candidate is an incumbent, the incumbency advantage is greater, the stronger voters' preferences for services are.

7. A coauthor and I study a model in which interest groups can switch between the candidates based on which candidate makes the more attractive offer of constituent services (Baron and Mo 1993).

8. If a policy imposes significant costs on interest groups on the other side, the policy is said to be collective.

9. Although the policy sets of the candidates may result from party identifications, parties are not actors in the model.

10. Banks (1990) provides a theory in which candidate positions are signals of future legislative actions. Chappell (1982) studied issues affecting only a single interest group and found only a weak relationship between contributions and subsequent legislative voting. The role of reelection interests in generating credible commitments is considered in Austen-Smith and Banks 1989 and Baron 1989b.

11. A voter does not choose an interest group, but instead, interest groups are formed from among voters who have similar characteristics such as occupation.

12. That is, G has the form

$$G(\phi|\theta) = (\theta - \phi)k + \frac{1}{2},$$

where

$$\phi = \frac{1}{2k} - \frac{1-k}{k}s_1 \quad \text{and} \quad \theta = \frac{C_1}{C_1 + C_2}.$$

13. If $C_1 = C_2 = 0$, this term is defined to be 1/2.

14. Another interpretation of the specification in equation 3 comes from models of probabilistic voting. If t (which depends on both positions and campaign expenditures) denotes the probability that a randomly selected voter will vote for candidate 1, then the probability T of candidate 1 winning is

$$T = \sum_{j=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} \frac{N!}{j!(N-j)!} t^j (1-t)^{N-j},$$

where N is the number of voters. For large N, maximizing the expected number of votes is equivalent to maximizing the probability of winning (Hinich 1977). Austen-Smith (1987) then assumes that the probability of winning can be approximated by the expected number of votes divided by N, which corresponds to W_1.

15. See Snyder 1990a.

16. The contributions function C_1 in equation 5 is specified as strictly decreasing in p_1, but since interest group preferences can be expected to be distributed across the policy space, there is no natural reason for this response function to be monotonic. If contributions reach a maximum at an interior point, $\bar{p}_1$, of [0, 1/2], the candidate would never choose a position farther from the median than that position. Consequently, the results indicating that the candidates separate their positions can be interpreted as meaning that candidate 1 never chooses a position to the left of max $\{0, \bar{p}_1\}$. To simplify the notation, $\bar{p}_1$ will be assumed to be 0, and the corresponding $\bar{p}_2$ will be assumed to be 1.

17. The specifications in equations 5 and 6 are based on the perspective that an interest group takes the probability of winning as independent of its contribution and that the candidate and the interest group bargain over the amount of the contribution. An alternative formulation is that an interest group believes that its contribution affects the probability of winning and thus chooses its contribution optimally based on its effect on that probability. This formulation is considered in Baron 1992, and the resulting equilibrium is shown to be qualitatively the same as the equilibrium based on equations 5 and 6. For a symmetric election, the equilibrium policies and contributions are identical in the two formulations.

18. Note that the beliefs w are not a direct function of policies. Beliefs adjust to policies only in accord with the contributions those policies generate.

19. The valuations z_i may be related to α, but I shall discuss the partial effects holding constant the other parameters.

20. For the asymmetric case, the responses to changes in the valuation parameters, for an interior equilibrium, are

$$\frac{dp_1^*}{dz_1} = 1 + \frac{2k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(z_1 - z_2)$$

$$\frac{dp_2^*}{dz_2} = -1 + \frac{2k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(z_1 - z_2)$$

$$\frac{dp_1^*}{dz_2} = \frac{dp_2^*}{dz_1} = -\frac{2k}{(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(z_1 - z_2).$$

If $z_1 > z_2$, so that the interest groups aligned with candidate 1 have a higher valuation than the interest groups aligned with candidate 2, an increase in z_1 moves both policies toward the median. This results because candidate 1 finds it easier to raise campaign contributions and thus can choose a policy that attracts more of the informed voters. Candidate 2 responds to candidate 1's move by also moving closer to the median. If $z_2 > z_1$, an increase in z_2 causes both candidates to choose policies closer to the median. If $z_1 > z_2$, however, an increase in z_2 causes candidate 1 to move away from the median. Depending on the values of k and α, candidate 2 may choose a policy closer to or farther from the median as z_2 increases. For k high, candidate 2 may move away from the median.

21. For the asymmetric case, as a function of z_1,

$$\frac{dC_1^*}{dz_1} = \frac{k}{2(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(2 + (z_1 - z_2)(2-\alpha)) \cdot (2 - 3(2-\alpha)(z_1 - z_2))$$

$$\frac{dC_2^*}{dz_1} = -\frac{k}{2(1-k)(2-\alpha)}(2 - (z_1 - z_2)(2-\alpha)) \cdot (2 + 3(2-\alpha)(z_1 - z_2)).$$

22. Public financing is not included here.

23. Campaign contribution reporting requirements provide such information but only with a lag.

24. For particularistic policies, the contributions were represented as $w(z_1 - p_1)$, and here, benefits are $w\eta(z_1 - p_1)$. If $\eta = 2$ and interest groups and candidates bargain to a 50–50 division of the benefits, then C_1 in equation 5 is half the benefits.

25. Austen-Smith (1987) considers electoral competition in collective policy positions and allows interest groups to contribute to both candidates. He shows that an interest group will never contribute to both. Empirical evidence indicates that most political action committees contribute to only one candidate.

26. Analogous to the specification just made, the term $\beta C_1/(\beta C_1 + C_2)$ is specified as $\beta/(\beta + 1)$ when $C_1 = C_2 = 0$.

27. The policies considered by Chappell (1982) include a mixture of particularistic and collective policies. Those policies are mortgage disclosure requirements, milk price supports, truck weight limits, tax rebates for oil companies,

funding for the B-1 bomber, auto emissions controls, and maritime cargo preference.

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THE NATURE OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE JURISDICTIONS

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Jurisdictions are the defining characteristics of committee systems, and they are central in any discussions about the U.S. Congress; yet we know little about them. Where do committee property rights come from? Are they rigid? Are they flexible? I introduce a distinction between statutory jurisdictions (which are written in the House and Senate Rules) and common law jurisdictions (which emerge through bill referral precedents). Turf is gained through common law advances, not through formal rules changes (like the "reforms" passed by the House in 1946, 1974, and 1980). Jurisdictional change is ongoing and incremental. The analysis draws on an examination of hearings held by the House Commerce Committee from 1947 through 1990.

Jurisdictions ("turf," or "policy property rights") are the defining characteristics of committee systems, and they are central in any discussions about Congress. Unfortunately, we know little about them. That is, we know that members seek seats on committees based largely on turf (Shepsle 1978), and we know that who has jurisdiction over an issue can have a tremendous impact on what policies, if any, eventually emerge (Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Tiefer 1989). But how did we end up with the committee system we now have? Where do jurisdictions come from in the first place? How do they change? These are critical questions.

If jurisdictions rarely change, then legislatures are not good at adapting when new issues like child care, sex discrimination, and industrial competitiveness emerge. If turf is carved out so that lawmakers can institutionalize logrolls and make it easier to distribute benefits back home (Weingast and Marshall 1988), then many of us might want to undermine those property rights in the name of the public interest. However, if property rights are granted to committees as rewards for specializing in complicated policy areas (Krehbiel 1991), then there might be good reasons for reinforcing the ways jurisdictions are arranged.

Where do jurisdictions come from? Are they rigid? Are they flexible? These questions are rarely asked, because jurisdictions have been fundamentally misconceived by many political scientists. Jurisdictions are *not* rigid institutional facts that rarely change. Rather, they are turbulent battle grounds on which policy entrepreneurs seek to expand their influence. What Washington insiders call "the jurisdiction game" is widely played on Capitol Hill, and that game has much to teach us about the dynamics of legislative institutions.

I shall describe the nature of committee jurisdictions, with an emphasis on understanding the role of periodic jurisdictional reforms (like those in 1946 and 1974). As such, the foundation is laid for a theory of jurisdictional change discussed in more detail elsewhere (King 1992). Most of my examples will draw on the House of Representatives, though the basic nature of committee jurisdictions is the same in the Senate and is similar in a majority of the state legislatures.

First, I introduce a critical distinction between common law jurisdictions, which emerge out of bill referral precedents, and statutory jurisdictions, which are written down in the House and Senate rules. I then examine the House Commerce Committee's jurisdiction for the emergence of common law issues. Finally, I show that jurisdictional "reforms" amount to little more than the codifications of common law jurisdictions. So if we want to understand how jurisdictions (and legislatures more generally) change, we should focus less on reforms and more on incremental day-to-day adaptations in unwritten (but often binding) rules.

THE SOURCES OF JURISDICTIONAL LEGITIMACY

Turf is hotly contested in Congress, and for good reason. One committee staff director described it this way: "Jurisdiction boils down to whether you'll have a seat at the table when important decisions are being made. If you're not at the table, you're a nobody."

Statutory Jurisdictions

There are two ways to get a seat at the table. One is to be on a committee that has turf hard-coded into the House or Senate rules, which I shall call "statutory jurisdiction," because turf is voted on by a majority of the House and Senate when adopting written rules. In practice, the rules of a preceding Congress are used by subsequent sessions with minor and infrequent changes.

Most committees have 10 to 15 specific issues listed under their jurisdiction in the rules. For example, child labor is under the control of the House Education and Labor Committee because it is included among the 14 issues granted the committee in House Rule X, clause 1. Political scientists almost exclusively studied statutory jurisdictions and concluded that jurisdictions rarely change merely because the written rules rarely change (Maass 1983; Collie and Cooper 1989; Smith and Deering 1990). Statutory jurisdictions are easy to find, footnote, and quantify, but the written rules are just one source of jurisdictional legitimacy.

Common Law Jurisdictions

The second way to get a "seat at the table when important decisions are being made" is to be on a committee that has been granted common law jurisdiction. When jurisdictionally *ambiguous* bills are introduced, they still have to be referred to one committee (or sometimes several committees) within 24 hours. As will be explained, the House and Senate parliamentarians—unelected but powerful clerks—refer bills and resolve jurisdictional ambiguities. These referrals establish binding precedents for all future bills on the same subjects, thereby resolving jurisdictional ambiguities. For example, in addition to child labor laws, House Education and Labor (as opposed to the Judiciary Committee) has long claimed a set of juvenile delinquency bills, but that property right is not actually written down in the rules (*Congressional Record* 1959, 1027).

"The law should be stable," wrote Justice Holmes, "but never stand still." So, too, for jurisdictions. The comparison between statutory and common law jurisdictions parallels the distinction lawyers and judges make between statutory and case law. Edward Levi writes that "the basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example" (1949, 1), and this also applies to committee property rights.

With few exceptions (Davidson and Oleszek 1994; Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert 1993; Oleszek 1989), political scientists have acted as if the written rules are the sole source of jurisdictions. Smith and Deering (1990) count the number of statutory issues in a committee's jurisdiction to estimate fragmentation. Sullivan (1984) does something similar when distinguishing between "general" and "functional" committees. Such measures completely miss issues that committees gain through the strategic introduction of bills and the establishment of referral precedents. And while the written rules in the House and Senate rarely change, some observers wrongly believe that jurisdictions also rarely change. "Stories of jurisdictional infighting are legion," write Collie and Cooper "and turf protection is so pronounced as to have frustrated all but the most minor changes in committee jurisdictions since 1945" (1989, 253).

I shall demonstrate that the received wisdom, reflected in the quote from Collie and Cooper, is simply not true. Stories of jurisdictional infighting are legion, and so are jurisdictional advances made through the strategic use of bill referral precedents. Consumer protection, national energy strategy, insurance regulation, and "fair" trade are just a few not-so-minor issues that have been claimed by committees since 1945. And for every committee that wins jurisdiction, there are many more that do not. Some committees now employ staffers called "border cops," whose jobs involve protecting turf and looking out for new areas to conquer.

Precedent-setting referral decisions are made by the House and Senate parliamentarians *routinely* (in several senses of the word). They use a predictable and nonpartisan set of decision rules for handing out turf (King 1992), and players in the jurisdiction game have come to count on these decision rules when drafting legislation (Tiefer 1989; Zorack 1990). The resolution of jurisdictional ambiguities is also commonplace. From 1935 through 1963, an average of 18 new common law expansions were recorded every year in Cannon's *Procedure*, and that underestimates the true number, because many were only recorded in the *Congressional Record* (Cannon 1963).

Interview evidence consistently points to changing jurisdictions. When one of the House parliamentarians learned that some observers think of turf as what is written down in the rules, implying that jurisdictions are largely static, he replied

> PARLIAMENTARIAN: I can see why, from a political scientist's standpoint, there would be some confusion. But we simply have to use past referral decisions to guide what we do. You just never know what new things are going to come up.
>
> INTERVIEWER: Then through referral precedents, jurisdictions can change. Do you think they have changed much in your time here?
>
> PARLIAMENTARIAN: Oh heavens yes, they're much different than when I came to Congress. Yes there are changes. There are always changes. Look at the battle over OCS [outercontinental shelf]. Look at the jurisdiction over national parks and the Interior Committee. Look at what constitutes a fee and what is a tax. There are too many like these to name. (Interview by author, 14 June 1991)

The strategic value of playing the jurisdiction game is well known to members of Congress. Because they have considerable say over their own agendas, committee and subcommittee chairs are more likely than junior members to lead jurisdictional forays. Former representative James Florio (D-NJ) was a subcommittee chair in the mid 1980s, and the following statement by him is typical of many I encountered during not-for-attribution interviews: "We're expanding our jurisdiction. We've got authority over the FTC [Federal Trade Commission], and that gets you to antitrust and regulation. We've begun to deal with some trade issues. There was a headline the other day, "Florio on Trade." The legislative credentials and the jurisdiction give you a forum on almost everything. From the forum you affect public opinion and from that you get clout" (quoted in Loomis 1988, 168).

Any current list of House committees gaining common law turf is topped by Energy and Commerce, chaired by John Dingell (D-MI), followed perhaps by Ways and Means under Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL); Natural Resources since 1991, when George Miller (D-CA) took over as chair; and Science, Space, and

Technology since 1990, when George Brown (D-CA) became chair. The list of jurisdictionally expansive committees may change from time to time, but the basic underlying strategies for gaining common law turf have been used since the institutionalization of the parliamentarian's office following the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon (King 1992).

Common law jurisdictions advance into the "grey areas" between committees when bills on jurisdictionally ambiguous issues are referred by the parliamentarians. Is there any value to political scientists in distinguishing between common law and statutory jurisdictions? Yes, for three reasons. First, it is a distinction that players in the jurisdiction game make implicitly. Some also distinguish between "literal" and "unwritten" jurisdictions. Others talk about "formal" and "informal" turf. But in any event, common law jurisdictions are just as binding as what is written in the rules. Second, if it can be shown that jurisdictions change through bill referral precedents, then we may gain insight into how legislatures change more generally. Most observers have focused on specific reform periods in which the written rules changed (Rieselbach 1986), but if institutional change is ongoing and reforms simply codify common law changes, then we should pay more attention to how institutions are changing day to day. Third, if institutional change happens through common law adaptations, understanding that process will help us better evaluate the competing claims of distributive politics theorists (Weingast and Marshall 1988) and organization and informational efficiency theorists (Krehbiel 1991; Polsby 1968).

THE PARLIAMENTARIANS

House and Senate parliamentarians are central to the jurisdiction game, but these institutional guardians have been long overlooked by scholars, perhaps because they guard their anonymity carefully. Journalists on Capitol Hill know the parliamentarians as important players who are reluctant to be interviewed and do not like to be photographed. In the House, the parliamentarians update the books of precedents, assist the Rules Committee on technical issues related to floor management, advise members of both parties on parliamentary procedure, and refer all bills to committees (no matter how jurisdictionally ambiguous those bills may be). As congressional employees, the parliamentarians are unelected either by voters or by members of Congress (Siff and Weil 1975).

According to the House rules, the Speaker is charged with referring bills to committees, but in practice the Speaker has rarely been involved in these decisions since the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910. It is well understood by members, their staffs, and Washington lobbyists that the parliamentarians are the central figures in bill referrals (Tiefer 1989).

There are five parliamentarians in the House, four of whom work under the head parliamentarian, who serves, ostensibly, "at the pleasure of the Speaker." But the parliamentarians are surprisingly independent of the Speaker (King 1992; Tiefer 1989; Zorack 1990), and they pride themselves on making nonpartisan decisions. It is also common for members of the minority party to praise the parliamentarians as nonpartisan, which one would not expect if they were simply doing the Speaker's handiwork. Trained as lawyers, the parliamentarians are expected to serve Congress for most of their professional lives (Lewis Deschler was head House parliamentarian from 1928 to 1974, serving under nine Speakers), and they think of themselves as institutional guardians.

When deciding where to send a jurisdictionally ambiguous bill (thereby granting common law turf to the committee that gets the bill), the parliamentarians use a decision rule called "the weight of the bill," which is similar to the legal construct "the weight of the evidence." This decision rule is self-consciously used so that the expertise of members in a "close-by" jurisdiction can be tapped. In this way, the parliamentarians help reinforce the kind of informationally efficient committee system that Krehbiel (1991) envisions. But like judges, the parliamentarians can only adjudicate jurisdictional disputes after a case is brought to them in a bill referral, and the entrepreneurial activity among members that drives the search for "hot" jurisdictionally ambiguous issues is best understood in a distributive framework (Weingast and Marshall 1988).

With respect to one jurisdictionally ambiguous issue—magnetically levitated trains—this dynamic has been tested empirically (King 1992). Institutional change involves both distributional incentives at the individual level (Weingast and Marshall 1988) *and* an institutional response, through the parliamentarians, that promotes an informationally efficient committee system (Krehbiel 1991).

Almost all jurisdictional change happens in "new" areas or in old areas that are being recast in the light of new events (Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert 1993). Most border wars are not fought along well trenched lines with one committee trying to take away another committee's turf. A few recent works have focused on attempted takeaways (LaRue and Rothenberg 1992; Shipan 1992, 1993; Krehbiel and Lavin 1993), but House and Senate rules are strongly protective of established property rights.[1] Rather, the real action is over unclaimed territory, over the resolution of jurisdictional ambiguities. When the parliamentarians adjudicate jurisdictional ambiguities by referring a bill to one committee (and sometimes several committees), their decisions are binding. As one former staff director put it, "If you lose with the parliamentarians, you've lost forever."

Multiple Referrals

Since 1975 in the House (and informally, many years earlier in the Senate), it has been possible for one bill to be referred to more than one committee (Davidson and Oleszek 1992; Young and Cooper 1993). In recent years, 15–20% of all House bills have been multiply referred, though the actual percentage of all public laws that were first multiply referred is somewhat less.[2] There are, in practice, two types of multiple referrals: joint and sequential.[3] Joint referrals, in which one bill is sent to more than one committee *at the same time*, is the most common, comprising more than 94% of all multiple referrals in the Ninty-Ninth Congress, 1986–86 (Davidson, Olsezek and Kephart 1988). With sequential referrals, additional committees may get a chance at a bill only after (and only if) it is reported out of a lead committee.

At first, it might appear that multiple referrals could lead to jurisdictional free-for-alls, with identical bills going to multiple committees. Collie and Cooper (1989) argue that through multiple referrals, committees have sacrificed autonomy over their own issues for jurisdiction over issues in other committees. In practice, committees have most assuredly *not* surrendered autonomy. Though not specified in the written rules, the practice under joint referrals is that committees are limited to working only on issues within their established domain (Young and Cooper 1993). To do anything else welcomes challenges at the Rules Committee and on the floor, something most committees are eager to avoid. Jointly referred bills reinforce, rather than tear down, jurisdictional walls (King 1992). Committees under multiple referrals may share a bill, but they do not share jurisdictions. In fact, much of the jurisdiction game is geared to avoiding sharing turf at all.

I turn now to an examination of the House Commerce Committee's jurisdiction. On Capitol Hill, Commerce is considered the most jurisdictionally expansive House committee. We look at this committee to give the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that jurisdictions are static) its toughest test. If we fail to find common law adaptations here, we should not expect to find them anywhere. The strategies that committee entrepreneurs employ when going after new issues and appealing to the parliamentarians are the same regardless of the committee.

JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE COMMERCE COMMITTEE

Originally named the Committee on Commerce and Manufacturers and dating from 1795, Commerce is one of the House's oldest committees. Its broad mandate was to "take into consideration all such petitions and matters of things touching the commerce and manufacturers of the United States" (U.S. House 1795, 376). The committee's jurisdiction was split in two in 1819, creating the Committee on Manufacturers (which was eliminated in 1911) and the Committee on Commerce. Commerce was renamed Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1892 and became Energy and Commerce in 1981.

Statutory Jurisdiction of House Commerce

House Commerce's statutory jurisdiction is reported in Figure 1. The issues are listed in the order in which they appeared in the Rules. Much of the committee's statutory jurisdiction dates to the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA). Beyond "interstate and foreign commerce generally," the committee was given property rights over civil aeronautics, communications, securities and exchanges, and public health, among other things. Some apparent gains and losses happened in 1974 and 1980, based on the 1974 Hansen–Bolling reforms (HR 988, 93d Congress) and the 1980 energy reforms (HR 549, 96th Congress).

Commerce's jurisdiction is exceptionally broad, partly because the committee's fortunes have been tied to the Constitution's commerce clause, which has been a base from which federal powers have expanded since the Great Depression.

In order to assess the relative importance and size of statutory as opposed to common law jurisdictions, we need a way to measure both. How should one go about it? The Smith and Deering (1990) approach, in which the number of issues listed in the rules plays an important part, fails to capture common law jurisdictions. A second approach might exploit committee calendars, but indexing schemes vary widely from committee to committee and from year to year. A third method—counting the number of entries in the books of precedents—is better. But Cannon's *Procedure* has not been published since 1963, and even if it were published regularly, not all referral precedents are recorded in such lists.[4]

I employ a method based on committee hearings.[5] The Congressional Information Service maintains a computerized listing of all published hearings. For Commerce Committee records, I extracted the number of days the committee held hearings, the number of pages of hearing documents printed, and the number of bills associated with each hearing. After reading one-to-two-page descriptions, each subject raised in a hearing was coded. From 1947 through 1990, 2,534 hearings were examined, and 221 distinct topics were identified. This allows me to construct a time series of the rise and fall of issues in the Commerce Committee.

Beyond identifying issues, each topic was categorized as either based on the committee's statutory jurisdiction or based on bill referral precedents. Here it was important to be conservative and to err on the side of overestimating the percentage of the committee's activities based on the House rules. For example, for 1947, the following hearing topics were all identified as justifiable based on the committee's statutory jurisdiction (in parentheses): agreements between carriers (interstate trucking), Alaska airports (civil aeronautics), amendments to the Natural Gas Act (interstate pipelines), and iodized salt (public health). But also in 1947, the committee authorized the creation of the National Science Foundation, which may have its merits but is not even remotely mentioned in the 1947 House Rules Manual. The

FIGURE 1

Statutory Jurisdiction of the House Commerce Committee



1 Interstate and foreign commerce generally.
2 Regulation of interstate and foreign transportation except transportation by water not subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
3 Regulation of interstate and foreign communications.
4 Civil Aeronautics.
5 Weather Bureau.
6 Interstate oil compacts; and petroleum and natural gas, except on public lands.
7 Securities and exchanges.
8 Regulation of interstate transmission of power, except the installation of connections between Government water power projects.
9 Railroad labor and railroad retirement and unemployment, except revenue measures relating thereto.
10 Public health and quarantine
11 Inland waterways.
12 Bureau of Standards, standardization of weights and measures, and the metric system.
13 Consumer affairs and consumer protection.
14 Travel and tourism.
15 Health and health facilities, except health care supported by payroll deductions.
16 Biomedical research and development.
17 National energy policy generally.
18 Measures relating to the exploration, production, storage, supply, marketing, pricing, and regulation of energy resources, including all fossil fuels, solar energy, and other unconventional or renewable energy resources.
19 Measures relating to the conservation of energy resources.
20 Measures relating to the commercial application of energy technology.
21 Measures relating to energy information generally.
22 Measures relating to (A) the generation and marketing of power (except by federally chartered or Federal regional power marketing authorities), (B) the reliability and interstate transmission of, and ratemaking for, all power, and (C) the siting of generation facilities; except the installation of interconnections between Government waterpower projects.
23 Interstate energy compacts.
24 Measures relating to general management of the Department of Energy, and the management of all function of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

National Science Foundation was coded as part of the committee's common law jurisdiction.

Figure 2 shows the percentage of the Commerce Committee's hearing activity on issues in the committee's statutory jurisdiction.[6] Oversight hearings in which no bills were referred are excluded from the data set because it is the referrals, not simply the hearings, that establish binding precedents. The data span the period between the 1946 and 1974 reform acts.[7] Hearing activity is measured by the percentage of the printed pages in hearings that were devoted to each topic.

Several things stand out in Figure 2. First, immediately after the 1946 LRA, more than 90% of the committee's hearing activity was on issues in the committee's statutory jurisdiction. The rules of this period were remarkably accurate descriptions of what the committee was actually doing. For the most part, George Galloway (1946) and the other reformers apparently accomplished what they set out to do, but in the decades that followed, their jurisdictional specifications slowly collapsed in the face of new issues and gradual adjustments. Second, by 1974, the year before new jurisdictional wordings were incorporated into the rules, more than a third of the Commerce Committee's activities were on issues not in the statutory jurisdiction of the committee. If we extended the time line, we would see that merely a third of the committee's activities in 1990 were granted to them in the rules in 1947. The remaining two-thirds of the committee's hearings have been on issues that were either given the committee through the 1974 and 1980 rules changes or taken by the committee through bill referral precedents. Further, the committee's common law jurisdiction more than tripled from 1946 to 1974 as the committee's turf expanded to include (among other things) certain patent infringements, daylight savings time, automobile insurance, and solid waste disposal.

Common Law Jurisdiction of House Commerce

Common law jurisdictions grow when an argument can be made that a new issue is closely related to something that a committee is already doing. One referral precedent is used to justify making another referral precedent, and so on. As a result, the nature of committee jurisdictions is that their expansion is dependent on the path that previous bill referrals have taken. Like the view of evolution in Stephen Jay Gould's (1989) *Wonderful Life*, committee jurisdictions would emerge differently if we reran the clock of history (see also Arthur 1988; David 1975; Dopfer 1991). Just one changed bill referral a generation ago could have made for a dramatically different constellation of jurisdictions today.

The path-dependent nature of jurisdictional change is evident in the Commerce Committee's

FIGURE 2

Commerce Committee Activity in its Statutory Jurisdiction (1947–1974)



acquisition of health policy issues in the 1800s. Beginning with the "protection of American international and domestic trade markets and shipping rights," the committee was referred bills relating to navigation safety, which soon came to include quarantine provisions at seaports. Through the Commerce Committee in 1798, Congress created the Marine Hospital Service to oversee quarantines of immigrants at entry ports (United States, Public Health Service, 1976).

A second part of the path leading to the health turf grew from the dangers of steamboat travel. Beginning in the 1830s and continuing through the end of the century, steam-powered merchant ships ran a booming business. Boiler explosions were common, especially during the 1850s. From 1848 through 1852, 1,155 lives were lost in boiler explosions on the western rivers alone (Hunter 1949). The Marine Hospital Service located hospitals along heavily traveled rivers where boiler explosions and other maritime disasters were likely. When yellow fever and cholera epidemics hit later in the century, the Marine Hospital Service, soon renamed the U.S. Public Health Service, was the only federal health organization capable of helping out.[8] By the close of the nineteenth century, the Commerce Committee had gained "broad jurisdiction over bills relating to the subject of health generally" (Hinds 1907, 4:743). None of this was put into the committee's statutory jurisdiction until 1946. It was clever to link quarantine bills and navigation safety to exploding boilers and marine hospitals, but the strategy of drawing analogies between issues that a committee wants and issues that it already controls is typical.

From 1947 through 1990, the Commerce Committee was referred bills on 133 issues that expanded the committee's jurisdiction. That is an average of three precedent-setting bill referrals every year. Often, those expansions were minor. Commerce used its jurisdiction over travel and tourism in 1983 to solidify its claim to a bill related to international sporting events (United States, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce 1983). But the committee also took major steps into new territory. From its jurisdiction over interstate and foreign transportation, the committee gained jurisdiction over automobile safety in 1956.[9] And the committee was then well positioned to respond to the regulatory challenges posed by Ralph Nader in the mid-1960s.

Of the 133 issues over which the Commerce Committee established a referral precedent from 1947 through 1990, 110 (82.7%) were issues raised in conjunction with a bill over which the committee had already established jurisdiction. Again, jurisdictional change is path-dependent.

Figure 2 provided some evidence that the Commerce Committee's common law jurisdiction expanded between the 1946 and 1974 reforms. A closer look at the growth of common law turf is provided in Figure 3. The figure is based on a content analysis of 1,485 hearing documents published by the Commerce Committee from 1947 through 1990.[10] Only hearings on referred bills (52% of all hearings during the period) are reported.

From 1947 to 1974, the Commerce Committee's agenda gradually included more and more common law issues. Much of the increase was from consumer protection problems like the testing of food additives (1957), product-labeling laws (1958), seat-belt regulations (1962), the safety of children's toys (1969), and deceptive advertising (1971).

FIGURE 3

Growth of Commerce Committee's Common Law Jurisdiction 1947–1990



There are two trend lines in Figure 3: the percentage of common law hearing activity and a three-year moving average. The moving average indicates gradual upward change, but there are also wide swings from year to year as the committee launched into new areas. In 1958, for example, Commerce worked on a medical education bill (which could have gone to Education and Labor) and on air pollution legislation. The next year, its common law activity dropped by half as it turned its attention to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to railroad unemployment, both of which are in its statutory jurisdiction. Still, an upward trend is unmistakable between 1947 and 1974. Use of the committee's common law agenda peaked at 54.23% in 1971 with extensive hearings on air pollution control, solid waste recycling, cigarette labeling, and automobile safety, none of which was yet in the committee's statutory jurisdiction.

Between the 1974 and 1980 reforms, the percentage of the committee's hearing activity spent on common law issues averaged about 30% with no general trend up or down. The common law percentage did not drop after the 1974 reforms because Commerce launched into energy issues not yet in its statutory jurisdiction just as consumer protection issues (codified in the rules in 1974) began to die down. During the late 1970s, nearly all of the committee's common law activities were on energy-related issues such as synthetic liquid fuels, energy conservation, solar energy, and a national energy strategy. None of these issues was in the jurisdiction of any other committee during this period, so the committee staked a claim and then worked to protect it.

The 1980 reforms locked the Commerce Committee's energy jurisdiction into the House rules, and the committee's common law agenda fell from 35% to 15% in two years. The gradual, incremental process of common law expansion began anew: the committee has successfully staked claims to jurisdiction over the insurance industry, international trade, and some securities-related banking activities.

The rate of jurisdictional expansion under Chairman John Dingell (D-MI) in the 1980s was almost identical to the rate of expansion under Oren Harris (D-AK), who chaired the committee from 1957 through 1965. This might surprise some observers of Congress, because John Dingell is a "recognized master of territorial expansion" (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 1988, 357), while Oren Harris was sometimes dismissed as an unaggressive old southern Democrat. However, there is much more to the jurisdiction game than personalities. Put John Dingell in charge of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and he would still be a policy entrepreneur, but he would not have as many successes as he has had on Commerce because the Merchant Marine's jurisdiction is not as broad to begin with. Entrepreneurs need to be able to make a plausible claim that a jurisdictionally ambiguous issue is proximate to their committee's established turf. In the jurisdiction game, the rich get richer and the poor get the same old bills.

Two lessons seem clear from this look at the Commerce Committee's jurisdiction. First, jurisdictions are malleable through common law referral precedents. Second, the trend toward common law issues appears incremental, as committees gradually move away from some issues and embrace others. What, then, of periodic jurisdictional reforms?

JURISDICTIONS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORMS

Reform seems to imply a plan, a thoughtful way to get from how things are to how things ought to be. Congressional reforms are marked by commissions, special committees, and hoopla. The 1946 LRA was widely supported in and reported by the news media, and attention focused on congressional reform a generation later through the 1974 Bolling Committee. In both cases, efficiency experts were called upon to help Congress run more "efficiently" and "effectively."[11] And in both cases, Congress passed reform legislation.

Perhaps, as implied by the way the 1946 and 1974 jurisdiction reforms are sometimes portrayed, congressional reforms are purposeful and collectively ratified breaks from the past (Galloway 1955; Rieselbach 1986). Thus one interpretation of congressional reforms is that they are sporadic but highly significant tools for changing the institution: proposals are carefully planned and collectively ratified. Call this the *rational problem-solving model.*

Former Speaker Thomas Reed described reform situations as times when "an indefinable something is to be done, in a way nobody knows how, at a time nobody knows when, that will accomplish nobody knows what" (quoted in Henning 1989, 233). Rational problem solving is often unrealistic: "However attractive such an orderly reformation might be, its preconditions—consensus on goals and precise calculations of means–ends relationships—are rarely realizable in real-world situations" (Davidson, Kovenock and O'Leary 1966, xii).

Of course, the truth about what congressional reforms accomplish likely lies someplace between Speaker Reed's characterization and the rational problem-solving model. When legislatures vote on reform proposals, the reforms are indeed well-planned and highly publicized events, but what do they really change? Some reforms, like those following the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910, are clear and significant breaks from the past, and it is now in fashion to call recent Congresses "post-reform," as if the mid-1970s qualitatively changed the institution. What of the landmark 1946 LRA, the 1974 Bolling Committee jurisdiction reforms, and the 1980 changes in energy jurisdictions (Davidson and Oleszek 1977; Galloway 1955; Uslaner 1989)? These three reforms are first pointed to when one takes jurisdictional change seriously. If these are to be our models for how the internal structures of Congress are reformed, what lessons can they teach us?

I shall argue that formal rules changes (like the writing of statutory jurisdictions) often *follow* institutional changes (such as common law adaptations in committee turf). If we want to understand change, we should focus not on "reforms" but on the incremental day-to-day changes in the unwritten rules. Former representative Richard Bolling (D-MO) understood the limitations of formal rules changes, calling them "the product of modification, change, and codification" (1965, 110). Codification comes last.

1946 Legislative Reorganization Act

World War II Congresses were widely ridiculed for alleged inefficiency, myopia, and (most of all) obstruction of President Roosevelt's war efforts (La Follette 1943; Perkins 1944). Congress, designed for a horse-and-buggy age, was said to be unprepared for the blitzkrieg of politics in the 1940s and beyond. President Franklin Roosevelt seemed to have had the upper hand in legislative battles, resorting to veiled threats if Congress failed to pass his bills by set deadlines.

In early 1941, the American Political Science Association's Committee on Congress (1945) launched a study of congressional mechanisms (see also Matthews 1981). Both the Committee on Congress report, *The Reorganization of Congress* and the National Planning Association's *Strengthening the Congress* (Heller 1945) emphasized the need to restructure committee jurisdictions and powers so that Congress could be a more potent check on the executive branch. These reports helped bring about the formation of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress in 1945, which was cochaired by Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette, Jr. and Oklahoma Representative Mike Monroney. Perhaps the most important impact of the American Political Science Association committee's report was that it helped launch George Galloway, the report's author, into the position of staff director of Congress's special joint committee on reform.

Galloway, La Follette, and Monroney were the primary architects of the 1946 LRA. Leading their list of objectives were streamlining committee structures, eliminating the use of select committees, and clarifying committee jurisdictions (Galloway 1955, 591). The reformers were also political operators, and they knew they would have to confront committee chairs who were content with their perks and powers under the status quo. Reformers also had to mollify the House and Senate Rules Committees, which specifically precluded the Joint Committee from making recommendations that would overturn any of the House or Senate Rules.

The 1946 LRA reduced the number of standing committees from 33 to 15 in the Senate and from 48 to 19 in the House. Fifty-eight percent of the committees disappeared overnight. Also, for the first time in the history of Congress, committee jurisdictions were carefully delineated in the House and Senate Rules.[12] On the face of it, these seem like remarkable achievements. Galloway set the tone for most subsequent commentaries on the act, calling it "the outstanding development in the organization and operation of Congress during the past fifty years" (1961, 57). Then again, Galloway had a vested interest in writing a favorable history.

The 1946 LRA passed with the help of committee chairs. Since over half of them were guaranteed to lose their positions, why did they support the reforms? The answer is that chairs of inactive committees were assured that they would benefit from the increase in staffs even though they would lose their committee staffs, and less-senior chairs were promised seats on more prestigious panels (Ripley 1969; Polsby, Gallaher and Rundquist 1969). Politically pragmatic deals like these, not a keen eye for the most "efficient" committee structure, drove the consolidation of committees.

How would one go about streamlining a committee system that begins with 48 committees in the House? Reformers began by aiming for committees with 25 to 27 members each, and they wanted to limit almost every member to one committee assignment. The number of postreform committees was simply derived by dividing the number of representatives (435) by the desired size of committees (25) and rounding up, yielding 19.

Starting with 48 committees, there were 1,128 possible pairwise combinations that could have been used to create 19 committees, and the apparent decision rule employed in selecting among all the possible pairwise combinations was to emphasize prereform patterns of shared committee memberships, because that is what was politically expedient. It was expedient because committees that shared large numbers of members were, in a sense, already working together, and the prereform committees could be made into postreform subcommittees on a single panel.

The hypothesis that prereform intercommittee memberships were central to the postreform structure is tested in Table 1, where possible pairwise combinations of committees are ranked by the sum of joint memberships (Two committees each sharing 25% of their members would score 50%.) Nine committees[13] with nine or fewer members are excluded because their small size would skew the percentages and because eight were combined into the House Administration Committee. This leaves 39 committees, or 741 possible pairwise combinations of prereform panels. For these 39 committees, 44 pairwise combinations were actually used. Of all the possible ways of shoehorning the committees together, 10 of the 15 committees with the highest shared memberships ended up together. That rate is much higher than one would expect by chance ($p = .000454 \times 10^{-6}$).

For a committee system in which most legislators served on only one panel, the results in Table 1 are striking. Intercommittee memberships drive the results. Sixty percent of the members of the Public Lands Committee also served on the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, and 39% of the Public Lands Committee served on Mines and Mining. Likewise, 37% of the Mines and Mining members served on Indian Affairs, and 30% of the Indian Affairs members were on Irrigation. Is it any surprise that these committees were bundled together? The postreform committees embraced membership patterns found before the reforms, thereby reinforcing coalitions rather than forging new ones.

TABLE 1

Intercommittee Memberships of House Committees Consolidated by the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act

POSSIBLE PAIRWISE COMBINATIONS[a]	SUM OF JOINT MEMBERSHIP[b] (%)	COMMITTEE AFTER 1946 LRA[c]
Public Lands, Irrigation	117	Interior
Mining, Indian Affairs	76	Interior
Public Lands, Mining	72	Interior
Public Lands, Indian Affairs	70	Interior
Public Buildings, Pensions	66	—
Irrigation, Insular Affairs	65	Interior
Irrigation, Indian Affairs	62	Interior
Civil Service, Claims	59	—
Flood Control, Roads	58	Public Works
Public Buildings, Patents	58	—
Claims, Revision of Laws	56	Judiciary
Expenditures, Accounts	55	—
Irrigation, Mining	53	Interior
Civil Service, Census	52	Post Office
Rivers, Territories	52	—

[a] This analysis excludes the nine prereform committees that had nine or fewer members. This leaves 741 possible pairwise combinations of prereform committees. Eight of the nine small committees excluded from this analysis were combined into one committee, House Administration. The ninth, UnAmerican Activities, was unaffected by the reforms.

[b] This column reports the sum of two percentages: (1) the percentage of committee A that is also in committee B and (2) the percentage of committee B that is also in committee A. (These two percentages are rarely the same, because committee size varies.)

[c] Of the 741 possible pairwise combinations, 44 were used in the 1946 LRA. This column reports the destination committee for the combinations that were actually used.

Were committee jurisdictions significantly changed by the 1946 LRA? No. Jurisdictions were *codified*, but they were not significantly changed. Ten of the 19 postreform committees were spared being consolidated with other committees, and they were jurisdictionally identical in every way to their prereform counterparts. The remaining 9 committees embraced established patterns of jurisdictional coordination. In almost every case, the specific descriptive words used to list committee jurisdictions, though new to the written rules after 1946, were taken verbatim from earlier books of precedents compiled by Asher Hinds and Clarence Cannon.

1974 Jurisdictional Reforms

Committee reform was on the agenda once again in 1974 in the form of the Bolling Committee, whose express purpose was "a wholesale realignment of jurisdictions and a limitation of one major committee per member" (*Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 1974, 634). The Bolling Committee proposals faced stiff opposition from committee chairs, and almost all of the reform suggestions were defeated in the House Democratic Caucus (Davidson and Oleszek 1977). A second committee, chaired by Washington Democrat Julia Butler Hansen, was established by the Democratic Caucus to offer scaled-down alternatives to the Bolling Committee recommendations. HR 988 primarily reflected the more modest Hansen Committee recommendations and passed the House on 8 October 1974. Noticeable changes were made in the statutory jurisdictions of committees, including transportation, health, and banking. Most transportation issues were transferred to the Public Works Committee, renamed the Committee on Public Works and Transportation. This included aviation and surface transportation (from Interstate and Foreign Commerce) and mass transit (from the Committee on Banking and Currency). Interstate and Foreign Commerce was given jurisdiction over "health and health facilities, except health care supported by payroll deductions" (which went to the Ways and Means Committee). The Banking and Currency Committee, renamed Banking, Currency, and Housing, was given jurisdiction over federal monetary policy, urban development, and international finance, among other issues. The Foreign Affairs Committee lost jurisdiction over international monetary organizations.

Like the realignment of committees in 1946, these and other jurisdictional realignments *appear* to have been significant reforms shifting issues from committee to committee and adding otherwise overlooked subjects to committee agendas. The 1974 reforms changed the Commerce Committee's statutory jurisdiction by adding four issues and deleting three. The committee gained consumer affairs and consumer protection, travel and tourism, health and health facilities, and biomedical research and development. Lost to other committees was the committee's jurisdiction over the Weather Bureau, civil aeronautics, and almost all transportation issues except railroads.

Looking just at the Rules Manual (recall Figure 1), Commerce's acquisition of consumer protection issues seems to be an important (though delayed) institutional response to the calls for consumer protection legislation throughout the late 1960s. In fact, though, the Commerce Committee helped define what we mean by "consumer protection" by its actions in the 1960s (Nadel 1971). Even before consumer protection began to be thought of as a certain cluster of issues, the Commerce Committee expanded its common law jurisdiction to include health and safety problems. Paired with its statutory jurisdiction covering aviation, the committee regulated food inspections of agricultural products shipped by air in 1954. In 1957, the committee held hearings on seven related bills to "prohibit the use of new chemical food additives without adequate pretesting for safety" (U.S. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 1957). The committee began staking out jurisdiction on the deceptive labeling of automobile stickers a year later. Hearings on the regulation of cigarette advertising were held in 1965, followed by investigations into the safety of children's toys and radiation from household electric devices. Through the active efforts of California Democrat John Moss, the committee was referred a series of product labeling bills, and by the time "consumer protection" began to be understood in its modern sense, the Commerce Committee had already established a precedent-setting track record on consumer issues. Consumer protection had unquestionably become part of the committee's jurisdiction. When the Consumer Product Safety Act was introduced in Congress in 1971, the bill was naturally, and without objection, referred to the Commerce Committee—this, four years before the Hansen Committee added consumer protection to Commerce's statutory jurisdiction.

A similar pattern of referral precedents confirms that most health issues were in the Commerce Committee's jurisdiction before the 1974 reforms, as well. Because of the 1946 LRA, Commerce claimed "public health and quarantine" as part of its statutory jurisdiction, and throughout the 1950s, more than a quarter of the committee's activity was related to this general jurisdictional grant. However, the committee also moved into health issues that were not necessarily implied by the 1946 reforms. The committee was working on a national health insurance program by 1949. By 1957, committee staffers were investigating the quality of instruction at dental schools, an issue that could have been legitimately claimed by the Committee on Education and Labor. The humane treatment of animals used in medical research was the subject of two bills referred to the committee in 1962. And as drug abuse problems became more acute, the committee claimed new and politically relevant turf by drawing parallels between drug abuse and public health problems. This eventually led to the committee's oversight of several programs overseen by the Drug Enforcement Agency, a function that might seem more naturally to belong to the Judiciary Committee.

The Bolling Committee's original plan was to recast the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce as the Committee on Commerce and Health, and this was to include wrestling Medicare issues from the Ways and Means Committee. Medicare issues were often approached through amendments to the Social Security Act, which had been in the statutory jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee since 1946. The Hansen Committee compromise maintained the preexisting distinction between the committees by precluding the Commerce Committee from extending into "health care supported by payroll deductions." With respect to health, the net effect of the 1974 reforms was to write down in the Rules Manual the established common law jurisdictions governing bill referrals on health issues.

Travel and tourism issues were codified in the

House Rules in 1974, but the Commerce Committee reported a bill establishing the U.S. Travel Bureau as early as 1948. The committee also established the Office of International Travel and Tourism in 1960 to encourage foreign tourism in the United States. The Travel Bureau was established within the Department of the Interior, but it was subject to Commerce oversight (not Interior Committee oversight) because of the referral precedent. When the Interior Committee was referred a bill on the Arctic Winter Games in 1972, Chair Wayne Aspinall (D-CO) asked that the issue be rereferred to the Commerce Committee because it involved tourism. Finally, bills related to biomedical research and development had been referred to both the Commerce and Science Committees, but Commerce was working actively on the issue at the time that the jurisdictional reforms were being contemplated. During September 1974 alone, the Commerce Committee held hearings on 11 bills dealing with biomedical research and development.

In the four areas (consumer protection, health, tourism, and biomedical research) over which the Commerce Committee gained statutory jurisdiction in 1974, common law jurisdictions had already been established. The Hansen Committee took the path of least resistance, embracing the status quo in the name of reform. However, the Commerce Committee also lost three areas of jurisdiction in 1974. If statutory jurisdictions ratify common law jurisdictions, then we would expect to find that Commerce's activity on the issues that were lost (primarily transportation-related) had diminished significantly from 1947 to 1974.

This jurisdictional "loss" can be examined by looking at the percentage of committee hearings that were related to transportation issues. Immediately following the 1946 act, about a quarter of the committee's attention went to transportation (primarily aviation). The committee oversaw the development of a national system of airports and held investigations into accidents. Committee staffers in the Eightieth and Eighty-First Congresses devoted to transportation a great deal of attention that could easily have gone to other issues. By 1974, the committee activity on transportation issues had dropped below 5% of the committee's pages of hearings per Congress. Of that 5%, almost all of the attention went to the routine business of overseeing and maintaining long-established airports. The committee was not sponsoring new transportation projects. Removing transportation policy from the Commerce Committee's statutory jurisdiction was no great loss because they had let the turf lay fallow for years.

While the Commerce Committee largely ignored transportation issues throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, Public Works was increasingly active, in part because it oversaw the Highway Trust Fund and could pay for new programs out of its own committee. When the 1974 reforms were codified, jurisdictional changes in transportation that had been underway since the end of World War II were simply written into the Rules. The 1974 "reforms," whether expanding or subtracting from a committee's statutory jurisdiction, reflected the incremental common law changes that had been in force, in some cases, for decades.

1980 Energy Jurisdiction Reforms

In 1980, the Congress passed a jurisdictional reform proposal that was originally intended to focus energy issues in one committee, but like the 1974 reforms, this latest round of statutory changes merely updated the rules and locked in common law turf that had been taken during the 1970s.

The jurisdictional tangle on energy issues seemed especially acute in the late 1970s as the country faced its second energy crisis in the decade (Jones and Strahan 1985). A report by the House Select Committee on Committees decried the consequences of common law jurisdictional expansions, noting: "The present operational structure in Congress for energy jurisdiction is fragmented among numerous committees. It is now as much a product of legislation initiated by a particular committee or assigned to it by the Parliamentarian as it is the result of carefully circumscribed rules and procedures" (quoted in Davidson and Oleszek 1977, 53).

After several years of what Eric Uslaner calls "jungle warfare over jurisdictions," two reform proposals, one by the House Select Committee on Committees and another last minute substitute by the Select Committee's chair Jerry Patterson (D-CA), were aimed at creating a new Energy Committee and taking all energy issues away from Commerce, Interior, and Public Works.

John Dingell, on the verge of becoming the Commerce Committee's chair, led the other committee chairs in a floor fight against the Select Committee proposal, which would have stripped Dingell's Energy and Power Subcommittee of much of its jurisdiction and given it to a new and separate energy committee. A Commerce Committee alternative proposal was offered that solidified Commerce as the panel with principal jurisdiction over national energy policy. The attempt to take energy away from Commerce was thwarted, and the apparent reforms amounted to little more than updating the written rules to reflect reality.

The real battle over energy jurisdiction did not happen between Dingell and the 1980 Select Committee. Rather, the Commerce Committee gained important parts of the energy turf during the mid-to-late 1970s. From his newly created Subcommittee on Energy and Power, John Dingell managed, during the late 1970s, to gain jurisdiction over a wide variety of jurisdictionally ambiguous energy issues, like conservation and a "national" energy policy. Though the Commerce Committee had done little to expand its energy jurisdiction before 1974, that was certainly not true of other committees.

Figure 4 reports the Commerce Committee's hearing activity on energy issues that were granted to the committee in the 1980 reforms. In the year before the reforms, more than 18% of the committee's efforts

FIGURE 4

Commerce Activity on Energy Issues That Were Granted Jurisdiction in 1980 Reforms



were on energy issues not yet formally granted to them in the rules. From the time that John Dingell's Subcommittee on Energy and Power was created in 1975, the committee sought to establish binding referral precedents over otherwise unclaimed energy turf.

With a subcommittee in place, hearings on proposed oil import taxes were held, followed quickly by investigations into synthetic liquid fuels, solar energy, and energy from helium. Soon the committee began publishing a biennial compilation of energy-related acts within the jurisdiction of the committee. Dingell also hosted widely publicized hearings outlining a national energy strategy, hearings so extensive that they filled eight large volumes. In 1977, Commerce reported a bill creating the Department of Energy: its oversight would firmly establish the Commerce Committee as a major player in all energy legislation.

As with the earlier reforms, the Commerce Committee's common law jurisdiction had expanded before its statutory jurisdiction was recast. Uslaner aptly called the 1980 jurisdictional changes "deja vu" reforms, "a reinforcing of the status quo in the name of reform" (1989, 154).

Reform is not synonymous with change. Our focus should not be on the temporary floor majorities mustered to pass the 1946, 1974, and 1980 "reforms." Rather, jurisdictional change happens through bill referrals, and our attention should be on policy entrepreneurs and the parliamentarians.

DISCUSSION

It is time to recast how political scientists talk about congressional committee jurisdictions and how they think about congressional reform. Within the rules of the jurisdiction game, turf is up for grabs in legislatures. With clever bill drafting and incremental moves into new territories (strategies discussed in King 1992), the nature of congressional committee jurisdictions is lively indeed. Jurisdictional fragmentation is a direct result of so many committees trying to stake out claims to pieces of larger issues like the environment and national health care. Devoid of common law jurisdictions and the politics of bill referrals, no static notions about Congress can account for the ongoing border wars among committees.

Few things in Congress are more highly sought than committee turf over politically "hot" issues. Subsequent jurisdictional changes ripple through the institution, affecting the power and prestige of the committees. It is no secret why House Commerce has become an especially attractive committee assignment in the last 20 years (Munger 1988): its turf is large and rewarding.

One can scarcely read journalistic reports about Congress without seeing evidence of border wars (Moore 1993; Stanfield 1988). Yet, oddly, political scientists are only now beginning to pay close attention to institutional change in Congress. For the last 20 years at least, the scholarly emphasis has been on finding sources of institutional stability and on specifying the nature of equilibria (Shepsle 1986). But for all the attention equilibria have received, we should never lose sight of the forces that push institutions toward incremental change (Riker 1980; Rowe 1989).

We need a new vocabulary for talking about jurisdictions. Statutory jurisdictions (the usual way political scientists talk about turf) are written down in the House and Senate Rules. Common law jurisdictions emerge through binding bill referral precedents. The real dynamics of committee jurisdictions are found in referral precedents, not in dusty old books of rules. Also, we need to think about institutional change. It has been shown that jurisdictional "reforms" (i.e., the 1946, 1974, and 1980 changes in the House Rules) simply codified bill referral precedents. Common law jurisdictions were written into the rules, yielding little more than the appearance of change. In the work-a-day world of Congress, institutional change may be glacial, but it is always happening. Instead of focusing all of our attention on what brings about periodic reforms (Rieselbach 1986), we should pay more attention to how rational-actor legislators interact with and shape institutions day to day (Dodd 1986, 1993).

The policy consequences of the jurisdiction game are only now beginning to be understood. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) show how committees can redefine old issues (e.g., by recasting tobacco policy from "agricultural" to "health"). Over time, this breaks down issue monopolies. At the same time, however, the relentless pursuit of turf has left the House and Senate committee systems highly fragmented. There seems to be an almost inevitable tension between gridlock and how accessible a committee system is to various groups. Maybe it is the old trade-off between representation and governance (Shepsle 1988) but in a slightly different form. Only with a view of jurisdictions as malleable and committees as political battle grounds over turf can we begin to think about the causes and consequences of jurisdictional fragmentation.

I do not know how common it is for political institutions to go through "reforms" only to codify incremental and long-standing changes. It happens in the U.S. Congress, and I suspect it happens in every majority-rule institution. Because it takes a majority to update the written rules of most political bodies, the easiest thing to agree on is to embrace the status quo. Does that mean that the status quo is itself stable? Certainly not. It does not take an act of Congress to change the status quo. That happens every time written rules are reinterpreted, every time behavior is modified, and every time a precedent is set. We need to pay more attention to how and why these things are done.

Notes

Thanks are due Lawrence Dodd, Richard Hall, John Jackson, Bryan Jones, John Kingdon, Kirsten Syverson, and the congressional lobbyists, staffers, and legislators who shared their insights with me.

1. LaRue and Rothenberg (1992), Shipan (1993), and Krehbiel and Lavin (1993) all focus on a turf war involving the House Appropriations Committee. But turf wars involving the Appropriations Committee are atypical and may give the impression that property rights can be easily undermined: they cannot. In general, turf wars are over new territory, not over established ground. The Appropriations Committee is not supposed to write (authorize) legislation on spending bills. By the House Rules, authorizing legislation is something the authorizing (or policy) committees are supposed to do (House Rule XXI-2). That kind of "turf war" is often done with the acquiescence of the authorizing committee, and it sets no binding precedent.

2. During the Ninety-Eighth Congress, 7.2% of all jointly referred measures were ultimately passed on the House floor. This compares to a success rate of nearly 17% for all singly referred measures during the same period. Oleszek, Davidson, and Kephart speculate that jointly referred bills are less likely to succeed because "by their very nature, bills that are sent to two or more committees are complex and multifaceted. As a general proposition, this raises the possibility of conflict and controversy" (1986, 44). But the parliamentarians suggest another reason. "A great many jointly referred bills are dead on arrival anyway," said one, "so there's no harm in giving everyone a piece of the action."

3. A third type of multiple referral—a split referral—is allowed through the House Rules, but it is no longer used. With split referrals, a bill is supposed to be divided up by sections or titles and given to the committees of jurisdiction. That is time-consuming. Instead, joint referrals serve the same function. Whole bills are given to multiple committees with the explicit understanding that they will work only on sections over which their committees have jurisdiction.

4. Cannon's (1963) *Procedure* has been replaced by Deschler's (1977) *Precedents*, which does not list common law issues separately.

5. In some respects, this approach is a descendant of the uses of hearings by Dodd and Schott (1979, 168–79) and Price (1979). My coding differs in that I specifically look at the distinction between common law and statutory issues and record how and when new issues are linked in a hearing to existing issues.

6. Figure 2 is based on 746 hearing documents from 1947 through 1974. This number only includes hearings on referred bills. A three-year moving average is reported. Subjects in Figure 2 were categorized in the following manner. Health included public health and quarantine generally, drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and children's health. Communications included the regulation of interstate and foreign communications generally, telephones, telegraphs, radios, and television. Ground transportation included regulation of interstate railroads, hazardous materials transportation, regulation of interstate busses, regulation of interstate trucks, regulation of interstate pipelines, railroad labor, railroad retirement, and railroad unemployment. Securities and exchanges included Security Exchange Commission issues generally and mergers and acquisitions. Air transportation included civil aeronautics (primarily accident investigations and airport construction) and postal rates on air mail. Other statutory issues not otherwise classified included interstate and foreign commerce generally, barriers to foreign trade, the Weather Bureau, interstate oil compacts and petroleum and natural gas (except on public lands), inland waterways, the Bureau of Standards, standardization of weights and measures, the metric system, the regulation of interstate transmission of power (except the installation of connections between government water-power projects), war claims, committee housekeeping, and general oversight hearings.

7. To reiterate a point made in the text, Figure 2 excludes hearings for which there was no bill referral, because committees can hold oversight hearings on issues not in their legislative jurisdiction. Since the mid-1970s, only about half of the committee's hearings have focused on referred bills, but during 1947–74, 83% of the hearings addressed referred bills.

8. It is because of the lineage of the Marine Hospital Service that the U.S. surgeon general's official seal still includes a ship's anchor. That, in turn, came from the House Commerce Committee's jurisdiction over international shipping.

9. This followed the creation by Commerce of the House Special Subcommittee on Traffic Safety. In a fairly typical pattern, the committee first received a bill, HR 9836, in the Eighty-Fourth Congress establishing Interstate Commerce Commission authority over the transportation safety regulations for migrant farm workers. This was justified at the

federal level because migrant farm workers often cross state lines (see United States, House, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 1956b). One month later, the Traffic Safety Subcommittee conducted investigatory hearings into other safety problems (see U.S., House, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee 1956a).

10. As is discussed in the text, the hearing documents are maintained by the Congressional Information Service and were accessed through their CD-ROM records.

11. Of course, the meaning of the words *efficient* and *effective* cannot be divorced from one's political views. Alexander Hamilton, as secretary of the treasury in Washington's first administration, complained that it would be inefficient to create a House Ways and Means Committee to oversee the national treasury. He pushed hard to keep the purse in the executive's hands by waving the "efficiency" flag. Among the 1946 reformers, one's view of what an effective legislature might look like was strongly related to whether one chafed at President Franklin Roosevelt's programs. A strong president seemed to imply a weak Congress, which was more troubling to Republicans than Democrats in the 1940s.

12. The 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act most important accomplishment has nothing to do with these two reform elements and is often overlooked; it set in motion the professionalization (and proliferation) of congressional staff (Davidson 1990; Dodd and Schott 1979).

13. The nine excluded were Disposition of Executive Papers; Elections 1, 2, and 3; Enrolled Bills; the Library Committee; Memorials; Printing; and the Committee on Un-American Activities.

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SHORTCUTS VERSUS ENCYCLOPEDIAS: INFORMATION AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN CALIFORNIA INSURANCE REFORM ELECTIONS

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Voters in mass elections are notorious for their apparent lack of information about relevant political matters. While some scholars argue that an electorate of well-informed voters is necessary for the production of responsive electoral outcomes, others argue that apparently ignorant voters will suffice because they can adapt their behavior to the complexity of electoral choice. To evaluate the validity of these arguments, I develop and analyze a survey of California voters who faced five complicated insurance reform ballot initiatives. I find that access to a particular class of widely available information shortcuts allowed badly informed voters to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed voters. This finding is suggestive of the conditions under which voters who lack encyclopedic information about the content of electoral debates can nevertheless use information shortcuts to vote as though they were well informed.

Decades of survey research have provided us with countless examples of voter ignorance. While the existence of the badly informed voter is now a central part of political science's intellectual heritage, the implications of voter ignorance continue to be vigorously debated. Many scholars and pundits argue that widespread voter ignorance leads to voting behavior and electoral outcomes that are meaningless representations of voter interests.[1] Other political observers argue that voters find ways to adapt to their apparent lack of information. These scholars conclude that voting behavior and electoral outcomes provide valuable measures of voter interests.[2]

To understand whether or not voters can successfully overcome their lack of information, it is instructive to consider briefly how voters can obtain information about the personal consequences of electoral outcomes. I conduct this review in the particularly appropriate context of a direct legislation election. In direct legislation elections (e.g., the initiative and the referendum), voters make selections from an exogenously determined menu of specific policy alternatives called propositions. A defining characteristic of many propositions is complexity.[3] Since voters who encounter a complex proposition for the first time are likely to be confused about the consequences of its approval, the extent to which voters can adapt to their initial condition of ignorance will determine how well they can promote their own interests through the act of voting.

Voters who have an interest in the outcome of a direct legislation election might first consider gathering facts about a proposition from the official document that describes its content. However, these documents are usually lengthy and/or filled with technical language. As a result, voters in large electorates who consider their opportunity costs may decide that the acquisition of "encyclopedic" information is not a worthwhile activity.

As an alternative to the costly acquisition of encyclopedic information, voters may choose to employ information shortcuts. For example, voters can acquire information about the preferences or opinions of friends, coworkers, political parties, or other groups, which they may then use to infer how a proposition will affect them. The appeal of these information shortcuts is that they generally require relatively little effort to acquire. The drawback of these shortcuts is that they may be unreliable, since relatively well informed information providers may have incentives to mislead relatively uninformed voters.

Because many of my colleagues and I were curious about the extent to which relatively uninformed voters could use information shortcuts to cast the same votes they would have cast if better informed, I designed and administered an exit poll of California voters who, in 1988, were confronted by five distinct and complex insurance reform propositions. The survey responses allow me to identify a class of voters who, while appearing to possess relatively low levels of encyclopedic knowledge about the content of insurance reform initiatives, used an information shortcut that allowed them to emulate the behavior of well-informed voters. Specifically, I find that relatively uninformed voters who could correctly identify the insurance industry's official position on a particular proposition were much more likely to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed voters on that proposition than were similarly uninformed voters who did not know the insurance industry's position. I conclude from this finding that if relatively well informed voters are most likely to cast the votes that are consistent with their own interests, then knowledge of the insurance industry's position allowed voters who might otherwise be classified as ignorant to act as they would have if they had taken the time and effort necessary to acquire encyclopedic information. While the analysis I present does not lead me to conclude that shortcuts will always be sufficient to help uninformed voters overcome their lack of knowledge, I believe that it is suggestive of the conditions under which voters who have not acquired encyclopedic knowledge can vote as though they had.

Next, I offer a brief history of the events leading up to the insurance reform elections. I then place relevant aspects of this history within the context of previous theoretical and empirical research on voter decision making in order to generate predictions about how different types of information should affect voting behavior. I then offer a description of the survey instrument's construction and execution and employ a number of statistical tests to identify the effects of certain types of information on respondent voting behavior. With this survey, and related theoretical and experimental research on the responsiveness of direct legislation,[4] I hope to advance more general debates about the nature of voter competence and the substantive meaning of electoral outcomes.

INSURANCE REFORM AND THE INFORMATION PROBLEM

What events led up to the insurance reform elections and how do they figure in the context of previous work on voter decision making?

A Brief History

In 1987, California drivers paid the third highest auto insurance rates in the nation. Both the state's trial lawyers—who receive half of their case load from automobile accident claims (Reich 1988a)—and the insurance industry recognized the widespread public support for regulatory reform and both were interested in influencing the legislative reform agenda. Each group publicly blamed the other for the recent rapid increase in auto insurance premiums. Insurance industry spokesmen argued that higher rates were caused by skyrocketing legal costs and publicly supported regulatory reforms that assigned most of the costs of reform to trial lawyers (e.g., laws that limit attorney fees, decrease the likelihood of large settlements, or both.) In contrast, the California Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA) publicly portrayed the insurance industry as greedy oligopolists who were conspiring against consumers. The CTLA supported regulatory reform that assigned most of the costs of reform to the insurance industry (e.g., the elimination of the insurance industry's exemption from many of California's antitrust laws).

Both groups attempted to influence insurance reform through their lobbying efforts in the state capitol. In this domain, the insurance reform debate was a battle of Titans. Both the insurers and attorneys had what were among the most influential lobbies in California (Reich 1987a). Perhaps coincidentally, all attempts at reform died in state legislative committees.[5]

When the legislative stalemate seemed destined to outlast calendar year 1987, a number of consumer groups, who had been effectively shut out of the insurance reform debate in the legislature, voiced their intent to place an initiative on the November 1988 ballot. By submitting an initiative, consumer groups would not only gain control of the reform agenda, but they might also compel other groups, who would be opposed to their initiative, to spend millions of dollars to protect the relatively favorable status quo. In order to avoid a costly initiative campaign, insurance industry representatives and the CTLA made several attempts to form coalitions with the consumer groups that were preparing an electoral strategy. In addition, insurer and attorney groups attempted to form legislation-supporting coalitions with each other and each drafted its own separate initiative in the event that no agreement could be reached. By the time the deadline for qualifying ballot measures had arrived, however, no coalitions had formed.[6] As a consequence, the three groups (the insurance industry, the trial lawyers, and the consumer activists) placed five different insurance reform initiatives on the November 1988 ballot.

Only one of the five qualifying propositions passed on Election Day: Proposition 103 was sponsored by the consumer activist group Voter Revolt (whose primary spokesman during the campaign was Ralph Nader) and received 51.1% of the vote. Proposition 103 called for the removal of the insurance industry's antitrust exemption, public hearings as a prerequisite for rate changes, auto insurance premiums to be determined primarily by driving record (as opposed to where one lived), a premium discount for "good drivers," election of the state's insurance commissioner (rather than gubernatorial appointment), and a mandatory 20% reduction on all auto insurance premiums.

Of the four initiatives that lost, one was sponsored by trial lawyer interests, and three were sponsored by insurance industry interests. Proposition 100 was sponsored by the CTLA and received 40.9% of the vote. This proposition called for the reduction of "good driver" rates by 20% and the institution of health insurance rate regulation. It also allowed banks to sell insurance and allowed claimants to sue insurance companies for acting in "bad faith." Proposition 104, the no-fault initiative, was the insurance industry's most favored proposition (as evidenced by the fact that the insurance industry spent much more to promote this proposition than it did to promote the others). Despite this status, it was approved by only 25.4% of the voters. This proposition called for the establishment of a no-fault system of auto insurance (thus eliminating the need for many types of legal recourse in the event of an accident), the reduction of some premiums by 20% for two years, a restriction on future insurance regulation legislation, limitations on damage awards against insurance companies, limitations on attorney contingency fees, and the preservation of the insurance industry's antitrust status. Proposition 101 was sponsored primarily by one insurance company, received 13.3% of the vote, called for a temporary reduction of the bodily injury portion of insurance premiums and limited injury claims for pain and suffering and required that all other sources of compensation be exhausted before an insurance company was required to pay. Proposition 106 was sponsored by the insurance industry and received 46.9% of the vote. This measure placed limits on attorney contingency fees in tort cases.

Several characteristics of the insurance reform elections made them particularly appropriate for testing the effect of different types of information on voting behavior. Two of these characteristics led me to believe that most voters would not take the time or effort needed to become well informed about many of the issues relevant to the insurance reform debate. The first of these characteristics is that the text of the five insurance reform ballot initiatives was lengthy (totaling over 26,000 words) and technical. Second, insurance reform voters were likely to have been occupied with other political matters, since the November 1988 general election ballot in California was unusually long.[7]

Other characteristics led me to believe that there would also be a vigorous campaign. The first of these characteristics is that reform of the state's insurance regulation was—and still is—a highly salient issue. Each of the five initiatives corresponded to a significant change in the insurance regulatory framework and each had the potential to affect the price or expected value of many insurance policies, as well as insurance industry profits and trial-lawyer case loads. Second, the potential effect of different electoral outcomes on their profit margins led me to expect, a priori, that there would be high levels of campaign expenditure by the insurance industry and trial lawyers. (Over $82 million was actually spent on the insurance reform campaigns.) Because the insurance reform elections had these four characteristics, I expected that there would be complex electoral decisions, many confused voters, a vigorous campaign, and a unique opportunity to examine how different types of information affect voter behavior.

Sources of Information

Insurance reform voters had access to different types of information than voters in candidate-based elections typically do. The most notable difference was the absence of two types of information that are widely believed to affect voting behavior in elections involving candidates. The first type of missing information was the *partisan cue*. Not one of the initiatives had a party label attached to it.[8] This absence is particularly relevant because much of the contemporary understanding of voting behavior relies on the notion of voters taking cues from party labels.

The second familiar type of missing information was *the past*. Retrospective evaluations, of the type considered by Downs (1957), Key (1966), and Fiorina (1981) are thought to help voters simplify their evaluations of electoral alternatives and depend on the existence of relevant past histories. For instance, retrospective voting hypotheses tell us that voters can evaluate a candidate's credibility and potential effectiveness by reviewing particular features of the candidate's past. While credibility is less of an issue for the content of a ballot proposition, an electorate's ability to evaluate the consequences of a particular proposition retrospectively could help it better understand the future consequences of the proposition's acceptance. Unfortunately for voters, no such history was available for the five insurance reform propositions, since none of the proposed laws had ever previously been enacted in California.

In addition to the absence of some common types of information, the insurance reform elections included two sources of information that are not generally available in other electoral environments. First, the state provided a *summary* of each initiative. The summaries for the five insurance reform initiatives appear in Appendix A and were available in many places, including on the ballot itself. The summaries were between 25 and 100 words long and were intended to help voters distinguish between the initiatives. While each summary provided some information about an initiative, certain characteristics of the summary limited its effectiveness. For instance, a summary's brevity often resulted in the omission of important components of a complex initiative.

A second source of state-provided information was the *California Ballot Pamphlet*. The pamphlet for the November 1988 election was a thick document that contained, for each proposition, the summary just described, one signed argument by proponents, one signed counterargument by opponents, one signed argument by opponents, one signed counterargument by proponents, and the actual text of the proposed changes to the law. The fact that voters could obtain a great deal of information from the California Ballot Pamphlet is not in question. However, whether voters might reasonably be expected to spend the time and effort required to learn from the pamphlet is questionable and undermines its potential effectiveness.

A final source of information was the campaign waged by the three affected interest groups: the insurance industry, the CTLA, and consumer activists. Together, these three groups spent more than $82 million on the campaign. Table 1 details the names, preferences, and expenditures of all the campaign organizations that were involved in the insurance reform campaign and registered with the state board of elections. Each organization is classified by its primary source of funding. After reading through the campaign receipt and expenditure documents that were filed with the state, I can confidently assert that there did not exist an organization for which this classification was not obvious. (All contributors of $25 or more must be listed by name and occupation in a California direct legislation campaign's contribution filings.)

A cursory inspection of Table 1 reveals more about the campaign than just dollars expended. All of the large groups claim to be consumer- or citizen-oriented. These claims are indicative of the campaign

TABLE 1

Campaign Expenditure by Organization

CONTESTANT ORGANIZATION	RECOMMENDED VOTE	EXPENDITURE ($)
Insurance Industry		
Citizens for No Fault	yes on 104 and 106, no on 100 and 103	$41,402,392
Californians against Unfair Rate Increases	no on 100 and 103	14,951,162
Consumers for Lower Auto Insurance Rates	yes on 101	5,401,934
Committee for Fair Lawyers Insurance Fees	yes on 106	2,523,599
American Insurance Association	yes on 104	730,575
Committee for Fair Auto Insurance Ratings	no on 100 and 103	39,323
Total		$65,048,985
Trial lawyers		
Good Driver Initiative	yes on 103	$13,786,653
No on 106	no on 106	624,449
Consumer Coalition against 106	no on 106	401,704
No on Proposition 106 Committee	no on 106	172,737
Consumer/Legal Equal Justice Committee	no on 106	20,000
Total		$15,005,543
Consumer activists		
Voter Revolt for Lower Insurance Rates	yes on 103	$ 1,932,902
Californians for Honest Insurance	no on 101,104, and 106	24,005
Friends of Motorcycling	yes on 100, no on 101, 104, and 106	22,500
Santa Cruz Committee for Consumer Justice	yes on 100, no on 104	6,117
		$ 1,985,524
Total	—	$82,040,052

strategies employed by the large information providers. In the advertisements purchased by the insurance industry and trial lawyers, the identity of the sponsor was as well hidden as the law would allow. Except for the small print at the bottom of print advertisements or the rapidly disappearing disclaimer that surfaced in broadcast media, the fact that a particular message was associated with the preferences of the insurance industry or trial lawyers was not mentioned. These strategies gave all of the paid advertisements the quality that groups supporting an initiative attempted to represent themselves, and their initiative, as "proconsumer," regardless of their source of financial support, while groups opposing an initiative represented the initiative they were campaigning against as "anticonsumer". So, unlike either scientists and engineers (Kuklinski, Metlay, and May 1982) or major political parties in candidate-centered elections, the insurance industry and trial lawyers did not want to be used as reference groups by the voters—a circumstance that further complicated the voters' ability to understand the likely effects of five complex propositions.

Shortcuts and Voter Inference

If insurance reform voters faced complex alternatives, were too busy or disinterested to acquire encyclopedic information, and could rely on neither the past nor partisan cues, how did they decide which propositions to vote for? To place this case study in a broader context and to motivate the empirical tests that follow, I briefly review some research that is relevant in attempting to understand the behavior of insurance reform voters.

Particularly appropriate for this case study are the dynamics described in strategic models of communication, more commonly known as "signaling" games. In a signaling game, a relatively well informed information provider has information that is relevant to a relatively uninformed decision maker.[9] The information provider can attempt to affect the decision maker's behavior by sending a "signal" about the consequences of the decision maker's actions. The inferences that the decision maker is able to draw from the content of the signal depend on prior beliefs about both the information provider's knowledge and the information provider's incentives for truth telling. Since the information providers in the insurance reform example also drafted the propositions, I proceed as though it were common knowledge that the information providers understood the content of the propositions and focus this review on the relationship between an information provider's credibility and voter inference.

When either the information provider or the content of the signal is known to be perfectly credible, several scholars have argued that voters can use the content of a signal to make more accurate inferences about the personal consequences of an electoral outcome. Calvert (1985), McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985, 1986), and Grofman and Norrander (1990) use spatial models of candidate-centered elections, while I (Lupia 1992) used a spatial model of direct legislation, to identify conditions under which the existence of perfectly credible signals are sufficient to allow in-completely informed voters to emulate the behavior of better or completely informed voters. In these studies, uninformed voters tend to find it in their interests to cast the same vote as the information provider when they know that they and the information provider have similar preferences over outcomes. The same dynamic allows relatively uninformed voters to emulate the behavior they would exhibit if well informed by voting against the information provider's preferred alternative when they know that the information provider's interests are contrary to their own. Unfortunately, these arguments are of limited helpfulness when we attempt to understand voter decision making in circumstances where information providers are not perfectly credible and may, in fact, have an incentive to mislead voters.

Sobel (1985) and Brady and Sniderman (1985) have presented arguments suggesting that the existence of a "reputation for honesty" or "likability" is sufficient to allow voters to condition their voting behavior on the content of a signal provided by an information provider who is not perfectly credible. Sobel uses a repeated-play signaling model to show that if an information provider (who is not initially assumed to be perfectly credible) can establish a reputation for some consistent quality, like honesty, then badly informed decision makers can make more accurate inferences about the options available to them from the content of a signal whose truthfulness cannot otherwise be easily established. Brady and Sniderman use the National Election Studies to show that voters in candidate-centered elections rely on their feelings toward information-providing groups better to understand the relationship between their own preferences and those of the candidate.[10]

In the absence of perfectly credible signals, could insurance reform voters have used their knowledge or perceptions of a particular information provider's reputation to help them understand the personal consequences of a particular electoral outcome? The theories I have reviewed—and others like them—suggest that the answer is *yes*, but only if voter perceptions of an information provider's preferences (i.e., the information provider's reputation for supporting certain types of policy) were correct. If correct, perceived information-provider preferences are equivalent to the information providers having a known and informative reputation for supporting certain types of policy. If incorrect (which is quite possible in this case considering the insurance industry and trial-lawyer attempts to shield their identities), then perceived information-provider preferences will not be sufficient to allow badly informed voters to overcome their lack of encyclopedic knowledge.

For our purposes, it is unfortunate that evaluating the accuracy of insurance reform voter perceptions is quite difficult. Fortunately, we need not make this explicit evaluation to determine whether knowledge of a prominent information provider's preferences allowed otherwise uninformed voters to vote as though they were well informed. We can simply compare the behavior of voters who differ only in the amount and types of information they possess. With this type of comparison in mind, I developed and executed an exit poll of insurance reform voters. In an attempt to distinguish relatively informed voters from those who were relatively uninformed, I designed the survey to provide individual-level measures of the amount of encyclopedic information that a respondent possessed. To determine what impact, if any, information shortcuts had on voting behavior, I also asked respondents to report their perceptions of opinions that could have been used as shortcuts, relevant demographic questions, and their voting behavior.

My plan was to use these measures to compare the behavior of well-informed voters, relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut, and relatively uninformed voters who did not know that shortcut. Finding that the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut" was significantly different from the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who did not know a shortcut" would lead me to reject the hypothesis that knowing the shortcut did not affect voting behavior. Finding that the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut" was also very similar to the voting behavior of "relatively informed voters" would provide support for the assertion that voters who appeared to possess low levels of encyclopedic knowledge used certain types of shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were relatively well informed. In contrast, finding that the voting behavior of "relatively uninformed voters who knew a shortcut" was very different from the voting behavior of "relatively informed voters" would suggest that knowing the shortcut was insufficient for voters to overcome their lack of encyclopedic information.

A SURVEY TO TEST FOR THE EFFECTS OF INFORMATION

The survey consists of exit interviews with 339 voters in Los Angeles County. Respondents were asked how they voted on the insurance reform propositions, socioeconomic and insurance-rate-related questions, and a series of questions designed to elicit the level of information (or confusion) that each respondent had on the issue of insurance reform. The information questions were designed to learn not only what respondents knew about the content of the insurance reform debate but also to gauge respondent beliefs about information-provider preferences. The information questions used in the analysis appear in Appendix B.

To execute the survey instrument, I recruited 30 undergraduates from the California Institute of Technology, California State University (Northridge), and Pasadena City College. The pollsters received extra credit in political science and economics classes in exchange for attending two instructional sessions and administering the poll for four hours on Election Day. Lecturers at these institutions received a day off from lecturing in exchange for providing me with access to their students. In effect, I received low-cost pollsters in exchange for lecturing about the results of the exit poll in the students' classes. The entire survey was conducted for less than three hundred dollars.

In the instructional sessions, I stressed careful execution of the polling, as opposed to maximizing the number of respondents. I directed the pollsters to use a randomizing mechanism to select respondents in the hope that this would dampen any selection bias. Specifically, I instructed pollsters to choose every fifth exiting voter, with counting to begin only after an interview was completed. In addition, there was no reward to a pollster for the number of surveys completed.

The sample we obtained is neither large enough nor diverse enough to make broad generalizations about insurance reform voting behavior. Fortunately, making these generalizations was not our intention. Our purpose was to contact voters with varying amounts and kinds of information in an attempt to learn more about the effect of different types of information on voting behavior. Financial and physical limitations led me to restrict our polling universe to a ten-city area located in Los Angeles County and centered about the city of Pasadena. I chose polling places in areas across which there was a variance in the cost of auto insurance, the average number of accidents, and the cost of insurance claims.[11] I reasoned that these variables would be correlated with insurance rates, interest in the insurance reform issue, and the propensity to obtain information. Given these constraints and goals, I was able to obtain a sample that included enough variation for me to explore the relationships I have described. Appendix C shows how the 339 respondents compared to the voters of Los Angeles County and the State of California.

For the purposes of analysis, I feel justified in assuming that our respondents were also consumers of insurance, since nearly all of our respondents (98.7%) reported living in a household where a car was insured. Correspondingly, I also assume that (1) respondent preferences over electoral outcomes do not vary systematically with the propensity to possess certain types of information, (2) the ability to determine the relationship between the proposition and one's own well-being does vary with the propensity to possess certain types of information, and (3) all respondents prefer electoral outcomes that result in either a lower premium or a higher expected value of compensation in the event of an accident.[12]

Finally, each respondent was given a two-sided card at the beginning of the interview. One side of the card had a description of each insurance proposition exactly as it appeared on the official ballot (see Appendix A). We allowed respondents to see the summaries during the interview in order to minimize the effects of variance in non-information-related recall ability. The other side of the card was used for asking potentially sensitive socioeconomic and insurance-rate-related questions. Instead of giving numbers for income, age, traffic violations, or insurance premiums, respondents selected from lettered categories that were listed on the card.

Empirical Model

I shall now use a series of multivariate logit regressions to identify the determinants of respondent voting behavior. I present one logit for each of the five propositions. In each logit, the dependent variable is the binary variable *Vote*. *Vote* equals 1 for a *yes* vote on the proposition and 0 for a *no* vote. Thus, positive coefficients for the independent (explanatory) variables imply that having the characteristic presumed to generate the independent variable is associated with a greater propensity to cast a *yes* vote. The model used in the estimation is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Vote} &= \alpha + \beta_1\text{INSURANCE} + \beta_2\text{LAWYER} + \beta_3\text{NADER}\\ &+ \beta_4\text{KNOWLEDGE} + \beta_5\text{INSURANCE} * \text{KNOWLEDGE}\\ &+ \beta_6\text{NADER} * \text{KNOWLEDGE} + \beta_7\text{LAWYER} * \text{KNOWLEDGE}\\ &+ \beta_{8,\ldots,11}\,[\text{other insurance-reform-related variables}].\end{aligned}$$

The first three independent variables are measures of a respondent's possession of a certain type of information shortcut—knowledge of an information-provider's preferences. INSURANCE equals 1 if the respondent correctly identifies the insurance industry preference on the proposition and 0 otherwise (correct responses are *yes* on 101, 104, and 106, *no* on 100 and 103). Similarly, LAWYER equals 1 only if the respondent correctly identifies trial-lawyer preferences (*yes* on 100, *no* on 106); and NADER equals 1 only if the respondent can identify Ralph Nader's preferences (*yes* on 103). As defined, the values of INSURANCE, LAWYER and NADER are proposition-specific. For example, if a respondent could identify correctly the insurance industry's preference with respect to Propositions 100 and 104, then the value of INSURANCE would be 1 for the Proposition 100 estimation, 1 for the Proposition 104 estimation, and 0 for the other three estimations for that respondent. Also notice that each of these variables is used only in estimations that correspond to campaigns with which the relevant information provider was directly involved (see Table 1).

To determine the extent to which a respondents' knowledge of these endorsements enhanced their ability to vote as though they were relatively well informed, I must first show that "knowing the shortcut" affected voting behavior. To test for this effect, I use the survey responses to evaluate the null hypothesis, namely, "The information shortcut has no effect on voting behavior (e.g., $H_0 : \beta_4 = 0$). When the coefficient of INSURANCE (or LAWYER or NADER) is significantly different from zero, I can reject the null hypothesis.[13] The ability to reject these hypotheses is a first indication that these information shortcuts affected insurance reform voting behavior.

After determining whether or not these shortcuts affected voting behavior, I then want to address the question that motivated this research project: To what extent did possession of a shortcut affect relatively uninformed respondents' ability to cast the same votes they would have cast if they had been well informed? The first step in addressing this question is to find a measure of a respondent's encyclopedic knowledge. The independent variable, KNOWLEDGE, is such a measure.

KNOWLEDGE is derived from responses to the four questions (listed in Appendix B) of the form, "Which of the propositions have *characteristic X*?" For each of the questions, there were five correct responses, since each proposition either had *characteristic X* or did not have it. KNOWLEDGE takes on its highest value, 20, only if respondents provided all correct responses, and its lowest value, 0, for respondents who provided no correct responses.[14] I assume that respondents for whom KNOWLEDGE was high were more likely to understand the personal consequences of a particular proposition's approval than were respondents for whom KNOWLEDGE was low.[15]

If respondents prefer lower premiums and higher-valued policies (as their status as consumers had led me to assume), then they should be likely to favor propositions that mandate lower insurance premiums (100, 103, 104) and increase competition in the provision of insurance (100, 103). For the same reasons, respondents should also be likely to oppose propositions that restrict a claimant's ability to collect from an insurance company (101, 104, 106). Since I expect that respondents with greater KNOWLEDGE would be relatively likely to understand which propositions were consistent with these interests, I predict that the sign of KNOWLEDGE will be positive for Propositions 100 and 103 and negative for Propositions 101 and 106. The sign of KNOWLEDGE for Proposition 104 depends on the respondents' willingness to trade off lower premiums for a decrease in the amount that they can expect to receive in the event of an accident. Since I possess neither a measure of, nor a compelling theory about, our respondents' willingness to make this trade, I cannot predict the sign of KNOWLEDGE for Proposition 104.

The second step in determining whether or not relatively uninformed voters could adapt to their lack of encyclopedic information is to determine the extent to which the shortcuts represented by the variables INSURANCE, LAWYER, and/or NADER were effective substitutes for encyclopedic knowledge. Since I expected each of these shortcuts to be effective, I expected that the coefficients of INSURANCE, LAWYER, and/or NADER would have the same sign as the coefficient of KNOWLEDGE. If these coefficients are also significantly different from zero, then I have supporting evidence for the assertion that these shortcuts were an effective substitute for the acquisition of encyclopedic information. Given my previous prediction of the signs of KNOWLEDGE, I expect positive and significant signs on the three information-provider coefficients for Propositions 100 and 103 and negative and significant signs on these coefficients for Propositions 101 and 106.

The theories reviewed earlier suggest that knowledge of an information-provider's preferences should have a greater effect on the inferences and voting behavior of relatively uninformed respondents (who have more to learn) than it does on the behavior of relatively well informed respondents. Therefore, I include interactive explanatory variables that condition the effect of the INSURANCE, LAWYER, and NADER variables on the respondent's level of KNOWLEDGE. Because relatively uninformed respondents have more to learn, I expect the signs of the interactive term coefficients to be different from the signs of its components. In addition, I expect the magnitude of the interactive term coefficients to be smaller than the coefficients of INSURANCE, LAWYER, and NADER, since even relatively well informed persons may be able to form more accurate inferences about proposition content from their acquisition of knowledge about the information-providers' preferences.

In each of the estimations, I also include measures of potential within-group variance in preferences over insurance reform initiatives to account for the possibility that some respondents may care more about the insurance reform issue than others and, therefore, may feel even more strongly about obtaining lower insurance premiums or higher-valued policies. These variables are described in Appendix D.

Results

Table 2 reports the logit results. Since I have predicted that many of the coefficients will have the same sign, I used a singular value decomposition to determine the existence of multicollinearity. This test (explained in Belsley, Kuh, and Welch 1980) failed to show significant levels of collinearity.[16]

I first discuss the effect of the variable INSURANCE. To determine whether or not knowledge of insurance industry preferences was an effective shortcut, we must first determine whether or not INSURANCE affected voting behavior. My analysis suggests that respondents who knew the insurance industry's preferences on a particular proposition exhibited very different voting behavior from that of respondents who did not have this information. Table 2 shows that in three of the five elections, knowledge of the insurance industry's preferences was a statistically significant determinant of voting behavior. In the other two cases, conventional levels of significance were narrowly missed. To better understand how meaningful the INSURANCE coefficients are, consider the fact that the existence of 20 categories in the KNOWLEDGE variable make it relatively unlikely that any effects I capture with variables like INSURANCE are actually the result of within-group variance in the KNOWLEDGE categories. This formulation allows me to make a meaningful distinction between the effect of

TABLE 2

Effects of Information and Rate Determinants on Voting Behavior

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	PROPOSITION 100	101	103	104	106
Constant	−1.50	−.90	−3.95	−.57	.29
	(1.11)	(1.48)	(1.26)	(1.16)	(1.13)
KNOWLEDGE	.05	−.09*	.22**	−.06	−.07
	(.05)	(.05)	(.08)	(.05)	(.05)
INSURANCE	2.57**	−1.89	3.35**	−1.15	−2.28**
	(.91)	(1.28)	(.90)	(.82)	(1.14)
INSURANCE * KNOWLEDGE	−.10	.41	−.20**	.04	.02
	(.07)	(1.19)	(.07)	(.07)	(.10)
LAWYER	−2.42**	—	—	—	−1.25
	(1.04)	—	—	—	(.86)
LAWYER * KNOWLEDGE	.15*	—	—	—	.04
	(.08)	—	—	—	(.07)
NADER	—	—	.86	—	—
	—	—	(.85)	—	—
NADER * KNOWLEDGE	—	—	−.09	—	—
	—	—	(.07)	—	—
Traffic violator	−.24	.09	.07	.22	.32
	(.37)	(.60)	(.36)	(.44)	(.43)
Male-under-25 violator	.06	−8.23	−.18	−.02	−.12
	(.68)	(42.25)	(.70)	(.72)	(.74)
CARTYPE	.22	.01	.21	−.32	−.16
	(.22)	(.34)	(.22)	(.27)	(.24)
Income	.05	.00	.32**	.14	.01
	(.15)	(.22)	(.14)	(.16)	(.15)
N	219	220	236	221	220
Begin-log likelihood	−151.8	−152.49	−163.58	−153.19	−152.49
End-log likelihood	−135.55	−65.13	−139.25	−112.51	−119.64
% correctly predicted	67	90	72	78	75

Note: The dependent variable is binary, equals 1 if the respondent reported voting for the proposition in question, and equals 0 if the respondent reported voting against the proposition in question. The observations used in this analysis include only those respondents who voted on the proposition in question and answered all of the relevant knowledge and demographic questions. The coefficients presented are unstandardized and the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The coefficients and standard errors were derived using the logit macro in the SST program (Dubin/Rivers Research, Pasadena, California).
*$p \leq .10$.
**$p \leq .05$.

encyclopedic information on voting behavior and the effect of the shortcuts. Therefore, given the strength of the test and the relatively small sample size, the levels of significance in all five cases are quite remarkable.[17]

Since logit coefficients do not provide much intuition about the absolute magnitude of the hypothesized relationships, I report relevant "first differences" in Table 3. A "first difference" is a straightforward translation of a logit coefficient into a percentage. The first differences I present are estimates of how much the probability of voting *yes* on the relevant proposition would change, given a particular change in a single independent variable (or set of independent variables) while holding the other independent variables constant at their mean values. For example, the first differences tell us that a respondent who was average in every way except that she provided no correct responses to the proposition content questions had a .17 higher probability of voting for Proposition 100 than did a respondent who was similarly average except for her ability to provide 20 correct responses.

An examination of Table 3 once again shows the relatively large effect that knowing the insurance industry's position had on respondent voting behavior. The lower part of Table 3 shows that whether they knew the insurance industry's preferred electoral outcome or not was the largest single determinant of low-KNOWLEDGE respondents' voting behavior. Notice also that this effect decreased as KNOWLEDGE increased (because INSURANCE and INSURANCE * KNOWLEDGE always had different signs, as expected). For example, knowing that the insurance industry was against Proposition 100 increased by 48 percentage points the probability that a respondent who could provide no correct answers to proposition knowledge questions voted for Proposition 100. The

TABLE 3

First Differences: Change in the Probability of a "YES" Vote

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE OR CONDITION	CATEGORY CHANGE		PROPOSITION				
	FROM	TO	100	101	103	104	106
KNOWLEDGE	lowest (0)	Highest (20)	17	−7	19	−5	−22
INSURANCE	Does not know Insurance perferences	Knows	34	−7	26	−11	−34
LAWYER	Does not know Lawyer preferences	Knows	−17	—	—	—	−15
NADER	Does not know Nader preferences	Knows	—	—	−3	—	—
Household Income	$22,500–$40,000	over $75,000	0	0	14	3	2
INSURANCE, if							
KNOWLEDGE = 0	Does not know Insurance preferences	Knows	48	−18	68	−24	−46
KNOWLEDGE = 10	Does not know Insurance preferences	Knows	36	−8	32	−14	−35
KNOWLEDGE = 15	Does not know Insurance preferences	Knows	26	−5	8	−8	−30
LAWYER, if							
KNOWLEDGE = 0	Does not know Lawyer preferences	Knows	−40	—	—	—	−28
KNOWLEDGE = 10	Does not know Lawyer preferences	Knows	−21	—	—	—	−16
KNOWLEDGE = 15	Does not know Lawyer preferences	Knows	−5	—	—	—	−10

Note: A concise explanation of when and how this and related methods can make limited-dependent-variable-model coefficients more intuitive is provided in King 1989 chap. 4. The first differences of KNOWLEDGE, INSURANCE, NADER, and LAWYER and their interactive terms are computed using the appropriate conditional means. For instance, the change in the dependent variable due to knowledge of the insurance industry's preferences is determined by increasing INSURANCE from 0 to 1 and INSURANCE * KNOWLEDGE from 0 to the mean of KNOWLEDGE.

magnitude of this effect was roughly double that of a respondent who could provide correct responses on 15 of 20 occasions.

I now use the data to evaluate the extent to which use of the INFORMATION shortcut allowed low-KNOWLEDGE respondents to emulate the behavior of high-KNOWLEDGE respondents. Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence for the prediction that relatively uninformed respondents used their knowledge of the insurance industry's preferences to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed respondents. In every logit, the sign of INSURANCE is the same as the sign of KNOWLEDGE. This implies that whether respondents used encyclopedic information or their knowledge of insurance industry preferences, they formed the same types of inferences about the relationship between a proposition and their own well-being.

To show the effect of the INSURANCE shortcut in a more concrete manner, in Table 4 I divide the sample into three mutually exclusive categories based on the respondents' values of KNOWLEDGE and INSURANCE. Presented in Table 4, column 1, is the behavior of respondents who had relatively high KNOWLEDGE and who knew the insurance industry's preferences. Table 4, column 2, contains the behavior of respondents who had relatively low KNOWLEDGE, but (like the respondents in column 1) knew the insurance industry's preference. In column 3 are respondents who also had relatively low KNOWLEDGE but (unlike the second group) did not know the insurance industry's preferences. A comparison of the behavior of these three groups makes my main point in a dramatic fashion. Voters in the first two columns look very much like each other, while voters in column 3 look very different from voters in the first two columns. The relationship between these three groups strongly supports the assertion that knowledge of the insurance industry's preferences provided an effective shortcut for voters whose (encyclopedic) KNOWLEDGE of proposition content was low.

TABLE 4

Percent Voting Yes by Information Category

	INFORMATION CATEGORY		
PROPOSITION	HIGH KNOWLEDGE (10–20) WITH KNOWLEDGE OF INSURANCE INDUSTRY PREFERENCES	LOW KNOWLEDGE (0–9) WITH KNOWLEDGE OF INSURANCE INDUSTRY PREFERENCES	LOW KNOWLEDGE (0–9) WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF INSURANCE INDUSTRY PREFERENCES
100	53	53	27
101	8	5	15
103	72.5	73	26
104	17	17	34
106	11	12.5	45

Note: Cell value is percent *yes*. Percentages are rounded to the nearest percentage point except where the true value is exactly half a percentage point.

It is also interesting to note that the coefficients of INSURANCE (and KNOWLEDGE) are negative for the three propositions that insurance industry favored (101, 104, and 106) and positive for the two propositions that the insurance industry opposed (100 and 103). In all cases, the signs of KNOWLEDGE and INSURANCE are as predicted. The similarity of the two sets of coefficients supports the notion that relatively informed respondents concluded—and relatively uninformed respondents perceived—that the insurance industry's preferences over electoral outcomes were contrary to their own.[18] This finding reflects well on the insurance industry's attempt to hide its identity, in that respondents who were able to identify its preferences tended to use them as a negative reference. Given the closeness of the vote on Proposition 103 (only 11 out of every 1,000 voters would have had to cast a different vote to change the outcome), we can conjecture that a slightly more successful attempt to detach the insurance industry's identity from their endorsements may have lead to a different electoral outcome.

For voting behavior on Proposition 100, the effect of the variable LAWYER is similar to the effect of INSURANCE but less dramatic. The coefficient for LAWYER is significant at the .05 level in the Proposition 100 logit. The negative, significant, and correctly predicted sign of LAWYER in the Proposition 100 logit is consistent with the assertion that respondents perceived the trial lawyers' preferences to be different from their own. However, the magnitude of this coefficient suggests that this shortcut did not affect voter inferences as much knowledge of the insurance industry's preferences did. In contrast, the negative coefficient of LAWYER in the Proposition 106 logit is of a different sign from that of either KNOWLEDGE or INSURANCE and thus contrary to my prediction. These findings suggest that knowledge of the LAWYER endorsement was not as effective a shortcut as was knowledge of the INSURANCE endorsement. Unfortunately, I do not have sufficient data to determine whether this signal was less effective because the lawyers waged a smaller campaign than the insurance industry (less costly and observable effort) or because respondents were relatively uncertain about lawyer views on the value of an insurance policy (lack of reputation).[19]

Finally, the relatively small coefficient on the NADER variable may surprise those who recall Nader's role in this election. The interpretation that Ralph Nader had no effect on voting behavior, however, would be going a bit too far. Unlike Voter Revolt (the sponsors of Proposition 103), Ralph Nader had a relatively well known past. I believe that Nader's past and his widely covered and frequent speeches about the insurance industry's big money campaign against 103 were Voter Revolt's greatest asset. With Nader, Voter Revolt was able to prevent the insurance industry from monopolizing the transmission of widely accessible (i.e., mass-media) information. Nader's presence certainly made it easier for some voters to locate the insurance industry's preferences over outcomes. Without someone like Nader, it is unlikely that Voter Revolt could have either received the media attention it did or acquired credibility sufficient to affect voter opinions for those occasions when it did have access to the media.

CONCLUSION

I used a survey instrument to identify the effect of different types of information on voting behavior in the complex insurance reform initiatives of 1988. I showed that respondents who possessed relatively low levels of factual (or encyclopedic) knowledge about the initiatives used their knowledge of insurance industry preferences to emulate the behavior of those respondents who had relatively high levels of factual knowledge. If we believe that well-informed voters make the best possible decisions, then the fact that relatively uninformed voters can emulate them suggests that the availability of certain types of information cues allows voters to use their limited resources efficiently while influencing electoral outcomes in ways that they would have if they had taken the time and effort necessary to acquire encyclopedic information. In closing, I believe that the policy implications of this analysis are quite straightforward: while scholars and pundits propose that we educate the public about politics in order to lessen the impact of uninformed votes on the responsiveness of democratic decision-making institutions, a deeper understanding of how people adapt to the uncertainty that characterizes many of their important decisions suggests that directing our efforts into the provision of credible and widely accessible "signals" may be a more effective and cost-efficient way to ensure the responsiveness of electoral outcomes to the electorate's preferences.

APPENDIX A: SUMMARIES OF INSURANCE REFORM PROPOSITIONS

Each of the following summaries are presented here exactly as they appeared on the ballot, in the California Ballot Pamphlet, and on the card given to each respondent during the interview.

100 INSURANCE RATES, REGULATION, INITIATIVE. Reduces good driver rates. Requires automobile, other property/casualty, health insurance rate approval. Adopts anti-price-fixing, antidiscrimination laws.

101 AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS AND INSURANCE RATES. INITIATIVE. Reduces automobile insurance rates, limits compensation for non-economic losses for four years.

103 INSURANCE RATES, REGULATION, COMMISSIONER, INITIATIVE. Reduces auto, other property/casualty rates. Requires elected Insurance Commissioner's approval of rates. Prohibits price-fixing, discrimination.

104 AUTOMOBILE AND OTHER INSURANCE. INITIATIVE. Establishes no-fault insurance for automobile accidents. Reduces rates for two years. Restricts future regulation.

TABLE B-1

Information Questions

QUESTIONS	RESPONSES 100	101	103	104	106	DK
About information provider preferences						
Which of the propositions do you believe were supported by the *insurance industry?*	65	129*	39	171*	93*	61
Which of the propositions do you believe were supported by the *trial lawyers?*	78*	35	26	27	58	119
Which of the propositions do you believe were supported by *Ralph Nader?*	15	16	188*	15	10	71
About Proposition Content						
Which proposition(s) establish a *no-fault* system of auto insurance?	21	19	17	191*	8	54
Which proposition(s) mandate giving *discounts* in insurance premiums to *good drivers?*	117*	35	65*	16	4	52
Which propostion(s) *limit attorney contingency fees?*	7	13*	14	22*	193*	59
Which proposition(s) mandate insurance rates which are *not based on where you live?*	56	19	88*	16	7	140

106 ATTORNEY FEES LIMIT FOR TORT CLAIMS. INITIATIVE. Limits amount of contingency fees which an attorney may collect in tort cases.

APPENDIX B: INFORMATION ABOUT INFORMATION MEASURES

The starred cell entries in Table B-1 identify correct responses. Respondents were permitted to give multiple responses to each of the following questions. Notice that for some questions there were multiple correct responses.

APPENDIX C: ELECTION AND POLL RESULTS

The cell entries in Table C-1 are percentages voting in favor of the proposition. The source of state and county level election results is the Statement of Vote provided by the California Secretary of State, Sacramento.

APPENDIX D: OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

VIOLATOR is a binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent admitted to a traffic violation in the last three years. Since violators face higher premiums than nonviolators, the outcome of insurance reform elections are likely to have a greater effect on violators than nonviolators. Mv25 equals 1 if the respondent was a male "violator" under 25 years of age, and 0 otherwise. As a member of this group at the time I designed the exit poll, I knew that male respondents who were under age 25 would pay higher premiums than other violators. Therefore, the outcome of insurance reform elections should have had a greater effect on these respondents than on other violators.

The variable CARTYPE is a discrete variable with values 1–5. As CARTYPE increases, so does the retail price of the particular model. Since insurance rates are correlated with the price of the respondent's car, I expect that (all else held constant) respondents having higher-priced cars will be more affected by the electoral outcome than will respondents with lower-priced cars. INCOME is a discrete variable that is valued 1–5 and increases with household income. Cutoff levels for the discrete categories were $15,000, $22,500, $40,000, and $75,000. Insurance reform should have a relatively large effect on persons with higher incomes, who tend to purchase more insurance.

As interesting as these concepts are, the variables described in this appendix do not produce significant coefficients. In fact, only two out of these variables' 20 coefficients have coefficients that are larger than their standard errors. While the inclusion (or exclusion) of these variables does not alter the results I have presented, I include them because I expect many readers to question the viability of a statistical model that tests for the effects of different types of information by including only independent variables that are measures of information.

TABLE C-1

Comparison to County and State Vote

PROPOSITION	SPONSOR	STATE	LA COUNTY	SURVEY (N = 339)
100 (good driver initiative)	Trial lawyers	40.9	50.4	44.3
101 (Polanco initiative)	Insurance industry	13.3	15.5	10.8
103 (Voter Revolt/Nader initiative)	Consumer activists	51.1	62.6	65.2
104 (no-fault initiative)	Insurance industry	25.4	22.3	21.5
106 (contingency fee initiative)	Insurance industry	46.9	43.6	29.4

Notes

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1. For a review of these arguments as they apply to direct legislation elections, see Cronin 1989.

2. For examples of this type of argument as they apply to direct legislation, see, e.g., Kuklinski, Metlay, and May 1982 and Lupia 1992. Popkin 1991 provides a more general review of the consequences of voter information problems.

3. For example, the most comprehensive analysis of proposition complexity that I am aware of (Magleby 1984) shows that the average number of words in the propositions that appeared on the California ballot during the 1970s was 8,121. He goes on to argue that over 17 years of formal education would be required to comprehend the text of the average proposition.

4. Theoretical analyses are developed in Lupia 1992, 1993a. For experimental tests of the theory, see Lupia 1993b.

5. I have reviewed the votes of insurance-related bills in the three years preceding the election and have found two systematic relationships: insurance-industry-supported tort reform bills die in the Assembly Judiciary Committee, while lawyer-supported insurance reform bills die in either the Assembly Finance and Insurance Committee or the Ways and Means Committee. Republicans (the minority party in both houses of the California legislature) tended to support tort reform measures. Democrats on these committees tended to support bills more favorable to the trial lawyers, yet each of these measures tended to fall one or two votes short of passage in committee through the defection of two to four Democrats.

6. In October 1987, an insurance industry spokesperson in the course of a conversation about a consumer-activist-supported insurance reform ballot proposition estimated, "We could spend $10 million and still not be assured of beating it" (from Reich 1987b). One wonders how the negotiations might have changed had the insurance industry and trial lawyers anticipated that campaign expenditures would total in excess of $80 million and that a consumer-sponsored initiative would be the only resulting change to the status quo.

7. In addition to nonpolitical concerns, there were elections for the office of president and U.S. Senator; seats in Congress, the state senate, and the state assembly; local ballot measures; and 22 other statewide measures on the same ballot.

8. Some prominent figures of both parties took public stands on the insurance reform issue, but these endorsements provide no evidence of a clear partisan consensus. See Campbell et al. 1960 for a definitive statement of the effect of partisan cues.

9. For well-known examples of this type of research, see Crawford and Sobel 1982; Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Spence 1973.

10. Related research on "cue taking" merits attention. Kuklinski, Metlay, and May (1982) showed that voters in nuclear power referenda conditioned their strategies on the stated positions of reference groups. Feldman and Conover (1983) identified emotional bases for certain types of voter responses to new political information. Popkin (1991) argued that certain images allow voters to simplify their voting calculus. Page and Shapiro (1992) examine responses to over one thousand survey questions to support their argument that electorates have somewhat parallel adaptive capabilities.

11. The sources used to make these evaluations included California, Department of Insurance 1988a; California, Department of Insurance, Consumer Affairs Division 1987; and California, Department of Insurance, Statistical Services Unit 1988a–c.

12. This is not to say that respondents knew, initially, which propositions would achieve this goal. If they had, the campaign would have been meaningless. In addition, two respondents in the sample admitted to working for insurance agencies. Both voted in a manner consistent with a "job security" hypothesis. Otherwise, there was nothing in the data suggesting that this voter preference hypothesis did not represent respondent preferences.

13. As it is important not only to provide support for one causal hypothesis but also to reject other plausible causal hypotheses, I reran each of the estimations in Table 2 four times, replacing INSURANCE with an equivalently defined binary variable that measured a voter's ability to answer one of the four questions about proposition content. For instance, the first of the four questions that links a proposition to an issue is "Which proposition(s) establish a *no-fault* system of auto insurance?" (see Appendix B) Responses to this question were used to produce five binary variables that equaled 1 when the respondent correctly identified the relationship between the statement and the proposition and 0 otherwise. In 19 of the 20 cases, the replacement variable performed very badly. The T-statistic for the replacement variables were usually below 1 and often below .5. In addition, the difference between the initial likelihood function and the final likelihood function was generally much smaller than the equivalent estimations using INSURANCE. The one exception to this rule was the respondent's ability to correctly identify Proposition 104 as setting up a no-fault system of insurance. As Proposition 104 was referred to as the no-fault initiative, the effect of this particular variable in the 104 logit is hardly surprising. I reran the 104 logit once more, using INSURANCE, the no-fault replacement variable, and the corresponding interaction terms to find that the coefficient of neither variable was affected by the simultaneous inclusion of the other.

I also reran each estimation adding the respondent's reported partisanship. Implemented a number of theoretically consistent ways, the effect of party never attained conventional levels of significance and was omitted to preserve degrees of freedom. This lack of effect was especially true of PARTY'S interaction with NADER, where the use of a party term seems most appropriate. In this case, the standard error was 30 times greater than the coefficient.

Since some readers may still be concerned about the absence of a party term in this analysis, an additional history of these elections may be insightful. Recall that insurance reform was a very touchy issue, one that the revealed behavior of California legislators suggests that few were willing to take public positions on. Despite repeated attempts over the five years preceding the November 1988 election, neither house of the California legislature could get an insurance reform bill out of committee and onto the floor for a vote. This inability to get out of committee is especially surprising, given the relatively strong Democratic control of both chambers. If Democrats had reached some type of consensus on how to reform the insurance industry, it would have been easy for them to use their control of the legislature to produce a bill for the governor to sign. In this case, "Democrat" might have served as an effective cue. However, the state legislature never achieved this consensus.

Likewise, voters who followed the actions of Republican governor George Deukmejian may have been confused about either his or his party's stand on insurance reform. Prior to the passage of Proposition 103, the insurance commissioner was appointed by the governor. Deukmejian's appointee, Roxani Gillespie, was previously a lobbyist for a large insurance company. This action might lead voters to believe that the Republican position was proinsurance. However, Deukmejian also encouraged voters to vote against all five propositions, including the three drafted by the insurance industry. That the governor and the legislature never once publicly locked horns on this issue, that the issue had to be decided using the initiative, and that during the campaign season the few partisans who did take stands differed in their stances is suggestive of the lack of observable partisan consensus on the insurance reform issue. Therefore, we should not be surprised that party was not an effective cue for relatively uninformed voters.

14. The distribution of respondents achieving each knowledge score (from 0 to 20) was 14, 1, 3, 11, 4, 7, 2, 25, 15, 7, 26, 16, 43, 26, 10, 35, 16, 33, 7, 2, and 0.

15. The arguments underlying this type of assumption are evaluated in greater detail by Bartels (1990) and Gerber and Lupia (1993).

16. The values of the singular value decomposition for each of the logits, ordered by proposition number, from lowest to highest, were 23.79, 20.48, 30.59, 22.14, and 23.37. Values of over 100 indicate collinearity, values from 30 to 100 indicate mild collinearity, and values under 10 indicate no collinearity. While the Proposition 103 logit is just over the threshold for mild collinearity, I reran it, collapsing several KNOWLEDGE categories and achieved very similar results to those presented, with less collinearity.

17. In case of the 101 and 104 logits, it is worth noting that (1) the dependent variable had relatively little variance and (2) this variable did achieve conventional levels of significance when I used weaker tests of the effect of INSURANCE. Of the respondents who voted on the relevant proposition and answered all of the information and demographic questions, only 22 of 220 voted *yes* on 101 and only 49 of 221 voted *yes* on 104. Thus, by attempting to make inferences about voting behavior that rely heavily on the observable differences between these yes-voters and the rest of the sample, we are asking a lot of the data. When we combine the limited variance of the dependent with our relatively small sample size, the fact that our coefficients even come close to conventional levels of significance (both are about one-and-a-half times the size of the standard error) is encouraging. Another part of the failure to achieve conventional levels of significance in the two extreme cases may be that I set up an empirical test in which rejection of the null hypothesis was quite difficult. The advantage of the difficult test is that I am more confident that the magnitude of the INSURANCE coefficient represents the effect of that particular shortcut. The drawback is that if processes that generate INSURANCE and KNOWLEDGE are correlated, this makes the likelihood of a large T-statistic relatively small. I reran the estimations replacing the KNOWLEDGE variable with limited measures of encyclopedic information that had two or 3 categories (*low knowledge, somewhat knowledgeable, high knowledge*), instead of 20. I found that all of the INSURANCE coefficients achieve conventional levels of significance in these reestimations.

18. Notice that for me to conclude that INSURANCE served as an effective shortcut, it matters not whether low-KNOWLEDGE respondents knew that they were economizing on their information costs by relying on the insurance industry preference cue or whether they just did not like insurance companies. For my conclusion to be valid, it is sufficient that use of the shortcut allowed relatively uninformed respondents to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed respondents who were otherwise like themselves (my estimate of how these respondents would have voted if better informed).

19. The insurance industry was able to stifle early trial-lawyer attempts to advance their preferences by running a series of advertisements pointing out the lawyer sponsorship of certain advertisements. This particular series of advertisements proved so effective that not only were lawyer-sponsored campaign advertisements removed from the airwaves in the final weeks of the campaign, but so were noncampaign related advertisements for trial-lawyer services, at the request of CTLA (Reich 1988b).

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FISCAL CONSTRAINTS AND ELECTORAL MANIPULATION IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE

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American social welfare policy involves a politically significant fiscal interaction between short-run, pay-as-you-go constraints and long-run equilibrium constraints motivated by the contributory principle and the concept of actuarial soundness. The fiscal constraints induce conflict between benefit recipients and payroll-tax-payers. To support small election-year reductions in payroll taxes, means-tested program benefits are slightly reduced in election years (compared to non-election-year levels under similar economic conditions). The existence of the constraints and of the election-year changes is tested using a multivariate time series regression model of monthly transfer payments and contributions for social insurance during years 1948–87. Short-run dynamics are found to be weakly incrementalist, but otherwise the results support the argument. Extraordinary manipulations are identified during 1972. Special technical features of the econometric analysis are a nonlinear, dynamic specification; robust generalized method of moments estimation; and near cointegration.

The taxing side of American social welfare policy is as important as the array of payments; that is, who pays is as important, politically, as who gains (see Browning 1986; Page 1983; Pechman 1985; Reynolds and Smolensky 1977). Ever since its beginning in 1935, the contributory design of American social insurance has forged strong links between benefits received by individuals and taxes they have paid (Achenbaum 1986; Bernstein and Bernstein 1988; Derthick 1979). One effect of this design has been a widespread feeling that in particular, each individual personally deserves the Social Security benefit payments that he or she ultimately receives: many believe that the benefits each person gets are exactly the benefits personally paid in throughout the working life. The view that social insurance benefits such as Social Security are earned awards has helped drive the escalation of payroll taxes needed to cover the costs of rising benefit levels in what has long been an unfunded, pay-as-you-go system (Bernstein and Bernstein 1988; Brittain 1972; Munnell 1977; Munnell and Blais 1984). This political consequence of the contributory design reflects Roosevelt's original conception, as epitomized by his remark, "We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program" (Schlesinger 1958, 309).

I argue that American social welfare's contributory design has indeed produced important political effects. Long-run constraints between aggregate taxes and aggregate benefits have been used to implement the design. The long-run political viability of the social welfare system depends on the relationship between the long-run constraints and the short-run constraints of pay-as-you-go. In the absence of effective long-run constraints, it is difficult to see how the opposing interests of taxpayers and benefit recipients might be reconciled. But even effective constraints will leave some tension between payers and recipients. Free-riding incentives will always motivate demands for small, personally favorable adjustments. Each recipient will want a small increase in his or her benefits, while each taxpayer will want a small decrease in his or her taxes. In conjunction with differences among groups in political participation, the residual tension makes manipulation tied to the electoral calendar virtually inevitable. Incumbents have a strong incentive to take from recipients of benefits from means-tested programs, in election years, in order to give to groups more likely to reward them with votes.

I shall present this argument in greater detail, then describe and report the results from a multivariate time series regression model used to test the key assumptions and predictions of the argument. The dependent variables are the monthly levels of transfer payments and personal and employer contributions for social insurance during years 1948–87. The explanatory variables include several social and economic variables and several variables that measure political circumstances during the period.

Taxes and Benefits

By itself, pay-as-you-go implies that current payroll-tax-payers and current recipients of social insurance benefits have opposing interests. Pay-as-you-go means that current benefits are paid out of current taxes. Any increase to current recipients implies an extra cost to current taxpayers, while taxes can be cut only if benefits are reduced. Taxpayers and benefit recipients should therefore have opposing policy preferences if individuals act selfishly to maximize disposable income. Payers should want lower benefits, to allow their tax payments to fall, while recipients should want taxes raised, to support increases in their benefits.

The calculation of gains and costs is not so simple when the contributory principle is taken into account. According to the principle, a recipient's current level of benefits depends on the amount he or she paid in taxes when working. The individual-level contributory principle motivates an aggregate policy often described as actuarial soundness (Altmeyer 1966): current tax collections should promote economic growth sufficient to support the taxation that will be needed to pay benefits over the long haul. One way to do this is to use tax collections to generate aggregate public savings, that is, to collect payroll taxes in excess of the amount needed to meet current expenses (Munnell and Blais 1984). If such a system has been working, a policy of collecting higher taxes in the past should have produced higher levels of real income now (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987, 158–161). This increased income can be used to support higher levels of current benefits. Under pay-as-you-go, the benefits will be financed by higher current taxes.

In political terms, pay-as-you-go and the contributory principle are mutually reinforcing. Under pay-as-you-go, current benefit recipients can recoup past increases in their own taxes (increases in the taxes they paid when they were working) only if the costs to current tax payers increase.[1] But if earlier public savings promoted economic growth, then part of the income currently being taxed was produced by current recipients' previous tax payments. Such a system of effective investment would support the recipients' current claims. Moral rights such as Roosevelt cited might be invoked. The political connotations of such an arrangement should affect current taxpayers' long-run cost calculations: if they deny current recipients' claims, the legitimacy of their own future claims will be undercut. Such contingencies should reduce the net cost of current tax payments. But aggregate public savings are created only if current tax collections exceed current benefit payments. So if taxpayers are currently committed to pay-as-you-go in order to justify their own future claims, then they should also be willing to pay taxes in excess of the amount needed to cover current benefit claims. Indeed (and this is the key point), they should be committed to pay-as-you-go only if they are willing to pay such excess amounts. For if the actuarial-soundness concept holds, the increased income needed to support their own future claims will exist only if such amounts are paid. But if there will be no benefits in the future, then, in a purely selfish calculus, there is no reason to support pay-as-you-go now.

Such a synergy between the short-run policy of pay-as-you-go and the long-run investment policy associated with the contributory principle might go a long way toward dissolving the opposition between taxpayers' and benefit recipients' interests. If successful, a long-run aggregate savings policy can give selfish tax payers the long-run rate of return they need to view their tax payments favorably (see Boskin and Puffert 1987). Current benefit recipients can be expected to claim the amounts they need to recoup their own earlier payments. But if taxes and benefits are linked in a long-run equilibrium relationship, then recipients should keep their claims low enough that current taxpayers can make the excess payments necessary to bind them to the system's future. Such an equilibrium relationship would exist as an equilibrium path along which taxes and benefits covary (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987; Kamien and Schwartz 1991, 272–76.[2]

The conditions necessary for a long-run equilibrium to exist suggest restrictions on the forms a short-run policy of pay-as-you-go might take. A long-run equilibrium between taxes and benefits will be robust against stationary short-term shocks, but in general, long-run equilibrium cannot be sustained if either taxes or benefits are affected by arbitrary trends. Several social and economic conditions that affect social welfare tax or benefit levels are clearly nonstationary, however. Two examples are the population-age profile (in particular, the number of elderly and the number of children) and the price level as measured by the Consumer Price Index (Browning 1986). Political factors that affect social welfare policy, such as the party balance in the U.S. House of Representatives also exhibit trends (Berry and Lowery 1987; Browning 1985). A rulelike system of pay-as-you-go that automatically enforced strong short-run constraints between tax and benefit levels would magnify the effects of such trends. Long-run equilibrium would then be extremely difficult to maintain or, most likely, impossible.

A discretionary approach to short-run policy might better support long-run goals. The best policy, for this purpose, would be one that prevented uncontrolled trends from having persistent effects on tax or benefit levels. Weak forms of incrementalism might allow this, but a strong form such as Browning (1985) estimates for social welfare expenditures would not. Discretion would mean that the political viability of pay-as-you-go depends entirely on the policy's current political and administrative support.

Short-run Manipulation

Long-run considerations might imply substantial convergence between taxpayers' and benefit recipients' interests. But conflicts between the two groups should nonetheless remain. Even if there were consensus on a core policy of pay-as-you-go and broad agreement on the aggregate amounts of benefits and savings that should be generated, free-rider considerations imply that individuals will not agree about the shares of the totals they are to receive or pay (see Laffont 1988, 112–24). At the margin, each current beneficiary will want to receive more, while each current taxpayer will want to pay less.

In such a situation elected officials should be able to manipulate the system at the margins to serve their immediate electoral needs even if their manipulations will be subject to important constraints. Of course, every incumbent will want to give everyone what they want—more benefits for each recipient and lower taxes for each taxpayer. But if pay-as-you-go is actually in force, this will not be possible. That is, if benefits can be increased only if there is a concurrent increase in the taxes to pay for them or if conversely a decrease in taxes can be obtained only if benefits are concurrently reduced, then officials will be forced to choose. Marginal improvements can go to either taxpayers or benefit recipients but not both. The fiscal constraint will have created constituencies with conflicting interests (see Buchanan 1967; Chappell and Keech 1986; Lowi 1964; Wittman 1983).

The usual assumptions suggest that incumbents will favor those likely to return them the greatest gain in votes. Differences among social welfare program benefit recipients should therefore mean that incumbents treat different groups of recipients differently. The primary difference should be between means-tested and non-means-tested program recipients (see Munnell 1987). By definition, means-tested program recipients are poorer in income. They also typically have less education. Partly for these reasons, means-tested recipients not only are less likely to vote but, more generally, are less likely to use political participation to communicate their needs to public officials (Verba et al. 1993). Recipients from "condition-tested" programs, such as unemployment insurance, are also less likely to vote (Rosenstone 1982; see also Schlozman and Verba 1979, 235–54). So we should expect incumbents to choose against the interests of such recipients, more than against nontested program beneficiaries.

The choice between payroll-tax-payers and social welfare program benefit recipients is therefore better thought of as a choice among taxpayers, tested-program recipients and non-tested-program recipients. Fiscal conflict should exist between payroll-tax-payers and tested-program recipients not only because some tested programs have contributory designs (e.g., unemployment insurance) but also because (formal accounting rules notwithstanding) Social Security has historically been imperfectly separated from the rest of the federal budget (Munnell 1985). So the question *which group* incumbents will favor most and which least turns on the group members' relative probabilities of participating politically.

It is easy to anticipate that tested-program recipients will be least favored. Payroll-tax-payers are, by definition, working people. Payroll taxes affect the entire middle class. They therefore touch the largest group of active participants. Incumbents will not rank this group behind poor, tested-program recipients who rarely participate. The choice between taxpayers and non-tested-program recipients is not clear. These groups mostly occupy the same kinds of occupational and career ranks, except that members of the recipient group are typically older (usually retirees) and, because of their ages, more wealthy. Such recipients are active participants (Verba et al. 1993). On the other hand, payroll-tax-payers are much more numerous. General considerations such as these do not suggest that incumbents will see a particular priority ordering between the two groups.

We should therefore expect incumbents to seek ways to shift benefits away from the group of tested-program recipients, in order to increase non-tested-program benefits or decrease payroll taxes.

If voters weigh recent gains and losses more heavily than those further in the past and if a stable equilibrium path exists, then these shifts should take the form of regular oscillations around the levels of benefits and taxes specified in the current equilibrium policy. The shifts are prompted in the first place by group members' desires to cheat—in free-rider fashion—on the allocation of shares specified in current policy. By definition, permanent shifts would mean the policy had changed. Free-rider incentives would then exist relative to the new policy. If there is no stable equilibrium, then the free-rider-driven shocks might cause policy to wander to an arbitrary extent, in arbitrary directions. But if there is a stable equilibrium, shifts in one direction must eventually be matched by equally large shifts in the opposite direction. So if there is a stable equilibrium, the shifts among groups should fluctuate. Regular oscillations are expected because of the periodicity of elections. Incumbents will want the shifts in favor of likely voters to occur during election years.[3]

Such a pattern of manipulation differs from the one described by Tufte (1978, 28–44). Tufte highlights a pattern of election-year increases in social welfare benefits, with payroll tax increases being delayed until nonelection years. On the benefit side, Tufte focuses on nontested programs. He presents informal evidence of election-year increases. Some aspects of these findings have been corroborated by other, more systematic studies, while some aspects have been called into question (Frey and Schneider 1978; Keech and Pak 1989).[4] Tufte uses the idea that incumbents can completely delay the costs for preelection benefit increases until after the election (Tufte 1978, 33). In the interim between the preelection delivery of extra benefits and the postelection collection of the tax bill, Tufte suggests that everyone is enjoying free money—that incumbents have arranged to have no one pay any costs at all.[5] The ultimate expression of this view is Tufte's *kyphosis*, according to which extra benefits are supposed to be heaped up in the month or two immediately preceding an election.

My argument differs from Tufte's mainly in that I have tried to characterize more explicitly the fiscal context in which electorally motivated manipulations of social welfare taxes and benefits might be occurring. In my view, that context involves not only contemporaneous trade-offs among fiscally defined constituencies but also long-run fiscal relationships motivated by the contributory principle and the concept of actuarial soundness. Tufte ignores long-run fiscal considerations. In my view, the interaction between long-run and short-run considerations is a central and essential feature of American social welfare. Without the prospect of long-run returns, current payroll-tax-payers would have no incentive to contribute. And without a norm of pay-as-you-go, they would have no reason to believe that their collective investments will ultimately be recouped and therefore, again, no reason to participate.

STATISTICAL MODEL SPECIFICATIONS

Because the time series model and the tests defined in terms of the model are complicated, I shall outline the overall design before giving the exact specifications. Part of the model represents the changing social, economic, and political grounds that determine the value of the policy equilibrium at each time. The expected levels of payments and contributions are broken into components based on five socioeconomic variables reported each month. The effects of these variables depend on a collection of variables reported annually that measure current political circumstances. These time-varying effects represent the idea that social welfare tax and benefit levels do not respond to socioeconomic change automatically but instead reflect a continuing history of political conflicts (see Browning 1986, 44–49). The rules by which the current policy equilibrium is derived from socioeconomic conditions are allowed to change with shifts in the political environment. In formal terms, the elasticity[6] of each of the fiscal variables with respect to each socioeconomic variable is defined to be a function of the political variables.[7]

The existence of a pay-as-you-go rule is tested in two ways. One test is based on the similarities between the elasticities estimated for taxes and the corresponding estimates for benefits. Greater similarity indicates a stronger rule of pay-as-you-go. The other test is based on an estimate of the dynamic relationship between tax and benefit levels. This dynamic relationship is modeled as a first-order vector autoregression among the logarithms of the fiscal variables. Zero values for the autoregressive coefficients would suggest that pay-as-you-go (or any other short-run constraint) is purely a matter of discretion. One pattern of nonzero values for the coefficients would suggest that strong, virtually automatic pay-as-you-go constraints exist, while another pattern would suggest the existence of an uncontrollable incrementalism.

The specification of the disturbances in the model is designed to test the idea that the expected levels of the fiscal variables are attracted to an equilibrium path. If they are, then the vector of disturbances should be cointegrated (Engle and Granger 1987). The idea here is that random shocks keep the fiscal variables from exactly following the equilibrium path: equilibrium is never perfectly achieved. A cointegrated disturbance process is evidence that efforts are made systematically to compensate for the shocks, to move the fiscal variables back toward the equilibrium path. The second-order vector autoregressive process specified for the disturbances in the present model is sufficient to test for such cointegration (more precisely, for an appropriate degree of near cointegration).

The disturbance specification also includes an additive outlier feature, to allow for the possibility that a small portion of the observed data might have been affected by gross errors. "Gross error" in this context means that the affected observations were perturbed by processes unlike the one generally in effect in the data. Such processes are always unrelated to the political and socioeconomic conditions that determine the fiscal variables' expected levels. If the levels are connected in an equilibrium relationship, then the outlier-generating processes are also unrelated to the adjustments being made to stay on the equilibrium path. That is, the outlier neither corrects for previous equilibrium-disturbing shocks nor prompts a subsequent correction.

The idea that tax levels are set according to the concept of actuarial soundness implies a tendency for taxes to be collected in excess of the amount needed to support the current equilibrium level of benefits. That is, if savings are to accrue over the long run, then tax collections must generally exceed benefit payments. But if the aggregate effort is to produce savings over the long run in a reliable way, it should not be affected by the kind of socioeconomic and political fluctuations that in the short run affect the levels of the fiscal variables. The test of the actuarial soundness concept is therefore defined as a pattern that should be observed in the disturbance process. In particular, the test specifies a pattern of positive and negative differences between the disturbances and a vector of drift parameters. The differences for transfer payments should be negative, while the differences for the contributions series should be positive. Such a pattern is possible only if the disturbance process is near cointegrated. An aggregate public savings policy motivated by the concept of actuarial soundness can exist only if there is a long-run fiscal equilibrium.

The idea that election-related oscillations affect the levels of taxes and benefits is tested by checking for differences between even-numbered and odd-numbered years in the elasticities of each fiscal variable with respect to each socioeconomic variable. Significant oscillations should produce significant differences in the elasticities. If benefits grow faster in response to worsening socioeconomic conditions in election years than they do in nonelection years while, in response to the same conditions, taxes grow more slowly, then the elasticities for benefits should increase in election years while those for taxes decrease. But such a pattern of changes would tend to violate pay-as-you-go constraints. Strong constraints would force the changes to have the same sign for all the fiscal variables.

Because the aggregate total of transfer payments does not distinguish tested from nontested program benefits, I rely on the meanings of the socioeconomic variables to identify what kinds of changes would benefit or harm which group of recipients.[8] The implications of this approach are clearest for a variable used to measure unemployment. Obviously, unemployed individuals often receive unemployment insurance benefits. But people without jobs also often receive benefits from Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), public assistance, and other means-tested programs. Election-related differences in the elasticity of benefits with respect to unemployment should therefore be a good measure of how tested-program benefit recipients are treated over the course of the election cycle. My argument predicts that these differences will be negative: in an election year, an increase in unemployment will increase transfer payments less than it would in a nonelection year. This reduction should mirror—and possibly be directly connected to—negative differences in the relationship between unemployment and payroll taxes. Any direct connection should reflect pay-as-you-go constraints: the reason for the reduced provision of benefits even as economic circumstances worsen should appear to be a desire to reduce the burden of taxes during such times.

Similar but weaker expectations apply to a variable measuring the price level. If real income, employment, and unemployment are constant, then rising prices represent worsening economic conditions. A pattern of elasticity differences similar to that for unemployment might therefore be expected. On the other hand, the incidence of inflation's harmful effects is not as clearly skewed as those of unemployment (Hibbs 1987, 43–124). But cost-of-living adjustments have historically been more generous for nontested than for tested programs (Munnell 1987). Due to indexing, adjustments for nontested programs such as Social Security have also more often been automatic (Browning 1986, 132–155). Any election-related changes in the elasticity of transfer payments with respect to the price level therefore most likely reflect changes in tested-program benefits.

Tests of Tufte's kyphosis concept are based on dummy variables that allow the level of transfer payments to increase in the month or so preceding an election, regardless of current socioeconomic or political conditions (1978, 31–44). The possibility of such a pattern is tested separately for presidential and midterm election years. There is also a separate test for the 1972 election that Tufte emphasizes. Dummy variables are also used to test the related notion that the increases in taxes needed to pay for the preelection increase are delayed until shortly after the election.

Model Specification Details

The endogenous variables—transfer payments to persons, personal contributions for social insurance, and employer contributions for social insurance—are respectively denoted T_t, PC_t and EC_t, with the subscript indicating time.[9] These series contain aggregate monthly totals for the United States, seasonally adjusted at annual rates. There are $n = 480$ monthly observations. Data are described in detail in the Appendix.

The model is log-linear in the explanatory and lagged dependent variables but has disturbances that are additive on the original rather than the log scale. Using the column vector $\mathbf{y}_t = (y_{it})' = (y_{1t}, y_{2t}, y_{3t})' \equiv (T_t, PC_t, EC_t)'$, the model can be written

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_t + \mathbf{u}_t,$$

where $\mathbf{u}_t$ is a stochastic process and, for a 3×3 matrix $\mathbf{A} = [a_{ik}]$, $i, k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$,

$$\log \mathbf{y}_t = \mathbf{A} \log \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \log \mathbf{x}_t, \tag{1}$$

logarithms being taken elementwise. The vector $\mathbf{x}_t = (x_{it})'$ has elements $x_{it} = \gamma_{it} \Pi_{j=1}^{4} z_{ijt}{}^{\beta_{ijt}}$, where each variable z_{ijt} measures a socioeconomic condition and each γ_{it} and β_{ijt} is a function of social and political factors as will be described. Each function β_{ijt} measures the expected elasticity in each year of the fiscal variable y_{it} with respect to the explanatory variable z_{ijt}.[10]

The disturbance vector $\mathbf{u}_t$ is a second-order vector autoregressive process with drift, contaminated by additive outliers and scaled by $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_t$. That is, let Σ be a 3×3 symmetric positive definite matrix, such that for all t the serially uncorrelated random vector $\mathbf{v}_t = (v_{it})'$ has mean $E\, \mathbf{v}_t = \mathbf{0}$ and covariance $E\, \mathbf{v}_t \mathbf{v}_t' = \Sigma$. For a constant drift vector $\boldsymbol{\mu} = (\mu_i)'$ and 3×3 matrices $\mathbf{C}_1$ and $\mathbf{C}_2$, define

$$\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t = \boldsymbol{\mu} + \mathbf{C}_1 \tilde{\mathbf{u}}_{t-1} + \mathbf{C}_2 \tilde{\mathbf{u}}_{t-2} + \mathbf{v}_t. \tag{2}$$

Let $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_t = (\lambda_{it})'$ be a random process in which each λ_{it} takes an arbitrary finite value with probability π_i and takes the value 0 with probability $1 - \pi_i$. Then $\mathbf{u}_t^{\#} = \tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t + \boldsymbol{\lambda}_t$ describes a process in which $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t$ is contaminated with additive outliers $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_t$ (see Martin 1981). Finally, to reflect the fact that $\mathbf{y}_t \geq 0$, use the diagonal matrix $\mathbf{W}_t = \mathrm{diag}\, (\tilde{y}_{it}{}^{1/2})$ to define $\mathbf{u}_t = \mathbf{W}_t \mathbf{u}_t^{\#}$ (see McCullagh and Nelder 1989, 193).[11]

The specification of $\mathbf{x}_t$ reflects the idea that aggregate taxing and spending levels are primarily functions of current socioeconomic conditions, with the relation between levels and conditions being determined by the current political environment. Socioeconomic conditions are measured by five variables: P_t, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in month t; N_t, the total population; R_t, real income (less transfer payments) per capita; UN_{t-1}, the proportion of the population unemployed; and EMN_t, the proportion of the population employed.[12] For all three fiscal variables, $z_{i1t} = P_t$, $z_{i2t} = N_t$, and $z_{i3t} = R_t$. For the transfer payments equation (i.e., in x_{1t}), $z_{14t} = UN_{t-1}$, while for the contributions equations $z_{24t} = z_{34t} = EMN_t$. Unemployment is lagged one month to reflect the administrative delay between becoming unemployed and beginning to receive unemployment compensation (see United States, National Commission on Unemployment Compensation 1980, 44–45). The employment and price level measures directly reflect explicit social welfare legislation. An argument for including UN_{t-1} in x_{1t} can trace back to Titles III and IX of the 1935 Social Security Act, for example, while the inclusion of EMN_t in x_{2t} and x_{3t} reflects the fact that PC_t and EC_t are mostly payroll taxes (ibid. 9–19). The inclusion of P_t in x_{1t} can be justified by noting the various provisions that have been enacted to adjust benefits for changes in the cost of living. The other variables can be justified intuitively, as measures of either the need for or resources available to support social welfare program activity. For example, a larger population might imply a larger number of potential benefit claimants, while a higher level of R_t might mean a greater supply of funds available to be extracted through taxation.

The political environment is specified as a function of variables that measure the sizes of key groups of potential social welfare recipients, the political parties' control of national government, sectional distinctions, and the national electoral calendar. Specifically,

$$\beta_{ijt} = b_{ij0} + b_{ij1} \log N15_t + b_{ij2} \log N65_t + b_{ij3} H_t + b_{ij4} S_t + b_{ij5} D_t + b_{ij6} D_t H_t + b_{ij7} D_t S_t + b_{ij8} E_t$$

$$\gamma_{1t} = \exp\,(\beta_{10t} + \zeta_{1t} + d_1\, ON72_t + d_2\, F77_t + d_3\, F82_t + d_4\, FM50_t)$$

$$\gamma_{2t} = \exp\,(\beta_{20t} + \zeta_{2t})$$

$$\gamma_{3t} = \exp\,(\beta_{30t} + \zeta_{3t})$$

$$\zeta_{it} = c_{i1}\, CON_t + c_{i2}\, PON_t + c_{i3}\, CJF_t + c_{i4}\, PJF_t.$$

Each coefficient b_{ijl} measures the effect a political variable has on the elasticity β_{ijt}.

Variables $N15_t$ and $N65_t$ reflect the priority historically given to the needs of children and the elderly (Douglas 1939; Skidmore 1975; Witte 1962). $N15_t$ and $N65_t$ denote respectively the number of people in the United States population at time t aged 15 or younger and 65 or older. The age thresholds used to define $N15_t$ and $N65_t$ match those in the key age-related provisions of the 1935 Social Security Act: Title IV of the act defines a "dependent child" for benefit purposes to be a child in specified circumstances under the age of 16; and Title II of the act sets 65 as the age at which qualifying individuals are to begin receiving old-age benefits (see Collins 1967).

Variables H_t, S_t, and D_t represent the effects of political party strength in controlling the national government. H_t denotes the difference between the number of Democrats and the number of Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives a year before t, while S_t denotes this difference computed only for House seats in the South. The one-year lag reflects the idea that a party's presence in the House affects social welfare policy primarily through legislation, with legislation passed in one year taking effect in the next. The separate count for southern seats picks up the sectional difference that has most importantly affected social welfare legislation (Bensel 1984; Quadagno 1988; Sinclair 1978; Sundquist 1968). D_t, which equals 1 in years when the president is a Democrat and 0 otherwise, is intended to measure partisan control of at least the national level of social welfare program administration (Derthick 1979; Palmer and Sawhill 1984; Welborn and Burkhead 1989; see also Freeman 1988; Lowi 1979, 198–236). The products D_tH_t and D_tS_t are included to allow the effects of party legislative presence to vary depending on which party controls the executive.

The variable E_t, which equals 1 in even-numbered years and 0 otherwise, is used to measure election-year variations. The variables in ζ_{it} are the dummy variables used to test Tufte's kyphosis concept. CON_t and PON_t equal 1 in October and November of midterm and presidential election years, respectively, otherwise 0. CJF_t and PJF_t equal 1 in January and February following midterm and presidential elections, respectively, otherwise 0. $ON72_t$ in γ_{1t}, which is 1 only in October and November of 1972 (otherwise 0), isolates the 1972 election. The variables $F77_t$, $F82_t$ and $FM50_t$ in γ_{1t} pick up quirks in the transfer payments series.[13]

Tests for Short-Run, Pay-as-You-Go Constraints

One way to implement pay-as-you-go is to establish policies such that payments and contributions independently respond in the same way to changes in socioeconomic conditions. In the present model, such a direct approach would imply $\beta_{1jt} = \beta_{2jt} = \beta_{3jt}$, for each $j = 1, 2, 3$. In view of the connection between UN_t and EMN_t,[14] we might further expect the variations over time in β_{14t} to be similar to those in $-\beta_{24t}$ and $-\beta_{34t}$. I modify this test to eliminate the possibly confusing effects of election-year manipulations, by computing each β_{ijt} with $E_t = 0$ for all t.

Pay-as-you-go might also mean constraints that kick in after levels of benefits and taxes suitable for current socioeconomic and political conditions have been determined. Such constraints might work in either direction. Taxes might be modified as necessary to support the independently determined level of benefits, but benefit payments might also be made contingent on tax collections. Of course, since benefits are partially paid from revenues other than personal and employer contributions,[15] exact budgetary balance is not to be expected. So far as the broad range of social welfare expenditures is concerned, this form of pay-as-you-go can hold, at most, as a tendency.

The matrix **A** measures such dynamic constraints. If **A** = **0**, there are no constraints; this is the pure discretion case. Two patterns of nonzero values suggest relatively automatic pay-as-you-go constraints. If benefit payments in one month positively affect taxes in the next month, then positive values should be observed for a_{21} and a_{31}, in the first column of **A**. But if benefits are responding positively to prior month taxes, then a_{12} and a_{13}, in **A**'s first row, should be positive.

Because it makes taxes and benefits difficult to control and virtually impossible to coordinate, incrementalism is the short-run dynamic pattern most contrary to pay-as-you-go. In the extreme form of incrementalism, every shock to a fiscal variable has infinitely persistent effects that do not carry through to the other fiscal variables. Such a system is practically uncontrollable. This extreme case would be represented by $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{I}$, where $\mathbf{I}$ is the three-by-three identity matrix. More generally, strongly incrementalist dynamic relations are indicated if the diagonal elements of the matrix that measures the variables' ultimate responses to shocks (on the log scale) are much larger than 1, while the off-diagonal elements remain small (see Browning 1985). This matrix is $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1} = \mathbf{I} + \Sigma_{s=1}^{\infty} \mathbf{A}^{s}$.

Tests for Long-run Equilibrium and Actuarial Soundness

Cointegration is a model for long-run equilibrium in a multivariate time series (Engle and Granger 1987; Salmon 1982, 628). Adapting the concept to take into account the present heteroscedasticity and outlier specifications leads to the expectation that the underlying residual series $\tilde{u}_{it}$ should be cointegrated. To diagnose near cointegration, I use the decomposition method of Aoki (1990, 197–228). The test refers to the matrix

$$\mathbf{C} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{C}_1 & \mathbf{C}_2 \\ \mathbf{I} & 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

One eigenvalue of $\mathbf{C}$ should approximately equal 1.[16]

To build long-term savings in accord with actuarial soundness, transfer payments should tend to be reduced below the equilibrium levels expected given current conditions while contributions are, in a strongly coordinated manner, increased. This happens only if the series $\tilde{u}_{it}$ satisfy $\tilde{u}_{1t} < \mu_1$, $\tilde{u}_{2t} > \mu_2$ and $\tilde{u}_{3t} > \mu_3$, which can occur meaningfully only if the $\tilde{u}_{it}$ are cointegrated (see Engle and Granger 1987, 253). The comparisons are between $\tilde{u}_{it}$ and μ_i rather than between $\tilde{u}_{it}$ and 0, because a shift in the mean of $\tilde{u}_{it}$ away from 0 that is due solely to $\mu_i \neq 0$ cannot be related to any compelling concept of a fiscal constraint.[17]

If $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t$ is cointegrated, then the nonzero outliers $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_t$ represent shifts in benefits or in contributions that are not adjustments made to move toward equilibrium. The $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_t$ are, in any case, unrelated to $\mathbf{x}_t$.[18]

Tests of Election-related Manipulation

Election-related differences in the elasticities of each fiscal variable with respect to each socioeconomic condition are measured using the coefficients of the election-year dummy variable E_t. The differences with respect to CPI, population, income, and unemployment are respectively measured by

$$\boldsymbol{\Delta}_P \equiv (\hat{b}_{118}, \hat{b}_{218}, \hat{b}_{318})',$$

$$\boldsymbol{\Delta}_N \equiv (\hat{b}_{128}, \hat{b}_{228}, \hat{b}_{328})',$$

$$\boldsymbol{\Delta}_R \equiv (\hat{b}_{138}, \hat{b}_{238}, \hat{b}_{338})'$$

$\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{UN} \equiv (\hat{b}_{148} - \hat{a}_{12}\hat{b}_{248} - \hat{a}_{13}\hat{b}_{348}, \ -\hat{b}_{248}, \ -\hat{b}_{348})'$.[19]

The first element in each vector $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j$ measures the difference in the elasticity of transfer payments with respect to socioeconomic variable j, while the second and third elements measure the differences for personal and employer contributions, respectively. The negations of $\hat{b}_{248}$ and $\hat{b}_{348}$ are used in $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{UN}$ to allow all the components of $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{UN}$ to be interpreted as differences in elasticities with respect to unemployment.[20] The elasticity difference for transfer payments is measured by $\hat{b}_{148} - \hat{a}_{12}\hat{b}_{248} - \hat{a}_{13}\hat{b}_{348}$ because transfer payments are directly affected by unemployment in the preceding month.[21]

Because of the lagged vector $\mathbf{y}_{t-1}$ in equation 1, differences in the elasticities of future values of the fiscal variables with respect to current conditions are also relevant. For each time offset $\tau = 1, 2, \ldots,$ such differences (for $\mathbf{y}_{t+\tau}$ with respect to P_t, etc.) are measured by $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j^{\tau} \equiv \mathbf{A}^{\tau}\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j$, for $j \in \{P, N, R, UN\}$.

In the spirit of Tufte's argument, one might expect such elasticity differences to show that in election years incumbents try to make social welfare policy more responsive to individuals' needs. On the benefits side, this should mean larger increases in transfer payments in response to rising prices, increasing population, falling income, or rising unemployment. On the tax side, greater responsiveness in election years should mean that these same conditions meet with larger reductions. In terms of the elasticity-difference measures $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j$, these expectations correspond to the sign patterns $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_P = (+, -, -)'$, $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_N = (+, -, -)'$, $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_R = (-, +, +)'$ and $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{UN} = (+, -, -)'$. Recall that the elements in these patterns refer to the coefficients or combinations of coefficients for transfer payments, personal contributions, and employer contributions, respectively. Similar patterns might be expected for the $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j^{\tau}$ values.

Such expectations assume that incumbents can move benefits and taxes in opposite directions at the same time. Strong fiscal constraints would rule out such flexibility. Instead, in response to each socioeconomic condition, benefits and taxes would have to be moved in the same direction. In this case, the values in each $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j$ and in each $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j^{\tau}$ should all have the same sign. Because the distributive implications of these differences are clear only for unemployment and CPI, this prediction is well motivated only for these variables. My argument predicts that benefits will be less responsive to need in election years, in order to allow the rate of increase in taxes to be slowed at such times. Using the interpretations of unemployment and CPI, this prediction becomes the expectation that the signs in $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_P$, $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_P^{\tau}$, $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{UN}$ and $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{UN}^{\tau}$ will all be negative.

The tests for kyphosis and for the related idea that tax increases are delayed until after the election, refer to the coefficients of CON_t, PON_t, CJF_t, and PJF_t. If the idea is correct, CON_t and PON_t should have positive coefficients in the transfer payments equation, while CJF_t and PJF_t should have positive coefficients in the contributions equations. A positive coefficient for $ON72_t$ would indicate exceptional increases in transfer payments in 1972.

TEST RESULTS

The estimation procedure is described in the Appendix. Estimates for the coefficients in the elasticities β_{ijt} appear in Table A-2 in the Appendix. The present discussion focuses on the tests just described.

Pay-as-you-go Constraints

Inspection of the estimated elasticities $\hat{\beta}_{ijt}$ (computed with $E_t = 0$ for all t) suggests that there is a strong tendency toward contemporaneous pay-as-you-go constraint between transfer payments and payroll taxes, though there is no evidence of a strict budget constraint. The plots of the elasticities for each year, in Figure 1, reveal clear similarities between the transfer payments equation and the equations for contributions but also obvious discrepancies.[22] The product–moment correlations between the elasticities for transfer payments and the respective elasticities for contributions summarize the similarities. For personal contributions, the correlations for the elasticities for CPI, population, income and unemployment are .66, .63, .83, and .54. For employer contributions they are .80, .26, .25, and .41. By this measure, the constraints between transfer payments and personal contributions are stronger than those between transfer payments and employer contributions. Because the difference between employer contributions and personal contributions mostly reflects payments made only by employers for state unemployment insurance and workman's compensation, these results suggest that contemporaneous pay-as-you-go exists primarily at the federal level.

The test for dynamic constraints shows weak evidence of automatic pay-as-you-go. In the estimate[23]

$$\hat{\mathbf{A}} = \begin{bmatrix} .374 & .152 & -.145 \\ -.068 & .414 & -.330 \\ .037 & -.039 & .099 \end{bmatrix},$$

two values are compatible with pay-as-you-go. The estimate $\hat{a}_{12} = .152$ indicates a moderate tendency for transfer payments to be made contingent on personal contributions in the preceding month. The estimate $\hat{a}_{31} = .037$ indicates a much weaker tendency for employer contributions to be modified to support transfer payment benefits.[24] The negative values for $\hat{a}_{13}$ and $\hat{a}_{21}$ are not interpretable from the pay-as-you-go perspective.

Overall, the dynamic relations between payments and contributions are weakly incrementalist. The diagonal elements in

$$(\mathbf{I} - \hat{\mathbf{A}})^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1.528 & .422 & -.401 \\ -.217 & 1.687 & -.585 \\ .071 & -.055 & 1.118 \end{bmatrix}$$

are somewhat, but not dramatically, larger than 1, while the off-diagonal elements are small or moderate in size. For example, a unit shock in log y_{1t} ultimately produces a change of 1.528 in log y_{1t} but changes log y_{2t} by $-.217$. These results contradict Browning's (1985) finding of strong incrementalism in social welfare expenditures.

Long-run Equilibrium and Actuarial Soundness

The test for near cointegration shows strong evidence that the fiscal variables are bound to one another in a long-run equilibrium relationship. The estimates for $\mathbf{C}_1$ and $\mathbf{C}_2$ are

$$\hat{\mathbf{C}}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} .783 & -.481 & .694 \\ -.055 & .264 & .433 \\ .007 & -.008 & .807 \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\hat{\mathbf{C}}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} .165 & .004 & -.102 \\ .017 & .292 & .073 \\ -.012 & -.033 & .052 \end{bmatrix}.$$

The eigenvalues of $\hat{\mathbf{C}}$ are .991, $.774 \pm .091\sqrt{-1}$, $-.456$, $-.177$, and $-.053$. As the test requires, one value is approximately 1.[25]

There is also strong evidence that the equilibrating adjustments are designed to build long-term savings. The estimates $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}} = (-.37, -.24, .12)'$ compare in the required manner to the residuals $\hat{\mathbf{u}}_t$. Figure 2, which displays the weighted differences $\hat{\hat{y}}_{it}^{1/2}(\hat{\hat{u}}_{it} - \hat{\mu}_i)$, in units of 1984 dollars per person, on a monthly basis,[26] illustrates this. The differences for transfer payments are negative, those for contributions, positive.

The savings-building adjustments involve large amounts of money. This point can be seen in Figure 2. Over the entire 1948–87 period, adjustments in transfer payments average to a reduction of $52.74 per person in each month. This corresponds to an annual, national aggregate reduction averaging $127.2 billion per year. The adjustments in contributions are smaller but still substantial. In per capita terms, the combined adjustments in personal and employer contributions average to an increase of $3.74 per person in each month. This corresponds to an annual, national aggregate increase averaging $9.0 billion per year.

Election-related Manipulation

The estimates of the election-related differences in the elasticities do not suggest that incumbents make social welfare policy more responsive to everyone's needs in election years. Figure 3 plots the differences in elasticity with respect to CPI, population, income, and unemployment, for each fiscal variable. That is, the figure shows the values of $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j$ (at delay = 0), and the values of $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j^{\tau}$ for $\tau = 1, \ldots, 7$.[27] None of the $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j$ or $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j^{\tau}$ vectors have the sign patterns predicted by the idea that election-year policy is more responsive.

But there is support for the idea that fiscal constraints force incumbents to trade the interests of payroll-tax-payers against those of tested-program

FIGURE 1

Elasticities, Omitting Election-Related Differences



Source: Computed from parameter estimates in Table A-2 and historical data.

Note: The elasticities (beta) of transfer payments (T), personal contributions (PC) and employer contributions (EC) with respect to each socioeconomic variable are computed with the election-year dummy variable set equal to 0 for all years. The elasticity for each year is the percentage change in the expected value of each fiscal variable induced by a percentage change in the socioeconomic variable in that year, other things equal.

benefit recipients. The patterns expected for unemployment and CPI if benefits are being reduced to support reductions in taxes are clearly in evidence for transfer payments and personal contributions. The differences are negative at all time offsets for both CPI and unemployment. (For personal contributions, this means employment × −1.) The contemporaneous differences are all statistically significant, and the one-period-lagged differences are significant for transfer payments.[28] The differences for employer contributions do not follow the expected pattern but are statistically insignificant.

The elasticity differences for transfer payments are related to the differences for personal contributions in a way that strongly suggests the operation of a pay-as-you-go constraint. Indeed, the value $\hat{b}_{148} - \hat{a}_{12}\hat{b}_{248} - \hat{a}_{13}\hat{b}_{348}$ for transfer payments in Δ_{UN} is negative only because of the positive estimate for the coefficient $\hat{a}_{12}$ that links transfer payments in the current month to personal contributions in the previous month. When employment decreases (say because of a rise in unemployment), personal contributions decrease more rapidly in an election year than they do in a non-election year (i.e., $\hat{b}_{248} > 0$). If the link between transfer payments and contributions is ignored, an increase in unemployment appears to make transfer payments increase more rapidly in an election year ($\hat{b}_{148} > 0$). But in fact, due to the link, transfer payments increase less rapidly (i.e., $\hat{a}_{12}\hat{b}_{248} > \hat{b}_{148}$). For CPI, the link between transfer payments

FIGURE 2

Smoother-cleaned Residuals Minus Drift, Weighted by Expected Values


(a) Transfer payments equation

(b) Personal contributions equation



(c) Employer contributions equation



Source: Computed from parameter estimates (in Tables 1 and A-2 and the text) and historical data.

and contributions manifests itself in the fact that the first lagged elasticity difference for transfer payments is larger (more negative) than the contemporaneous one.

The election-related differences in the elasticity of transfer payments with respect to unemployment are nearly as large as the variations over time in the remainder of the elasticities for unemployment. This can be seen by comparing Figure 3 to the plot for unemployment in Figure 1. The non-election-related part of the elasticities, shown in Figure 1, ranges from a low value of −.05 in 1960 to a high value of .14 in 1983. This range is just more than double the magnitude of the value of −.08 observed for the initial and one-period-lagged election-related differences. This comparison suggests the substantive significance of the election-related oscillations in transfer payments' response to unemployment.

The results of these election-related differences are nonetheless sufficiently small that the changes can be viewed as manipulations at the margins. Simulations based on the model estimates show the changes inducing an average per capita reduction of $ .74 per month in transfer payments during the study years, which can be compared to the average per capita transfer payment of $102.86 per month (both amounts in 1984 dollars). The per capita change in personal contributions averages to a reduction of $ .58 per month, versus an average per capita contribution of $29.11.[29]

The tests for kyphosis give no indication that transfer payments are usually increased in the month before the election, though there is strong evidence of such manipulation in 1972. The estimates reported in Table 1 for CON_t and PON_t in the transfer payments equation are both smaller than their standard errors. But the coefficient for $ON72_t$ suggests an October–November increase of approximately 4.2% above what would otherwise have been expected, given the conditions and policies in effect at that time.[30] Since

FIGURE 3

Election-related Elasticity Differences



Source: Computed using parameter estimates from Table A-2 and the estimated dynamic matrix **A**.

Note: Figures show how the elasticities of transfer payments (T), personal contributions (PC) and employer contributions (EC) with respect to each socioeconomic variable differ in even-numbered, as compared to odd-numbered, years. Differences are shown for the elasticities both of the current value (delay = 0) and of future values (delay > 0) of each fiscal variable with respect to each socioeconomic variable.

the expected amount of transfer payments in each of those months was approximately \$10.96 billion (in 1972 dollars), this corresponds to an increase of more than \$450 million in each month.[31]

On the tax side, the estimates give no evidence of special increases in contributions following midterm elections but do point to such increases following presidential elections. The coefficient estimates for CJF_t are smaller than their standard errors, but the estimates for PJF_t are clearly positive. The presidential results should not be read as supporting the tax-shifting idea, however. For the estimate for PJF_t in the transfer payments equation shows a tendency for transfer payments also to increase following presidential elections. Indeed, in dollar terms the estimated .85% increase in transfer payments is just slightly larger than the estimated increases of 1.31% and .77% in personal and employer contributions, respectively.[32] So the idea that payroll tax increases are postponed until after the election is supported only with an important qualification: there is also a delayed increase of comparable magnitude in transfer payment benefits.

The impression that 1972 was exceptional is reinforced by a pattern appearing in the estimated outliers. High-density plots of the outlier estimates λ_{it} appear in Figure 4. Most of the outlier values are zero, and most of the nonzero values do not occur in any readily interpretable pattern. The chief exception is a sequence of increasingly negative values for employer contributions during 1972. In 1972 dollars, the values correspond to monthly reductions, from July through December, of \$37 million, \$56 million, \$110 million, \$216 million, \$317 million, and \$406

TABLE 1

Coefficients for the Short-Run Manipulation and Special Adjustment Variables

VARIABLE	TRANSFER PAYMENTS EQUATION	PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS EQUATION	EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS EQUATION
October–November			
Midterm year	.0013 (.0017)	.0038 (.0022)	.0038 (.0018)
Presidential year	−.0017 (.0019)	−.0049 (.0024)	.0043 (.0019)
January–February			
Midterm year	−.0033 (.0018)	−.0017 (.0022)	.0010 (.0018)
Presidential year	.0085 (.0019)	.0131 (.0024)	.0077 (.0020)
October–November, 1972	.0417 (.0059)	—	—
Fiscal year adjustment			
I (F77)	−.0020 (.0002)	—	—
II (F82)	.0017 (.0002)	—	—
February–March, 1950	.2720 (.0139)	—	—

Source: Estimates for the coefficients c_{im} in the functions ζ_{it} and d_m in γ_{1t}.
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

million.[33] These reductions are followed by increases in April, May, and July 1973 amounting to $51 million, $17 million, and $10 million, respectively. The outliers for personal contributions also indicate reductions during 1972, in August and September, amounting to $83 million and $80 million. In total, the preelection reductions in contributions during 1972 are roughly the same size as the October–November increases in transfer payments—the July–December reductions total approximately $1.24 billion, as compared to the October–November increase of approximately $900 million.[34] Such results qualify Tufte's conclusion that the 1972 acceleration he documents in real disposable income was due to "an autumn increase in transfer payments" (1978, 52). Cuts in payroll taxes were at least as important.

CONCLUSION

The statistical tests strongly support the idea that interaction between long-run and short-run fiscal considerations is a central feature of American social welfare. The near-cointegration test provides direct evidence that transfer payments and payroll taxes are bound together in a long-run equilibrium relationship. That relationship appears to be structured in part by the concept of actuarial soundness. Regarding the short run, there is evidence that the principle of pay-as-you-go constrains how transfer payments and payroll taxes respond to changing social and economic conditions. Finally, there is evidence that these constraints lead to reductions in the benefits provided through means-tested programs in election years, so as to support small election-year reductions in payroll taxes.

The dynamic relations estimated among the fiscal variables suggest that pay-as-you-go is a norm that must be continually sustained through discretionary adjustments based on political will, rather than an administrative rule that will usually be satisfied in due course automatically. Incrementalist dynamics exist, exacerbating the disruptive effects of exogenous trends. But these incrementalist tendencies are sufficiently weak that discretionary actions are capable of maintaining a long-run balance between taxes and benefits. Discretionary management along these lines is well documented for Social Security (Bernstein and Bernstein 1988). But for the rest of the social welfare system one is hard pressed to cite historical precedents or institutional grounds for such coherence. It is possible that the present evidence of long-run fiscal constraints stems solely from the fiscal arrangements in Social Security.

It is important to recognize limitations in the evidence regarding long-run constraints. The near-cointegration test does not precisely indicate the targets to which equilibration is being directed. The test of the concept of actuarial soundness does not trace the exact balance being maintained between

FIGURE 4

Outliers

(a) Transfer payments equation



(b) Personal contributions equation



(c) Employer contributions equation



Source: Computed from parameter estimates (in Tables 1 and A-2 and the text) and historical data.

taxes and benefits over time but rather only tests whether the equilibrating adjustments tend to move taxes and benefits in the directions long-term actuarial soundness would generally require. The tests are adequate for the present theoretical concerns, but are not intended to be and should not be interpreted as substitutes for careful accounting (see, e.g., Munnell and Blais 1984).

It is worthwhile to revisit the issue of the size of the election-year manipulations. The estimate reported of an average per capita reduction in transfer payments of $ .75 per month (in 1984 dollars) was computed relative to the entire United States population. But the idea that the reductions affect only tested-program benefit recipients suggests that this procedure seriously underestimates the reductions' impact on those whose benefits are cut. It would be better to compute the reductions relative to the size of the tested-program recipient group. If this size is measured by the number of persons unemployed in each month, then the estimated average reduction per person rises to a much more substantial value of $45 per month. For an intuitive feel for the importance of this amount, consider that seven months of such a reduction would exceed the Census estimate of median monthly gross rent in the United States in 1980, which was $304 (in 1984 dollars; United States, Bureau of the Census 1983, 23). Seven months of this reduction would also exceed the average monthly benefit paid in 1988 through AFDC, which was $288 (in 1984 dollars; Peterson and Rom 1990, 167). Clearly, a reduction of $45 per month would be a significant cost for a low-income person already in dire straits due to job loss. Admittedly, this estimate probably overstates the typical individual impact of the election-year reductions, because the reductions in transfer payments are probably not entirely concentrated on the unemployed. But it is closer to the mark than the original estimate. Even reductions half as big would mean significant fluctuations from year to year in the financial assistance being given to affected poor people.

APPENDIX

Data Descriptions and Sources

Definitions of variables are given in Table A-1.

TABLE A-1

Variable Definitions

SYMBOL	UNITS	DESCRIPTION
Monthly		
T	$ billion	Transfer payments[a]
PC	$ billion	Personal contributions for social insurance[a]
EC	$ billion	Employer contributions for social insurance[a]
P	index	CPI, all items (1982–84 = 100)
N	1,000s	Population, total (including armed forces overseas)[b]
I	$ billion	Personal income less transfer payments[a]
U	1,000s	Labor force, civilian, unemployed, seasonally adjusted
EM	1,000s	Labor force, civilian, employed, seasonally adjusted
Annual		
N15	millions	Population aged 15 or younger, 1 July
N65	millions	Population aged 65 or older, 1 July
H	count	No. Democrats minus Republicans in House, previous year
S	count	No. Southern[c] Democrats minus Southern Republicans in House, previous year
Special		
F77	—	0 before 1977, annual July–June trend (July = 1, . . . , June = 12) otherwise
F82	—	0 before 1982, annual July–June trend (July = 1, . . . , June = 12) otherwise
FM50	—	1 if February or March of 1950, 0 otherwise

Sources: T_t, PC_t, I_t: Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Business Statistics 1979* (1948–60) and *1986* (1961–86) and *Survey of Current Business*, February and August 1988 (1987). EC_t: unpublished data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Government Division. P_t, U_t, EM_t: same as T_t, except 1987, from *Business Conditions Digest*, August 1988. N_t: the Bureau of the Census's *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-25, nos. 27, 35, 45 (1948–49), 1022 (1950–87), 229 (Alaska and Hawaii, 1 July 1950–59). $N15_t$, $N65_t$: Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (1948–1959); *Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1987* (1970, 1979); and *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-25, nos. 519 (1960–69), 721 (1971–75), 800 (1976–78), 1022 (1980–87). H_t, S_t: Joint Committee on Printing, *Congressional Directory* (80th Cong.); *Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1954* (81st–83d), *1957* (84th–85th), *1963* (86th–88th), *1967* (90th), *1975* (92d, 94th), *1980* (89th, 91st, 93d), *1984* (95th–96th), *1988* (97th–100th).

Note: United States aggregate totals, 1948–87, excluding Alaska and Hawaii before 1960.

[a] Monthly totals seasonally adjusted at annual rates.

[b] Interpolation used to exclude Alaska and Hawaii for 1950–59.

[c] Southern states = AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV.

Estimation Procedure

The estimation procedure is a variation of the generalized method of moments studied by Gallant (1987, 442–46, 566–83). Apart from a *smoother-cleaner* operation used to make the estimates robust (see step 3), the procedure implements the estimator specified by Gallant (ibid., 446). Estimation is iterative.[35] Before the first iteration, assign $\mathbf{y}_t^{\#} := \mathbf{y}_t$. Then each iteration has five steps. In order, do

1. For each i: $\hat{x}_{it} \leftarrow \hat{a}_{ijk}, \hat{b}_{ijl}, \hat{c}_{im}, \hat{d}_m \leftarrow MQLE\ (y_{it}{}^{\#})$.
2. $\log \hat{\hat{\mathbf{y}}}_t := \hat{\mathbf{A}} \log y^{\#}_{t-1} + \log \hat{\mathbf{x}}_t$, $\hat{\mathbf{W}}_t := \operatorname{diag}\ (\hat{\hat{y}}_{it}{}^{1/2})$, $\hat{\mathbf{u}}_t{}^{\#} := \hat{\mathbf{W}}_t{}^{-1}\ (\mathbf{y}_t - \hat{\hat{\mathbf{y}}}_t)$.
3. For each i: $\hat{\hat{u}}_{it} \leftarrow SMO(\hat{u}^{\#}_{it})$.
4. $\hat{\mathbf{C}}_1, \hat{\mathbf{C}}_2, \hat{\mathbf{v}}_t, \hat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}} \leftarrow VAR(\hat{\hat{\mathbf{u}}}_t)$
5. $\hat{\mathbf{v}}_t{}^{\#} := (\hat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{-1/2})'\ \hat{\mathbf{v}}_t$, $\mathbf{y}_t{}^{\#} := \hat{\hat{\mathbf{y}}}_t + \hat{\mathbf{W}}_t\ [\operatorname{diag}\ (\hat{\sigma}_{ii}{}^{1/2})]\ \hat{\mathbf{v}}_t{}^{\#}$.

At step 1, the coefficient parameters are estimated separately for each equation, by maximizing the quasi-likelihood function defined by assuming the mean $E\ y_{it}{}^{\#} = \hat{\hat{y}}_{it}$ and covariance matrix $s_i{}^2\ \hat{\mathbf{H}}$, where $s_i{}^2 > 0$ and $\hat{\mathbf{H}} = \operatorname{diag}\ (\hat{\hat{y}}_{i1}, \ldots, \hat{\hat{y}}_{in})$ (see McCullagh and Nelder 1989, 324–28). Notice that these assumptions imply independent observations. Obviously, when $\mathbf{y}_t{}^{\#} = \mathbf{y}_t$, this contradicts the specification of $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t$ as autoregressive (ignoring the trivial case where $\mathbf{C}_1 = \mathbf{C}_2 = 0$), the allowance of nonzero values for $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, and the specification of arbitrary nonzero values for $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_t$. The formula used to compute $\mathbf{y}_t{}^{\#}$ at the end of each iteration can be thought of as purging these features, so that ultimately $\mathbf{y}_t{}^{\#}$ does satisfy the independence assumption.

In step 2, estimated values are assigned for $\log \hat{\hat{\mathbf{y}}}_t$, $\hat{\mathbf{W}}_t$ and $\hat{\mathbf{u}}_t{}^{\#}$. Then step 3 uses a robust smoother-clearer algorithm (Martin and Thomson 1982) to estimate the uncontaminated residual process. Each series $\hat{u}_{it}{}^{\#}$ is smoother-cleaned separately, based on separately computed bounded influence estimates of its univariate autoregressive parameters (Martin 1980).

At step 4, Whittle's recursion is used to estimate the vector autoregressive parameter matrices $\mathbf{C}_1$ and $\mathbf{C}_2$, the covariance matrix $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}$, and the innovations $\mathbf{y}_t$ (Whittle 1953; Whittle 1963, 101–2). In the recursion, each component series $\hat{\hat{u}}_{it}$ is centered using the sample mean

$$n^{-1} \sum_{t=1}^{n} \hat{\hat{u}}_{it}.$$

Notice that the estimates $\hat{\mathbf{C}}_1$ and $\hat{\mathbf{C}}_2$ are consistent even if the distribution of $\mathbf{v}_t$ has "heavy tails" as compared with the Gaussian case (Hannan 1970, 329; see Phillips 1987; Phillips and Durlauf 1986).

At step 5, the Cholesky decomposition $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{1/2}$ of $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}$ is used to compute approximately uncorrelated pseudo-innovations $\hat{\mathbf{y}}_t{}^{\#}$. That is, at least for the converged values, $\operatorname{plim}\ \hat{\mathbf{v}}_t{}^{\#}\hat{\mathbf{v}}_t{}^{\#\prime} = \operatorname{plim}\ (\hat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{-1/2})',\ \hat{\mathbf{v}}_t\hat{\mathbf{v}}_t{}'\ \hat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{-1/2} = (\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1/2})'\boldsymbol{\Sigma}\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1/2} = \mathbf{I}$. Then the $\hat{\mathbf{y}}_t{}^{\#}$ are weighted, using $\hat{\mathbf{W}}_t$ and the diagonal elements $\hat{\sigma}_{ii}$ of $\hat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}$, and added to $\hat{\hat{\mathbf{y}}}_t{}^{\#}$ to produce the value of $\mathbf{y}_t{}^{\#}$ to be used in the next iteration. By this procedure, we should have, at convergence, $s_i{}^2 \approx \hat{\sigma}_{ii}$ (see McCullagh and Nelder 1989, 327).

Upon convergence of the iterative procedure, $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ is estimated by applying the least squares estimator described by Aoki to the smoothed residuals $\hat{\mathbf{u}}_t$ (1990, 213–21).

The innovations $\hat{\mathbf{v}}_t$ lack skew but do have heavier-than-Gaussian tails. The covariance matrix is

$$\hat{\Sigma} = \begin{bmatrix} .02566 & -.00180 & .00045 \\ -.00180 & .00303 & .00110 \\ .00045 & .00110 & .00250 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Table A-2 reports estimates for the coefficients in β_{ijt}.

TABLE A-2

Coefficients in the Elasticities

VARIABLE	TRANSFER PAYMENTS		PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS		EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS	
	ESTIMATE	S.E.	ESTIMATE	S.E.	ESTIMATE	S.E.
CPI						
Constant = 1	−15.413	1.307	−14.873	2.755	−9.878	2.280
Pop. aged ≤ 15 (log)	3.904	.306	2.731	.584	4.461	.483
Pop. aged ≥ 65 (log)	−.019	.264	1.380	.461	−2.072	.376
House party balance	.0008	.0004	−.006	.001	−.001	.001
House balance, South	.001	.002	.017	.004	−.007	.003
Democratic president	−.448	.159	.864	.437	.364	.361
Dem. pres. × balance	−.001	.001	−.001	.002	.001	.002
Dem. pres. × bal. South	.002	.002	−.019	.004	−.012	.003
Election year	−.021	.007	−.149	.045	−.010	.037
Population						
Constant = 1	32.338	5.122	10.460	12.449	−18.534	10.389
Pop. aged ≤ 15 (log)	−6.538	1.558	−2.168	2.693	−8.251	2.267
Pop. aged ≥ 65 (log)	−1.303	1.585	−1.039	2.359	14.017	1.921
House party balance	−.005	.003	.011	.007	−.008	.006
House balance, South	.011	.013	.009	.021	.134	.017
Democratic president	1.711	1.570	1.115	2.491	1.512	2.042
Dem. Pres. × balance	.022	.003	.027	.010	−.001	.008
Dem. Pres. × bal. South	−.031	.014	−.015	.020	−.021	.017
Election year	−.103	.082	1.153	.244	.094	.199
Income						
Constant = 1	1.929	3.237	16.019	5.876	19.733	4.908
Pop. aged ≤ 15 (log)	.333	.653	−.773	1.161	2.634	.996
Pop. aged ≥ 65 (log)	−.826	.519	−3.200	.800	−8.095	.657
House party balance	.003	.001	.003	.003	.005	.002
House balance, South	−.016	.005	−.034	.008	−.073	.007
Democratic president	1.205	.480	2.874	.769	−.800	.639
Dem. Pres. × balance	−.011	.002	−.011	.004	.005	.003
Dem. Pres. × bal. South	−.001	.004	−.018	.007	.006	.006
Election year	.073	.039	−.583	.107	.089	.087
(Un)emp.[a]						
Constant = 1	.524	.541	16.693	9.835	15.622	8.121
Pop. aged ≤ 15 (log)	−.140	.102	.342	1.936	−2.720	1.653
Pop. aged ≥ 65 (log)	.077	.080	−5.236	1.377	−1.311	1.090
House party balance	−.0001	.0003	.012	.005	.003	.004
House balance, South	−.0018	.0008	−.039	.014	−.009	.011
Democratic president	.115	.082	−6.486	1.380	−2.544	1.147
Dem. Pres. × balance	−.0005	.0003	.015	.007	.007	.006
Dem. Pres. × bal. South	−.0004	.0008	.050	.013	.015	.011
Election year	.035	.008	.592	.168	−.190	.135
Constant = *e*						
Constant = 1	−313.967	89.995	90.866	187.207	456.010	156.368
Pop. aged ≤ 15 (log)	67.556	24.529	9.776	39.992	106.575	33.826
Pop. aged ≥ 65 (log)	8.905	22.435	−25.853	32.328	−237.873	26.372
House party balance	.090	.047	−.074	.099	.154	.084
House balance, South	−.288	.198	−.533	.305	−2.293	.251
Democratic president	−7.503	22.262	3.813	34.029	−29.371	28.055
Dem. Pres. × balance	−.375	.063	−.419	.139	.057	.116
Dem. Pres. × bal. South	.367	.202	.140	.285	.370	.236
Election year	2.153	1.349	−18.418	3.665	−.453	2.991

Source: Estimates for the coefficients b_{ijl} in the elasticities β_{ijt}.

[a] Unemployment, for transfer payments; employment, for contributions.

Notes

I thank Charles Uthus, Bureau of Economic Analysis, for data on employer contributions for social insurance. Thanks also go to Ben Ginsberg, Bill Keech, Elizabeth Sanders, Martin Shefter, and Sherri Wallace for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1. For example, suppose current recipients require current returns at rate $r > 0$ on their earlier tax payments p. That is, they require current benefits valued at rp. Under pay-as-you-go, current taxes to supply such benefits would increase with rp.

2. The equilibrium concept is not the static idea of a point at which taxes and benefits remain constant at particular values. The long-run equilibrium tested by the cointegration model I shall use represents a particular kind of equilibrium path.

3. The pattern of regular oscillations around the long-run equilibrium path distinguishes my predictions from those of Director's Law (Stigler 1970). Director's Law suggests a permanent bias in public expenditures in favor of the middle-income classes, with taxes shifted to fall disproportionately on the poor and rich, due in part to differences in voter participation among income classes. Oscillations such as I predict would neither prove nor disprove the existence of such a permanent bias in American social welfare policy.

4. Alt and Chrystal review other problems with Tufte's theory and evidence (1983, 118–22). Nordhaus (1989) reviews recent theoretical developments.

5. The possibility that extra payments are funded by debt complicates matters, but in any case, debt should not be analyzed as if it were "free money." The complications are many (e.g., Buchanan 1967, 256–66). I raise only the following question: If debt is a source of "free money" before the election, why only then? Empirical evidence regarding election-related variations in debt is mixed (Laney and Willett 1983).

6. The *elasticity* is the percentage change in a fiscal variable expected, given a percentage change in a socioeconomic variable, other things equal (see Gujarati 1988, 145; Tufte 1974, 113–15).

7. The selection of economic and political variables is similar to those used by Browning (1985) and Berry and Lowery (1987), though they were not trying to represent time-varying elasticities.

8. Plainly, it would be preferable to analyze benefits from tested and non-tested programs as separate series. Unfortunately, the necessary program-level data are not readily available at the frequency needed to implement the statistical model.

9. "Transfer payments to persons" includes "income payments to persons, generally in monetary form, for which they do not render current services" (United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1987, 3, n. 1). "Personal contributions for social insurance" includes "payments by employees, self-employed, and other individuals who participate in the following programs: Federal old-age, survivors, disability, and hospital insurance; supplementary medical insurance; State unemployment insurance; railroad retirement; government retirement; veterans life insurance; and temporary disability insurance" (ibid., 1, n. 3). "Employer contributions" includes matching, supplemental and other payments made for such programs by employers.

10. Each β_{ijt} is defined to vary annually. Exactly, $\beta_{ijt} = (\partial\tilde{y}_{it}/\partial z_{ijt})/(\bar{y}_{it}/z_{ijt})$. But as the number of observations in each year grows large, $\beta_{ijt} = \text{plim}\ (\partial y_{it}/\partial z_{ijt})/(y_{it}/z_{ijt})$ for each year.

11. Checks using several choices from the power family of variance functions in some simpler, univariate models supported the variance specification used in the text (McCullagh and Nelder 1989, 400). The alternative, gammalike model, in particular, produced inferior results (ibid., 285).

12. In terms of the variables defined in Table A-1, $R_t = I_t/(P_tN_t)$, $UN_{t-1} = U_{t-1}/N_t$ and $EMN_t = EM_t/N_t$.

13. $F77_t$ and $F82_t$ (see Table A-1 for definitions) bracket a period when the shift in the federal government fiscal year from July–June to October–September apparently induced a seasonal fluctuation in transfer payments not removed by the government's seasonal adjustment procedures. $FM50_t$ picks up a large, temporary increase observed in T_t in February and March of 1950.

14. See n. 20.

15. Since 1955, the ratio of transfer payments to contributions has varied between approximately 1.4 and 1.7. During this period, approximately 5% of transfer payments were nongovernmental.

16. **C** is the dynamic matrix in the state space representation of equation 2 given by $\mathbf{z}_t = \mathbf{C}\,\mathbf{z}_{t-1} + \mathbf{e}_t$, $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t = [\mathbf{I}\ \mathbf{0}]\,\mathbf{z}_t$, where $\mathbf{z}_t = (\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t{}', \tilde{\mathbf{u}}_{t-1}{}')'$ is the state vector and $\mathbf{e}_t = (\boldsymbol{\mu}' + \mathbf{v}_t{}', \mathbf{0}')'$. The case with **C** having a single near-unit eigenvalue corresponds to $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t$ being (near) cointegrated of degree 1 (Aoki 1990, 17, 123, 222).

17. Nonzero μ_i values represent permanent biases—upward or downward—in the levels of transfer payments and contributions. They do not represent an equilibrium constraint.

18. The sense in which $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_t$ is unrelated to both $\tilde{\mathbf{u}}_t$ and $\mathbf{x}_t$ is somewhat heuristic. For the precise meaning in the context of a completely linear model, see Martin and Thompson 1982.

19. For $j \in \{P, N, R\}$, the ith element of $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j$ is $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{ij} = E_t\ \partial[(\partial x_{it}/\partial j_t)/(x_{it}/j_t)]/\partial E_t$.

20. This is based on the conceptual substitution $EMN_t = (CLF_t - U_t)/N_t$, where CLF_t is the size of the civilian labor force at t. The point is to think of changes in EMN_t as being produced by changes in U_t/N_t, holding CLF_t/N_t constant.

21. Using $EMN_t = (CLF_t - U_t)/N_t$, the fact that x_{1t} is directly affected by the lagged value UN_{t-1} implies that for February–December in each even-numbered year, $E_t\ \partial[(\partial x_{1t}/\partial UN_{t-1})/(x_{1t}/UN_{t-1})]/\partial E_t \approx b_{148} - a_{12}b_{248} - a_{13}b_{348}$. The elasticity difference equals b_{148} only for January.

22. The similarities in Figure 1 reflect similarities among the coefficient estimates. See Table A-2.

23. Every $\hat{a}_{ik}$ is more than three times bigger than its estimated standard error, except $\hat{a}_{31}$ (s.e. .017) and $\hat{a}_{32}$ (s.e. .022).

24. In an alternative specification in which $\mathbf{y}_t$ is defined with $y_{1t} = T_t$, $y_{2t} = 2PC_t$ and $y_{3t} = EC_t - PC_t$ (throughout the present data, $EC_t \geq PC_t$), the estimate for **A** is

$$\hat{\mathbf{A}} = \begin{bmatrix} .5978 & .0301 & -.0009 \\ -.0614 & .1427 & -.0005 \\ .5017 & -.6080 & .4623 \end{bmatrix}.$$

In view of the principal difference between employer and personal contributions (see the text), these estimates suggest that the dependence of employer contributions on payments reflects constraints in supplemental state programs for unemployment insurance and workman's compensation, while the dependence of payments on personal contributions reflects constraints in Social Security.

25. So far as can be tested with the present data, the observed near cointegration is not due solely to the component that PC_t and EC_t should share because of the matched payments employees and employers make for Social Security (see, e.g., Brittain 1972). That is, near cointegration also appears if the model is estimated using the alternative specification described in n. 24.

26. The plotted "adjustments" are $\hat{\tilde{y}}_{it}{}^{1/2}\ (\hat{\tilde{u}}_{it} - \hat{\mu}_i)P_{1984:1}\ 10^6/(N_t\ P_t\ 12)$.

27. For all j, $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_j{}^{\tau}$ remains approximately zero for all $\tau > 7$.

28. The standard error (first-order Taylor approximation) of the contemporaneous elasticity difference $\hat{b}_{148} - \hat{a}_{12}\hat{b}_{248} - \hat{a}_{13}\hat{b}_{348} = -.082$ for unemployment in the transfer payments equation is .037. The standard error of the one-period-lagged difference for unemployment in the transfer payments equation ($= -.083$) is .045. The standard errors of $\hat{b}_{248}$, $\hat{b}_{348}$, $\hat{b}_{118}$, $\hat{b}_{218}$, and $\hat{b}_{318}$ can be found in Table A-2.

29. For employer contributions, the average per capita change is an increase of \$ .14, versus an average per capita contribution of \$31.09.

30. For an explanation of the interpretation in terms of percent change, see Tufte (1974, 125).

31. For October and November of 1972, I compute $\hat{y}_{1t}$ equal to \$130.04 billion and \$133.95 billion, respectively. The monthly dollar figure used in the text is 10.96 = (130.04 + 133.95)/(2 × 12).

32. Since transfer payments typically total approximately 1.5 times the total of personal and employer contributions (recall n. 15), the point is that .0085 × 1.5 = .01275 is just smaller than the estimate of .0131 for PJF_t for personal contributions equation but larger than the estimate of .0077 for employer contributions.

33. The monthly dollar values are computed using $\hat{\lambda}_{it}$ $\hat{y}_{it}^{1/2}/12$.

34. The coefficient estimates for PON_t in Table 1 imply an October–November decrease in presidential election years of approximately .49% in personal contributions, and a corresponding increase of approximately .43% in employer contributions. Since these effects are small, I ignore them.

35. The S-PLUS® (Statistical Sciences 1991) programs used to compute the estimates are available on request.

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THE REVERSE COATTAILS EFFECT: LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE 1989 BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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Increasingly, it is said that the main determinants of electoral outcomes are class, ethnicity, and religion and that local political organizations occupy only marginal roles in national elections. I assess the effects of local party organizations in the presidential election of 1989 in Brazil. Given the long hiatus in competitive politics, the absence of any parties linked to the country's previous democratic experience, and the weakness of citizen identification with political parties, Brazil should be a textbook example of the collapse of local political organizations. The presidential candidates, however, acted as if party endorsements mattered, and in the context of Brazilian politics, it was rational for municipal mayors to trade blocs of votes for future local benefits. Applying a series of increasingly complex models to the vote shares of the leading candidates, I show that all candidates did significantly better in municipalities where the mayor represented their party. I also show that spatial factors affect the tactics of local politicians, and I distinguish charismatic from purely organizational components of support.

As democratization sweeps over formerly authoritarian regimes in the Third World and in the former Soviet bloc, elections move to the center of the political stage. For students of politics in these new regimes, the primacy of elections presents an intellectual challenge. What will be the main factors determining electoral outcomes? Will class, ethnicity, and religion—the usual determinants of electoral results in advanced industrial countries—have the same weight in the newly competitive nations? If the experience of many industrial and industrializing nations, especially in Latin America, foreshadows the political futures of the nations in transition, *local political organization* will join class, ethnicity and religion as determinants of national-level electoral contests. By the term *local political organization* I refer not to affective ties linking citizens with their communities but, instead, to the efforts of a community's political leaders to deliver blocs of votes to candidates the leadership prefers.[1] In Colombia, for example, two dominant parties have long relied on an extensive clientelist network to link local political machines to the national state (Buitrago and Dávila 1990). In Mexico and Venezuela, local bosses "mobilize their clienteles to support a political party in rallies, demonstrations, and elections in exchange for favors from higher government and party officials" (Coppedge 1993, 262). In Italy, "the key to Christian Democratic power in the major southern cities has been . . . control of the *municipio*" (Chubb 1982, 78). Local politicians in Japan gather votes for Diet candidates by persuading constituents that good relations with their Diet members are a prerequisite for the continuation of subsidies and grants-in-aid from the central government. Success at generating support for the Diet candidate yields financial aid for the local politician's own election campaign (Curtis 1971, 44–45).

How can we evaluate the potential of local political organizations in the electoral processes of formerly authoritarian regimes? First, if local organizations are truly significant actors in national politics, they ought to affect electoral results in *supra*local contests, for example, in presidential elections. Second, if local organizations exist apart from longstanding voter loyalties, the effects of the machine ought to be clear even where party identification is weak. Finally, if local organizations have staying power in competitive polities, they should matter even when politicians use modern marketing techniques to reach voters directly.

I shall focus on just such a case, the Brazilian presidential election of 1989. Consider the background of the election. The 1989 contest was the first national decision since 1960, and less than one-third of the electorate had ever voted in a national election.[2] None of the political parties contesting the 1989 election had been around in 1960, and most of the contending parties were less than two years old.[3] The Brazilian Democratic Movement party (PMDB),* the nation's largest party, had ridden the initial success of its emergency economic program to overwhelming victories in the 1986 congressional and gubernatorial races, but the program collapsed soon after, and the popularity of the PMDB fell so drastically that half its congressional delegation deserted to form new parties or join old ones. In public opinion surveys, the percentage of the population agreeing that in its own vote choice, "the candidate's party is the decisive factor" had declined from 43% in 1982 to 24% in 1986 and to 18% in 1988 (Muszynski and Mendes 1990, 64).

As the election unfolded, the weakness of the parties seemed pathetic. Officially, the race included 22 candidates. Almost from the beginning of the campaign, the leader was Fernando Collor de Mello, a little-known governor from the politically and economically marginal state of Alagoas. Backed by the National Reconstruction party (PRN)—a party created solely for the election—Collor's campaign focused on his alleged achievements in rooting out Alagoas's *marajás,* the vastly overpaid "maharajas" of the civil service. His campaign team, for the first time in a Brazilian presidential election, made extensive and effective use of television.

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* All party acronyms are listed in the Abbreviations.

The election took place in two rounds. In the first round Collor and the runner-up, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers' party (PT), jointly received 48% of the vote. The parties backing these two candidates held less than 5% of all seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while two other candidates, whose parties held 61% of the seats, received only 5% of the vote. Though the losing parties of the first round had little sense of the true preferences of their partisans, they could not avoid endorsing one of the two finalists. After a campaign bitter enough to embarrass an American marketing consultant, Collor defeated Lula 53% to 47%. The new president remained in office until his impeachment and conviction on corruption charges in 1992.

Brazilian political analysts interpret the 1989 election as essentially plebiscitary: parties, in the conventional wisdom, failed in their attempts to mobilize or sway voters.[4] The presidential candidates disagreed with this interpretation, however, at least insofar as their campaign behavior reveals an underlying sense of the electoral process. In the months before the election every candidate worked at winning the endorsements of governors, senators, federal deputies, and local mayors. One of the country's leading newspapers, the *Folha de São Paulo,* provided frequent updates of its *adesómetro* (endorsement meter), a thermometer recording pledges of support announced by various national and local politicians. Newspapers in every state updated who-endorsed-whom stories. Candidates, in other words, thought politicians and their organizations still had the power to influence voters.

Were the presidential candidates simply fighting the last election? Were they failing to realize that the old politics of local bosses and local organizations no longer mattered? Or were the candidates right? Did local parties matter even when television had the power to catapult unknowns to national prominence?

In the context of Brazilian politics, the endorsement-seeking tactics of the presidential candidates, at least insofar as they focus on local officials, are perfectly rational, because the candidates know that municipal leaders have every reason to remain in the good graces of the future president. Municipalities (the basic unit of Brazilian government below the state level) desperately need the transfer payments that the central government makes available. In sanitation, school construction, social assistance, and roads, central government transfers are absolutely indispensable. Poor and rural municipalities are the most dependent, but even big cities need federal help. A very large share of these transfers—perhaps as much as 50%—is discretionary, and the central government relies heavily on political criteria in signing the expenditure transfer agreements known as *convênios.*[5] In 1990–91, for example, municipalities in the home states of President Collor (Alagoas), the education minister (Rio Grande do Sul), and the health minister (Paraná) all received a significantly greater number of transfer agreements than municipalities in other states.[6] Thus any sensible local leader, needing central government money and knowing that political criteria traditionally determine the distribution of such monies, would try to deliver votes to *some* candidate.

Endorsement seeking in Brazil has a second rationale: politicians know that strong local machines have the tools to influence the choices of voters. Naturally a machine leans on its patronage employees for support. Government employees constitute between 5% and 10% of the economically active population in the whole country (far more in some municipalities), and voters whose livelihoods depend on local government will surely support their leaders.[7] Local leaders also influence voters well beyond the narrow circle of friends and dependents. The local machine might disrupt the rallies and meetings of the opposition. It can hinder the attempts of the opposition to distribute electoral advertisements or gifts to voters. The machine can influence local newspapers and radio and television stations to slant news so as to benefit its favorites. Indeed, radio and television licenses were themselves often granted as political rewards to influential local politicians. These activities constitute not vote fraud (which, by 1989, had become quite unlikely) but simply a continuation of ordinary local government political activity.

If the presidential candidates behaved rationally in seeking the endorsements of state and local leaders, the question remains: Was the outcome of the 1989 election "politics as usual"? In other words, did organization matter?

No research has been undertaken directly on this topic, principally, I believe, because appropriate data bases have been unavailable.[8] I have created such a data base, and in this essay I construct and evaluate a model assessing the ability of local party organizations to mobilize voters for the presidential election. The analysis suggests that party endorsements and the mobilizational commitments they represent did indeed matter. In fact, they had a powerful impact on the fortunes of all the major candidates in the Brazilian presidential election. Although Fernando Collor de Mello probably would have won even if local machines had remained truly neutral, the Collor phenomenon was almost certainly exceptional, and in a normal election local organization will remain critical. Rumors of the death of parties, in other words, have been greatly exaggerated.

I first present some background necessary to understand the election itself, then develop and test a series of models linking local organizational backing to candidate support in the two rounds of the election. These models successively increase in complexity and realism. Finally, I extend the modeling exercise and consider the overall significance of the results.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1989

Though the 1989 election was Brazil's first *popular* presidential competition since the military seized power in 1964, the outgoing president was a civilian, not a general. In 1984 Tancredo Neves had beaten the military's preferred candidate in a contest conducted wholly within an electoral college, a college composed of various elected and appointed officials. When Neves died soon after the election, his vice-president, conservative northeasterner José Sarney, assumed the presidency. Though Sarney had his ups and downs, by the end of 1988 he was widely unpopular, and all contenders in the 1989 campaign attacked his presidency. Sarney's ministers endorsed various candidates, but the president backed no one, and his administration held to a position of official neutrality.

The Politics of Structure and Geography

Brazil is truly a federal system. States have been important actors in Brazilian politics since independence. Governors of economically significant states immediately become major players in national politics, and most congressional deputies reflect state and local interests. Such legislative localism is largely a product of Brazil's electoral system, its unique version of open-list proportional representation. In all open-list proportional representation systems, voters cast ballots for individual candidates. The *number* of seats a party receives is basically determined by a simple ratio: the sum of all votes cast for the party's candidates divided by the sum of all votes cast for candidates of all parties. The identity of the *holders* of the seats is then determined by ranking the candidates by the number of individual votes received. The Brazilian version of open-list proportional representation adds some features not found elsewhere: whole states serve as at-large congressional districts; state-level conventions select candidates; and, by law, parties cannot refuse to renominate incumbent deputies.[9]

The results of open-list proportional representation in Brazil are predictable: a proliferation of weak, ideologically incoherent parties; a focus on personalized politics; and a president usually bereft of solid legislative backing. Desperate to attract congressional support, Brazil's presidents parcel out cabinet positions to powerful state leaders in the hope that the latter will influence their states' delegations. Not surprisingly, these ministers manipulate projects and patronage jobs to advance their own political futures. President Sarney, for example, appointed Antonio Carlos Magalhães, former (and current) governor of Bahia, to be minister of communications. Magalhães funneled radio and television licenses to backers of the president (many of them deputies) and to supporters of his own political ambitions.

The central government distributes pork primarily to municipalities and secondarily to states. As a tool for attracting *legislative* support, pork is rather blunt, because *real* legislative districts (i.e., the actual areas in which deputies campaign) are usually neither whole states nor single municipalities. In other words, deputies care little about statewide pork, because they would have to share credit with the rest of their delegation. And though most deputies focus their campaigning on small groups of municipalities, few of the resulting bailiwicks are so secure that they resemble U.S.-style single-member districts (Ames 1992). As a result, the president has to persuade mayors to persuade their deputies to repay presidential generosity. Sometimes it works, sometimes not, but the overall price, in terms of efficient allocations of government spending, must rise.[10]

Region is also crucial to the Brazilian equation. The Northeast, composed of nine very poor states, has long been dominated by conservative politicians and political bosses. Although in certain states clientelistic politics has noticeably declined, traditional styles of politics maintain their grip in much of the region, and large portions of the rural Northeast survive only as a result of federal transfers. Here politics is a business, sometimes the only prosperous business. Generally supportive of Brazil's political Right, the Northeast (along with the North and Center–West) benefits from the malapportionment of the national legislature.[11]

The South and Southeast regions, by contrast, include the bulk of Brazil's industry and most of its Left and Left–Center electoral strongholds. Deputies in the South and Southeast are no less pork-oriented than northeasterners—but their vote bases are competitive, rather than monolithic, and they are substantially more accountable to their electorates.

Parties and Candidates

The results of the first round of balloting are shown in Table 1. My empirical analysis focuses on five of the first seven finishers: Fernando Collor de Mello, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, Leonel Brizola, Paulo Maluf, and Ulysses Guimarães.[12] I have eliminated Mário Covas, who finished fourth, because his Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) controlled very few municipalities. Afif Domingos of the Liberal party (PL) had a few more votes than Ulysses, but Afif was almost never an important player in the campaign, and his party was minuscule compared to the PMDB. Aureliano Chaves represented the Liberal Front party (PFL), a major party, but his campaign never got off the ground, and most PFL mayors abandoned his candidacy well before the first round of voting.[13]

In order to understand how local party organizations affected the 1989 election, readers unfamiliar with the Brazilian political scene need a brief introduction to the chief parties and their candidates.

TABLE 1

Results of Round One of 1989 Presidential Election

CANDIDATE AND PARTY	VOTES	PERCENTAGE
Collor, PRN	20,611,011	28.52
Lula, PT	11,622,673	16.08
Brizola, PDT	11,168,228	15.45
Mario Covas, PSDB	7,790,392	10.78
Maluf, PDS	5,986,575	8.28
Afif, PL	3,272,462	4.53
Ulysses, PMDB	3,204,932	4.43
Freire, PCB	769,123	1.06
Aureliano, PFL	600,838	.83
Caiado, PSD	488,846	.68
Camargo, PTB	379,286	.52
Total	72,280,909	91.16

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral: Coordenação Geral de Informática. Brasília, DF: Brasil.

Note: Eleven candidates, each with less than .52% of the vote, have been eliminated from this table. All the electoral data in this and subsequent tables come from the tribunal. Throughout the analysis, the percentage of votes cast for the candidate is the fraction of valid votes (i.e., votes for candidates minus blank and null votes).

Ulysses Guimarães and the PMDB. The Brazilian Democratic Movement party had originated as the Brazilian Democratic movement (MDB), the officially tolerated opposition party during the military regime. Increasingly independent and critical of the dictatorship, its legislative candidates began to mount a serious challenge in the election of 1974, especially in the more developed South and Southeast. In the 1970s and 1980s, the PMDB grew enormously, spreading from its original base to the whole country. With the legalization, in the 1980s, of multiparty politics, competitors on the left and right flanked the PMDB, and it lost most of its ideological coloration.[14] In 1984, the electoral college chose a PMDBista president, but Vice-President José Sarney, who assumed the presidency upon Tancredo Neves's death, was a northeasterner representing the much more conservative PFL. In 1989, the PMDB selected Ulysses Guimarães as its candidate for the presidency. As the official leader of the PMDB, Guimarães commanded wide respect, even reverence, for his struggle to reestablish Brazilian democracy. A 73-year-old Paulista, Guimarães was a skilled legislator, a moderate social democrat, and a lackluster television orator.

Leonel Brizola and the Democratic Labor Party. Leonel Brizola's political career is the stuff of legends.[15] A founder of the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) in 1945, in the 1950s he had been federal deputy and governor of Rio Grande do Sul, a dynamic state in the South. Moving in 1962 to the state of Rio de Janeiro (then called Guanabara), Brizola became an active figure in an already well established PTB and gained a seat as federal deputy once again. In 1964, the military regime, angered by Brizola's radical activities and powerful populist speeches, forced him to leave the country. He returned in 1979 as part of a general amnesty, and in 1982 Rio's voters elected him governor, this time on the ticket of the Democratic Labor party (PDT), a party he had formed when the electoral courts refused him the old PTB label. Brizola's national ambitions have always foundered on one huge obstacle: though he commands enormous popular support in Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro, he has never been able to penetrate the state of São Paulo. In Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul Brizola received 50% and 61% of the votes, respectively, in the first round of the 1989 election. In São Paulo, a state with more than one-fifth of the Brazilian electorate, he received less than 1.5%.[16]

Labeling Brizola ideologically is difficult. His socialism is certainly less doctrinaire than Lula's, but Brizola's thinking—often labeled populist—contains both xenophobic and statist elements.

Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and the Workers' Party. Even in the cacophony of Brazilian politics, the PT stands apart (see Keck 1992; Sader and Silverstein 1991). As the largest ideologically militant party in Brazil, it represents traditional socialism. Riven by internal disputes, the party is nonetheless highly disciplined in the federal Chamber of Deputies. Not only does a significant fraction of PT deputies come from working-class organizations, but Lula, the party's head, began as an industrial worker and union organizer. Though supported by intellectuals, especially university professors, its working-class electoral base is substantial, particularly in industrial states like São Paulo. In her study of the 1989 election in the *paulista* municipality of Presidente Prudente, Kinzo found Lula to be the only candidate with a largely class-based appeal (1992, 59). As Keck points out, Lula's campaign called for a socialist transformation of Brazilian society, while stressing the need for national reconciliation and the formation of a national popular government (1992, 159).

Paulo Maluf and the Democratic Social Party. Its name notwithstanding, the Democratic Social party (PDS) is a right-wing party. Recall that the military regime had permitted the creation of an official opposition party, the MDB, which became the PMDB. The military also created a progovernment party, the National Renovating Alliance—ARENA. As the democratic transition unfolded, ARENA became the PDS. Its presidential candidate, Paulo Maluf, had been appointed governor of São Paulo by the military regime in 1979. A politician of legendary memory and deal-making skill, Maluf enjoyed considerable popularity in the city of São Paulo (which elected him mayor in 1992), and his PDS controlled hundreds of municipalities across the nation.

Fernando Collor de Mello and the National Reconstruction Party. The National Reconstruction party (PRN) was nothing more than a vehicle for Collor's ambitions. Raised in a traditional political family (his father had been governor and an uncle had been a federal minister in the 1930s), Collor hailed from Alagoas, an economically and politically marginal state with a reputation for exceptionally corrupt politics (Mello 1992). The military appointed Collor mayor of Maceió, Alagoas's capital, and he subsequently won election as federal deputy and governor. Lula derisively referred to Collor as the "lap dog" of the military, but Collor ran for president as a populist reformer, criticizing the Sarney administration and trumpeting his own record in Alagoas as a corruption fighter. Collor was aided by his youth (he was barely forty at the time of the campaign) and his good looks. The PRN was his fifth political party. His career had already passed through ARENA, the PDS, the PMDB, and the Party of Youth. The PRN was not much of a party, however: at the time of the campaign, it controlled outright only three municipalities and had only 14 federal deputies.

The Course of the Campaign

At the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, Lula and Brizola led all opinion polls, and the election shaped up as a battle between these two leftists. But around the end of March, Brazilians began to witness the *fenômeno Collor*—a surge in the polls that carried Fernando Collor de Mello past the field and ultimately to about 40% of the electorate, more than the other candidates combined.[17] Although Collor finally slipped to a bit below 30%, no one seriously challenged him, and in its last six months, the campaign was really about second-place. Lula finally squeezed in, victorious over Brizola by less than five hundred thousand votes.

With only a month between the first and second rounds of the election, the struggle for the endorsements of the losing parties soon reached fever pitch. A group of PMDB deputies quickly endorsed Lula, but Orestes Quércia, the governor of São Paulo and a fierce opponent of Lula, demanded that the party remain neutral. Other PMDB governors fell in behind Quércia, and the PT itself proclaimed that no politician associated with the discredited Sarney administration (read PMDB) could appear with its candidates. So the PMDB endorsed no one. The PSDB, by contrast, agonized for awhile, then granted "qualified" support (*apoio crítico*) to Lula. Lula also picked up some *un*qualified support: Brizola threw his PDT enthusiastically behind the man who had so narrowly kept him from the final round.

On the right, alliances were simpler. The PFL and PTB strongly endorsed Collor. Various minor right-wing parties soon followed suit. Maluf's PDS joined the Collor brigade, although a few PDSsistas, especially in Brizola's stronghold of Rio Grande do Sul, went over to Lula. After two nationally televised debates and intense television advertising (the low-point coming during a Collor television program when Lula's ex-wife denounced him as a bad father and a racist), Collor defeated his PT rival, 53% to 47%.

Mayors and Local Machines

Brazil's mayors had all assumed office in 1988. Previously, the military regime had imposed officials on large cities and on certain other municipalities it classed as "strategically important," so the 1988 election was the first since the military takeover in which all municipalities had the right to elect their own mayors and councils. Nineteen different parties elected mayors in 4,000-plus municipalities. The major parties (PT, PDT, PMDB, PSDB, PDS, PTB, and PFL) elected a total of 3,164 mayors. In 1,787 cases, the victor had no formal support from other parties; in 1,377 cases, a formal coalition of two or more parties supported the winner.[18]

Did mayors use their influence to boost the candidate of their party, or did they desert to someone else? Overwhelmingly, mayors remained loyal.[19] In the first round, mayors from the PT (Lula), PDT (Brizola), and PDS (Maluf) almost never deserted. Even though Ulysses Guimarães' candidacy was in desperate trouble months before the actual vote, few PMDB mayors abandoned him, at least publicly. Most mayoral desertions came from the PTB and PFL. No one, including the candidate himself, took the PTB's campaign seriously, and PFLista Aureliano Chaves's candidacy foundered from the very beginning. Of those PTB and PFL mayors who abandoned their candidates, the largest number publicly endorsed Fernando Collor de Mello.

The ability of a mayor to put the machine's muscle behind a candidate depended, in part, on the mayor's own freedom of action. If a coalition, rather than a single party, had backed the winning mayor, the members of the supporting parties would likely object to the mayor's helping a presidential candidate they did not support. Moreover, successful coalitions usually elected members of the municipal council as well, so that the mayor was likely to face council opposition to electioneering efforts. As a result, presidential candidates are likely to gain less in municipalities where a coalition supported the mayor, as compared to municipalities where the mayor won without allies.

MODELS OF PARTY ORGANIZATION AND PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT

Let us begin with a "stupid" model, that is, a model regressing the candidates' vote shares on dummy variables representing the party (or parties) in control of the municipality.[20] These dummies are scored 1 if the mayor or coalition came from a given party and 0 if the mayor or coalition came from some other party (including parties with no serious presidential candidate). The results, presented in Table 2, can be interpreted as *the number of percentage points a candidate gains in municipalities with mayors or mayoral coalitions of each party.*

The simple model is encouraging. Lula does well in PT municipalities and badly elsewhere (except in the

TABLE 2

Least Squares Estimates of Presidential Support with Pure Endorsement Model

PARAMETER	LULA (PT)	COLLOR (PRN)	BRIZOLA (PDT)	MALUF (PDS)	ULYSSES (PMDB)	LULA (2) (PT)
Intercept	17.66**	30.95**	27.11**	4.88**	4.06**	54.38**
PT	12.39**	−8.89**	−23.00**	12.16**	−1.93**	−2.78
PDT	−5.82**	−11.39**	13.98**	3.24**	−.23	2.85*
PMDB	−.91	5.60**	−11.61**	2.88**	4.63**	−11.96**
PSDB	9.52**	−2.42	−17.77**	5.02**	−.26	−3.97
PDS	−3.61**	7.60**	−10.20**	6.03**	2.37**	−14.84**
PTB	−1.95	13.91**	−21.31**	6.91**	.32	−20.40**
PFL	.71	15.33**	−19.07**	2.41**	1.93**	−18.43**
Coalitions						
PT	−2.78**	−14.21**	−16.76**	16.55**	−2.83**	−6.63**
PDT	−.26	−1.06	−2.15	2.45**	.54	−1.80
PMDB	4.68**	7.69**	−15.49**	.74	3.44**	−9.57**
PSDB	15.95**	−13.03**	−18.55**	−1.80	−.56	11.81**
PDS	−2.57**	4.21**	−11.39**	6.02**	1.69**	−12.17**
PTB	3.10**	2.83*	−13.14**	5.34**	.12	−6.92**
PFL	5.87**	10.68**	−17.54**	.74	1.13*	−11.46**
R^2	.14	.23	.17	.26	.11	.14
F	43.24	76.97	52.38	90.35	31.07	43.16
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001

Note: N = 3,677.
$^*p \leq .05$.
$^{**}p \leq .01$.

few cases where the mayor was a PSDBista). Brizola gains only where his PDT ruled by itself, and Ulysses Guimarães gains the most in PMDB municipalities. In the second round, Lula loses badly everywhere except in the municipalities of the Left, but only in PDT municipalities does he really do well. Brizola, in other words, delivers votes to Lula in even larger numbers than the PT's own "machine." The only real anomaly is Maluf, who seems to do well everywhere, regardless of party. Maluf's results may well stem from his popularity in urban centers of the South, but we shall have to await elaboration of the model.

This model is "stupid," of course, because it leaves out socioeconomic and demographic factors. Even in a polity where few parties occupy well-defined ideological positions, candidates appeal to different social groups. Since these groups distribute themselves unevenly across municipalities, municipal-level results should differ even if party machines are nonexistent.

With their populist and statist appeals, Lula and Brizola clearly appealed to big-city voters, especially to working- and lower-class groups and to government employees (who concentrate in big cities). Collor's strength was greatest in small towns and rural areas, and, being a candidate with no party, he did well among newly arrived residents, immigrants who lack ties to old political machines. Maluf was a conservative candidate with considerable appeal in the capital city of São Paulo, while Ulysses Guimarães' candidacy lacked any clear, group-oriented content.

The only comprehensive source of Brazilian socioeconomic and demographic data is the census of 1980.[21] By 1989, the country had changed, especially through the shifting of population from rural to urban areas. I therefore substituted the size of the registered electorate, a datum collected in 1988, for the census measure of the percentage of the population living in urban areas.[22] Given the spatial distribution of Brazilian population and the absence of a distinction between cities and counties, measures of urbanization correlate closely with measures of total population, and the more recent population figures minimize any overweighting of rural areas.[23]

With electoral results aggregated at the municipal level, any inferences about the voting behavior of particular cohorts within these municipalities risk the dreaded "ecological fallacy." Here, however, the ecological fallacy is less troublesome, since I seek merely to account for the cross-municipality variance in voting patterns. My interest lies in political machines: to measure their effects, the social and demographic factors affecting municipal-level outcomes are held constant.

Table 3 presents the results of the "less stupid" model. The socioeconomic and demographic variables produce the expected effects. Lula and Brizola do better in larger municipalities. Lula, Brizola, and Maluf gain votes in areas with more industry. Collor does well in areas with more agriculture and more migrants. And leftists Lula and Brizola are more successful than "corruption fighter" Collor where government employees are more numerous.

With the inclusion of socioeconomic and demographic variables, the effects of party machines

TABLE 3

Estimates of Presidential Support with Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables

PARAMETER	LULA (PT)	COLLOR (PRN)	BRIZOLA (PDT)	MALUF (PDS)	ULYSSES (PMDB)	LULA (2) (PT)
Intercept	31.28**	44.94**	11.17**	−7.39**	9.25**	49.37**
PT	14.83**	−2.69*	−16.31**	−.05	1.76**	−.22
PDT	−4.89**	−14.52**	21.85**	−1.47**	.13	10.03**
PMDB	−1.00	−3.29**	−1.64	1.10**	3.18**	−.82
PSDB	6.97**	−5.80*	−4.75	−.58	1.81	2.98
PDS	−2.22*	−1.95	−3.04	5.32**	−.07	−3.62*
PTB	−.06	5.60**	−9.56**	1.98*	−.81	−7.02**
PFL	.59	3.88**	−7.62**	1.60**	−.42	−5.10**
Coalitions						
PT	1.97	−11.38**	16.52**	−6.43**	1.33*	11.37**
PDT	−1.03	−5.42**	7.66**	−.95	.63	5.53**
PMDB	3.44**	−.47	−6.84**	.75	1.92**	−.76
PSDB	15.90**	−4.74**	−29.02**	−.41	1.61*	.79
PDS	−2.20**	−2.69**	−1.00	2.76**	.92*	−1.89*
PTB	2.00*	−1.62	−3.34*	1.28*	.26	.81
PFL	5.06**	1.45	−8.98**	.96	−.82	−1.50
Voters (millions)	4.04**	−7.86**	30.50**	−16.10**	.57	23.40**
Voters^2	−.54**	1.57**	−5.80**	2.78**	−.09	−4.30**
% in manufacturing	7.85	−68.45**	48.32**	31.85**	−9.44**	49.82**
% government employees	19.06	−80.39**	121.50**	1.64	−45.14**	100.89**
% in agriculture	−.04**	.02**	.01**	.02**	.00**	−.05**
% migrants	.00	.04**	−.05**	.02**	−.03**	−.04**
Per capita income ($1,000s)	−2.51**	−1.62**	−.53*	2.86**	−.51**	−.98**
R^2	.26	.48	.35	.55	.26	.47
F	59.25	159.7	90.2	207.2	59.38	151.2
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001

Note: N = 3,611
*$p \le .05$.
**$p \le .01$.

sharpen. Lula continues to do well in PT municipalities, and he no longer loses support when the PT enters into a coalition.[24] Collor now gains only in municipalities controlled by the PTB or PFL—the two parties whose candidates were so weak that mayors abandoned them in droves. Brizola, as before, gains only in PDT municipalities, but his gain is almost 50% higher with the socioeconomic and demographic variables included. Maluf's support changes dramatically: in the more complex model, he gains major support only on the right, with by far the biggest gains coming from his own PDS-controlled municipalities. Ulysses Guimarães' party support also sharpens: only in PMDB and PT municipalities does he gain, and the PMDB contribution is twice that of the PT. Finally, in the second round, Brizola's PDT contributes heavily to Lula, Lula's own PT helps not at all, and the right-wing parties consolidate around Collor.

What does this model lack? The answer, as any "Michigan" scholar knows, is partisan tendency. Suppose we operationalize partisan tendency purely as party identification. The PT, for example, commands loyalties rivaling many long-established European parties. Overall, however, few parties competing in 1989 had been around very long, and none of the major parties had ever participated in a presidential election. As a result, party identification is not measurable in terms of loyalties spanning multiple elections. Still, despite Brazilian parties' short histories, weak organizational structures, and ideological incoherence (at least as compared to European parties), voters may develop habitual attachments either to a particular party or to a general ideological direction.

Socioeconomic conditions and political organizations, both historic and current, create habitual attachments. At the moment of casting a ballot, the voter finds the party whose program is closest to his or her own preferences. Closeness, of course, is subjectively perceived, and both the past and present power of a municipality's reigning political organizations mediate the voter's perceptions. Can socioeconomic and organizational effects be separated? First, we should seek a general left–right ideological direction, rather than identification with a particular party, as a measure of partisan tendency. By including various parties, the capture of a general left or right tendency minimizes the effects of loyalties to any given organization or candidate. And even if the indicator is a bit broad, its inclusion can only reduce the effects of current party organization—in other words, the estimator of party organization ultimately generated will be the minimum possible. Second, we should base our estimate of partisan tendency on municipalities where no single organization dominates, that is, on municipalities with considerable interparty fragmentation. In such competitive municipalities, voters are less subject to the coercion of a dominant machine.[25]

Measuring Partisan Tendency

In the absence of survey responses, any measure of partisan tendency must rely on actual electoral outcomes—in this case on the congressional elections of 1978, 1982, and 1986. Voters cast their ballots for individual candidates (under the rules of open-list proportional representation). I aggregated, for each election, the votes of all the candidates from each party in each municipality. In other words, the analysis began with the total ARENA vote in each municipality for 1978, the total PMDB vote in each municipality for 1986, and so on. Then, selecting in each state just those municipalities with *interparty fragmentation greater than the state's median,* I regressed these party vote totals on the socioeconomic and demographic variables.[26] The coefficients from these equations then generated predicted party totals for *all* municipalities, fragmented and unfragmented, by state and by year. In effect, this technique assumes that in more fragmented, competitive municipalities dominant machines have less influence over voters' partisan tendencies. It also assumes that the socioeconomic and demographic variables would create the same partisan tendencies in dominated municipalities if a more competitive political environment let voters express themselves.

These *predicted* party votes were then aggregated into left and right tendencies. In 1978 and 1982 (elections in which the military regime allowed only two parties), the Left is the MDB and the PMDB, respectively, and the Right is ARENA and the PDS. In 1986, the Left is the PT plus the PDT and the Right is the PFL plus the PDS. Of course, some fuzziness remains: Is the MDB really on the left? Can the PMDB be called a left-wing party? Lacking a perfect resolution of these ambiguities, I chose to establish a range of estimates: a *minimum left–maximum right* estimator on one side and a *maximum left–minimum right* estimator on the other. The minimum left estimator utilized the smaller of the predicted 1978 MDB and 1982 PMDB votes; maximum left utilized the larger.[27] The maximum right estimator was the largest of the three predictions: 1978 ARENA, 1982 PDS, and 1986 PFL–PDS. Minimum right equalled the smallest of the three.

Given this range of partisan tendencies, Table 4 presents estimates of the model with the indicator of the *largest* possible Left, while Table 5 includes the indicator of the *smallest* possible Left.[28] The results show that partisan tendency matters just where it ought to matter. For Lula, Brizola, and Maluf—three candidates whom voters could locate ideologically—the partisan-tendency coefficients are mostly in the expected directions, with high significance levels. Partisan tendency makes no difference either for Collor, who seemed all over the left–right space, or for Guimarães, whose position was essentially centrist. Although our partisan-tendency measures had consistently strong effects on the ideological candidates, some signs are inconsistent. With partisan left tendency estimated at its maximum, increases in left tendency led to more votes for Lula and Brizola in round 1 and for Lula in round 2—just what we expect. But with left tendency estimated at the minimum of its plausible range, increases led to big gains for Lula in round 1, a lower vote for Brizola, and—the real surprise—a sharply lower vote for Lula in round 2. Do these results make sense?

The key lies in Brizola's vote in round 1 and in Brizola's ability to deliver votes to Lula in round 2. Unlike Lula supporters, Brizolistas are mostly not strong left partisans. So when left tendency is estimated conservatively, increases help Lula but hurt Brizola. With left tendency estimated generously, further increases help both candidates, but the bigger gain goes to Lula. In the second round, Brizola delivers his nonideological voters to Lula, so Lula appears to be hurt by increases over the minimum left estimate.

If this explanation is correct, the model ought to be better behaved when reestimated without Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro, Brizola's two strongholds. This is precisely what happens. With these two states removed, the effect of increasing left partisanship is now more consistent: increases in partisan left tendency from its maximum produce gains of about four points for Lula; increases from minimum partisan left tendency neither help nor hurt.

With underlying partisan tendency now included in the model, what happens to our party variables? The results confirm the overall importance of local organization. In the first round, every candidate, from the strongest to the weakest, received a big boost in municipalities headed by a mayor from the candidate's party. Collor, the candidate with no party, clearly managed to pick up support from PTB and PFL mayors; the failure of their standard-bearer had put PTB and PFL mayors in a desperate position. Maluf, too, got some support from PTB and PFL organizations, but Maluf relied primarily on his own PDS machine. Remarkably, Ulysses Guimarães kept a portion of his local PMDB support, even though his candidacy foundered six months before the election. Guimarães' supporters may have done little to help him (the PMDB coefficient is the smallest of any candidate's own party), but at least they rarely deserted to other candidates.[29]

Party organization affects the results in the second round as well, but here the situation becomes a bit more complicated. The PDS, PTB, and PFL all went massively for Collor. Brizola made good on his endorsement of Lula, delivering more votes in PDT (and PDT-in-coalition) municipalities than any other

TABLE 4

Presidential Support with Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables and Partisan Tendency: Left at Maximum of Plausible Range

PARAMETER	LULA (PT)	COLLOR (PRN)	BRIZOLA (PDT)	MALUF (PDS)	ULYSSES (PMDB)	LULA (2) (PT)
Intercept	29.94**	45.49**	10.24**	−6.55**	9.14**	48.09**
PT	14.86**	−2.71	−16.30**	−.07	1.78**	−.19
PDT	−4.98**	−14.49**	21.77**	−1.41*	.13	9.94**
PMDB	−1.09	−3.25	−1.72	1.17**	3.19**	−.91
PSDB	6.76**	−5.71*	−4.92	−.44	1.81	2.77
PDS	−2.47	−1.85	−3.24	5.48**	−.07	−3.86*
PTB	−.24	5.67**	−9.72**	2.11**	−.81	−7.19**
PFL	.47	3.93**	−7.73**	1.68**	−.41	−5.22**
Coalitions						
PT	2.47*	−11.58**	16.87**	−6.74**	1.37	11.84**
PDT	−1.83*	−5.09**	7.08**	−.44	.59	4.77**
PMDB	3.37**	−.44	−6.92	.80	1.93**	−.83
PSDB	15.76**	−4.68**	−29.13**	−.31	1.61*	.65
PDS	−2.26**	−2.66**	−1.06	2.80**	.93*	−1.95*
PTB	2.03*	−1.63	−3.33*	1.26*	.28	.85
PFL	5.00**	1.46	−9.05**	1.00	−.78	−1.55
Voters (millions)	3.54**	−7.66**	30.19**	15.74**	.53	22.89**
Voters^2	−.49**	1.55**	−5.79**	2.74**	−.08	−4.24**
% in manufacturing	4.85	−67.21**	46.18**	33.76**	−9.68**	46.94**
% government employees	−15.07	−66.31*	97.08*	23.31	−47.82**	68.19*
% in agriculture	−.04**	.02**	.02**	.02**	.01**	−.04**
% migrants	−.00	.05**	−.05**	.03**	−.03**	−.05**
Per capita income ($1,000s)	−2.50**	−1.62**	−5.26*	2.86**	−5.11**	−.98**
Maximum partisan left tendency	5.11**	−2.10	3.64*	−3.24**	.38	4.88**
R^2	.27	.48	.35	.55	.26	.47
F	58.84	152.7	86.51	201.1	56.68	145.9
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001

Note: N = 3,611.
*$p \leq .05$.
**$p \leq .01$.

party delivered. The PT, however, seems to have been unable to contribute any positive increment to its own candidate. Why does the PT appear so ineffective? Perhaps its weakness is not so surprising. The PT mayoralities were all big cities. Nowhere did the party have the kind of dominant organization typical of a small town or rural machine. Moreover, the PT's rise to power in local government was very recent. Indeed, until 1988, there were no PT mayors. The PT was bereft of the ties to newspapers and radio and television stations that other machines profited from financially and manipulated politically. Finally, the PT's experience in governing its cities had been rocky. Its ascendancy to power raised expectations that it could not meet, especially given the hostility of other national power holders. Overall, local PT organizations lacked the dominance, the mechanisms of control, and the interparty alliances typical of other parties.

Still, before writing off the PT as a possible mobilizer of local voters, let us return to the issue of Brizola, his concentrated vote, and his pro-Lula mobilization. In the reestimated model, with Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro removed, Lula gains about four percentage points in PT municipalities. He *loses* about four-and-one-half percentage points in PDT municipalities. So outside the highly politicized, PDT-dominated states of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, the PT could deliver a few votes, after all. Moreover, Brizola's influence fell off sharply outside his traditional bases.

Did organizational power affect the overall outcome? At one level, this query is unanswerable: if local organization had not existed, candidates would have adopted alternative strategies. But it is possible to calculate the overall gains and losses each party produced for its candidate.[30] Without the party machines, Brizola would have lost to Lula by a bit more than the actual result. In the second round, Collor added to his advantage with the strength of his right-wing allies, but he would have edged Lula anyway. Thus one can say that in this particular election organizational effects did not change the outcome. But if local machines had not influenced blocs of voters, then preelection polls, especially in the second round, would have been closer. In that case, campaign funds might flow differently, candidates might adopt different tactics, and the ultimate results could look quite different.

TABLE 5

Presidential Support with Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables and Partisan Tendency: Left at Minimum of Plausible Range

PARAMETER	LULA (PT)	COLLOR (PRN)	BRIZOLA (PDT)	MALUF (PDS)	ULYSSES (PMDB)	LULA (2) (PT)
Intercept	29.16**	45.00**	15.32**	−8.43**	9.56**	50.64**
PT	13.40**	−2.66	−13.54**	−.75	2.00**	.63
PDT	−7.06**	−14.47**	26.06**	−2.52**	.48	11.33**
PMDB	−2.75**	−3.24**	1.74	.26	3.47**	.21
PSDB	5.74**	−5.77*	−2.37	−1.18	2.01	3.71
PDS	−3.27*	−1.92	−1.02	4.81**	.10	−2.99
PTB	−1.93	5.65**	−5.95**	1.08	−.51	−5.90**
PFL	−.75	3.91**	−5.01**	.95	−.19	−4.29**
Coalitions						
PT	−.48	−11.31**	21.29**	−7.62**	1.72*	12.84**
PDT	−1.84*	−5.40**	9.21**	−1.34**	.77	6.01**
PMDB	1.49*	−.42	−3.08*	−.18	2.23**	.39
PSDB	10.76**	−4.60**	−19.03**	−2.91**	2.41**	3.86*
PDS	−3.44**	−2.66**	1.39	2.16**	1.13**	−1.14
PTB	.92	−1.59	−1.28	.77	.44	1.45
PFL	3.56**	1.48	−6.11**	.23	−.54	−.60
Voters (millions)	5.32**	−7.90**	28.10**	15.44**	.38	22.60**
Voters^2	−.64**	1.57**	−5.60**	2.73**	−.07	−4.20**
% in manufacturing	.34	−68.24**	62.94**	28.18**	−8.29**	54.31**
% government employees	15.59	−80.27**	128.33**	−.08	−44.67**	102.99**
% in agriculture	−.03**	.02**	.01	.02**	.00**	−.05**
% migrants	−.01**	.05**	−.00	.01**	−.03**	−.03**
Per capita income ($1,000s)	−2.60**	−1.62**	−3.53	2.82**	−.49**	−.93**
Minimum partisan left tendency	13.79**	−.36	−26.79**	6.71**	−2.11	−8.23**
R^2	.29	.48	.38	.56	.26	.47
F	66.08	152.4	98.76	205.7	57.27	146.9
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001

Note: N = 3,611.
*$p \leq .05$.
**$p \leq .01$.

EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC ARGUMENT

I shall present two refinements of the final model, each strengthening the conclusion that party organization matters.[31] The first estimates the model for a subset of municipalities identified according to the size and preferences of their neighbors. This refinement demonstrates that the institutional basis of Brazilian electoral politics, especially the trajectory of political careers at the state level, affects the strategies of local politicians. The second refinement explores the organizational and affective bases of support of a single, unique politician, Leonel Brizola.

What Happens When Neighbors Disagree?

Remember that Brazil elects members of its state assemblies and its federal Chamber of Deputies through open-list proportional representation. At both levels, whole states are districts.[32] The most common entry into the federal legislature is service as a state deputy, and state deputies often begin in local politics, for example, as municipal council members or mayors.[33] Suppose a mayor or council member wants to run for a legislative seat, and suppose the potential candidate can count on heavy support from the citizens of the municipality. Still, few individual municipalities are so big that their votes alone can assure victory, so aspiring statewide candidates from small communities need outside allies. Logically, they seek these allies in nearby municipalities. This search gives politicians from large communities broader influence, influence beyond their particular municipalities. The smaller the community from which a potential candidate hails, the more dangerous it is to alienate big neighbors.[34] If politicians from larger communities back a different presidential candidate, a small-town mayor may decide not to disrupt opponents' rallies, council members may choose to ignore (rather than follow) the mayor's political directives, and community leaders may reach "understandings" with outside political forces.

The political danger of disagreeing with large neighbors ought to weaken endorsement effects. How can this hypothesis be tested? First, ascertain, for each municipality, which contiguous neighbors were governed by parties backing opposing candidates.[35] Next, calculate each municipality's opposition neighbors, that is, the total contiguous popula-

TABLE 6

Small Local Machine Surrounded by Large Neighbors Backing Other Candidates

	LULA (PT)		COLLOR (PRN)		BRIZOLA (PDT)		MALUF (PDS)		ULYSSES (PMDB)		LULA (2) (PT)	
PARAMETER	ALL	S.O.[a]	ALL	S.O.[a]	ALL	S.O.[a]	ALL	S.O.[a]	ALL	S.O.[a]	ALL	S.O.[a]
Intercept	29.94	31.39	45.49	42.50	10.24	17.45	−6.55	−10.50	9.1	9.81	48.0	53.96
PT	14.86	8.75	−2.71	−.13	−16.30	−9.98	−.07	−2.29	1.7	1.80	−.1	−3.19
PDT	−4.98	−3.71	−14.49	−15.85	21.77	24.79	−1.41	−1.13	.1	.47	9.9	12.96
PMDB	−1.09	−2.66	−3.25	−.62	−1.72	−.74	1.17	1.22	3.1	1.87	−.9	−2.85
PSDB	6.76	5.06	−5.71	−4.20	−4.92	−3.57	−.44	−1.01	1.8	1.48	2.7	1.56
PDS	−2.47	−2.07	−1.85	−1.94	−3.24	−1.67	5.48	4.45	−.0	.19	−3.8	−2.54
PTB	−.24	−.78	5.67	3.91	−9.72	−6.87	2.11	1.69	−.8	−.51	−7.1	−5.58
PFL	.47	−.80	3.93	.90	−7.73	−4.06	1.68	2.25	−.4	.02	−5.2	−3.50
Coalitions												
PT	2.47	−1.17	−11.58	−5.13	16.87	33.17	−6.74	−15.82	1.3	2.95	11.8	12.90
PDT	−1.83	−2.05	−5.09	−.38	7.08	−.43	−.44	.97	.5	1.30	4.7	−1.26
PMDB	3.37	−2.11	−.44	−1.51	−6.92	2.06	.80	.88	1.9	.18	−.8	.28
PSDB	15.76	16.54	−4.68	6.19	−29.13	−32.23	−.31	−5.80	1.6	3.29	.6	−5.91
PDS	−2.26	−2.96	−2.66	−3.61	−1.06	−.03	2.80	3.62	.9	1.09	−1.9	−.31
PTB	2.03	−.82	−1.63	−2.00	−3.33	1.87	1.26	.24	.2	.42	.8	1.33
PFL	5.00	5.59	1.46	2.76	−9.05	−8.91	1.00	.16	−.7	−.05	−1.5	−1.72
Voters (millions)	3.54	1.51	−7.66	−21.50	30.19	37.04	15.74	−9.41	.5	−2.24	22.8	31.86
Voters^2	−.49	−.21	1.55	5.37	−5.79	−6.80	2.74	.78	−.0	.63	−4.2	−6.53
% manufacturing	4.85	7.89	−67.21	−45.05	46.18	16.10	33.76	37.76	−9.6	−13.26	46.9	21.75
% government employees	−15.07	15.02	−66.31	37.06	97.08	−47.94	23.31	30.44	−47.8	−56.74	68.1	−31.85
% agriculture	−.04	−.04	.02	.04	.02	−.01	.02	.03	.0	.00	−.0	−.07
% migrants	−.00	.00	.05	.06	−.05	−.06	.03	.03	−.0	−.03	−.0	−.06
Per capita income ($1,000s)	−2.50	−2.83	−1.62	−1.75	−5.26	−.98	2.86	3.43	−5.1	−.59	−9.7	−1.33
Maximum partisan left tendency	5.11	5.87	−2.10	−4.74	3.64	3.95	−3.24	−3.18	.3	1.50	4.8	7.12
R^2	.27	.31	.48	.53	.35	.45	.55	.47	.26	.24	.47	.58
F	58.84	3677	152.7	90.70	86.51	66.8	201.1	72.28	56.68	25.14	145.9	112
p	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.0001	.00

Note: Left is at maximum of plausible range. N = 3,611 for "all," 1,807 for small outliers.

[a] Small outliers.

tion whose mayors backed opposing candidates minus the total contiguous population whose mayors supported the same candidate. Then find the ratio of opposition neighbors to the local population. Finally, estimate the endorsement model on what I call *small outliers*, that is, municipalities with neighboring opponent-to-local population ratios above the national mean. Table 6 compares these results to the overall model.

The estimates in Table 6 support the argument. In small-outlier PTB and PFL municipalities, Collor's first-round gains decline (though remaining statistically significant). Maluf's PDS support and Guimarães' PMDB backing also fall. In the second round, small-outlier PT municipalities give Lula less support; similar municipalities of the opposing PDS, PTB, and PFL provide Lula more backing than he gets in the country as a whole. Only one party runs against the trend: the PDT offers strong support to Brizola in round 1 and to Lula in round 2 *even when big neighbors are hostile.* Actually, this exception strengthens the case. As we saw earlier, the PDT, especially in Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, is not merely a local machine. In these areas of PDT domination, the party has strong state-level leadership, and it serves as an electoral vehicle for a charismatic candidate commanding loyal grassroots support. Politicians may adjust their behavior to future political prospects, but ordinary voters do not.[36] Thus, the small-outlier hypothesis applies to machine-based candidates, not those with durable grassroots support. Politicians in strong local machines seek to ingratiate themselves with presidential hopefuls, but they also look to their immediate political futures, futures that, in Brazil, are inevitably determined at the state level.

Organization Versus Charisma in Support for Brizola

Charisma is a term social scientists and journalists often toss around without careful definition, but even by the most demanding criteria, Leonel Brizola qualifies as charismatic. Still, how can a charismatic presidential candidate receive 1.5% of the vote in the state of São Paulo and 50.5% in the state of Rio de Janeiro? Of course, Rio and São Paulo differ, but both are industrial, heavily urban, and located in the highly developed Southeast. Brizola had no difficulty, moreover, reaching Paulista voters: his television access in the two states was exactly equal. And he had already managed, without losing his original base, to transfer his appeal from his first home in Rio Grande do Sul to Rio de Janeiro. Why was São Paulo so hard to crack?

Perhaps the problem lay purely in organization. The PTB, Brizola's party before the military dictatorship, had tried for almost 20 years, with little success, to gain a foothold in São Paulo.[37] The modern PDT itself had few Paulista deputies and controlled few municipalities. But weak local organization can be no more than a partial explanation, because in Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro Brizola did well even where *opposition* parties controlled local municipalities.

Suppose we approach the Brizola riddle by examining his support spatially, moving from the centers of strong Brizola states to municipalities near the borders of these states, then to municipalities on each side of the border, then to municipalities near the borders of opposition states, and finally to the centers of opposition states. If Brizolismo is purely an organizational phenomenon, the drop-off at the border of his core states should be quite abrupt. A gradual decline, on the other hand, would suggest support built on social networks and on affective ties between Brizola and voters, because such networks and ties cut across state boundaries.

What is the appropriate measure for assessing Brizola's support? Given that the municipalities in each spatial group have different expected (predicted) levels of Brizola vote, levels that depend on each group's socioeconomic and demographic conditions, partisan tendencies, and local political control, actual Brizola vote percentage would be inappropriate. Rather, the test should be the size of the *difference between Brizola's actual percentage and the model's predicted percentage.*[38] In other words, an initial way to assess the argument is to compare these residual values for Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina.

Let us begin with Rio de Janeiro and its neighbors. Excluding the contiguous border municipalities of the two states, the differences between Rio and São Paulo average 40 percentage points. Brizola's vote in Rio municipalities bordering São Paulo falls off, thus suggesting a gradual decline in Brizola support, but this is misleading. The shape of the two states is such that very few municipalities actually touch, and a large number of former Paulistas live inside the state of Rio in these few border municipalities. In fact, Brizola's support drops off very rapidly upon crossing the border. A comparison of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais leads to a similar conclusion. The contiguous municipalities of the two states differ by 20 percentage points, and the municipalities one row from the border are 43 points apart. So far, then, the story seems to be one of organizational strength and weakness.

Tracing Brizola's vote from Rio Grande do Sul to Santa Catarina reveals a different picture, one of more gradual decline. Brizola's vote drops off very little from the center of Rio Grande do Sul to its border with Santa Catarina. On the Catarinense side of the border, his support is a bit lower but still substantial, and he holds that level in municipalities one row back from the border.

Figures 1 and 2 illuminate the difference by showing the actual municipalities involved in each case. Figure 1 demonstrates that Brizola's strength in Santa Catarina is not distributed evenly along the entire border with Rio Grande do Sul; rather, it concentrates in the west and along the east coast.[39] And observing that Brizola's strength continues past western Santa Catarina into southwestern Paraná, a pattern of *migration* emerges. Over the last 40 years, one stream of migrants from Rio Grande do Sul went up the eastern edge of Santa Catarina toward São Paulo. Another, numerically much more important, went across western Santa Catarina into Paraná, then into Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, and into the Amazon. Some migrants stopped in Santa Catarina; others trekked as far as Paraná. Because their social ties remain with Rio Grande do Sul, they are fertile ground for PDT organizational efforts. Figure 2, by contrast, shows what happens in the absence of a long-lasting population exodus. Because people flow back and forth across the border, Brizola shows some strength in the nearest municipalities. But beyond these neighbors, his support quickly drops to very low levels.[40]

Obviously this is just a preliminary test of a complex hypothesis. Still, the analysis highlights the limits of charisma. Brizola is undeniably a charismatic politician, and the rules of the Brazilian electoral campaign gave him television and radio access to voters everywhere. But he scored well only where his political organization had been in place long before the 1989 campaign. In such areas, the PDT's ties with voters bound them to Brizola even after they migrated. But where Brizola's organization had historically foundered, his considerable personal magnetism failed to attract even minimal support.

CONCLUSION

Most scholars and journalists, I suspect, wrote about Brazil's presidential election from the perspective of their own places of residence, that is, from very large cities. In such cities, electronic media are a principal means of political communication, and political organizations are far less dominant than their counterparts in small cities or rural areas. But all over Brazil, local political organizations are alive and well. They survive because politicians, faced with the institutional structure of Brazilian politics, find it necessary

FIGURE 1

Brizola Support in Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul



*Note:*The scale represents the Brizola share of the presidential vote.

and feasible to trade blocs of votes for pork barrel and patronage.

True, the candidates with the strongest organizations failed to advance to the second round in the Brazilian election. But they would have been enormously weaker without the support organization provided. The issue is not whether Brizola would have edged Lula or whether Lula could have beaten Collor. This election was clearly an anomaly: Collor was the first presidential candidate to utilize the electronic media extensively. In the future, all serious candidates will be "telegenic," and all will make sophisticated use of radio and television. No one, as a result, will have Collor's overwhelming advantages. In consequence, party organization is likely to become crucial just because it creates advantages that candidates cannot overcome during the short life of a campaign itself. Brizola's utter failure to penetrate São Paulo demonstrates, even for charismatic candidates, the centrality of organization.

More than 40 years ago V. O. Key (1949) explored the spatial nature of local, state, and national political organization in the American South. Though data-processing techniques have advanced enormously since Key's pioneering work, few scholars have followed his lead, either in the United States or elsewhere. What contribution did the big-city machines of the United States make to presidential vote totals in the early part of the century? How does Mexico's Revolutionary Institutional party channel votes to the "official" candidate? Did local organization matter in pre-1973 Chile, where open-list proportional representation coexisted with ideologically coherent parties?

The failure of scholars and journalists to recognize the importance of local organization in Brazil's presidential election also has a methodological aspect, one that raises warning flags for analysts of elections in other newly competitive polities. With the rise of the political marketing industry, the price of survey research has declined, and survey techniques in Brazil and other Third World countries have advanced. Scholars would be wise, nevertheless, to temper their attraction to survey data. Although public opinion research tells us a great deal about the motivations of individual voters, surveys sample from broad geographic areas. As a result, survey data inevitably mask such locality-specific effects as party organization. Because political context matters, analysis of aggregate data must remain an important part of public opinion research. Brazil can hardly be the only country where the political landscape shelters both the electronic media and local political organizations.

FIGURE 2

Brizola Support in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Minas Gerais



Note: The scale represents the Brizola share of the presidential vote.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARENA	National Renovating Alliance
MDB	Brazilian Democratic movement
PCB	Brazilian Communist party (Roberto Friere)
PDS	Democratic Social party (Paulo Maluf)
PDT	Democratic Labor party (Leonel Brizola)
PFL	Liberal Front party (Aureliano Chaves)
PL	Liberal party (Afif Domingos)
PMDB	Brazilian Democratic Movement party (Ulysses Guimarães)
PRN	National Reconstruction party (Fernando Collor de Mello)
PSD	Social Democratic party (Ronaldo Caiado)
PSDB	Brazilian Social Democratic party (Mário Covas)
PT	Workers' party (Luís Inácio Lula da Silva)
PTB	Brazilian Labor party (Affonso Camargo)

Notes

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1. For a provocative discussion of the importance of spatial attachments in American politics and of the role of political institutions in fostering such attachments, see Salisbury 1993.

2. Increases in participation do not necessarily increase party volatility. But in Brazil even experienced voters have low levels of party loyalty, so new voters enter the electoral process in a context of weaker socialization into parties. On party volatility in Latin America, see Coppedge 1992.

3. The PTB did contest both elections, but the 1989 version of the party was similar to the 1960 version in name only.

4. See, e.g., Geddes and Neto 1992; Kinzo 1992; Lamounier 1989, 1990; Lima 1993; Marchal, Théry, and Waniez 1992; Nêumanne 1989; Silva 1993; Singer 1990; A. Souza 1992; Straubhaar, Olsen, and Nunes 1993. Singer's view is typical: "Collor's election [placed him] outside the parties, with a rhetoric of confrontation against the elites and with a strong base of support among the masses whose availability always characterizes Latin American populism. . . . [There was] direct linkage between leader and mass, without any necessary party channel" (1991, 18). Singer based the analysis on surveys taken in the poor areas of the city of São Paulo. Amaury de Souza refers to "plebiscitary renewal" and to the "volatility of the electoral support of parties and public" (1992, 181). The weekly news magazine *Veja* said that the electorate demonstrated that "it votes for who it wants, when it wants, without the opinion of any political boss having any

influence over its choice" ("O voto no raio x," *Veja*, 29 November 1989, p. 62). Lamounier (1989) points to four aspects, in addition to television, of the Collor appeal: Collor's anti-Sarney campaign, his campaign against politicians in general, his ability to use his small party efficiently while internal disputes wracked the big parties, and his support from business as the "lesser evil" as compared to Lula or Brizola. Lima (1993) focusing specifically on the role of television in the campaign, discusses the soap operas airing on Brazil's biggest network, TV Globo. These *novelas*. "either directly or indirectly portrayed Brazil as a kingdom of political corruption run by professional politicians and politics as a contaminated social space" (p. 105).

5. In addition, administrations can refuse to transfer money committed by previous agreements, even international agreements. President Sarney, for example, blocked an emergency loan that the World Bank had slated to help Rio de Janeiro deal with the effects of a flood.

6. I estimated a logistic regression in which the dependent variable was the existence of an education or health transfer agreement with the central government between April 1990 and July 1991—roughly, the first 15 months of the Collor administration. Transfers were more likely to go to municipalities that were larger in population, more urban, and poorer. But for an Alagoas municipality, the probability of receiving a transfer jumped an additional 123%; for a Bahian municipality with a PFL mayor, the probability jumped 105%; for a Paraná municipality, the probability jumped 84%; and for a municipality in Rio Grande do Sul, the probability jumped 160%. The qualification "with a PFL mayor" reflects the ability of Bahia's powerful governor, Antonio Carlos Magalhães, to channel central government money to municipalities of his party.

7. In his study of Presidente Prudente, a cattle-raising town in western São Paulo state, Lamounier argues that in an undiversified economic structure of this type, "employment opportunities will frequently depend on favors and personal loyalties. . . . Such a structure would be very unreceptive to oppositionist appeals such as those in contemporary Brazilian party disputes" (1978, 4).

8. Brazilianists have given a great deal of attention, however, to parties, elections, clientelism, regionalism, populism, and related topics. The classic treatment of local-level clientelism is Leal 1949. Empirical works on parties and elections include Fleischer 1981, vol. 1; Lamounier 1989; Lamounier and Meneguello 1986; Mainwaring 1992/93, Santos 1979; Sarles 1982; Soares 1973; A. Souza 1992; and M. Souza 1976. On regionalism, see Lavareda 1978; Schwartzman 1975; and A. Souza 1985. On populism, see Weffort 1978. Research focusing on the 1989 election includes Singer's (1990) study of Collor support in São Paulo city, Kinzo's (1992) analysis of Presidente Prudente (a municipality in São Paulo state), and Fleischer's (1989) work on the effects of the 1988 municipal election.

9. Chile (pre-1973) and Finland are other examples of open-list proportional representation, but in both cases, national party leaders select candidates. Chile's congressional districts, in addition, were arbitrary constructs: they corresponded to no unit of government, and they cut across province lines. See Ames 1992.

10. When the water supply in one São Paulo municipality failed, President Sarney promised to release central government funds if the deputy based in that area voted to give the president a term of five (rather than four) years. The deputy refused, and the president held up the money. But when Sarney left the country for a foreign visit, the interim president, Paulista Ulysses Guimãraes, immediately signed the papers. The money flowed.

11. During the Constitutional Assembly of 1987–88, a large billboard greeted deputies and senators (who jointly constituted the Assembly) leaving the airport in Brasília. The sign read simply, "CO + NO + NE = 259"; that is, the delegations from the Center–West, North and Northeast together held 259 votes, a majority of the Assembly. Purely by population, they would merit less than 30%. Most of the advantage falls to states in the Center–West and North.

12. I shall refer to the candidates in a modified form of common Brazilian usage. Sometimes common usage implies a family name, sometimes a given name, sometimes a nom de guerre. The names in Table 1 are exactly as they appear in official electoral results.

13. Aureliano Chaves's PFL was a splinter of the PDS and was formed to support Tancredo Neves's successful run for the presidency against the official candidate in the electoral college vote in late 1984. Concentrated mainly in the Northeast, the PFL is ideologically indistinguishable from the PDS (which in 1993 merged with the Christian Democratic party to form the Renovating Progressive party), though its hundreds of mayors are perhaps a bit more oriented to pork-barrel politics. Chaves had been vice-president under the last military president, João Figueiredo, and minister of mines and energy in the Sarney government. Tests of the various models on Chaves's vote percentage show small but statistically significant gains in municipalities with PFL mayors.

14. In work in progress, I have implemented a factor analysis of votes in the 1987–88 Constitutional Assembly. Both the right-wing and left-wing parties fall out as well-organized factions, but the PMDB rarely votes as a bloc.

15. For a good treatment of Brizola's career, see Bandeira 1979. On the old PTB, the best work is Benevides 1989. Amaury de Souza (1985) analyzes Brizola's victorious 1982 campaign for the governorship of the State of Rio.

16. Brizola would have overtaken Lula and gone to the second round if he had picked up another half-million votes, that is, if his São Paulo total had represented just 4.2% of the state's votes.

17. The figures are percentages of those who actually voted minus about .6% who voted null or blank. About 12% of those eligible to vote failed to appear at the polls.

18. The major parties also participated in coalitions successfully backing a member of a minor party. In fewer than two hundred cases, a minor party won with no coalitional support. Some successful parties, such as the Municipal party, ran no candidates above the local level. They will be ignored.

19. I searched for mayoral endorsements in at least one newspaper from the capital city of every state in Brazil during the last four months before the election. These desertions became the basis of a "true preference" variable, which is the party of the mayor, adjusted to subtract desertions to, and add desertions from, other parties. The whole empirical analysis was then redone with this new variable. As expected, coefficients of the party endorsement variables are a bit stronger. In the interests of simplicity, I present only the "pure party" version of the analysis. This version is preferable, because the reporting of desertions by the newspapers may be systematically biased toward, for example, larger communities.

20. The models presented here become more complex, but they never include dummy variables for individual states. Though such dummies were tried, they seemed generally inappropriate even though they raised R-squareds. First, Brazil's political institutions ought to have the same effects everywhere, so the model should attain reasonable levels of explanatory success without dummies. Second, I could find no theoretically consistent explanation for the differences in the dummies' coefficients. Finally, I tried some state-by-state regressions, but the differences seemed more likely the results of the differing numbers of municipalities than differences in state politics.

21. The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) implemented the census. Officials at Prodasen, the data-processing agency of the Federal Senate, made the data available in machine-readable form. The IBGE did not undertake the 1990 census until 1991–92; few results are currently available.

22. The registered electorate is a good proxy for the adult population, because voting in Brazil is obligatory, with fines for those who fail to vote and cannot demonstrate an imped-

iment such as illness. Registration is required for all literates over 18 and less than 70; it is optional for illiterates, those between 16 and 18, and those over 70.

23. The models include both the number of voters and its square, because for some candidates a curvilinear relationship seemed likely. In other words, up to a certain point their vote shares would increase with population, but above that population level vote shares would level off or decline.

24. Lula still does well in the eight municipalities controlled by the PSDB. Most were located outside São Paulo, the home state of PSDB candidate Covas.

25. Although the analogy is imperfect, the coercive effects of a dominant machine may resemble those of censorship under a dictatorship. For an analysis of Brazilian public opinion under military-imposed censorship, see Geddes and Zaller 1989.

26. These regressions were implemented state by state; that is, a regression was run separately in each state on all municipalities above the state's median interparty fragmentation. The variables included measures of total population, educational attainment, size of tertiary economy, agricultural population, migration, income distribution, and per capita income. The R-squareds varied from 2% to 77%, with the differences mostly a function of the number of municipalities in the state-by-state regressions. Using F-tests, all are significant except 1982 for São Paulo and 1986 for Minas Gerais. Interparty fragmentation equalled 1 minus the sum of the squares of the total vote garnered by each party. Levels of interparty fragmentation were substantially higher in the states of the South and Southeast.

27. The two Left estimators exclude the 1986 election, because in most municipalities the PT and PDT simply had no organization or candidates.

28. The choice of mayor is really endogenous; that is, it is affected by partisan tendency, and the model as specified ignores that relationship. Correctly specifying the relationship would be very difficult, and it is unlikely that the results would differ.

29. This result confirms my personal observation during the campaign. Ulysses Guimarães commanded enormous loyalty and respect for his role in restoring Brazilian democracy. Some of his followers held out hope that his standing in the polls would recover, but even those who knew the game was lost refused to declare for other candidates. His accidental death in November 1992 brought forth an outpouring of genuine mourning rare among politicians.

30. For continuous variables, take the mean value of the variable times the coefficient; for the dummy variables, multiply the number of municipalities with a particular party or coalition times the coefficient.

31. I also estimated the model for a *regional* partition of municipalities. If parties in the Northeast (a region known for its poverty, greater clientelism, and machine dominance) contribute significantly more to their candidates than parties elsewhere, the results presented earlier may simply mistake a regional phenomenon for a national one. If, on the other hand, estimates of party effects in the Northeast are similar to those in the country as a whole, then it is more likely that we have identified a strategic response of both local politicians and local voters to the incentives they face.

In fact, regression results show that party organizations in the Northeast performed, with predictable deviations, much like those in the rest of the country. Lula's PT, Brizola's PDT, and Maluf's PDS all helped their candidates *less* in the Northeast than in the country as a whole. In the first round, Collor did about twice as well in northeastern PTB or PFL municipalities as in all of Brazil, and Ulysses Guimarães almost doubled his overall PMDB total in the Northeast. In the second round, Lula improved his vote percentage in PT municipalities of the Northeast, but the PT controlled so few municipalities that the additions are unimportant. In northeastern PDT municipalities, Lula saw his second-round gains drop to less than half those in PDT municipalities nationwide. And Lula lost heavily in PDS, PTB, and PFL municipalities located in the Northeast.

Why are these results plausible? Consider Lula, Brizola, and Maluf. The increments in the vote of Lula and Brizola in PT and PDT municipalities of the South and Southeast reflect both organizational strength and fierce, long-standing partisanship. Outside the South and Southeast, these parties lack the cumulative power of working-class and industrial contexts and their traditional militancy. Thus the Northeast is pure organization, almost without grassroots militancy. Maluf's relative decline in the Northeast is actually not statistically significant, but his identification as a Paulista candidate might have led to weakness. Maluf's national percentage in round 1 was 8.28%; in São Paulo he received 22.56%. So Maluf loses not just in the Northeast but everywhere outside his home. The gains in the Northeast by Collor and Ulysses Guimarães (and Lula's losses to Collor in the second round) reflect mostly organizational strength, though Collor's status as a northeasterner probably helped. Though Ulysses Guimarães was a Paulista, his party endorsement coefficient was much worse in São Paulo than in the Northeast.

In general, then, parties relying on grassroots support faltered in the "backward" Northeast; and parties relying on machine domination did better. In no case, however, does removal of the Northeast states from the estimation erase the significance of the party coefficients in the South and Southeast. Thus local party machines support candidates at about the same rate in the "modern" areas of the country as in the supposedly tradition-bound, "clientelistic" regions.

32. To those unfamiliar with Brazilian politics, this may seem bizarre, so it is worth putting another way. State assemblies really have no districts at all: everyone is elected at large.

33. In the last four legislatures, 32% of federal deputies had been state deputies immediately before moving to Brasília. Another 13% had just concluded terms as mayors or municipal council members, while 21% held state-level bureaucratic positions. Career paths vary widely, however, across states. In states like Bahia, where bureaucratic control over federal largesse has long been a route to political power, purely local politicians are rare. In the South and Southeast, especially in states like Minas Gerais, politicians tend to have strong local roots, so the most common career trajectory follows a single sequence: council, mayor, state deputy, federal deputy. See Ames 1992.

34. For an extensive treatment of these issues, see Ames 1992.

35. This is, of course, no small task for a country in which many states have hundreds of municipalities. I have developed computerized municipal-level maps of all Brazilian states. These maps, coupled with programs developed by the statistics department of the University of Washington, Seattle, generated a 1–0 nearest-neighbor matrix for each state. With these matrices, a program could be created to produce a data set in which the voting population of each municipality's contiguous neighbors was output to the same observation.

36. The same argument could be made for Lula and the PT; that is, his personal appeal should prevent declines in small-outlier PT municipalities. The actual decline that did occur is probably a statistical artifact: since most PT municipalities were large cities, very few fit into the small-outlier category.

37. The Paulista PTB, Benevides points out, had always been "electorally weak, politically disorganized, and ideologically inconsequential," and it served the interests of the PTB leaderships in Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul that it should remain so (1989, 9; see also 18–22).

38. The discussion uses the minimum left partisan tendency, but the results are essentially the same with partisan tendency at maximum left level.

39. In the municipalities along Santa Catarina's western border with Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola averaged 47.4%, and in coastal municipalities, he reached 37.5%. On the central part of the border, however, he averaged only 20%.

40. Note that both São Paulo and Minas Gerais extend much further away from the border than the municipalities

shown in the figure. Brizola's strength in these distant regions is extremely low.

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THE PRESTHUS DEBACLE: INTRAPARTY POLITICS AND BARGAINING FAILURE IN NORWAY

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Bargaining failure has been neglected in the study of interparty coalitions. I examine the unsuccessful attempt by three Norwegian nonsocialist parties to defeat a Labor party minority government in June 1987 when the majority opposition twice failed to agree on a simple vote to that end. This failure of coalition bargaining was facilitated by incomplete information, intraparty constraints and misdelegation of authority, and by anticipation of the impending parliamentary recess. Despite these complexities, simple noncooperative games like the war of attrition can shed considerable light on this and other unsuccessful negotiations. The "Presthus debacle" demonstrates that political parties bring many different objectives to the bargaining table and that the trade-offs between these objectives vary according to organizational and institutional conditions.

On Monday, 8 June 1987, Rolf Presthus was widely expected to become Norway's next prime minister within a few days. Presthus' Conservative party (H) had just agreed to join forces with the other two major nonsocialist parties, the Christian People's party (KRF) and the Center party (SP), to bring down Gro Harlem Brundtland's Labor party (A) minority government on the farm bill that it had brought before the Storting (the Norwegian parliament). The nonsocialist motion of no confidence (censure), attached to a farm bill amendment, needed only the additional support of the right-wing Progress party (FRP), which had repeatedly called for the government's ouster. Well-informed observers estimated the likelihood of a change of government at 80% or 90% (Rommetvedt 1991, 198). Yet on 12 June, the Storting rejected two separate no-confidence motions against the government. The nonsocialist majority of four parties, each explicitly committed to dislodging Brundtland's government, twice failed to agree on a simple vote to that end. Presthus' dreams of becoming prime minister never materialized, and the nonsocialist parties were humiliated.

The causes of this "Presthus debacle" are interesting for a number of reasons. First, the outcome was one that none of the principal players most preferred and few anticipated. Four parties, all explicitly committed to a change of government and collectively a legislative majority, twice failed to oust a minority government. Moreover, two of these parties, the Center party and the Conservatives, set the agenda in ways that left them distinctly worse off. The Presthus debacle underscores our limited understanding of bargaining failure in coalition politics. It demonstrates constraints on the ability of political parties to make enforceable agreements, as well as the importance of information and sequence in interparty negotiations. Finally, the events of June 1987 show that parties differ in the objectives they bring to coalition bargaining. To account for such differences in party objectives, we have to consider the constraints of politics within parties, especially the consequences of different intraparty *delegation regimes.*

In this analysis, I first discuss the causes of bargaining failure, as well as the implications for coalition theory, then describe in greater detail the events of June 1987. I construct an initial game-theoretic representation of these events, derive various solutions, and test their adequacy. In order to solve the remaining puzzles, I then introduce a more complex account of party behavior, taking into account information uncertainties and intraparty constraints. I apply this framework to the various phases of the Presthus debacle in order to illuminate the behavior of the critical players. In the conclusion, I summarize the lessons of the Presthus debacle for the study of government coalitions.

BARGAINING FAILURE AND COALITION THEORY

The making and breaking of interparty coalitions are dramatic and decisive events in parliamentary democracies. And although the study of coalition behavior has long been one of systematic, rigorous, and often formalized comparative inquiry, there are still significant lacunae in our knowledge. As students of coalition politics have pointed out, we know much less about coalition termination than we do about formation, and there is next to no systematic knowledge of what happens in between, that is, about the process of coalition governing (Laver and Shepsle 1990a).

Bargaining Failure and Selection Bias

Even the study of coalition formation is curiously incomplete. Empirical studies almost exclusively focus on coalitions that have actually formed, that is, on *successful* coalition bargaining. The sordid tales of bargaining failure are rarely told. But if our interest is in coalition bargaining itself, then this practice results in selection bias, which may distort our understanding insofar as unsuccessful bargaining situations systematically differ from successful ones (Geddes 1990). By restricting our observations to cases of successful bargaining, we obtain samples that systematically misrepresent the likelihood of securing such agreements. If our interest is in coalition stability, for example, the effect of neglecting bargaining failures may be systematically to underrepresent the least favorable conditions for durable coalescence.

Information and Bargaining Failure

The principal reason that coalition bargaining fails may be information uncertainty, which indeed has been a key concern in coalition theory since its inception. In his seminal work, Riker (1962) argued that information uncertainty could lead to deviations from his size principle, such as the formation of oversized coalitions, a thesis later elaborated by Dodd (1976). Luebbert took issue with this argument, claiming that "rationalist theory greatly overstates the role of information uncertainty" (1983, 242). In the face of bargaining failures like the Presthus debacle, Luebbert's dismissal seems too categorical, though he may have been right in suggesting that coalition theorists have traditionally emphasized the wrong kinds of information uncertainty. Riker and Dodd, for example, focused on uncertainty as to the weights (i.e., the number of parliamentary votes) and prior moves of other players (e.g., Dodd 1976, 40–47), whereas incomplete information about payoffs or feasible strategy sets may be the more critical uncertainties. In other words, the players in parliamentary bargaining are more likely to be uninformed about each other's options and objectives than about agreements and bids that already exist. In the Presthus debacle, as we shall see, the Conservatives and the Center party knew perfectly well how many seats the Progress party commanded. They were much less sure about how the latter weighed the costs and benefits of supporting their no-confidence motion.

Constraints and Intraparty Politics

Information uncertainty in coalition bargaining may in large part be a function of intraparty politics. Party leaders may know each other's personal preferences and yet be less than fully informed about the discretion each enjoys vis-à-vis his respective party. This problem goes to the heart of the assumption that parties bargain as *unitary actors*—a prevalent, though increasingly questioned, stylization in studies of cabinet coalitions (Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1990b; Luebbert 1986). It is often more fruitful to think of party leaders as *agents* of their respective parliamentary or extraparliamentary parties (their *principals*) in coalition bargaining. Because of variation in delegation regimes, party leaders may be constrained in different ways in these negotiations. Such constraints may strongly affect outcomes, and when bargaining fails, it may be because of how the hands of the agents are tied.

Institutions and Bargaining Models

Political institutions may also play an important part in bargaining failure. Coalition theory has traditionally paid little attention to the rules under which bargaining takes place (but see Pridham 1986; Strøm, Budge, and Laver n.d.). Such rules may regulate the mandate of the *formateur* or *informateur*, the sequence of negotiations, or the set of parties with which this person is permitted to negotiate. Another important factor that has rarely been systematically considered is *time constraints* on coalition bargaining. Situations of extreme time pressure may be particularly likely to cause information uncertainty and to occasion delegation problems that impede effective party oversight. Indeed, the time pressures associated with the impending parliamentary recess significantly impinged on the negotiations resulting in the Presthus debacle.

The complex set of factors that might facilitate bargaining failure is not adequately captured in the traditional study of government coalitions, which theoretically has relied mainly on cooperative coalition theory, whose predicted outcomes are entirely preference-induced, or in Riker's (1980) words "equilibria of tastes." The object has been to *characterize* a set of equilibria, generically large and unstable, without recourse to ad hoc institutional assumptions, which are indeed difficult to incorporate into this body of theory. Such considerations as information uncertainty, constraints, and sequential moves can much more adequately be addressed within the theory of noncooperative games. A disadvantage of noncooperative game theory is that its potential complexity may jeopardize parsimony of explanation. Yet in exploring the Presthus debacle, we shall see that even very simple noncooperative models can generate significant insights. These considerations suggest that the emerging literature applying noncooperative games can make fruitful contributions to the study of multiparty coalition bargaining (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Baron 1991, 1993).

PRESTHUS AND THE EVENTS OF JUNE 1987

The Presthus debacle ended a lengthy effort by the Norwegian Conservative party and its sometime allies to resurrect the nonsocialist coalition that had governed Norway from 1965 to 1971 and again between 1983 and 1986 (see Strøm 1990b; Strøm and Leipart 1993).[1] In May 1986, Kåre Willoch's coalition, which had been reduced to a minority government in the September 1985 election, resigned after losing a bill to increase gasoline taxes to offset the precipitous decline in government oil revenues. Gro Harlem Brundtland formed a precarious Labor minority government facing a nonsocialist legislative majority. Upon his resignation as prime minister, Willoch also passed the chairmanship of the Conservative party to his hand-picked successor, Rolf Presthus, who had previously served as Willoch's finance minister.

Presthus' chief concern was to reconstruct the bourgeois coalition.[2] As finance minister, he had distinguished himself as an effective facilitator of interparty compromise, and largely for this reason, the Conservatives had elected him as their leader. Since the Conservative party, with 50 seats in the 157-member Storting, was almost twice as large as its two potential partners combined, Presthus was also the designated prime ministerial candidate of the three "coalitional" parties: the Center party (with 12 seats), the KRF (with 16 seats), and the Conservatives. His first opportunity to gain office arose in October 1986 during the debate on the budget presented by finance minister Gunnar Berge. The failure of this so-called "autumn hunting season" became apparent on 28 October, when the three coalitional parties abandoned their attempt to reach a budget accord. The Labor government survived, and the breakdown of these negotiations immediately led to mutual blaming and name calling by Conservative and Center party representatives.

The next chance to defeat Brundtland arrived during the following spring session, when there were two legislative opportunities for joint nonsocialist action: the revised national budget (which contained an agenda for long-term economic policies, such as taxation) and the government's farm bill. During April and May 1987, the three parties began to coordinate their policies in these two areas, amid extensive media speculation about the prospects for a change of government. The leaders of all three parties encouraged such speculations by issuing optimistic, though duly ambiguous, public declarations.

As negotiations reached a definitive phase in early June, the different designs of the three parties became more evident. The Center party and the Conservatives in particular had distinctly different preferences over the different potential censure motions that were discussed. One possibility was a general motion of no confidence unrelated to any particular issue. The second and third options were no-confidence motions attached to a farm bill amendment (to increase agricultural subsidies) or to a minority report on the revised national budget (to provide tax relief). The Center party, with its distinctly rural and agricultural constituency, strongly favored the farm bill option, whereas the Conservatives equally clearly preferred the third (the revised national budget). The position of the KRF was less clear. On 5 June, party leader Kjell Magne Bondevik signaled a weak preference for the option favored by the Conservatives. However, the KRF leader seemed most anxious to maximize the likelihood of passage. Bondevik was concerned that since the three coalitional parties collectively controlled only 78 of the 157 seats in the Storting, they needed the two votes of the pivotal right-wing Progress party. The six Left Socialist party members had to be counted upon to support Labor's 71 representatives in any showdown with the bourgeois opposition.

Although the three coalitional parties needed the Progressive vote, they were not prepared to enter any binding agreement with a party many considered irresponsible and extremist. The question, therefore, was what sort of no-confidence motion Carl I. Hagen, the Progress party leader, would support without a quid pro quo. Hagen had explicitly promised to support a general no-confidence motion. He could also be counted upon to sympathize with a proposal to lower taxes, since tax relief was his party's principal policy concern. Higher farm subsidies, on the other hand, were hardly an issue for which the Progress party would muster any enthusiasm. On a no-confidence motion attached to this bill, Hagen would therefore be forced to choose between his preferences for a nonsocialist government and lower farm spending.

Negotiations between the three coalitional parties increased their pace through 8 June, as the end of the parliamentary session was rapidly approaching. After 12 June, the Storting would be in recess for four months, with local and regional elections in September. It eventually became clear that the Center party would insist on attaching the no-confidence motion to a farm bill amendment. The Center party's insistence, which left no room for concessions, set the agenda for the battle over the Labor government's life. The KRF, with few stakes in farm policy or tax relief, quickly accepted the Center party's policy demands. With recess less than a week away, the national executive committee of the Conservative party eventually caved in on 8 June and accepted farm subsidies as the key to a nonsocialist government. This agreement was cemented on 10 June, when the three parties' members of the Agriculture committee drafted a joint no-confidence motion calling for higher agricultural appropriations.

The pivotal Progress party decision came on 11 June, the penultimate day of the Storting's spring session and the day before the parliamentary vote. Precisely at 7:30 P.M. Progress party leader Carl I. Hagen gave a press conference, which was broadcast live at the top of the prime-time television news hour. Hagen's speech, in which he disclosed that the Progress party would not topple Brundtland at the cost of budget-busting farm subsidies, was an immense publicity hit. In chastising the other bourgeois parties for their irresponsibility and opportunism, Hagen managed to project fiscal and ethical integrity. And while he rejected the farm bill amendment, Hagen explicitly committed his party to a *general* no-confidence vote against Brundtland.

The next day, the final act unfolded. Arne Alsåker Spilde, a Conservative member of the Agriculture Committee, formally introduced the no-confidence motion. At about 9:30 P.M., the Storting defeated Spilde's motion by a vote of 80 to 77, as the Progress party and the Socialist Left cast their lots with Labor.[3]

FIGURE 1

Extensive-form Representation of Presthus Endgame


FRP
Accept
Reject
I (Farm subsidies pass; Government falls)
H
2nd Motion of NC
No Motion
SP
Accept
Reject
II (Farm subsidies fail; Government falls)
III (Farm subsidies fail; Government survives)
IV (Farm subsidies fail; Government survives)

Note: FRP = Progress party, H = Conservative party, SP = Center party.

Approximately one hour later, the legislators faced a second no-confidence motion, pressed by Conservative parliamentary leader Jan P. Syse and expressly built on the joint minority report of the three coalitional parties on the revised national budget. This motion was supported also by the KRF and allegedly drafted in large party by Kjell Magne Bondevik (*Dagbladet*, 17 June 1987). After a bitter debate, Syse's motion failed by a larger margin (89 to 68) than Spilde's (*Stortingstidende* 1986/87:4082–4214). In the end, the Center party voted against Syse's measure even though it was based on the party's own financial program. These defeats left the nonsocialist parties embarrassed and bitterly divided, while Socialist Left parliamentary leader Hanna Kvanmo gloated over "this historic moment: the burial of non-socialist cooperation" (Rommetvedt 1991, 208).[4] Kvanmo was temporarily correct, since the nonsocialist parties would make no further coalition efforts until after the September 1989 election.

The Presthus debacle also took its human toll. When the Storting finally took its summer recess at 2:30 A.M., Center party deputy leader Anne Enger Lahnstein remained seated in the empty chamber, quietly weeping over the humiliations her party had suffered during the acrimonious debate. Yet the hardest blows fell on Rolf Presthus himself. More than anybody else, he had been the architect of nonsocialist cooperation, and as the bourgeois prime ministerial candidate, he would also have been its main beneficiary. The failure of Presthus' efforts quickly led to calls for his resignation as Conservative leader. In September, the Conservatives suffered a staggering defeat in the local and regional elections, and Presthus immediately tendered his resignation. Four months later, he was dead at the age of 51, felled by a massive heart attack.

GAME REPRESENTATION

This complex and puzzling "Presthus debacle" involved a variety of players, as summarized in the Appendix. I shall test the explanatory power of simple noncooperative game models against these puzzles and complexities, first by exploring a very simple set of assumptions and then by enriching these models as the task at hand requires. The interaction between these parties can be divided into two subgames: an unstructured bargaining game up through 10 June, which set the agenda for a subsequent, structured endgame over the following two days. My strategy will be to analyze these games in reverse order, beginning with the endgame and then using its solutions to understand the prior bargaining game. Figure 1 represents the endgame in extensive form, with each of the critical parties as a player. The game tree contains three decision nodes, illustrated by circles at which the player is identified by the first letter in that party's Norwegian name. These decision nodes represent choices faced by the three critical parties and the sequence in which they were confronted. Note that this sequence corresponds to the order in which the parties had to make their actual decisions, not to the formal voting procedure in the Storting. The branches lead from the starting node to four different end nodes (outcomes), identified by roman numerals. End node III represents the actual outcome.

For simplicity, Figure 1 excludes parties whose moves were taken for granted by all players. Thus, it was common knowledge that Labor and the Socialist Left would vote against any no-confidence motion, that the KRF would support any feasible censure motion, and that the Progressives would join any tax-related or general motion pressed by the Conservatives. The parties in question had, in essence, precommitted themselves to these strategies.

The agenda reconstructed in Figure 1 had been set by the previous bargaining between the three coalitional parties. The sequence of moves is as follows. The Progress party first decides whether to accept the farm bill amendment. If it does, the government is defeated (outcome I). If, on the other hand, the Progress party rejects this no-confidence motion, the Brundtland government's fate depends on the further moves by the other bourgeois parties. The Conservatives then have to decide, presumably after consultations with the KRF, whether or not to press their own motion of no confidence, based on the national budget. If they do not, the game ends at outcome IV. If they do press a second no-confidence motion (and assuming the support of the KRF and the Progressives), the Center party has a second opportunity to dislodge Brundtland (outcome II). If the Center party rejects the second (Syse) censure motion, however, the outcome is III.[5]

Figure 1 represents this game in its simplest form by assuming perfect and certain information.[6] The expectations concerning the outcome of this endgame are derived from simple noncooperative game models. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash, which implies that in equilibrium, no player has any incentive unilaterally to deviate from his or her strategy and that this condition applies in every subgame, as well (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; Rasmusen 1989).[7] In the extensive-form representation in Figure 1, solutions are found through backward induction from the end nodes (outcomes I–IV).

Party Objectives

In order to solve this game, we need to stipulate how each party evaluates each of the outcomes to which each of its choices may lead. It is clearly desirable to derive these preferences from general assumptions about the motives ("objective functions") of the players (here, the relevant Norwegian party leaders). For this purpose, I rely on three common and parsimonious models of competitive party behavior, derived from the literatures on electoral competition and coalition formation: the *office-seeking* party (O), the *policy-seeking* party (P) and the *vote-seeking* party (V) (Strøm 1990a). The office-seeking party seeks to maximize its control of public office and the spoils it derives from such control (see Leiserson 1968; Riker 1962). The policy-seeking party instead maximizes its impact on public policy (Axelrod 1970; Budge and Laver 1986; De Swaan 1973). Finally, the vote-seeking party seeks to maximize its support in future electoral contests (Cox 1987; Downs 1957). We can give these general models concrete meaning in this Norwegian case by specifying the aspects of the various outcomes that are relevant to each party under each behavioral assumption. This specification is obviously a tall order, and I again simplify as much as possible.

Policy Preferences

If parties were pure policy seekers, what would be the critical aspect of the game outcome? As shown in Table 1, the only issue clearly riding on the June 1987 negotiations was agricultural policy. On 6 June, Center party leader Johan J. Jakobsen had taken pains to stress that a potential nonsocialist government should not be expected to pursue economic policies significantly different from those of its predecessor (Rommetvedt 1991, 196). Hence, I assume that policy-seeking parties would vote according to their preferences on the farm bill and that they would be indifferent between outcomes that are equivalent as far as farm policy is concerned.[8] Other issues enter their calculations only secondarily, in the sense that if forced to vote on such issues (e.g., the national budget), parties (strictly) prefer voting in accordance with their program to voting against it.[9]

ASSUMPTION P1. *The Center party prefers any outcome in which its farm bill amendment passes to any outcome in which it fails. Thus, it prefers outcome I to all others. Secondarily, if forced to vote on its national budget policy, the party prefers supporting this motion to opposing it. Hence, the Center party prefers outcome II to outcome III.*

ASSUMPTION P2. *The Conservative party and the Progress party prefer any outcome in which the farm bill amendment fails to any outcome in which it passes. Thus, they prefer outcomes II–IV to outcome I.*

Office Preferences

The implications of an office-seeking model are more straightforward. I assume that Brundtland's resignation would lead to the formation of a three-party bourgeois cabinet and that she would not resign voluntarily. Under these assumptions, the three potential coalition partners prefer office to opposition. The Progress party, which would not gain office under any circumstances, is indifferent.

ASSUMPTION O1. *The Center party and the Conservative party prefer any outcome in which the Brundtland government resigns to any outcome in which it does not. Thus, they prefer outcomes I and II to all others.*

ASSUMPTION O2. *The Progress party is indifferent between outcomes in which the Brundtland government resigns and outcomes in which it does not. Thus, this party is indifferent between all outcomes.*

Electoral Preferences

Finally, assume that parties are motivated strictly by future electoral success. If so, we need to look for explanations of their behavior in the anticipated electoral consequences of different strategies. Specifically, different legislative strategies may entail individual or collective electoral costs. Individual costs result from policy inconsistency, that is, from voting against party program or previous commitments.

Collective electoral costs are a more complex matter. The Norwegian electorate apparently contains a significant number of sophisticated nonsocialists whose first preference is a minor party, such as the Progress party or the Liberals. Yet these voters may be induced to vote strategically for one of the three "coalitional" parties if and only if these parties jointly present a credible alternative to a Labor government. Otherwise, these individuals vote sincerely for the smaller party closest to their policy preferences.[10] In other words, these voters can be persuaded to cast a governmental, rather than a partisan, vote if they believe that a governmental choice exists. The three coalitional parties therefore have a collective electoral incentive to enhance their credibility as a potential government. Hence, they should avoid any behavior—such as overt policy disagreements—that detracts from this credibility. The Progress party, on the other hand, should for electoral purposes seek to provoke precisely such conflict.[11] Hence, the following assumptions go with the vote-seeking model.

Assumption V1. *The Center party prefers any outcome in which it does not vote against its previous policy to any outcome in which it does. It also prefers voting consistently with the other coalition parties to voting contrary to one or both of them. Consequently, the Center party prefers all other outcomes to outcome III.*

Assumption V2. *The Progress party prefers any outcome in which any subset of the Center party, the KRF, and the Conservative party vote inconsistently with each other to any outcome in which they all vote consistently. Hence, it prefers outcome III to all others.*

Assumption V3. *The Conservative party prefers voting consistently with the Center party and the KRF to voting inconsistently with one or both of them. Hence, the Conservative party prefers all other outcomes to outcome III.*

Table 1 summarizes the critical information about each possible outcome of the endgame. Table 2 identifies the equilibria, with the first three rows representing the assumptions of the respective models. Three general observations can be made: (1) under two of three models, there are multiple equilibria, (though in neither case more than two), which reflect assumptions of indifference; (2) different behavioral models yield different equilibria, only one outcome (II) being in equilibrium under all behavioral assumptions; and (3), most tellingly, no model predicts the actual outcome (III).

Since these simple assumptions obviously do not adequately explain the Presthus debacle, we need to introduce richer and more plausible stipulations. To avoid the multiple equilibria caused by indifference, let parties be motivated by not just one but two—or all three—of the objectives we have discussed. To retain as much simplicity as possible, I assume lexicographic preferences, wherein some objectives (e.g., office) dominate others (e.g., policy). In this example, policy preferences would only be decisive for outcomes between which a party is indifferent on office grounds. Stipulations 4–7 in Table 2 represent four different models of lexicographic preferences. In each row, the party objectives, in abbreviated form, have been listed in declining order. With lexicographic preferences, the solution sets are reduced in most cases to a unique equilibrium (outcome II).

TABLE 1

Properties of Different Outcomes of Endgame

PROPERTY	OUTCOME I	II	III	IV
Government falls?	Y	Y	N	N
Farm subsidies pass?	Y	N	N	N
Coalition parties agree?	Y	Y	N	Y
Center party policy-consistent?	Y	Y	N	Y

Persistent Puzzles

The problem, of course, is that outcome II failed to materialize on 12 June, 1987. The Center party did *not* vote for Jan P. Syse's motion of no confidence. And if the other parties could have anticipated this move, the whole solution unravels. Three puzzles thus persist: (1) Why did the Progress party oppose the farm bill amendment even though it turned out to be the only feasible way to give Norway the nonsocialist government the party explicitly favored? (2) Why did the Conservatives support higher farm subsidies, even though they ran counter to their program and failed to win the party either office or votes? and (3) Why did the Center party, after its farm bill amendment had been defeated, vote against a measure that would have put the party in government and prevented an acrimonious conflict with the other nonsocialists? I shall examine these questions in reverse order, exploring some additional considerations that can be incorporated in an extensive-form model. These considerations include interparty differences in objectives, incomplete information, and the effects of organizational arrangements involving party leaders in several simultaneous and interrelated games.

TABLE 2

Equilibria According to Different Party Objectives

STIPULATED PARTY OBJECTIVES	OUTCOME I	II	III	IV
1. Office (O)	X	X	—	—
2. Policy (P)	—	X	—	X
3. Votes (V)	—	X	—	X
4. O > P	—	X	—	—
5. O > V	X	X	—	—
6. P > V	—	X	—	—
7. O > P > V	—	X	—	—

Note: X denotes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Stipulations 4–7 assume lexicographic preferences.

TABLE 3

Parameters in Presthus Bargaining Game

SYMBOL	MEANING	ASSUMPTIONS
G	the value of a change of government	$G_H, G_S, G_F > 0$
F	the value of an amended farm bill	$F_S > 0; F_H, F_F < 0$
C	the electoral value of policy inconsistency	$C_i < 0$ for all i
K	the electoral value of nonsocialist conflict	$K_S, K_H < 0; K_F > 0$
V	the expected value of the endgame if a farm bill amendment is rejected	—
W	the expected value of the endgame if a compromise no-confidence motion is rejected	—
$p_{H,S}$	the estimated probability of adoption of a no-confidence motion based on a farm bill amendment	$0 \leq p_{H,S} \leq 1$
$q_{H,S}$	the estimated probability of adoption of a no-confidence motion based on a policy compromise between the Center party and the Conservatives	$0 \leq q_{H,S} \leq 1$ $q_{H,S} \geq p_{H,S}$
r_F	the estimated probability of adoption of a no-confidence motion based on a policy issue chosen by the Conservatives	$0 \leq r_F \leq 1$

Note: Subscripts denoting parties represent the initials of their Norwegian names: F = Progress party, H = Conservative party, S = Center party.

TABLE 4

Payoff Matrix for Presthus Endgame

	OUTCOME			
PARTY	I	II	III	IV
Progress	$G_F + F_F + C_F$	G_F	K_F	0
Conservative	$G_H + F_H$	G_H	K_H	0
Center	$G_S + F_S$	G_S	$C_S + K_S$	0

COMPLEX PARTY OBJECTIVES

Initially, I assumed that all parties had identical goals: policy, office, or votes. I later relaxed that assumption so as to permit lexicographic preferences. However, I still assumed that all parties had the same objective functions. In order to grasp the June 1987 events, we need to move beyond these simplifications and to consider (1) how different goals may be traded off against each other and (2) how parties differ in the weight they give to different objectives. Consider the case in which political parties place positive value on all three "goods"—votes, office, and policy (see Strøm 1990a)—and in which trade-offs may have to be made between different goods. Table 3 defines the parameters of the endgame under the assumption that parties have objective functions that include office, policy, and votes. These parameters simply formalize objectives we have already discussed. A change of government in itself has a positive value *G* for both the Conservatives and the Center party. Passage of the farm bill amendment has a policy value *F* that is positive for the Center party but negative for the Conservatives. There is an individual electoral cost C of policy inconsistency and a collective cost K, to the coalitional parties, of policy disagreement. The payoff to each party is a function of these four parameters. Table 3 also includes the Progress party, which (as before) values nonsocialist conflict positively and the farm bill amendment negatively. I make one modification in stipulating an *instrumental* value to the Progress party of a change of government (a positive *G*). Although a nonsocialist government would yield no direct office benefits for the Progressives, it would in all probability pursue policies more favored by the party. The remaining parameters in Table 3 refer to the prior bargaining game, which I shall discuss later. With this notation, we can represent the payoff structure of the endgame, as in Table 4.

Intraparty Aggregation and Constraints

In order to understand the apparent irrationalities in party behavior, we now have to focus on intraparty constraints. So far, I have discussed parties as if they were unitary actors, a common simplification in the analysis of coalition politics (see Laver and Schofield 1990). In reality, parties are complex organizations of individuals with different preferences over policy, office, and votes. Organizational rules determine which of these preferences get reflected in party policy. Coalition bargaining decisions have the analytical advantage of directly involving only a small elite of leaders, since parties typically delegate such decisions to their leaders because of shortages of time and information. In such coalition negotiations, party leaders act as agents for their respective parliamentary or extraparliamentary parties (their principals). The trade-offs that these leaders make between different goods (and thus the coalition agreements they are willing to accept) depend on three factors: (1) the feasible outcomes and payoffs, (2) the "contracts" between party leaders and their respective principals (parliamentary parties or executive committees), and (3) the private rewards to the leaders from the various outcomes.

Delegation Regimes and Party Organization

Variation in intraparty delegation regimes is a particularly interesting determinant of bargaining behavior. To prevent their leaders from strictly pursuing their private rewards, parties hold them accountable through contracts and performance standards, where the ultimate sanction for poor performance is loss of office. As Luebbert observed, "Party leaders are motivated above all by the desire to remain party leaders" (1986, 46), and intraparty incentives powerfully constrain their behavior in coalition bargaining. Yet designing an effective contract for their leaders is no small matter, and parties sometimes unintentionally give their leaders incentives to behave contrary to the party interest. In the Presthus debacle, the delegation regimes of both the Center party and (particularly) the Conservatives ultimately backfired.

Most Norwegian parties share a similar organizational structure (see Strøm 1993). The annual (Conservatives, Progressives) or biennial (Center party) national congress (*landsmøtet*), which normally meets in the spring, is the highest formal authority within the party. Between congresses, leadership is officially exercised by two party committees elected by the congress: the national council (*landsstyret*) and the executive committee (*sentralstyret*). Norwegian parties have two top leadership positions: a chair, elected by the party congress, and a parliamentary leader, elected by the party's parliamentary caucus (*stortingsgruppe*). In many parties, it is customary for a single person to hold both offices concurrently.

Despite their general similarities, the Center party, the Conservatives, and the Progress party presented somewhat different organizational features in 1987. The Conservative party traditionally had a strong parliamentary party accustomed to delegating critical decisions to its leader, whereas, particularly in the Progress party, the influence of the extraparliamentary leadership was stronger. More important, however, were the characteristics of the 1987 leaderships. Whereas the Center and Progress leaders were both long-term party chairs, as well as parliamentary leaders, Presthus had to share power with parliamentary leader Jan P. Syse. And whereas Jakobsen and Hagen were entrenched leaders with almost 10 years' tenure each, Presthus was still new and inexperienced and faced much more visible competition within his party. Internal constraints varied between the Center and Progress parties, as well. Hagen dominated his parliamentary delegation of two (himself and a military officer used to taking orders) much more effectively than Jakobsen could control his.

THE ENDGAME: MISDELEGATION

Let us now return to the decisions of the three critical parties in the endgame, with an eye toward the constraints each leader faced within his own party.

The Center Party: Throwing the Steering Wheel out the Window

The most striking puzzle in the Presthus debacle is the behavior of the Center party at the last decision node, where its choices were clear. If Jakobsen rejected the censure motion from the Conservatives and the KRF, his party would be left in opposition and susceptible to electoral repercussions (compare its payoffs under outcomes II and III in Table 4). The farm bill amendment had already been lost. In rejecting costless office benefits and embracing electoral liabilities, the party seems deliberately to have made itself worse off.

Yet this behavior was no accident. Immediately after Hagen's press conference, the Center party reiterated its opposition to any censure motion based on the revised national budget. The party's executive committee issued a similar proclamation the day *before* Hagen's press conference (Rommetvedt 1991, 206). At that time, Center party representatives explained their apparently uncooperative behavior as a way to force the Progress party to accept higher farm subsidies. If Hagen believed that the Center party would support a second no-confidence motion, they argued, he would have no incentive to accept higher farm spending. Game-theoretically, however, the Center party's posturing should not have been a credible threat. If ultimately forced to choose between outcomes II and III, the party would still have office as well as electoral incentives to vote *for* the no-confidence motion. Hence, Hagen could confidently call the Center party's bluff. Yet even before the final vote, neither Hagen nor the Conservative leaders apparently harbored much hope that Syse's no-confidence motion would pass. Even the Labor party taunted the Center party during the debate, essentially daring the party to bring down the government.

The key to the Center party's intransigence surely lies in intraparty constraints. Jakobsen's insistence on the farm bill amendment reflected the deep skepticism toward any Conservative coalition harbored by two members of parliament, Ragnhild Q. Haarstad and Lars Velsand. Haarstad and Velsand represented the so-called "Hedmark guerrilla," a vocal left-wing faction of the party.[12] Jakobsen, who himself favored a change of government, appears to have precommitted himself to this group in internal party negotiations. In the parliamentary caucus on 5 June, Velsand voted to accept the Labor party's farm bill. His eventual support for a censure motion was expressly conditional on the farm bill amendment. A censure motion on any other basis was unacceptable (Thomassen 1991, 33–34).[13] Haarstad was even more intransigent and proceeded to vote against her party's own (technically, Spilde's) no-confidence motion, a highly unusual occurrence in traditionally cohesive Norwegian parties.

Could Jakobsen have reneged on his commitment and thrown his weight behind the Syse no-confidence motion anyway? Jakobsen might well have faced sanctions from his parliamentary group or national executive committee in such an event. More importantly, however, a humiliating scenario might have ensued had he supported a second no-confidence motion. The bourgeois majority in the Storting was so slender (80 to 77) that it could tolerate only one defection, such as Haarstad's on the first censure vote. Had both Haarstad and Velsand opposed Syse's no-confidence motion, it would have failed even with Progress party support, and no one would have looked more ineffectual than Jakobsen.

Thus, the "Hedmark guerrilla" was, in fact, pivotal and Jakobsen may therefore have preferred the seemingly irrational strategy leading to outcome III for internal party reasons. The nested games in which the Center party leader was involved may account for his anomalous behavior (Tsebelis 1990). His impotence was caused by the pivotal parliamentary position of the "Hedmark guerrilla." This pair of parliamentarians were able to impose strict ex ante controls on their leader's negotiations with the Conservatives. By allowing Jakobsen virtually no discretion in bargaining, the Center party had essentially "thrown the steering wheel out the window." Such brinkmanship may have helped the party in bargaining with the Conservatives, but it came back to haunt the agrarians in the parliamentary debate on 12 June.

One additional consideration may have been involved in the Center party's decision. Quite possibly, Jakobsen did not think of himself as playing a one-shot game. If, indeed, he foresaw a series of interparty games, his concern may have been *reputation* (Calvert 1987; Kreps 1990). According to Rommetvedt one Center party parliamentarian remarked in retrospect that he would have preferred a different strategy (1991, 207). But once the party had insisted on the farm bill amendment, it had to stick with it: "The party had tied itself so tightly to the mast that it could not vote for the general motion of no confidence without losing credibility at later junctures" (p. 210). Jakobsen thus became a victim of his own precommitment (Elster 1984).

The Conservative Party: Incompatible Incentives

As much as the Progress party won the June 1987 showdown, the Conservative party was the loser. The party failed to dislodge Brundtland, poisoned its relationship with the Center party, and suffered badly in the polls. After 12 June, the political career of Rolf Presthus was effectively ruined. One could hardly imagine a less desirable outcome. Both critical Conservative decisions seem foolhardy in retrospect: acquiescence in the farm bill amendment, as well as the subsequent decision to press a second no-confidence vote. Why on earth did the Conservatives go down this path to disaster?

The answer surely involves incomplete information concerning the Progress party. Presthus' dilemma also directs our attention to the internal politics of the Conservative party. The Conservatives clearly realized the risk that if the Progress party balked, their acquiescence on the farm subsidy issue would be for naught. Ideally, Presthus therefore wanted some guarantee of cooperation from either the Progress party or the Center party (concerning a potential, second censure motion) before accepting this agenda. Unfortunately, any explicit agreement with the pariah Progress party was ruled off-limits by his two would-be coalition partners. Hence, the Conservatives repeatedly attempted to extract assurances from the Center party that the latter would remain committed to bringing down Brundtland in a potential second round.[14] Conservative parliamentary leader (later prime minister) Jan P. Syse raised this issue on 7 June. But Jakobsen steadfastly refused to issue any such guarantee.

Under this uncertainty, the prospects seem to have been estimated differently by the various Conservative leaders. Former prime minister Kåre Willoch and Storting president Jo Benkow both opposed Presthus' course of action (Bakke 1990, 187; Rommetvedt 1991, 196; Willoch 1990, 404). And though he supported Presthus, Jan P. Syse seems to have pressed more insistently for a guarantee from the Center party.[15] Did these experienced parliamentarians more correctly estimate how unlikely it was that the Progress party and the Center party would make the choices necessary to propel Presthus into the prime ministership?

Was Presthus a victim of wishful thinking? Perhaps. But according to Thomassen both Presthus and Syse recognized that the farm bill amendment was a huge gamble (1991, 35). Presthus apparently chose to accept big risks and to "swallow camels" in order to gain the prime ministership. He was willing to accept quite unpalatable policies and take substantial electoral risks in the hope of dislodging Brundtland. Rather than any personal idiosyncracy, however, this behavior reflected Presthus' "contract" with the Conservative party and, more specifically, the incompatibility between his incentives as an individual and the interests of the party.

After only about a year as Conservative leader, Presthus' star had already begun to fade. Though he had been elected in large part because of his perceived skills in promoting nonsocialist cooperation, he had failed to deliver the bourgeois government for which many Conservatives were hoping. A consummate insider, Presthus also had not proven to be an inspirational opposition leader. The media hounded him for his failure in the "autumn hunting season," as well as for his awkward style. The party congress in Tromsø, in early May 1987, made a nonsocialist government before the end of the spring session an explicit party goal, thus adding to the pressure on Presthus (Norvik 1990, 156; Thomassen 1991, 30–31; Willoch 1990, 403–4). Time was already running out for Presthus, and he knew it. The party had defined recapturing executive office as his overriding concern. Any outcome short of this goal would bode ill for Presthus' political future. On the other hand, the party had not properly defined the highest acceptable price of office.

Thus, in considering the second censure motion, Presthus may not have attached much value to the added electoral liability (K_H) of outcome III, as compared to outcome IV. Either way, the party would remain in opposition and be electorally damaged. Presthus' leadership was also likely to come to an end. But if Presthus was thus essentially indifferent between outcomes III and IV, then any infinitesimal chance that the Center party would "tremble" and support the Syse censure motion would lead Presthus down this path (Selten 1975). In fact, the negotiators from the Conservative party and the KRF took care to maximize the costs to the Center party of rejecting Syse's proposal (Rommetvedt 1991, 208).

The Conservative executive committee members may not have shared Presthus' preferences, but with customary deference they allowed him the rope by which he would come to his political demise. Presthus' gamble was approved by the party's executive committee, as well as by its parliamentary caucus. In fact, in the parliamentary caucus, only three out of 50 members were opposed (Bakke 1990, 188; Norvik 1990, 158).[16] By tradition, the Conservative party's control of its leaders has taken place mainly through ex post accountability. In the Norwegian Conservative party (as among tories elsewhere), nothing fails like failure, particularly in the electoral arena. Predictably, after his gamble failed, Presthus' leadership of the Conservative party was doomed. While his complicity in the design to increase farm subsidies might have been forgiven, it was much more difficult to overlook the electoral damage he had inflicted. In other words, while Presthus might have been able to trade off policy goals for office with impunity, he could not get away with sacrificing the party's electorate.

Both Presthus and Jakobsen were thus constrained by their respective parties but in radically different ways that reflected interesting organizational differences in delegation regimes. Jakobsen was tightly policy-constrained ex ante and in reality had no choice but to oppose Syse's censure motion. Presthus enjoyed much more policy discretion but was constrained by his ex post office accountability to his party. He was expected to produce office benefits and knew that without results, he was eminently dispensable. Jakobsen, on the other hand, faced less obvious challenges to his leadership but was essentially powerless to make policy compromises. As we shall see, these differences in constraints were critical to the bargaining game between the two parties.

THE BARGAINING GAME: A WAR OF ATTRITION?

Having thus explored the seemingly irrational behavior of the Center party and the Conservatives in the endgame, we now turn to their preceding bargaining game, where the assumption of full information clearly does not apply. This game was over the policy content of the no-confidence motion, of which there were three possibilities: the policy favored by the Center party (the farm bill amendment), the policy favored by the Conservatives (possibly the national budget), or some compromise. Each party had two feasible moves (or strategies): *insistence* and *acquiescence*. Insistence (I) meant accepting only a censure motion based on the party's own preferred policy (the farm bill amendment for the Center party and the national budget for the Conservatives). Acquiescence (A) meant accepting the other party's preferred no-confidence motion. There were four possible outcomes: mutual insistence (II) (in which case no censure motion is made), mutual acquiescence (AA), Center party insistence and Conservative acquiescence (IA), and Center party acquiescence and Conservative insistence (AI).

Neither the Conservatives nor the Center party had complete information about the preferences of the Progress party and thus could not predict Hagen's behavior with certainty. The Progress party, on the other hand, did not have full information about the other parties' preferences. Yet we can confine the uncertainty concerning each potential censure motion to a single party: the Progress party in the cases of the farm bill amendment and the potential compromise motion, and the Center party with respect to a motion chosen by the Conservatives.

Table 3 describes three probability terms (p, q, and r) related to the likelihood of passage of the different potential censure motions. Lacking reliable information, the Center party and the Conservatives may have thought of the Progress party as having two possible types: one that would support the farm bill amendment and one that would oppose it. Absent any information to the contrary, I assume that the Center party and the Conservatives had common *prior beliefs* about the Progressives. Terms p and q represent these prior beliefs of the Center party and the Conservatives concerning the Progress party's preferences. Term p denotes the probability estimate of these two parties that the Progressives would support a censure motion based on a farm bill amendment (IA). (For IA, etc., see Figure 2.) Similarly, q is their (substantively less interesting) subjective probability that the Progress party would support a no-confidence motion reflecting mutual concessions by the Center party and the Conservatives (AA). Since AA could be no further from the Hagen's ideal policy than IA, q must be equal to, or greater than, p. For both parties, cell IA thus offers either an office bonus (with a policy outcome valued positively by the Center party and negatively by the Conservatives) with probability p or a substantial electoral liability with probability $1-p$. These parties' beliefs about the value of p (the Progress party's "type") must therefore have played a critical role in their decisions. Finally, r is the Progress party's probability estimate that the Center party would support a no-confidence motion based on a policy issue chosen by the Conservatives (e.g., the national budget). Table 3 contains subscripts denoting the parties whose beliefs we thus characterize. I shall, in the remainder, dispense with these subscripts for simplicity.

These assumptions allow us to represent the initial bargaining game in strategic form as a two-by-two matrix, shown in Figure 2. The payoffs in each cell list

FIGURE 2

Strategic-Form Representation of Presthus Bargaining Game

		CONSERVATIVE PARTY (H)	
		Insist (I)	Acquiesce (A)
CENTER PARTY (SP)	Insist (I)	K_S, K_H	$p(G_S+F_S)+(1\text{-}p)V_s$, $p(G_H+F_H)+(1\text{-}p)V_H+C_H$
	Acquiesce (A)	$G_S+C_S,\ G_H$	$qG_S+(1\text{-}q)W_{S+}C_S$, $qG_H(1\text{-}q)W_H+C_H$

Note: Subscripts denoting parties represent the initials of their Norwegian names: H = Conservative party, S = Center party. Cells are identified by row followed by column (e.g., IA).

the row player (the Center party) first and the column player (the Conservatives) second. This representation makes one important simplification: the value of the endgame in the event of a farm bill amendment censure motion is given as an unidentified expectation V. The value of V is obviously party-specific and derived from the endgame solution. Similarly, W denotes the value of an endgame following mutual acquiescence (i.e., policy concessions on both parts). (Under strategy sets II and AI, there would have been no endgame.)

We can use our knowledge of the endgame to simplify these payoff functions. Assuming that Jakobsen's constraints and Presthus' incentive incompatibilities could be foreseen, we substitute the payoffs from outcome III for V in cell IA in the payoff matrix in Figure 2. For the continuation value W in cell AA, we substitute the payoffs from outcome IV of the endgame since, if Jakobsen had already acquiesced in the first round, there would have been no basis for a second censure motion. Consider next the payoffs to the Center party and the Conservatives if the Progress party's "type" had been known. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the two possibilities by setting p equal to 0 and 1, respectively. With $p = 0$, and assuming $K \geq C$ and $0 < q < 1$, both parties have the same preference ordering over the four outcomes: AI > AA > II > IA. Note that the actual outcome is the *worst possible* result for *both* parties. In this game, both parties have dominant strategies. The Center party will acquiesce, and the Conservatives will insist. If, on the other hand, $p = 1$ and $q = 1$, then the Center party has the preference ordering IA > AA, AI > II, and the Conservatives, AI > AA > IA > II. This is essentially a game of chicken.[17]

But the one-shot, simultaneous-move nature of chicken is not the best representation of the bargaining game between the Center party and the Conservatives. Since their bargaining proceeded over a considerable period, the *war of attrition* is a more accurate model. The war of attrition is essentially chicken "stretched out over time." Each player can in each time period choose to stay (insist) or exit (acquiesce). The last player to stay earns a reward, but until all but one exit, all who stay pay a penalty in each period (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, 119–26; Rasmusen 1989, 74–75). A continuous-time version of this game also has the advantage of effectively eliminating the implausible outcome AA, that is, both parties' acquiescing simultaneously.

Chicken has two equilibria in pure strategies: IA and AI. In the two-player chicken or war of attrition, II (mutual insistence or intransigence) is the worst outcome for each player, and in any pure-strategy equilibrium, one player insists and the other acquiesces. The game itself, however, does not provide much of a clue as to which player will acquiesce ("swerve"). And if the players can adopt mixed strategies, the strategy set II occurs with regularity (Rasmusen 1989, 74). The war of attrition also has mixed-strategy equilibria, in which each player exits (acquiesces) with a constant probability at each move as long as the opponent has not already done so. Contrary to the regular war of attrition, however, in the Presthus bargaining game, the penalty for mutual intransigence rose dramatically toward the end of the parliamentary session, when the opposition parties suddenly would have had to wait four months and go through local elections before they would have another shot at the government. As the end of the session approached, the incentives to acquiesce therefore increased dramatically. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Center party and the Conservatives reached agreement on a censure motion only two days before the summer recess.

Why Presthus Blinked

The Center party took a tough bargaining stance vis-à-vis the Conservatives. Its precommitment to

FIGURE 3

Bargaining Game Payoffs by Progress Party Type: Farm Bill Amendment Rejected (p = 0)

		CONSERVATIVE PARTY (H)	
		Insist (I)	Acquiesce (A)
CENTER PARTY (SP)	Insist (I)	K_S, K_H	$C_S + K_S, C_H + K_H$
	Acquiesce (A)	$G_S + C_S, G_H$	$qG_S + C_S, qG_H + C_H$

Note: Subscripts denoting parties represent the initials of their Norwegian names: H = Conservative party, S = Center party.

intransigence is a time-honored strategy in chicken and the war of attrition. If one player can find a way to move first (e.g., through credible precommitment), then he can safely insist, knowing that the second player, on observing this behavior, can do no better than to acquiesce. The fact that the Center party (and perhaps, less successfully the Conservatives) so clearly adopted this strategy suggests a belief that *p* was significantly larger than 0. Yet, credible precommitments in chicken are difficult to make, and they can be disastrous if they fail to deter (Taylor 1987, 45–49). Every player has an incentive to bluster, and credible commitments may require dramatic measures ("throwing the steering wheel out the window"). While Jakobsen's tough stance probably helped the Center party prevail in the bargaining game, it did not deter the Conservatives from embarrassing him with a second censure motion in the endgame.

What other factors might account for the Center party's success against the Conservatives in the bargaining game? Two factors suggest themselves: (1) the credible policy constraints on Jakobsen versus the wide discretion given to Presthus and (2) the greater impatience (higher discount rate) of Presthus, due again to his personal incentives. The resistance Jakobsen faced from the "Hedmark guerrilla" helped make his threats credible. Conservative leaders presumably knew of this opposition, as it was in the Center party leader's interest to inform them that his hands were tied. Presthus' greater impatience contributed to the same outcome. In the war of attrition, players' ability to hold out generally depends on their discount rates. All else equal, the player with the higher discount rate (i.e., the more impatient one) is more likely to acquiesce early. The Conservative party congress in May had done Presthus a disservice by publicly requesting a coalition before the parliamentary recess. Center party negotiators knew that Presthus had the latitude to make policy compromises and that he needed a quick fix. These circumstances eventually doomed the Conservatives in their negotiations.

FIGURE 4

Bargaining Game Payoffs by Progress Party Type: Farm Bill Amendment Accepted (p = 1)

		CONSERVATIVE PARTY (H)	
		Insist (I)	Acquiesce (A)
CENTER PARTY (SP)	Insist (I)	K_S, K_H	$G_S + F_S, G_H + F + C_H$
	Acquiesce (A)	$G_S + C_S, G_H$	$G_H + C_S, G_H + C_H$

Note: Subscripts denoting parties represent the initials of their Norwegian names: H = Conservative party, S = Center party.

THE PROGRESS PARTY: THE VALUE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION

Clearly, the Progress party was the greatest unknown factor in the Presthus debacle. Guesses about the preferences of the Progress party were therefore critical to the calculations of the other parties. Such private information as the Progress party had about its own "type" can be a source of considerable power. Carl I. Hagen exploited this advantage to the hilt, playing his cards extremely close to his chest. The public statements that Hagen made prior to his dramatic press conference on 11 June were studiedly ambiguous. When it became increasingly clear that the farm bill would be the basis of the no-confidence motion, Hagen tempered his enthusiasm about the bourgeois coalition. On 6 June he admitted to doubts about the three-party coalition, citing internal differences and the lack of a clear policy alternative to the Labor government (Rommetvedt 1991, 196). Two days later he reiterated his opposition to increased agricultural transfers, yet the following day he told journalists that his party might well vote against the government's farm bill anyway.

In his equivocation, Hagen kept stressing the need to consult his party's national and regional officers, many of whom were known to oppose any policy compromise. And in Hagen's public justification of his final decision, the voice of his party's activists had a prominent place. Were Hagen's hands, then, tied by his organization due, perhaps, to his party's commitment to reducing transfers to Norwegian agriculture? Not likely. Hagen's personal authority in his party was immense, and on a similar issue in 1985, he had, without serious repercussions, voted against his party's program in order to save Willoch. Hagen's deference to his party's officers was therefore probably more of a rationalization than a rationale.

What was fundamentally at stake for the Progress party? Consider Table 4, which shows the endgame payoff matrix. Assuming that Hagen correctly anticipated the eventual result of opposing Spilde's censure motion (outcome III), then the Progress party's decision hinged on the magnitude of its benefit from nonsocialist conflict relative to the three other terms. Specifically, the party should vote for the censure motion if the net benefit of a change of government—minus the cost of an amended farm bill and the electoral cost of voting contrary to its program—exceeded the party's electoral rewards from conflict between the other nonsocialist parties. Hagen's strategy, then, would be to vote *yes* if and only if $G_F + F_F + C_F \geq K_F$. Before 11 June, presumably no one outside the Progress party knew whether this condition held. But although the Progress party kept Norwegians in suspense about its intentions, one thing was perfectly clear. If the government's farm bill and the no-confidence motion were separated, the Progressives would support both and thereby give the country a bourgeois cabinet without higher agricultural spending. Hagen had committed his party as early as 29 May by declaring that the Progress party would support a Conservative censure motion (AI) (Rommetvedt 1991, 191). As it turned out, Hagen would not have the luxury of separating these two issues. Until 11 June, however, he remained noncommittal concerning the farm bill amendment (IA) favored by the Center party.

In all likelihood, Hagen's precommitment to no confidence on the revised national budget was designed to strengthen the Conservatives in their negotiations with the Center party. If the Conservatives could prevail in their bargaining, then the Progressives would have their most preferred outcome. But why did Hagen not further boost the bargaining power of the Conservatives by fully revealing his type, that is, by clearly rejecting a farm bill amendment? The Progress party, after all, had both electoral and policy incentives to vote against Spilde's censure motion. One possibility is that the Center party might not have believed such a threat. After all, Hagen had an incentive to engage in cheap talk of this kind regardless of his actual intentions.

But equivocation may in fact have been Hagen's best strategy. At first glance, this seems incompatible with the claim that a no-confidence vote based on the Conservatives' policy choice would have been the Progress party's most preferred outcome. But Hagen may not have been convinced that if he revealed his "type," the Conservative censure motion would in fact pass. That outcome would hinge on whether the Center party leadership could convince at least one of the two "Hedmark guerrillas" to go along. Assume that Hagen attached a probability of r to this outcome. Alternatively, if Hagen had revealed his private information and the requisite Center party support had not been forthcoming, the result would essentially have been a null event. The Center party and the Conservatives would both have had an incentive to paper over their differences, no censure motion would have been made, and no policy would have been affected. I therefore attribute a subjective probability of $1 - r$ and a 0 value to this outcome for the Progress party. The Progress party should rationally only reveal its type if $rG_F \geq K_F$, that is, if the value of a nonsocialist government times the probability that the Center party would bring it about at least outweighed the electoral benefit that the Progressives could draw from a coalitional debacle. If Hagen's estimate of r was low, then he had an incentive deliberately to mislead the coalitional parties down the garden path.

Hagen's electoral considerations (K_F versus C_F) were in themselves probably something of a lottery. If he accepted increased farm subsidies, he stood to suffer a predictable loss of votes among his libertarian supporters. A poll published on 11 June showed little popular support for the farm bill amendment. Only 11.7% of the voters thought this was an appropriate issue on which to defeat the government, and even among nonsocialists, two-thirds considered this a contrived way to generate a cabinet crisis (Rommetvedt 1991, 205). If, on the other hand, Hagen made the much more dramatic gesture of opposing the bourgeois no-confidence motion, the electoral fallout would be much more unpredictable. In a similar situation in 1963, when the Socialist People's party brought down Einar Gerhardsen's Labor government, it suffered stinging losses among voters incensed at its complicity in the formation of Norway's first postwar bourgeois government. Hagen, however, gambled on his ability to frame the issues in such a way that he would appear the principled and responsible statesman rather than the traitor to the nonsocialist cause. Given the party's precarious electoral position, the Progressives could ill afford even a small but certain electoral setback. Even a drop of .5% in the national poll could have deprived the party of its parliamentary representation. It was better, then, to gamble at the high-stakes tables. His party's weakness among the voters made Hagen highly *risk-acceptant* over electoral outcomes and willing to take his case to the people. In this endeavor, he was amazingly successful, probably beyond his wildest imagination.

CONCLUSION

I have examined a spectacular case of coalition bargaining failure in recent Norwegian history. The Presthus debacle of 1987 is not easily accounted for by traditional explanations based on cooperative coalition theory. Through an alternative extensive-form game model, I have analyzed the ill-fated strategies of the protagonists and teased out their motivations. This mode of analysis allows us to consider the implications of asymmetric information, variations in objective functions, structured versus unstructured bargaining environments, the sequence of bargaining, time preferences, and internal delegation regimes in political parties.

Whereas Hagen was seeking electoral gains and Jakobsen farm subsidies, Presthus was primarily concerned with office payoffs. These differences in party behavior were in large part a function of intraparty politics. The Presthus case offers us no happy medium between the Scylla of strict ex ante policy constraint (Jakobsen) and the Charybdis of ex post office accountability (Presthus). Both the Conservatives and the Center party featured delegation regimes ill suited to the bargaining situation in which they found themselves, and much of the responsibility for the Presthus debacle rests with these internal structures of Norwegian political parties. The lack of similar constraints in the Progress party made it possible for Hagen to place greater weight on electoral objectives and to take substantial risks. Hagen's humiliation of Jakobsen and especially of Presthus demonstrates the value of private information. His control over private information enabled him to entice the coalitional parties into behavior that was ultimately self-destructive. And Jakobsen's tough bargaining stance highlights the attractions and perils of precommitment.

Even without misdelegation or deliberate manipulation, however, the bargaining situation faced by Presthus and his associates invited disaster. The game of chicken (played with mixed strategies) occasionally produces outcomes that are catastrophic for everybody. The war of attrition, which the Presthus debacle even more closely resembles, can have similarly unpleasant results. Moreover, misperception and bargaining failure were particularly likely in the Presthus debacle due to the impending summer recess. The closer the end of the session drew, the higher the stakes, until the flurry of frenzied activity in the last few days before the "guillotine" fell. Such frantic times have a way of producing ill-considered behavior, a phenomenon well known from congressional budget debates in the United States (Cox and Kernell 1991).

Thus, the calendar, information, and structure are important keys to the dismal fate of Rolf Presthus and his would-be coalition partners. Given time, knowledge, and appropriate incentives, the story might have been a happier one for Presthus, Jakobsen, and Bondevik (and less triumphant for Hagen and Brundtland). Although, sadly, the main protagonist cannot now benefit from this knowledge, the student of coalition behavior can. Bargaining failures can offer us valuable insight into party behavior, and noncooperative game theory affords us useful tools with which to explain the dramas that elite-level politics occasionally produces.

APPENDIX

TABLE A-1

Players in the Presthus Debacle

PARTY AND INDIVIDUAL	POSITION
Labor	
Gunnar Berge	finance minister
Gro Harlem Brundtland	prime minister
Conservatives	
Jo Benkow	president of the Storting
Rolf Presthus	party chair
Arne A. Spilde	MP, member of Agriculture Committee
Jan P. Syse	parliamentary party leader
Petter J. Thomassen	MP, former minister of industry (1985–86)
Kåre I. Willoch	former prime minister (1981–86)
Christian People's party	
Kjell M. Bondevik	party chair and parliamentary leader
Center party	
Ragnhild Q. Haarstad	MP, member of "Hedmark guerrilla"
Johan J. Jakobsen	party chair and parliamentary leader
Anne E. Lahnstein	MP, deputy party chair
Lars Velsand	MP, member of "Hedmark guerrilla"
Socialist Left party	
Hanna Kvanmo	parliamentary party leader
Progress party	
Carl I. Hagen	party chair and parliamentary leader

Notes

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1. The 1965–71 cabinet, headed by Per Borten of the Center party, was a four-party coalition, whereas the 1983–86 government failed to include the Liberals (Venstre). The Liberals lost their parliamentary representation in 1985 and were therefore not a relevant party in the events described here.

2. I use the terms *nonsocialist* and *bourgeois* interchangeably. This usage is consistent with Norwegian convention and is neither derogatory nor indicative of a class-analytic perspective. In fact, the nonsocialist parties frequently apply the label *bourgeois (borgerlig)* to themselves.

3. One member of the Center party, Ragnhild Queseth Haarstad, voted against her party's position on this bill. After disposing of Spilde's no-confidence motion, the Storting overwhelmingly, by a vote of 123 to 34, rejected a motion by Arent Henriksen of the Socialist Left party to increase agricultural appropriations.

4. Here, as elsewhere, I am responsible for all translations from the Norwegian.

5. It might seem that one or more additional no-confidence motions could follow end node III. As the argument will show, however, outcome III implies that no such motion would pass. Since I assume that the coalitional parties bear an electoral cost if they propose divisive no-confidence motions, we can disregard any further agenda.

6. Perfect information implies that each player knows (1) who the other players are, (2) the set of actions available to each player, (3) all potential payoffs to each player, and (4) all previous moves. Certainty means that the outcome is not affected by random, unpredictable events ("moves by Nature") that take place after the players have made their choices (Rasmusen 1989, 51).

7. A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies from which no player has an incentive to deviate as long as no other player does. In other words, no player can make himself better off by unilaterally changing his strategy. The Nash equilibria identified in Figure 1 are subgame perfect because they satisfy the requirements of backward induction. On subgame perfection, see Selten 1975 and Rasmusen 1989. I also assume here that all players adopt pure strategies, that is, that no player's strategy is a lottery over several feasible moves. This assumption seems both plausible and parsimonious here.

8. All preference relations are strict unless otherwise indicated.

9. This does not imply that the Center party or the Conservatives prefer voting for their respective programs to not voting. Hence, the Conservatives have no *policy* incentive to introduce the Syse motion.

10. Such voters may base their decisions on preferences over final policies rather than preferences over parties (or candidates) per se. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) argue that policy preferences are the more theoretically satisfactory assumption in models of multiparty competition and use this stipulation to generate strong analytical results.

11. This interpretation is corroborated by the 1987 events. Polls taken immediately after the Presthus debacle showed marked declines for the Conservatives (from 30.2% to 27.1%), as well as the Center party (from 5.9% to 5.2%). The KRF, which had been conciliatory throughout, registered a modest gain (8.1% to 8.4%). But the big winner was the Progress party, which lept from 5.1% to 7.1% (Rommetvedt 1987). These figures represent the means of polls by several authoritative firms. The preevent poll figures are the averages of polls by Norsk Gallup, Markeds- og Mediainstituttet, and Scan Fact. The postevent figures represent the means of polls by Norsk Gallup and *Opinion*. See Rommetvedt 1987 for details. The Progress party later continued to surge, reaching a stunning 12.3% of the national vote in the September regional elections, more than twice its poll in any previous election.

12. This unofficial faction takes its name from the province of Hedmark, an agricultural area in east central Norway and the constituency of Ragnhild Q. Haarstad. The province is a traditional stronghold of the Center party.

13. In his memoirs, Petter Thomassen reports that the internal debate in the Center party was so intense that Jakobsen wept when Velsand came around to supporting the farm bill amendment (1991, 33). Thomassen is a leading Conservative who served as minister of industry in one of the Willoch cabinets (1985–86).

14. Bente Bakke, a maverick Conservative backbencher, reports that the need for a precommitment from the other coalitional parties was strongly felt within the Conservative parliamentary caucus. After the failed "autumn hunting season" the previous year, parliamentary leader Jan P. Syse had reportedly assured the members that no further assaults on the Brundtland government would be attempted without the

binding agreement of both the KRF and the Center party (Bakke 1990, 179–86).

15. Jan P. Syse later replaced Presthus as chair of the Conservative party. In October 1989 he became prime minister in charge of the same three-party coalition that Presthus had tried to establish. Syse's coalition, which was fragile from the very beginning, broke down after only one year in office.

16. The three skeptics were a prestigious group, however. They included Willoch, Benkow, and one backbencher.

17. The payoff structure in this game would have been true chicken had the Center party strictly preferred AA to AI. The party's indifference between these two outcomes makes no difference to the game's equilibrium, however.

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THE POWER OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS A CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTER

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The European Parliament under the current cooperation procedure *has an important power: it can make proposals that, if accepted by the Commission of the European Communities, are easier for the Council of Ministers to accept than to modify, since only qualified majority is required for acceptance, whereas full unanimity for modification. The importance of this power, which I call the power of the* conditional agenda setter, *has not been recognized in previous scholarly work. For structural reasons explained in the text, this power is likely to increase in the future. I conclude by arguing that the conditional delegation of power to international actors (the European Parliament, Commission, and the Court of Justice) is a frequent phenomenon in European institutions. This delegation presents three important advantages: it makes possible the selection of one among many possible equilibria, it accelerates European integration, and it diffuses responsibility for politically unpopular measures.*

The European Parliament (EP) is widely considered a weak parliament (Dehousse 1989; Edward 1987; Fitzmaurice 1988; Lenaerts 1991; Lodge 1989; Wessels 1991). Moreover, discussions are frequently advanced about the "democratic deficit" of European institutions, which, among other things implies a weakness of the EP (Bogdanor 1989; Bowler and Farrell 1993; Thomas 1988; Williams 1991).

Yet in 1989, the EP, when confronted with the common position of the Council of Ministers specifying low standards on exhaust emissions for small cars, raised the standards and was able to impose its decision on both the Commission of the European Communities and a "reluctant majority" in the Council of Ministers (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 170). According to the *cooperation procedure* established by the Single European Act treaty, the Council of Ministers can modify the position of the Parliament by a unanimous vote, but in this case the Council could not agree on any alternative. The legislation in question is far from trivial, since it affects around 60% of all passenger cars in the European Community (Kim 1992). Moreover, the differences in positions between the EP and the Council were significant: compared to the Council's position, the legislation adopted raised the price of small cars by more than five hundred dollars apiece and significantly improved the environment.

I shall explain this surprising power of the EP. I argue that under the current cooperation procedure, the EP has an important power: it can make proposals that, if accepted by the Commission, are easier for the Council of Ministers to accept than to modify (only qualified majority being required for acceptance but unanimity, for modification). I call this the power of the *conditional agenda setter* and study its properties.

My answer generates a second question: If the EP is able to influence the legislative process so significantly, why does it not do so all the time? Alternatively, if the conditional agenda-setting power is significant, the EP should have been recognized in the literature as a strong parliament. To address these issues, I shall specify the conditions under which the EP can make use of its agenda-setting power.

The European Community fascinates observers and scholars because it is a unique object of study. Accordingly, a series of neologisms have been invented to describe it. It is "neither a state nor an international organization" (Sbragia 1992, 257); "less than a Federation, more than a Regime" (W. Wallace 1983, 403); "stuck between sovereignty and integration" (W. Wallace 1982, 67); a "part formed political system" (H. Wallace 1989, 205); "institutionalized intergovernmentalism in a supranational organization" (Cameron 1992, 66), and the "middle ground between the cooperation of existing nations and the breaking of a new one" (Scharpf 1988, 242). Some scholars have even seen advantages in the situation. Krislov, Ehlermann, and Weiler claim: "The absence of a clear model, for one thing, makes ad hoc analogies more appropriate and justifiable. If one may not specify what are clear analogies, less clear ones may be appropriate" (quoted in Sbragia 1992, 258).

Instead of using (appropriate or inappropriate) analogies in this analysis, I examine the logic and the outcomes of decision making among the three institutional actors generated by the cooperation procedure. In this sense, my approach is part of a series of studies that attempts to apply the institutional approach developed through the study of American politics to the institutions of the community (Garrett 1992; Garrett and Weingeist 1993; Scharpf 1988; Weber and Wiesmeth 1991).[1]

My results complement empirical studies. I explain why they find little influence for the EP in most cases. I explain why the EP in some instances (e.g., the automobile emission standards) was so influential. Finally, my analysis clarifies why cases involving high parliamentary influence are likely to multiply in the future.

The first section presents the rules of the cooperation procedure. The second section formally analyses the interaction among the three institutional actors (the EP, the Commission, and the Council of Ministers). The third section explores the implications of the analysis for the role of the EP. In the conclusion, I discuss the theoretical problem of specifying the driving forces of European integration in light of the results of my model.

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Three major institutional actors are involved in European decision making: the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the EP. These actors interact according to quite complicated rules, and their decisions, along with those of the Court of Justice, supersede the national law of member countries. The Council is composed of the relevant ministers of the member countries (ministers of the environment for decisions concerning the environment, ministers of agriculture for agricultural matters, etc.). The Commission is composed of 17 members appointed by national governments for their competence and "whose independence is beyond doubt" and assures the everyday operation of the institutions of the Community. Finally, the EP is composed of 518 representatives elected (since 1979) by universal suffrage of the member countries of the community.

There are currently (before the application of the Maastricht treaty) three different legislative procedures in play: the *assent procedure*, the *cooperation procedure*, and the *consultation procedure*. Each of these attributes different powers to the three institutional actors. This is why, sometimes, a political and legal battle among the three actors takes place before the discussion of particular pieces of legislation in order to decide which procedure will be followed (Garrett 1992; Lodge 1987, 1989). I shall not discuss these institutional battles here. Instead, I shall focus on presenting the cooperation procedure.

The cooperation procedure does not cover all areas of Community legislation (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 169; Lodge 1989, 69). It applies to nine articles of the Rome treaty: prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality (art. 7); freedom of movement of workers (art. 49); freedom of establishment (art. 54.2); coordination of provisions providing special treatment of foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health (art. 56.2); mutual recognition of diplomas and the like and coordination of provisions on activities of self-employed persons (art. 57.1–2); harmonization of measures for the establishment and functioning of the internal market (art. 100a and b); the working environment and the health and safety of workers (art. 118a.2); economic and social cohesion (art. 130e); and research and development (art. 130q). Of all these issues, the most important has been the harmonization of the internal market and then social policies, research programs, and regional fund decisions. Legislation examined under the cooperation procedure constitutes between one-third and one-half of parliamentary decisions (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 169).

The cooperation procedure entails two readings of each piece of legislation (initially introduced by the Commission) by the EP and the Council of Ministers. The Council makes the final decision either by qualified majority or by unanimity. In the abstract, the procedure is reminiscent of a *navette* system between the two houses of a bicameral legislature, where the upper house (the Council) has the final word.[2] The European Community procedure is presented schematically in Figure 1.

The legislative process begins with the submission of a Commission proposal to the EP. At the same time, the Council may begin deliberating but cannot reach a decision until it receives the EP's position. The EP may, in the first reading, accept, amend, or reject the proposal; it may also withhold its opinion by referring the legislation back to committee, thereby effectively aborting the proposal. Once the EP decides, the proposal goes back to the Commission, who may revise the initial proposal to accommodate the EP. The Commission presents the proposal, as amended, to the Council, who adopts a "common position" by qualified majority (54 out of 76 votes).[3] No time limits on deliberation exist in this first reading of the proposal. It is therefore obvious that any of the institutions can effectively abort legislation at this stage of the process.

Once the Council adopts its common position, the second reading of the proposal begins. The Council sends its common position back to the EP, along with a full justification of its adopting this position. The full justification of the Council's and the Commission's positions is required by article 149.2b of the Single European Act. However, in the early phase of application of the procedure, the Council provided extremely sketchy reasons or even no reasons at all. In one case, it even apparently failed to notice that the EP had tabled amendments to the Commission proposal (Bieber 1988, 720). Parliament formally protested, its president declaring on 28 October 1987 that "as a minimum, the Council should provide a specific and explained reaction to each of Parliament's amendments" (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 173). On 18 November 1987, the EP, in two resolutions, threatened the Council with legal action (Bieber 1988, 720). As a result, the Council altered its approach and from then on it provided an account of its point of view on each of the substantive issues raised by draft legislation (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 173).

Parliament then has three months to select one of three options: to approve the common position of the Council (or, equivalently, take no action), in which case the Council adopts the proposal; to reject the common position by an absolute majority of its members (currently 260 votes); or to amend the common position, again by an absolute majority of its members. In this second round, time is of essence. The clock starts when the president of the Parliament

FIGURE 1

Outline of the Cooperation Procedure


Stage I
Commission
Initiative
Proposal of the Commission
Stage II
EP
First Reading
Parliament's opinion (no time limit)
Stage III
Council
First Reading
Council's common position:
☐ without modification of the proposal: qualified majority
☐ modification of the proposal:unanimously (no time limit)
Stage IV
EP
Second Reading
Stage V
Commission
Stage VI
Council
Second Reading
Parliament approves Council's common position or has not taken a decision within three months*
Council adopts the decision, by qualified majority or unanimously (cf. Council First Reading)
OR
Parliament rejects Council's common position by an absolute majority (260 MEP) within 3 months*
Re-examination (one month)
Council has unanimously taken a decision within three months* (adopts Council's common position)
OR
Council has not taken a desision within three months:* the proposal is rejected
OR
Parliament proposes amendments to the Council's common position by an absolute majority (260 MEP) within 3 months*
Commission adopts a reexamined proposal with the ammendments of the Parliament
Council approves reexamimed proposal by a qualified majority within three months*
OR
OR
Commission adopts a reexamined proposal without the (or certain) amendments of Parliament
Council modifies reexamined proposition unanimously within three months*
OR
Council has not taken a decision within three months:* Commission's proposal is rejected

* The time limits of three months may be extended to four months by common accord between the Council and the European Parliament (EP).

announces the receipt of all relevant documents in all nine official languages.

The Commission may or may not introduce legislation rejected by the EP to the Council; if such legislation is introduced, the Council can overrule the rejection by unanimity. Amended legislation is presented to the Commission, who must revise the proposal within a month. Parliamentary amendments that are accepted by the Commission can be adopted by the Council by qualified majority (54/76), whereas any other version requires unanimity in the Council (Nugent 1989, 248). If the Council fails to act within three months (four, with the agreement of the Parliament), the proposal lapses.

This account makes the Commission appear as the agenda setter. Indeed, a proposal by the Commission is required to initiate the legislative process, and it is the Commission's proposal that the Council accepts by qualified majority or modifies by unanimity. The EP or the Council have no right to initiate legislation. However, the Council was given the right under article 152 of the European Economic Community treaty to request that the Commission undertake studies and submit to it the appropriate proposals. Similarly, the EP, on its own initiative, has several times adopted resolutions calling for new legislative proposals (e.g., concerning the ban on imports of baby seal skins to the Community and transfrontier television broadcasts) (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 181). In 1982, the Commission agreed in principle to take up any parliamentary proposals to which it did not have major objections; if it had objections, it would undertake to explain its reasons in detail to the EP (ibid.). Nugent argues that it is difficult to establish the initial impetus for legislation and that even resolutions from the EP could have in fact originated with the Commission, which may have wanted to reinforce its own position vis-à-vis the Council (1989, 240). In any case, all three institutional actors can in fact place items on the legislative agenda.

Once discussion is initiated by a Commission proposal, there are no restrictions on the amendments that the EP can introduce in its first reading. There are, however, such restrictions on its second reading. Parliamentary amendments in the second reading are restricted not by the Single European Act but *by the Parliamentary Rules themselves*. According to art. 51.2, only amendments that concern the parts of the text that have been modified by the Council and that seek to adopt a compromise with the Council or to restore the EP's position in the first reading are acceptable during the second reading (Bieber 1988, 722). Further, only a committee comprising a group of at least 23 EP members may present amendments (Fitzmaurice 1988, 397). Did the EP tie its own hands with these rules? Nothing of the sort. These restrictions simply increase the efficiency of the EP during its second reading, since, substantively, they permit the adoption of any position in the interval between (and including) the EP's initial position and the adoption of the Council's common position.

There is, however, a very important restriction on the EP's second-reading amendment power. Amendments require absolute majorities to be adopted. In practice, the 260 required votes constitute a two-thirds majority of members present. Moreover, given both that the 518 EP members from the 12 countries are organized into more than 10 (cross-national) parliamentary groups and that voting alignments occur more frequently by political group and less frequently by country and also that voting discipline is weak, 260 votes is a stringent requirement. The most likely combination to achieve an absolute majority is a coalition of Socialists and Christian Democrats—the European People's party—that currently controls 301 seats.

To summarize, according to the cooperation procedure, in its second reading the EP can, by an absolute majority of its members, make a proposal that, if adopted by the Commission, can be accepted by a qualified majority (54/76) of the Council but requires unanimity of the Council to be modified. This proposal can be anywhere between the EP's and the Council's first reading of initial legislation, including a reiteration of the EPs previous position. Consequently, if the EP manages to make a proposal that makes the Commission and a qualified majority of the Council better off than legislation that can be voted unanimously, this proposal will be adopted by all institutional actors. If, however, such a proposal does not exist or if the EP cannot adopt one by an absolute majority of its members or makes the wrong choice, then the agenda is transferred into the hands of the Council, which can modify the EP's proposal by unanimity. These conditions describe the power of the conditional agenda setter that is attributed to the EP by the cooperation procedure. I shall examine how this power has been used and then focus on its theoretical properties.

CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTING

Agenda-setting players have power when it is impossible, difficult, or costly for decision makers to modify their proposals. Modification of proposals may be precluded by the prevailing institutions. For example, when the president of the United States nominates a candidate for the Supreme Court, the Senate cannot modify the proposal. In the first theoretical paper analyzing the importance of agenda control (McKelvey 1976), the agenda setter could make a series of proposals that would be voted under "closed rule," that is, without amendments. This agenda setter had quasi-dictatorial powers, being able to drive a society through a series of successive votes to select the agenda setter's ideal point. However, an agenda setter looses this power under open rule, because the proposals can subsequently be modified by amendments of the deciding body (Krehbiel 1987; Shepsle and Weingast 1987a, 1987b). Agenda setters also have power if the deciding body is impatient, that is, if it pays a price as long as there is no agreement. Impatience creates an asymmetry in favor of the proposal of the agenda setter and against its modifications (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Tsebelis and Money n.d.).

The cooperation procedure presents a different mechanism for agenda-setting power. Regardless of impatience, it is more difficult for the Council to modify a Parliamentary proposal (provided it is accepted by the Commission) than to accept it. Indeed, qualified majority is needed for acceptance but unanimity for modification. This procedure *may* enable the EP to offer a proposal that makes a qualified majority of the Council better off than any unanimous decision. *If* such a proposal exists, *if* the EP is able to make it,[4] and *if* the Commission adopts it, then the EP has agenda-setting powers. If, however, these conditions are not met, the EP looses its agenda-setting power. This is why I characterize the EP's agenda power under the cooperation procedure as *conditional.*

I shall study the last reading of the cooperation procedure and provide necessary conditions for the existence of a winning EP proposal (i.e., a proposal that will be accepted by the Commission and a qualified majority of the Council). I will call such a proposal X.

In the Appendix, a series of definitions and elementary geometric properties necessary to analyze the powers of the conditional agenda setter are provided. Here, I shall provide a nontechnical account of the argument. Consider that the members of the Council are concerned simultaneously about two different issues.[5] Figure 2 presents a graphic repre-

FIGURE 2

Status Quo: Winning Proposal Exists



sentation of the position of the members of the Council. I assume that the Council is composed of 7 members, that a qualified majority of 5 is required for acceptance of the EP's proposal, and that the members of the Council have circular indifference curves (Euclidean preferences)—that is, they are indifferent between proposals of equal distances from their ideal points. I assume 7 members, instead of 12, in order to simplify matters while keeping a reasonable approximation of the qualified majority requirement. The cooperation procedure requires a 54/76 (.710) qualified majority, while the qualified majority I shall use here is 5/7 (.714).

Consider that the status quo is outside the heptagon 1–7 that represents the Council, as indicated in Figure 2. Consider also that the positions of the Commission and the EP are on the other side of the heptagon—points C and P, respectively. The points in the figure are selected so that the horizontal axis represents integration. According to the standard argument, the EP and the Commission are more prointegration than the members of the Council (Garrett 1992).

If the EP is able to find out what the Council can do on its own (i.e., unanimously) and present a proposal that makes the Commission and a qualified majority of the Council better off than either the status quo or what the Council can do on its own, this proposal will be accepted by both the Commission and the Council and will be the outcome of the cooperation procedure. So let us follow the EP in its calculations.

The Council can unanimously adopt any proposal inside the area indicated by the unanimity set of the status quo, or U(SQ). This area is generated by the intersection of all circles whose centers are the ideal points of the members of the Council and pass through the status quo. This area is included between the circles around the two states closest to the status quo (1 and 2 in the figure).

However, which point inside U(SQ) would be selected by the Council is not clear. It all depends on how convincing different governments are in proposing their alternatives for a vote. For example, the Danish parliament is known to have a permanent committee on European Community legislation, which extracts statements from the government prior to Council meetings, so that the Danish representative in the Council is particularly inflexible (Williams 1991, 159).[6] Under such circumstances, would other members of the Community accept the Danish position as the alternative to the status quo, or select a different point? In Figure 2, no ideal point of the member countries is included inside U(SQ), so the different countries would have to come to a compromise.

Since the unanimity position is not unique, I shall impose on parliamentary proposals a severe restriction. I shall require that in order to be accepted, they must be preferred by the Commission and by a qualified majority of the Council to *any* proposal that can be voted unanimously by the Council. This way we will have a (very conservative) estimate of the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP.

In Figure 2, five out of the seven members of the Council can be made better off by proposals inside the qualified majority set of the unanimity set of the status quo, or Q(U(SQ)). Indeed, members 3–7 prefer any point inside this area over any point inside U(SQ). The area Q(U(SQ)) is generated by the intersection of five circles with centers the points 3–7 going through the edge of U(SQ)). Therefore, the EP can select inside the area Q(U(SQ)) the point that it prefers most, that is, the point closest to its own ideal point (provided that the Commission prefers it over U(SQ), which is the case in the figure). This is point X in Figure 2.

However, such a winning proposal does not always exist, as the situation depicted in Figure 3 indicates. Here, the status quo is further away from the positions of the Council (the heptagon 1–7); consequently, the Council has a wide set of options on its own (by unanimity). There is no proposal that can defeat, by qualified majority, all points inside U(SQ). For example, a five-member majority consisting of members 3–7 is impossible, because the circles around 3 and 7 tangent to U(SQ) do not intersect. The same is true for all other possible majorities.

Another interesting case exists when the status quo is inside the heptagon 1–7. In this case, the Council cannot modify the status quo by unanimity, because at least one member will object to any particular move. Consequently, the status quo can be modified only through a parliamentary proposal. Figure 4 indicates that in this case, the EP can select one of several possible coalitions. The top lens of Q(U(SQ)) is preferred to the status quo by a coalition of members 3–7. (It is generated by the intersection of circles around 3 and 7.) The bottom lens is preferred by a coalition of 1–5. The middle lens is preferred by the coalition 2–6 (intersection of circles around 2 and 6). In this case, the EP will propose X and will be supported by the Commission and the coalition of states 2–6.

In these examples, the EP was sometimes able to make a winning proposal (Figures 2 and 4), sometimes not (Figure 3). Sometimes it could select its allies (Figure 4), sometimes not (Figure 2), while on still other occasions, there were no allies available (Figure 3). Is there any *systematic* argument connecting these three figures?

First of all, if the status quo is located inside the heptagon 1–7 (the Pareto set), it cannot be changed by the unanimity of the Council: at least one member will object to any particular move. Second, in two dimensions, for the qualified majority specified by the cooperation procedure (54/76), there is a central area of the Council (technically the 54/76-core, hereafter the Q-core). If the status quo is inside the Q-core, it cannot be modified by *any* 54/76 majority coalition. So if the status quo is located in the Q-core, it cannot be modified by either the EP's proposal or by the Council on its own. The Q-core is represented in Figure 5 by the heptagon 1'2'3'4'5'6'7'.[7]

Figure 5 uses calculations from the appendix and divides the plane into four different areas. If the status quo is inside the Q-core (area IV) it cannot be changed (either by unanimity or qualified majority). If the status quo is outside this central area but inside the heptagon 1234567 (the Pareto set), then the Council cannot modify the status quo by unanimity. In this case, the EP can select a majority in the Commission and a qualified majority (Q) in the Council as allies and make a proposal that is preferred by its allies to the status quo. If the status quo is outside the Pareto set but close to it, then again the EP can make a winning proposal X to the Council (provided the Commission adopts it in its report).

If the status quo is further away from the Pareto set of the Council, the set of alternatives unanimously preferred to the status quo may or may not intersect with the Q-core. If there is an intersection, then there is no point that can command a Q–qualified majority of the Council, so the EP has no agenda-setting power. The set of status quo points for which the unanimity set intersects with the Q-core is defined by the curve I(Q-core). If the status quo is outside this line (area I), the EP has no agenda-setting power, and the Council will select its preferred solution by unanimity. If, however, the status quo is inside the area defined by the I(Q-core) curve (area II), a winning proposal by the EP may exist. Consequently, in two dimensions, the agenda-setting power of the EP increases as the status quo approaches the Pareto set of the Council and reaches its maximum when it is inside the Pareto set (no change is possible without the EP) but decreases again when the status quo moves inside the Q-core. (This is what I have called *curvilinear property* in the Appendix, Theorem 2.)

In all these figures, I have presented the EP's and the Commission's ideal points as close to each other. This is the most frequent case, because both are supranational actors and because the Commission is politically responsible to the EP. However, if the position of the Commission were far away from the position of the EP, it might be that no winning parliamentary proposal existed, because a parliamentary amendment would be rejected by the Commission *before* it reached the Q-majority in the Council.

Paradoxes can arise in such an institutional setting. For example, the final outcome selected by the cooperation procedure might not be in the Pareto set of the Council. Consider a case in which the status quo is in the Pareto set, Q(SQ) has points outside the heptagon 1234567, and the EP's and the Commission's ideal points are located in such a way that they make a proposal outside the Pareto set. Figure 4 would present such a case if states 3–5 were moved to the left of X. Politically, such a situation could arise if there were a polarization between a relatively cohesive qualified majority in the Council and the minority. The EP could then step in, making a proposal between its own position and the qualified majority's but still better than any feasible solution by unanimity. This result would be opposite the conclusion of Weber and Wiesmeth who claim that the outcomes of the cooperation procedure are always efficient (1991, 265).

Another paradoxical property of the cooperation

FIGURE 3

Status Quo: Winning Proposal X Does Not Exist



procedure is nonmonotonicity. Consider that the status quo is at the position presented in Figure 3, where there is no winning proposal by the EP; if country 1 moves to the left of the status quo, the status quo will be included in the Pareto set. In this case, there is always a proposal that the EP can make to move the status quo further to the left. In this hypothetical example, the only change is a movement of one government to a less integrationist position, and the resulting change in the outcome is more integration (nonmonotonicity). Why did this happen? Because before, there was a wide range of unanimity outcomes, and no qualified majority could win all of them, while afterward the movement of

FIGURE 4

Winning Proposal (X) When Status Quo Is in the Pareto Surface



FIGURE 5

Existance of Proposal Commanding a Q-majority in Council (X) as a Function of Position of Status Quo (SQ)



If SQ in:
Area I: no X proposal exists
Area II: X proposal may or may not exist
Area III: X proposal exists
Area IV: no X proposal exists

one country persuaded the others that there was no unanimously preferred change of the status quo, so they had to accept the EP's proposal by qualified majority.

To summarize, a 54/76-core is guaranteed to exist in two dimensions. In this case, the curvilinear property described in Theorem 2 holds: when the status quo is inside the Q-core or far away from it, there is no winning parliamentary proposal, so that the EP's conditional agenda-setting power is null. But whenever the status quo occupies some intermediate position, a winning parliamentary proposal (assuming adoption by the Commission) is either guaranteed or may exist. This is the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP in two dimensions.

What happens in more than two relevant dimensions? In this case, a Q-core is not guaranteed to exist. The implication of the absence of a Q-core is that no point inside the Pareto set is invulnerable. There is always at least one coalition of 54/76 votes in the Council that will be made better off by a change of the status quo. If the EP can identify these coalitions and the changes they are willing to support, it can propose the one that it most prefers. In other words, the set of alternatives available to the EP increases when there is no Q-core. On the other hand, if the status quo is far away from the Pareto set, there is no winning proposal from the EP.

One additional interesting feature of conditional agenda setting is the importance of information. According to the informational property (Theorem 3 in the Appendix), when the EP's information about what the Council will unanimously do increases, its agenda-setting power increases. In the limiting case, when the EP knows exactly which point inside the Pareto set the Council will select, it will always have agenda-setting power (unless there is a Q-core and the Council decides to select a point inside it).

As we saw earlier, the EP and the Council fought bitterly about the informational content of the common position rendered by the Council. Some commentators regarded this struggle and the subsequent shift in the Council's position as "preconditions for rationalizing and coordinating the legislative procedure" (Bieber 1988, 720). The informational property helps us to view this struggle in a different light: it is a fight for control of the agenda. The conclusions of this analysis are fourfold.

The Position of the Final Outcome. The final outcome of the cooperation procedure will most likely be inside the heptagon defined by the states. However, it is possible that Q(U(SQ)) has points outside the Pareto set, and if one of these points is the closest to the EP (and accepted by the Commission), then the cooperation procedure leads to an inefficient outcome for the members of the Council.

Curvilinear Property. The EP's agenda-setting power is a function of the position of the status quo. If there is a Q-core, this power is a curvilinear function of the position of the status quo. It does not exist if the status quo is inside the Q-core or far away, and it does or may exist in intermediate positions.

Multiple Dimensions. In multiple dimensions, it is likely that the Q-core does not exist. In this case, the agenda-setting power of the EP increases when the status quo is inside the Pareto set or close to it. (The EP may be able to select among several possible coalitions.)

Informational Property. Accurate information in the EP about the positions that are likely to be adopted by unanimity in the Council increases the agenda-setting power of the EP.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS

I use these four conclusions to discuss empirical results of the cooperation procedure, as well as to compare my model with other analyses.

The Car Emission Story

On 15 February 1988, the Commission introduced legislation concerning small-car emission standards to the Council (composed of the 12 ministers of the environment).[8] The proposal would reduce emissions from small cars by 58% by 1992–93.

The Council commenced discussion and found the positions of the 12 ministers to be divergent: Luxembourg, Ireland, and Belgium agreed with the proposal; France, Britain, Italy, Spain, and Portugal found the standards too strict; and Holland, Denmark, Greece, and Germany found the standards too lax. Before the EP's first reading, several countries modified their positions (notably France and Germany), allowing the Environmental Council to approve the Commission's proposal by qualified majority.

The EP, in its first reading (September 1988), voted for what are called U.S. 83 standards, which require catalytic converters. The Commission rejected the EP's amendments. The Council, after a series of compromises, adopted the Commission's proposal as a common position by qualified majority.

In April 1989, the common position came before the EP for a second reading. The EP insisted on its previous set of U.S. 83 standards. This renewed (but not new) proposal met the agreement of the Commission this time around. Jacobs and Corbett claim that the EP threatened the Commission by stating that unless the Commission accepted its version, it would reject the Council's common position (1990, 170). Given the absence of unanimity in the Council, this would be equivalent to aborting the legislation. This threat was credible because European public opinion is very sensitive to environmental issues, and the election of the European EP was approaching. The Council, faced with a proposal that incorporated higher standards and knowing that it could not come to a unanimous decision, adopted the EP's position by a qualified majority.

The car emission story is the EP's most spectacular success, although there are others similar to it.[9] In general, only one out of two amendments of the EP gets incorporated in legislation, as statistics will indicate.

Cooperation Procedure Statistics

During the period from July 1987 to November 1991, the EP dealt with 208 Commission proposals under the cooperation procedure.[10] The Commission accepted 1,626 out of the 2,734 parliamentary amendments, and the Council accepted 45 percent of the EP's first-reading amendments. In the second reading, the EP adopted 716 amendments, 366 of which were adopted by the Commission and 194 by the Council (27%). In three cases, the EP rejected the common position of the Council. If the amendments that are proposed by the EP in the second reading are repetitions (or possibly watered-down versions) of the initial amendments, then out of the 2,734 parliamentary amendments the Commission accepts 1,992 (73%), and the Council, 1,410 (52%).

Using similar figures, Lodge notes out that "the EP's second-reading amendments stand a far slimmer chance of survival" (1989, 75), while Bogdanor comes to the conclusion that "the main effect of the second reading of Community legislation . . . is to increase the importance of the first reading as a point of leverage for Parliament" (1989, 208). Similarly, Fitzmaurice argues that "the second reading 'navette' will have little real purpose" (1988, 390).

Little can be made of these first-versus-second-reading statistics, because without further investigation, we cannot assess the importance of the EP's amendments, nor consequently, can we tell whether amendments were accepted in the first reading because they would have been accepted in the second, whether the Council accepted some amendments in order to weaken the Parliamentary majority and make the EP unable to offer amendments in the second reading, or whether the Council accepted the less-important amendments in the first round. However, what clearly emerges is that of every four EP amendments, two are accepted, one is rejected by the Commission, and one is rejected by the Council. This mixed result can be well understood within the conditional agenda-setting framework: the EP has conditional agenda-setting power; consequently, it may find proposals with the property of making both the Commission and a qualified majority in the Council better off than the status quo. The reason successful amendments are not the rule is that such proposals do not always exist.

Comparisons with Other Analyses

The model I present combines the existing evidence to make several points, including the importance of information and the curvilinear property and the fact that the cooperation procedure can generate paradoxes. However, two findings are especially important: (1) the conditional agenda setter, under the conditions specified by the model, has an important input in decision making; and (2) the EP is the agenda setter in the cooperation procedure. Both points have not always been understood or analyzed correctly. Most analyses base their conclusions overwhelmingly on the observation that the final decision in the cooperation procedure is made by the Council; others are incorrect in terms of the strategic calculations of the actors; and in still others, the EP's role has been underestimated because the agenda-setting power is attributed to the Commission.

Bieber, Pantalis, and Schoo argue that "with regard to the European EP, the Single Act is an inconsistent document: Where it increases the EP's powers of participation in decision-making the practical effect is either very limited or diminished because the exercise of the powers is conditional on the *attitude* of the Council and the Commission" (1986, 791; emphasis mine). Similarly, Fitzmaurice argues that "despite the appearances of a co-decision model, the Council virtually retains the last word" (1988, 391). Both accounts underestimate the EP's role. My analysis demonstrates that the Council has the last word only if the EP fails to make a winning proposal. Moreover, if the "attitudes" of the Council and the Commission are not whimsical and if each actor, when confronted with a choice, selects the best alternative for itself (thereby adopting maximizing behavior), the EP, through astute selection of its proposals, sometimes has the power to impose its will upon the other actors.

Lodge notes the power of the EP "in an alliance with one or more member states prepared to thwart the attainment of the necessary majorities (qualified or unanimous) unless EP's views and amendments were accommodated" (1987, 23). If Lodge's analysis concerns the power of the EP to block the decision in the Council, one or two allies in the Council are not necessary. Both the EP and the Council can block legislation by simply sitting indefinitely on a proposal during the first reading of the cooperation procedure. However, in the second reading, the EP has more than blocking power. If the analysis concerns the power of the EP to impose its will on the Council, one or two members in the Council are not enough: a qualified majority is required. To make this point clear, consider the configuration in Figure 3. Move the EP's ideal point to coincide with state 4. There is now an objective alliance between the EP and state 4. However, there is no winning proposal that the EP can make, and if the EP makes a proposal, even if state 4 argues that it supports the EP and will vote down an otherwise unanimous proposal causing the status quo to prevail, it will not be believed by the other members of the Council.

The argument that the EP has agenda-setting powers is perhaps the most controversial position in this article. Most analyses of the cooperation procedure attribute agenda-setting power to the Commission, not the EP. For example, Garrett argues that "parliament amendments merely allow the commission again to make its own proposals" (1992, 551); and Lenaerts argues that the Commission has a "monopoly of legislative initiative" (1991, 22). I have already argued that in practice, the initiative may come from any one of the three actors. The real question is whether the Commission is constrained in its proposal by the amendments of the EP in the second reading. The evidence indicates that it is.

In the EEC Treaty there are two rules specifying the role of the Commission. Article 149.3 gives the Commission wide powers of revision and specifies, "As long as the Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its proposal at any time during the procedures mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2." According to this article, there are no restrictions on time (as long as the Council has not acted) or on the content of the revisions. In contrast, Article 149.2d, which refers specifically to the role of the Commission after the second reading by the EP, adopts a more restrictive procedure: "The Commission shall, within a period of one month, re-examine the proposal on the basis of which the Council adopted its common position, by taking into account the amendments proposed by the European Parliament. The Commission shall forward to the Council at the same time as its re-examined proposal, the amendments of EP which it has not accepted, and shall express its opinion on them. The Council may adopt these amendments unanimously." According to this second procedure, the Commission will simply incorporate or reject the Parliamentary amendments to its proposal.

FIGURE 6

Winning Proposal (X) with Different Positions and Powers of the Commission



Empirical reports on the cooperation procedure do not mention any Commission amendments adopted or rejected by the Council, which indicates that the Commission does not make amendments of its own at this stage. Finally, while there are complaints from the EP that the Commission rejects parliamentary amendments, there have been no complaints that the Commission has altered the amendments that it accepted.[11]

As long as the Commission accepts or rejects parliamentary amendments and does not significantly modify them or add its own amendments, agenda-setting power lies with the EP. Politically, it is not very important whether the EP or the Commission is the agenda setter, because their positions are usually close to each other. (The Commission accepts three-fourths of parliamentary amendments).

However, for reasons of completeness, in Figure 6, I present a counterfactual situation under two assumptions: (1) the Commission decides to apply article 149.3 instead of 149.2d in the second reading of the cooperation procedure; and (2) the positions of the Commission and the EP are substantially different from each other. In this figure, I present the set of points that command a qualified majority over anything that can be voted unanimously by the Council, Q(U(SQ)), and the ideal points of the EP and the Commission. Under the two assumptions, the outcome of the procedure will be Y, instead of X. However, if one of the two assumptions is relaxed, the outcome reverts to X, the EP's proposal. For example, if the Commission's ideal point in Figure 6 is inside the shaded triangular area, say, C_1, then, even if the Commission could completely ignore the EP's proposal, it would still propose X. Similarly, if the Commission's ideal point is C_2 and the Commission can only accept or reject the EP's proposal, it will accept X.

Figure 6 can also help us relax the unitary-actor assumption regarding the EP in a particular case. Consider that a majority of EP members are located inside the shaded triangular area that include P in the figure; in this case, all these members would prefer X from the set of feasible point Q(U(SQ)). Further research is required to relax the EP as a unitary-actor assumption in other cases.

According to my account, the EP has agenda-setting power as long as it can make a winning proposal in the second stage of the cooperation procedure. There are essentially four relevant points, which I shall discuss in turn.

Existence of an Absolute Majority in the European Parliament. This is the requirement for successful parliamentary proposals that I have least discussed. I avoided it by assuming that the EP was a unified actor and by studying the internal divisions of the Council. However, as I said earlier, the 260-vote requirement for a second-round proposal is not a trivial matter. It essentially requires congruence on the part of socialists and Christian democrats from different countries. This is not a frequently observed alliance at the national level.[12] I think that such a coalition can be formed more frequently on social or quality-of-life issues (environment, health, education, and research) than on economic issues. To the extent that the former prevail on the agenda, the EP will see its influence increased.

Acceptance by Commission. The EP and the Commission have had positions close to each other in the past. The statistics already reported indicate that the Commission accepted three-quarters of parliamentary amendments in the cooperation procedure. There are two ways in which the EP can keep this relationship close in the future. The first is through the political responsibility of the commission in front of the EP. The second is illustrated by the car emissions case: it can threaten to reject a proposal in its second reading. Such a measure requires unanimity in the Council and consequently would probably kill the Commission proposal, damaging the Commission's reputation. However, if there is sufficient divergence between the EP's and Commission's positions, a winning EP proposal may not exist, since it will not be adopted by the Commission.

Position of the Status Quo. An unconditional agenda setter has more power when the status quo is far away, because then the former has more leeway to make a "take it or leave it" offer. In contrast, the European EP (a conditional agenda setter) has less power the further away the status quo, because there are many positions that the Council can adopt on its own by unanimity to avoid both the status quo and the EP's position. It is reasonable to assume that throughout the history of the European Community the status quo has continued to move toward more integration. If this assumption is accepted and if integration continues, then as the status quo approaches or gets inside the Pareto set of the Council, the EP's role is likely to increase. The simple displacement of the status quo toward more integration will transform winning parliamentary proposals into the rule. Obviously, this is a ceteris paribus prediction, and it assumes the same institutional structure (the current cooperation procedure) and the same distribution of tastes among the different actors.

Dimensionality. A 54/76-core is guaranteed to exist in two dimensions but not in three or more dimensions. Lack of a core makes every point inside the Pareto set vulnerable and consequently increases the likelihood that a parliamentary winning proposal will exist. So if issues become more complicated, the EP's role is likely to increase. This conclusion is congruent with the argument in Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) that the likelihood of cooperation increases through issue linkage. The only difference is that issue linkage is a conscious effort (i.e., a strategy) to connect different issues, while my argument is that regardless of the reason for the connection (conscious effort or objective complication), the outcome is not only more cooperation but a shift of power to the EP.

CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTING AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

There are two competing theories of European integration, neofunctionalism (Haas 1958, 1971; Lindberg 1963; Scheingold 1970) and intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1991).[13] Their main point of disagreement is whether governments play the principal role in the process of integration. A series of empirical studies focuses on particular areas of European integration and finds evidence to support and to contradict each theory (Cameron 1992; Lange 1992; Peters 1992; Shapiro 1992).

I shall conclude by arguing that the concept of conditional agenda setting can help us understand the process of integration differently from the major competing theories. The cooperation procedure provides a *formal expression of the conditional agenda-setting concept*. The idea is simple—delegation of powers *as long as* certain limits are not crossed and loss of these powers otherwise. One can hardly think of a principal–agent relation where the delegation of powers is unconditional. Simple and universal though the concept of conditional delegation may be, the cooperation procedure presents the rare feature of specifying the conditions, instead of leaving them to an implicit understanding.[14]

One important feature of the cooperation procedure is that the outcome is not necessarily Pareto optimal for the states. In this sense, it is not necessarily an efficient institution (Tsebelis 1990, chap. 4). However, most of the time the outcome will be inside the heptagon defined by the ideal positions of the states. But which Pareto optimal outcome will be selected? Krasner (1991) raises this point with respect to the international regime of communications. Garret and Weingast (1993) forcefully present the problem of equilibrium selection and argue that ideas, as well as the interests of the most powerful states are important in equilibrium selection. The cooperation procedure presents an important mechanism for equilibrium selection combined with other desirable features.

European integration proceeds through a series of measures that may have redistributive or investment aspects. In both cases, sacrifices are required by some social or national actors. It is obvious that such actors would prefer alternative policies with lower or no cost for them. If such actors represent brakes on European integration, what is the accelerator? Figures 2–4 provide a visual representation of the answer. In all these cases, a supranational actor (the EP) is provided with conditional control of the agenda. Whenever the EP exercises this power the outcome is more integrationist than that which the members of the Council would have selected on their own (by unanimity). It is even more integrationist than the positions of the Council's pivotal members (country 7 in Figures 2 and 4) and can be even more integrationist than any member of the Council (outside the Pareto set). Moreover, if efficiency gains from the common policy are high (if the status quo is far away), the Council can resolve redistributive issues on its own. (Remember that in this case, the EP has no agenda-setting power.) If efficiency gains are low (i.e., the status quo is close to or in the Pareto set), the EP is empowered to solve the problem of equilibrium selection. So equilibrium selection is one feature of the conditional agenda-setting mechanism.

But conditional agenda setting by the EP presents some more desirable features. The speed of integration is under the final control of governments. Most of the time the outcome will be inside the Pareto set of the Council, but in any case the Council is able to overrule the EP if it pushes integration too fast. Another important advantage of European institutions is that they diffuse responsibility for unpopular measure from national governments to some combination of supranational institutions who were able to impose their will despite existing objections.

Other European institutions offer the same advantages. In the consultation procedure, the Commission has the role of the conditional agenda setter. In the cases that the Council can decide by qualified majority, the mechanism of delegation of agenda-setting powers is exactly the same: the Council needs qualified majority to agree and unanimity to modify.

When the European Court of Justice made the decision concerning *cassis de dijon*, thereby creating the doctrine of mutual recognition, it was making a decision that was bound to be in serious disagreement with important social interests in all member countries at some time or another. Similarly, the Court practically rewrote the interpretation of the Community value-added-tax directive. Such measures were subsequently adopted by the Single European Act (i.e., by the unanimity of governments). In all these case, governments in disagreement can opt out of the application of particular legislation or even of the system altogether. It is up to the supranational actor to make decisions that will carry the Community further along, rather than lead to disagreement, dissent, and ultimately to disintegration.

Conditional agenda-setting powers are likely to increase in the future for two reasons: (1) the status quo approaches the positions of the members of the Council; and (2) issues become more complicated, so that a 54/76 qualified majority core is not likely to exist. As I demonstrated earlier, both features lead to increase in powers of the conditional agenda setter.

In conclusion, European integration happens, among other reasons, *because* national governments have built institutions attributing conditional agenda-setting power to supranational actors. If in the future popular sentiment wants to reduce the speed of integration, the citizens of Europe may use the electoral process to make sure that some particular points of view are present in or absent from the EP; that is, they may change the EP's policy position. Altering the position of the EP in Figures 2–6 would not affect the agenda-setting powers of the EP (it will still be able to make winning proposals under the conditions I have specified), but it does affect the content of the winning proposals, that is, the outcomes of the cooperation procedure.

Appendix

DEFINITION 1. Pareto Set. *The set of points where the welfare of all members cannot be improved simultaneously.*

LEMMA 1. *The Pareto set of the states in Figure 5 is defined by the contour of the heptagon 1234567.*

DEFINITION 2. Q-Core. *The set of points where the welfare of Q out of N states cannot be improved simultaneously.*

LEMMA 2. *The Q-Core (for $Q = 5/7$) of the states in Figure 5 is defined by the contour of the heptagon $1'2'3'4'5'6'7'$.*

LEMMA 3. *The Q-core exists if $Q > n/(n + 1)$, where n is the dimension of the space (Greenberg 1979 theorem 2).*

COROLLARY 1. *In the cooperation procedure, a 54/76-core always* *exists in two dimensions. A 54/76-core is not guaranteed to exist in more than two dimensions.*

Definition 3. Unanimity Win Set of a Point. *For any point SQ, define U(SQ) as the set of points that are unanimity preferred to it.*

Corollary 2. *U(SQ) is empty if SQ belongs to the Pareto set.*

Definition 4. Qualified majority Win Set of a Point. *For any point SQ, define Q(SQ) as the set of points that are qualified-majority-Q-preferred to it.*

Corollary 3. *Q(SQ) is empty if SQ belongs to the Q-core.*

Definition 5. Qualified Majority Win Set of a Set. *For any set of points X, define Q(X) as the set of points that are qualified-majority-Q-preferred* to any point *in X.*

Corollary 4. *If X intersects with the Q-core,* $Q(X) = \emptyset$.

Proof. The proof follows from definitions 2 and 5. Call x one of the points of intersection. According to definition 2, there is no point preferred to x by a Q-majority, consequently Q(X) is empty.

Definition 6. Conditional (Q, U) Agenda-setting Power. *For a status quo point SQ, an actor has conditional (Q, U) agenda-setting power if when U(SQ) is not empty, Q(U(SQ)) is not empty, and when U(SQ) is empty, Q(SQ) is not empty.*

Corollary 5. *If SQ belongs to the Q-core, there is no conditional (Q, U) agenda-setting power.*

Proof. Both U(SQ) and Q(SQ) are empty.

Corollary 7. *If SQ belongs to U\(Q-core), there is conditional (Q, U) agenda-setting power.*

Proof. U(SQ) is empty; therefore, we have to examine Q(SQ). But Q(SQ) is not empty, since SQ does not belong to the Q-core.

Theorem 1. *If SQ is in the "neighborhood" of U, there is conditional (Q, U) agenda-setting power.*

Proof. Select a point SQ close to but outside the Pareto set (the sides of the heptagon 1234567), say along the segment 17. In this case, U(SQ) will be a small set defined by the indifference curves of 1 and 7. Call SQ′ the symmetric point of SQ with respect to the segment 17. If SQ is close enough to 17, the other 5 members will prefer SQ′ to any point inside U(SQ), and SQ′ will not be included in the Q-core. So Q(U(SQ)) = Q(SQ′), and Q(SQ′) exists (Corollary 7).

Construction of "Neighborhood" of U. In the proof, I used the point SQ′, which is preferred to any point inside U(SQ) by all other five members. If we draw the lines 16 and 27 and call 1″ their intersection, all the points SQ′ inside the triangle 171″ have this property. The circles from 2 and 7 through SQ′ intersect once to the right and once to the left of segment 27. But since SQ′ is to the left of 27, the other point is to the right, which means that there is no point of U(SQ) preferred to SQ′ by 2. Similar argument can be made with respect to the other four points of the heptagon (in particular, for point 6). For SQ′ to be inside triangle 171″, SQ has to be in the triangle symmetric to the 171″ triangle with respect to segment 17. This is how the shaded triangles adjacent to the sides of the heptagon in Figure 5 are constructed.

Definition 7. *Call inverse Q-core I(Q-core) the set of points x with the property that the intersection of U(x) and Q-core is nonempty.*

Corollary 7. *If SQ belongs to I(Q-core), there is no conditional (Q, U) agenda-setting power.*

Proof. By definition 7, there is at least one point of U(SQ) that belongs to the Q-core. Call this point x. By the definition of the Q-core, Q(x) is empty; therefore, Q(U(SQ)) is empty.

Construction of Boundary of I(Q-core). The boundary of the inverse Q-core is defined the following way. Construct the symmetric of segment 1′2′ of the Q-core with respect to the segment 12 of the Pareto set. Repeat the construction for the other six sides of the heptagon. Connect these segments by circles with centers at the vertices of the heptagon. The first circle has center 1 and radius 11′, and so on.

By construction, if SQ lies on the boundary of I(Q-core), the boundary of U(SQ) (the points that are preferred to SQ by six out of the seven members, while the seventh is indifferent between these points and SQ) will be on the heptagon 1′2′3′4′5′6′7′. Indeed, if SQ lies on a segment of a straight line (e.g., the one symmetric to 1′7′ in Figure 5), the U(SQ) will include the indifference curves of 1 and 7, which intersect in symmetric points along the axis 17; if SQ lies on a segment of a circle (e.g., center 1 and radius 11′), the U(SQ) will include the indifference curve of 1, which by definition goes through 1′. Since points SQ along the boundary of I(Q-core) produce U(SQ), who are on the boundary of the Q-core, points further away (area I in Figure 5) will produce U(SQ), which intersect with the Q-core. Therefore,

Theorem 2. Curvilinear Property. *For any two-dimensional configuration of the Council, the plane is divided into four subsets according to the position of SQ, as in Figure 5: AREA I: the inverse Q-core of the Council; no conditional (Q, U) agenda-setting power. AREA II: agenda-setting powers may or may not exist. AREA III: the Pareto set (excluding the Q-core), along with "neighboring" areas; always conditional (Q, U) agenda-setting power. AREA IV: the Q-core; no conditional (Q, U) agenda setting power.*

Theorem 3. Informational Property. *For any two points x and y, if U(x) is a subset of U(y), then Q(U(y)) is a subset of Q(U(x)).*

Proof. From the definition of Q(A) it follows that Q(AUB) is a subset of Q(A). The proof follows if one calls U(x) = A and U(x)/U(y) = B.

Notes

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1. Scharpf (1988) studies the decision-making process of the Community, and argues that it resembles German, much more than American, federalism and that the fact that decisions are taken by the Governments and by the unanimity rule leads to "a joint-decision trap" with suboptimal outcomes. Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) analyze the Single European Act and find that the outcome is always "efficient" for the members of the Council and that issue linkage is likely to increase the powers of the Commission. Garrett (1992) studies the interaction among all four institutional actors (the Commission, the EP, the Council, and the Court) in decision making, as well as in the implementation of decisions. Garrett and Weingast (1993) focus more on the Court and the implementation of its decisions. These studies echo a series of papers in congressional studies examining the properties of relation of legislatures with the executive (Hammond and Miller 1987) and their internal rules, especially agenda setting (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; McKelvey 1976; Ordeshook and Schwartz 1987; Schofield 1978; Shepsle and Weingast 1984).

2. For a detailed description of the *navette* system in comparative perspective, see Money and Tsebelis 1992. For an institutional analysis of the French case, see Tsebelis and Money n.d.

3. The accounts diverge at this point. Most empirical literature speaks about qualified majority (Lodge 1989; Nugent 1989), Jacobs and Corbett (1990) speak about qualified majority *or* unanimity, and Van Hamme (1989) argues that

qualified majority is needed to approve and unanimity, to modify. Bieber comes to the conclusion that the translation of the Single European Act in different languages is ambiguous and, therefore, that unanimity is required (1988, 719). However, on several occasions, the Council has decided by qualified majority, so in the remainder of my account, I will assume that only qualified majority is required for the adoption of a common position. The four largest countries, (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) have ten votes each; Spain has eight votes; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal have five each; Denmark and Ireland have three votes each and Luxembourg has two votes, making a total of 76 votes on the Council.

4. The reader is reminded that 260 votes are required for a proposal.

5. I select a two-dimensional representation instead of the (marginally simpler) one-dimensional one, for four reasons—first and foremost, because one-dimensional models typically produce equilibrium results (Shepsle 1979), while two-dimensional ones not only generically lack such equilibria but produce chaotic behavior, that is, cycles all over the space (McKelvey 1976). The model here includes a mechanism for equilibrium selection that the reader will not be able to identify unless the generic model has the possibility of producing chaotic results (i.e., is at least two-dimensional). Second, the results from two dimensions are easily generalizable to more than two dimensions, which is the most realistic assumption in the politics of the European Community. Third, two dimensions is the minimum required to give the EP the possibility of *selecting* a supporting coalition inside the Council. Finally, as it will become clear later, the one example of the cooperation procedure that I shall present cannot be represented in a less than two-dimensional space (in fact, at that point, it will become clear that the representation of the status quo requires more than one dimension).

6. What Denmark does in this case is nest the international game of European policymaking inside its domestic politics game in order to achieve a credible threat (Putnam 1988; Tsebelis 1990).

7. It is easy to verify that any point outside the heptagon 1′–7′ can be defeated by its projection on the closest side of this heptagon by a 54/76 qualified majority.

8. The following account is based mainly on Kim 1992; see also Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 170, and Stephen 1992.

9. Guy Peters argues that the case of occupational health provides another example of the power of the EP (1992, 102); and Juliet Lodge adds the case of a medical research program to the list (1989, 75).

10. The data come from European Parliament 1992 and cover the period from July 1987 to November 1991.

11. John Fitzmaurice, personal communication, March 1993.

12. Exceptions include tripartism in post-World War II France, the Grand Coalition in Germany (1966–69), post-1960s coalitions in Italy, and coalitions in Belgium and the Netherlands.

13. See Keohane and Hoffman 1991; Scharpf 1989; Webb 1983.

14. Other cases of such conditional delegation that I can think of are the veto power of the American president (conditional upon not violating the will of 2/3 of either House of Congress), the power of the German president to nominate the chancellor (conditional upon selecting a candidate acceptable to the Bundestag in the first round), and legislative veto in the United States.

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ARISTOTLE'S SCIENCE OF THE BEST REGIME

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Aristotle's science of the best regime brings to light an almost forgotten but by no means settled quarrel between reason and faith concerning the best way of life and its political embodiments. Aristotle denies the claimed superiority of divine legislation, in favor of the guidance supplied by unaided reason. Aristotle knows, however, as contemporary political science may not, that only by confronting the divine law as such can science avoid collapsing into dogmatism. The present study attempts to sketch that confrontation by considering Aristotle's analysis of justice—the concern fundamental to both Aristotle and divine law—in order simply to encourage the kind of reflection necessary to reinvigorate rationalism, or that which, according to Aristotle, is closest to the divine in man.

This essay contends that Aristotle's scientific account of the best form of government or "best regime"[1] in the *Politics* deserves serious reconsideration today because, quite apart from its specific conclusions or prescriptions, it brings to light a nearly forgotten but hardly settled dispute between reason and faith as to what the best way of life and its political embodiments are. In brief, can human beings by their own lights discover the good life, or are they necessarily dependent on the divine to reveal this to them?

The urgency of the need for political science to recover this question *as* a question and to think it through once again is perhaps not obvious at present, but this is likely to change. For modern liberalism's practical answer to it—in brief, the separation of church and state—now rests on theoretical foundations that have all but given way under the sustained critical onslaught of Nietzsche and his successors, and it is only reasonable to expect that this practical provision will one day collapse as well. Indeed, there are already indications that the subordination of religious beliefs to the private or subpolitical sphere is being severely tested, as in the emergence, for example, of Christian "fundamentalism" as a legitimate political force on the Right (Corbett 1990, 209–30; Jorstad 1987; Wald 1992, 222–78). Moreover, despite the apparently global rise of liberalism and its impressive victory over communism, there remain regimes virulently opposed to liberal democracy that, far from being soon-to-vanish relics of a benighted age, are at least holding their own and are arguably on the rise (see Fukuyama 1992, esp. 39–51; Hiro 1989; Naipaul 1981). In the most impressive cases, these antiliberal regimes ground their opposition to liberalism in an appeal to religious truth, especially Islamic law; the ordering of political life there owes, or is said to owe, its origin to the one true God whose law is as thoroughly political as any merely human law but is necessarily free of imperfection. Accordingly, these regimes deny not only that freedom or equality is the correct organizing principle of political life but also that reason is the means appropriate to the discovery of that principle.[2] The difficulty with which Aristotle's science of the best regime wrestles proves to be with us still, mutatis mutandis. And in order to live up to the rationality and openness that characterize liberalism at its best, we must try genuinely to think through this political quarrel between faith and rationalism and never permit ourselves recourse to indignation or derision to settle it. Both internal doubts and external challenges thus bid us to try to recapture the contest between reason and revelation as it was once played out on the level of politics and political philosophy.

To this end, I suggest a return to the exposition of this question in the classic of premodern political science, Aristotle's *Politics*. For the political science of Aristotle, especially in its guiding inquiry into the "best regime," is very much aware of and concerned to meet the challenges that any rational account of politics encounters in the face of suprarational claims to know what the best way of life is.[3] It is therefore particularly helpful in recovering that theologicopolitical understanding of the world against which the early philosophers of liberalism fought and according to which religion and politics rightly belong together—a view that not only remains the usual understanding in much of the non-Western world today but that gives every indication of reappearing here in one form or another. Of course, there are considerable differences between classical and modern political science on the one hand and between ancient piety and the living religions of today on the other. Only subsequent reflection can decide the extent to which Aristotle's specific answers can be adapted to guide us in our own circumstances. It is hoped, however, that this return to an older political science may be helpful to the liberal political scientist today in preparing the way for a truly fundamental debate between us as liberals and our contemporary antagonists both within and without, insofar as that debate ultimately concerns the competing claims of religion and reason to guide political life.

THE RATIONAL SCIENCE OF POLITICS AND THE DIVINE CITY

Aristotle's scientific attempt to determine the "best regime" in book 2 of the *Politics* includes both the denial of the claimed superiority of divine legislation and the contention that human beings are capable of discovering for themselves the best way of life and the political means needed to bring it about. Aristotle's science of politics may earn the right to criticize the divine city above all because it possesses a thoroughgoing analysis of the fundamental concern common to both Aristotle the scientist and the inhabitants of the divine city, the concern, namely, for justice.

The Quarrel Concerning the Best Regime

Aristotle first turns to the question of the best regime in book 2 of the *Politics*,[4] and it is there that he lays out, in a number of different ways, the fundamental issue of the origin and character of the account of the best regime. For example, Aristotle relates, in passing, how a certain Onomacritus is said to have been the first to become skilled at legislating (1274a22–31). A Locrian living on Crete, he practiced the art of prophecy (see also Herodotus, *History* 7.6). He was also said to be a companion of the philosopher Thales, future teacher of the lawgiver Lycurgus and Zaleucus. The story of Onomacritus is a digression from its immediate context and, moreover, is regarded by Aristotle as false. Why, then, does he tell it? This story or myth is significant because it raises the question of the *source* of legislative skill: Did Onomacritus become skilled on the basis of his prophetic art (practiced on the island of Crete, the home of the divine laws of Minos) or did his expertise result from his association with Thales, the tutor of Lycurgus and Zaleucus and perhaps the most famous of philosophers?[5] In other words, does the expertise in political affairs and, above all, the science of the founding of the best city, rely on knowledge accessible to the unassisted human mind or on superhuman inspiration? Does it owe its origin to "Thales" or "Onomacritus" (philosophy or prophecy, human reason or the gods)?[6]

Lest we miss the wood for the trees, the outline of book 2 as a whole points to much the same difficulty; for Aristotle there criticizes not only other rational or scientific attempts to delineate the best regime—those of Plato, Phaleus, and Hippodamus—but also three existing regimes, contenders to the title of best regime on account of their superlative laws: Sparta, Crete, and Carthage. In order properly to appreciate Aristotle's boldness, it is necessary to understand the divine character of every classical city: "We must not lose sight of the fact that, among the ancients, what formed the bond of every society was a worship. Just as a domestic altar held the members of a family grouped around it, so the city was the collective group of those who had the same protecting deities, and who performed the religious ceremony at the same altar" (Fustel de Coulanges 1956, 146). Again, "There was not a single act of public life in which the gods were not seen to take a part" (ibid., 163). Accordingly, "The founder was the man who accomplished the religious act without which a city could not exist. He established the hearth where the sacred fire was eternally to burn. He it was who, by his prayers and his rites, called the gods, and fixed them forever in the new city" (ibid., 142; see also, e.g., Rousseau, *Social Contract* 4.8). To criticize a city of emphatically divine origin and to replace it with a city of one's own making is therefore daring (see *Politics* 1260b33–36); Aristotle implies that he can do by his own powers what no human being or god before him had done adequately, namely found, if only in speech, the truly best regime or the city "in accordance with what one would pray for."[7] The gods and the divine form the background against which Aristotle sketches his rational science of politics in general and his best regime in particular, a background that occasionally but tellingly protrudes into the foreground.[8] Let me turn now to the most important elements of that science as they bear on my theme—to Aristotle's critique of law as such and then to the difficulties he discerns in the divine law of Crete.

The Rule of Law

Aristotle initially broaches the problem of law[9] in the third and last of his criticisms of a certain Hippodamus, the first to have attempted to give a theoretical account of the best regime without being engaged in politics himself (*Politics* 1268a6–8, 1268b22–1269a28). Hippodamus calls for the honoring of those who propose some innovation beneficial to the city, even if this involves changing the traditional laws. According to him, innovation or the departure from traditional practices has benefited the other arts, sciences, and capacities. The political art or science rightly belongs among these, and the departure from traditional ways will therefore benefit political science as well. Two pieces of evidence may be adduced in favor of this view. First, the old laws are overly simplistic and barbaric because those who drafted them were so. It is known, for example, that the Greeks used to carry arms and purchase their wives from one another. Why, then, should we retain their beliefs? We must be open to changes in the law. Second, there is a difficulty with written laws as such, for they are necessarily general while actions, as such, are particular. Laws should try to overcome this inherent shortcoming by being as flexible as possible: we must be open to changes in the law (1268b31–69a13).

Aristotle nowhere disagrees with the evidence adduced by Hippodamus or the "innovationists" that there has been an advance over the earliest times (e.g., *Politics* 1269a3–4; 1271b23–24) or more importantly that the generality of the law as such prevents it from being simply adequate in every particular circumstance or crisis: "Every law is universal and it is impossible to speak correctly and in a universal way about some things. Now where it is necessary to speak universally but impossible to do so correctly, the law grasps what is for the most part the case" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1137b12–19; *Politics* 1282b4–6). Nonetheless, Aristotle rejects Hippodamus' proposal as "unsafe" (*Politics* 1268b23–24). He does so in part because "the parallel of the arts is false": the law is indispensable to the political art and "holds no strength in regard to obedience apart from habit; this arises only over a period of time" (1269a19–22). Aristotle maintains, then, that the law is not simply rational and that the human beings who create the law as well as those who obey it do so on the basis of a reason alloyed with irrational opinions or passions: "Thus the exchanging of the existing laws for other, new laws weakens the power of the law" (ibid. 22–24).

Aristotle's view of law and the danger of legal innovation might well seem to be conservative in the extreme. It ought to be recognized, however, that Aristotle does admit the desirability of changes in particularly foolish or barbaric laws (see *Politics* 1269a15–17). But more important, the *basis* of his conservatism is radically different from that of the conservatives who seek to maintain the traditional laws on the grounds that they are good because traditional (see 1287b5–8 and context). Aristotle's conservatism, far from being a kind of celebration of the traditional, receives its impetus from the insight into the flawed character of all law. While agreeing more or less with the practice of the conservatives, then, Aristotle is more "radical" in spirit than even the innovationists insofar as he denies to the law the very possibility of full rationality. From Aristotle's point of view, the conservatives and the innovationists are united in their unwarranted optimism regarding the possible goodness of the law (see 1281a34–39, 1282b1–10, 1283b35–42). When thought through, the conservatism informing Aristotle's *Politics* is a point of entry into philosophy, not an exhortation to devotion to the classical polis.

Against all of the foregoing, one might adduce Aristotle's elevated and even beautiful remarks regarding the law in book 3. The rule of law is there said to be akin to the rule of "the god and nous." Devoid as it is of desire and spiritedness, the law is held to be reason itself, to be "intelligence without longing" (1287a10–32). A consideration of the context of these remarks, however, makes it clear that this is the view advanced by a "republican" partisan (ibid. 10–12; cf. Leyden 1967, 9). And in this section of book 3, Aristotle repeats almost verbatim a remark from the Hippodamus passage, namely that "the example of the arts seems to be false" (cf. 1269a19 and 1287a32–33). In the present context this means that while we wish doctors to exercise their art on a case-by-case basis without being strictly bound by a set of formal rules, it is better for the practitioners of the political art to follow rules (laws) because the politicians are much more inclined than are doctors to do harm to those they are supposed to help. The obedience to set laws, then, will at least curb this tendency. Doctor and patient have an obvious common good in the health of the patient; much less obvious is the good common to both ruler and ruled. To overstate the case, Aristotle too comes to recommend the rule of law, not because the law is so good but because politics is so defective. The law is indeed a mean between the rule without laws characteristic of the doctor, which seems to have no counterpart in politics, and the rule without laws characteristic of tyranny or anarchy (see 1287b4–5). The rule of law is then a sensible compromise but it is not the rule of god and nous (ibid. a32–b4). It would seem, in addition, that the rule of a god cannot be exercised by means of law alone. Regardless of its origin, any law that wishes to rule human beings here and now, without benefit of a miraculous change in human nature and hence in the nature of politics, must partake of the limitations inherent in law as such. The law must thus be supplemented by wise judges and interpreters—by human beings who, possessing practical wisdom (*phronêsis*), are capable of discerning and adapting the spirit of the law to a given circumstance. Even if the law is as perfect at the outset as one would pray for, it must nonetheless be administered by subsequent generations of human beings who constitute a regime that is, as such, superior to (because able to interpret and change) the law (see 1281a36–39, 1282b8–13). From these general considerations let us pass to the specific difficulties Aristotle discerns in the divine law of Crete.

The Critique of Divine Law: Crete

Minos was the legendary son of Zeus renowned in the classical world for his justice[10] and who, after keeping company with Zeus, gave to the island of Crete its laws (see, e.g., *Iliad* 13.450 and Plato's *Apology* 41a, *Minos,* and the beginning of the *Laws;* see also Huxley 1971). The Cretan regime is then ancient and of a most august heritage. It is also seminal. Carthage resembles Sparta most, but Sparta itself owes much to Crete, Lycurgus having spent considerable time there (*Politics* 1271b25–27; 1272b25–26). Minos is thus the example par excellence of the divine lawgiver in the *Politics,* Crete, of the divine city (or cities).

The first part of Aristotle's examination of Crete concerns domestic or economic questions, the second, the ordering of the regime, or political questions strictly speaking. Aristotle begins the latter by criticizing the Cretan manner of electing the *orderers (kosmoi),* for while the regime is not compelled to choose from the demos, it nonetheless selects at random those who possess no more merit than the demos. And although the senators (*gerontes*) are chosen only from those who have served previously as orderers, they are unaudited and rule in that powerful office for life. Finally, the demos meets in an assembly but is nothing more than a rubber stamp for the orderers and senators. While the fact of the demos's peaceableness is laudable, it is misleading: as Aristotle indicates presently, this tranquillity is due, above all, to Crete's location, distant from those who would incite or corrupt the people. In his concluding remarks to the analysis of Crete (*Politics* 1272b7–23), Aristotle allows us to wonder whether the demos will not be infected by the instability of the orderers on the one hand and by a recent war on the other.[11] With the exception of Minos's arrangements regarding the messes (1271a26–29; 1272a12–27), every virtue of the Cretan regime (the manageability of its slaves, the placidity of the demos, and the regime's very preservation) is traceable to its location, that is, to chance (1269a39, 1272a39–b1, b16–19). A recent attack on Crete suggested that that natural buffer was no longer effective. It would seem that for Crete and the Minoan legislation, long in a period of political decline, the writing was on the wall.

Aristotle's critique of Crete would indeed seem to cast a genuine shadow on the Minoan legislation. It is difficult to imagine that Minos was indifferent to the stability of the whole regime or to the very survival of its people (and therewith of the laws themselves). In other words, it seems that the Minoan legislation, as legislation, claims to do in a more perfect manner what merely human legislation tries to do, namely to secure the well-being here and now of the political community dedicated to the true good, the goodness of which is meant to be visible to all who have eyes to see. This essentially *political* character of divine law in the classical city has its counterparts also in our own tradition: "Behold, I have taught you statutes and judgments, even as the Lord my God commanded me, that ye should do so in the land whither ye go to possess it. Keep therefore and do them: for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people" (Deuteronomy 4:5–6). It is precisely as *political* entities—meant to effect change for the better in this life and with a view to human beings as we know them—that the divine law and the divine city admit of the same kind of analysis as do the admittedly human institutions of Plato, Hippodamus, and the rest. By virtue of this claim, common to the laws of both Moses and Minos because common to law as such, there appears to be a common ground between Aristotelian political science as the science of the best regime on the one hand and the comprehension, necessary to the dutiful obedience to it, of the divine law or the virtuous city on the other. By making a claim meant to affect human beings in humanly comprehensible ways, therefore, the divine legislation is open to a human science, namely to political science.

This statement of the importance of political science nonetheless ignores a crucial possibility. Might not divine legislation have access to privileged knowledge unavailable as such to the scientist and in the light of which apparent failings on the plane of ordinary politics would reveal themselves as the mark of "Zeus," that is, of true perfection? Are not the ways of Zeus partly and even wholly mysterious? How is the scientist, including the political scientist, to proceed in the face of this claim? If at one point Aristotle praises Minos for having "philosophized," is there any indication that Minos himself wished to be judged by the standard of philosophy or that this standard is in any way germane (*Politics* 1272a22–23)? If there is no solution to this difficulty that is acceptable in principle to both scientists and citizens of the divine city, the political scientist would be revealed to be a boaster whose putatively rational findings rest on a nonrational belief in the power of reason. Political science would remain at least as pretentious—and therefore as laughable—as Aristotle himself indicates it was at its "Hippodamean" origins (1267b22–30).

To be sure, maintaining this extreme position carries a price: the divine city and its laws cease to be indications to all of the wisdom and understanding of those who follow them. In the light of what understanding, then, would the adherent of the divine law be led to deny the otherwise powerful critique of the divine law that Aristotle presents? Some other consideration, some *x*, must be at work in the heart and mind of the faithful to lead them to do so. Insofar as Aristotle himself turns, immediately after his critique of other, would-be best regimes, to a consideration of justice (book 3), he at least raises the possibility that the *x* in question is the concern for justice. For the law wishes above all to be just or righteous and to instill in those who follow it an understanding of and devotion to justice or righteousness. The concern with the law points ultimately to the concern for justice, and divine law is distinguished above all by its superior justice. Such concern for justice, moreover, is at the center of political philosophy in general and of Aristotelian political philosophy, in particular. I suggest that this shared concern for justice supplies to both the citizens of the divine city and the political scientist a genuine common ground.

THE ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE

The analysis of justice, if it begins from and remains true to the concerns of most importance to the adherent of the divine law, supplies the proper starting point to understand that law and the piety at its core. The analysis of justice may therefore shed light on the difficulty with which book 2 as a whole leaves us, the problem of divine legislation and the status of political science as the science of the divine city.

The Problem of Justice in the Political Community

Aristotle begins the most important section of his analysis of justice (*Politics* 3.9–13) by stating a point of agreement between all political parties in their reasoning about justice and injustice, namely that justice is equality for those who are equal and inequality for those who are unequal (1280a9–22). Now this agreement, important as it is, does not go very far, for the wealthy, the free, the nobly born, and so on all contend that their peculiar excellence or preeminence is most important to the city's well-being and as such is the just title to rule: "Some who are unequal in something, for example, wealth, suppose that they are unequal generally, and others who are equal in something, for example, freedom, suppose that they are equal generally" (ibid., 22–25).

While the partisans may disagree vehemently regarding the rank of the various preeminences, they do not disagree—or would not, if pressed—concerning the avowed aim of the honor or office allotted thereon, namely, the happiness of the citizens living in a healthy political community. Aristotle devotes a good part of *Politics* 3.9 to fleshing out what is implied in this common presupposition because it proves to be, or at any rate to lead to, the immanent standard by which he judges the justice of all regimes. Aristotle argues that the various claims to rule advanced by the partisans look only to an incomplete version of what the city is meant to aim at according to the self-understanding of the partisans themselves. Just as the sharing of a common location, the practice of intermarriage, and commercial exchange do not by themselves constitute a city, neither do wealth, freedom, and military excellence yet make a *political* community in the full sense. All of these "must be present if there is to be a city, but there is not yet a city when quite all of these are present"; for the city is "a partnership in living well, for both households and families, for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life" (1280b31–35). This means in turn living "happily and nobly," so that "one must posit that the political community exists for the sake of noble actions" (1281a2–3). Out of the turmoil characteristic of the fundamental disputes over the question of rule, then, Aristotle discerns this provisional agreement regarding the goal of politics as such: all agree that the community exists for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient, (i.e., a happy and noble) life, and all believe in principle that those who contribute unequally to this most important end should enjoy unequal reward. *Politics* 3.9 concludes with a concise statement of the standard of judging thus arrived at: "Accordingly, those who contribute most to such a community have more of a share of the city than either those who are equal or greater in freedom or family but unequal in political virtue, or those who outdo them in wealth but are outdone in virtue" (1281a4–8). And yet this principle of adjudication is perhaps not so unproblematic as it may seem, for Aristotle adds immediately, "It is clear from what has been said, then, that *all* of those who dispute concerning the regimes speak of a certain *part* of justice" (1281a8–10, emphasis mine). Could it be that no faction speaks of the whole of justice?

Aristotle begins *Politics* 3.10 by wondering "what the authoritative element of the city should be": The multitude, the wealthy, the decent or equitable (*epieikeis*), the one best, or the tyrant? And just as the principle of adjudication adduced in chapter 9 seems to be problematic, so "*all* of these [elements] appear to involve a difficulty" (1281a13–14; emphasis added). In order to spell this out, Aristotle focuses not on the fulfillment of the community's highest goals—on "political virtue" and the performance of "noble actions"—but on the problem of securing, once any one group has come to power, that civil stability requisite to the higher goals indicated (ibid. 14–). It is unjust if the poor, by virtue of being the majority, rob the rich of their possessions, even if such robbery is sanctioned by the authoritative assembly. This will destroy the city, and virtue does not destroy that which possesses it. Such action is based on nothing but superior force and as such is indistinguishable from the actions of a tyrant. No better is the rule of the few over the many if they too will pillage the possessions of the ruled (ibid. 24–28). But one might well suppose that some of the few or the many would not be rapacious and could rule moderately. The next claim to rule mentioned in chapter 10 is precisely that of the decent or equitable human beings. Since these are necessarily few, however, their rule would exclude from office, and hence from the honor always associated with it, the vast majority of the community (1281a28–32). This same difficulty is all the more acute in the case of the rule of the one most outstanding human being. Thus the rich and the poor will be at one another's throats, and the decent, like the one best, will be at the mercy of the many indecent, whether rich or poor. Since Aristotle does not stoop to consider the tyrant's claim to rule, he substitutes for it a consideration of the rule of law (cf. 1281a13 and 34–39). It is wrong to suppose, however, that the laws can somehow rise above the interests and errors of the human beings who formulate them. The law itself must be either democratic or oligarchic, for example, and so will share in the defects inherent in those regimes (ibid. 34–39). There does not seem to be any easy solution to the problem of rule.

After attempting, with only limited success, to sketch a "republican" compromise to the problem of rule (*Politics* 3.11), Aristotle makes something of a new beginning at chapter 12 (cf. the beginnings of *Politics* 1 and 4 and the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*). The political partisans are now said to agree not merely with one another but with "the arguments in accord with philosophy" that justice is certain equality (cf. 1282b18–20 and 1280a9–22). Justice will now be considered from the highest point of view, that of "political philosophy" (1282b23). Aristotle argues at some length that the capacity or preeminence serving as the basis of the distribution of goods must be relevant and that the well-born, the free, and the wealthy thus all have a genuine claim, since there cannot be a city of slaves or paupers. Furthermore, "justice and the military virtue" are necessary to a city's being nobly administered, and those who excel in these have a claim, as well. To this point, Aristotle's argument recalls the lower standard of adjudication seen in *Politics* 3.10–11, namely, that which looks to the demands of the city's existence. The crucial shift occurs at the beginning of chapter 13: "All, or at least some, of these might be held to contend [for office] correctly *with a view to the city's existence*. However, *with a view to the good life*, education and virtue, above all, would contend justly" (1283a23–26;

emphasis added). That is, good birth, wealth, freedom, military virtue, and even justice are necessary preconditions to "the good life"; but they do not by themselves constitute that life. While chapter 13 thus recalls that other, higher strand of justice seen in chapter 9 that looks to the good of each, it is not clear, now that "political philosophy" has been introduced, whether even these two "higher" standards are simply identical. Whereas in chapter 9 the higher end whereby equality and inequality were to be judged was the happy and noble life consisting of the performance of the "noble actions" proceeding from "political virtue" (1280b5, 1281a2–3, 7), the end in question here is simply "the good life" to which "education" and "virtue" are means. It is clear, in other words, neither whether the performance of "noble actions" is the same as "the good life" nor whether "political virtue" is equivalent to "virtue" unqualified. Might "political philosophy" lead beyond the claim of any one political partisan, or beyond politics as such, in the search for the true good?

This possibility is played out in Aristotle's treatment of kingship or, more precisely, of a certain kind of "absolute kingship" (*Politics* 3.13–18).[12] If some human beings should arise in the city who surpass all others in point of virtue and political capacity and yet are insufficient in number to found a city unto themselves, one nevertheless ought not to consider them a part of the city: "for they shall be done an injustice in being deemed worthy of equal things when they are unequal to such an extent in regard to virtue and the political capacity"; a member of them is "like a god among human beings" (1284a3–11). Since the political community is an association of free persons similar in kind and since the law or legislation is an integral part of any political community, it is necessarily the case that "legislation pertains to those who are equal in regard to stock and capacity and that there is no law for such [outstanding] persons. For they are themselves a law" (ibid. 12–14).

Would not the best regime, however, as such take its bearings by justice in the sense of giving to each what is truly good for him? "As for the best regime, there is much perplexity as to what one ought to do if someone arises who differs, not by being outstanding with respect to the other goods (e.g., strength, wealth, and abundance of friends) but in point of virtue. For surely they would not say that they ought to expel and cast out such a person, but neither ought they to rule such a one. It would be as if, in dividing up the offices, they deemed themselves worthy to rule over Zeus" (*Politics* 1284b25–31). According to the higher principle that Aristotle has outlined to adjudicate the claims to rule—and to which he here returns—the human being of outstanding virtue in the best regime must rule: "So it remains—a fact which seems naturally to arise—for all to obey such a person gladly, so as to make such persons permanent kings in the cities" (ibid. 32–34). This, then, would seem to bring to a close Aristotle's discussion of justice and rule. All regimes wish to promote the common good as they see it, and all wrongly suppose that the part of excellence they call their own is the whole of excellence. All regimes, even and especially aristocracies, would have to yield in the face of the one best human being. Given the vivid portrait in the *Politics* of the quarrels between the various political factions, however, does Aristotle believe in all seriousness that, while it may be in some sense "natural" to yield to such a one, any regime, including the best regime, would do so "gladly" (e.g., 1281a16, b18–20)? The merit to rule must be accompanied by the capacity to be obeyed (1284b32), and we have seen already the difficulty involved in the claim to rule of even the decent or equitable human beings: in order to be obeyed, they would likely have to employ the services of the indecent—of a "people's security force"—and this changes fundamentally the character of the rule. Can kingship solve this aspect of the problem of rule (see Vander Waerdt 1985, 261–64)?

In order for the absolute king to rule justly in the sense both of the deserts of the individual and of the common good, not only must he possess the true peak of virtue (whatever that may be) but the multitude must recognize that virtue for what it is and thus willingly accept his rule. If these two criteria are met, the rule of an absolute king is fully just—and is so, Aristotle argues, according to the logic of the arguments of those who found aristocracies, oligarchies, and democracies (*Politics* 1288a19–25). What, then, is the outstanding virtue in question that is as such *the* title to rule? However vague Aristotle may be here, he is as forthright as possible in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7–8: theoretical (contemplative) virtue is superior to moral virtue, and one possessing the higher virtue to a greater degree is superior to one possessing the lower (1098a16–18). Even in the present context, Aristotle determines "virtue" in the light of "the good life" (*Politics* 3.13), and in the final analysis, the good life is the philosophic one, as is confirmed not least by Aristotle's sketch of the best political life in chapters 7–8: the best regime is best because it is directed above all to "leisure," the closest imitation of the philosophic life that is possible within the confines of the political community. Aristotle ultimately judges political life, that is, in the light of a philosophic and apolitical standard. Wisdom is in a sense the supreme title to rule, and the human being who possesses it most merits rule above all others.[13] The extreme kingship under discussion is, in short, the rule of a "philosopher–king." Aristotle's silence on this singular institution in Plato's *Republic* 2.2–5 is to some extent compensated for by his discussion here of the "absolute king" (Vander Waerdt 1985, 268–73). To be sure, this is the political—and therefore limited or distorted—presentation of the philosopher, the only presentation possible in the *Politics*.

Once one sees the extreme character of the kingship in question,[14] the difficulty of its realization becomes clear. Only in primitive or barbaric times would there likely be a community willing to accept such absolute rule, but only in later times is one likely to find a human being of such outstanding virtue, for philosophy does not belong to the early times (*Politics*

1252b19–26; 1285a16–18, 30 and b4–5; 1286b20–22; see also Strauss 1964, 37). It is thus unreasonable to expect both of the foregoing conditions ever to be met, and the absolute kingship Aristotle here describes is for all practical purposes impossible. The description of this kingship is then a kind of experiment on Aristotle's part, an attempt to give virtue its day in the political community. As quickly becomes evident, the political community properly speaking (i.e., the association of free and equal persons meant to secure a complete and self-sufficient life) cannot tolerate the peak of human excellence, so great is the possible disparity in virtue among human beings. The political community must either become something like a large family headed by a human being of outstanding virtue as a kind of beneficent parent or it must ostracize him. The discussion of this extreme kingship is thus linked with the preceding discussion of justice because, while it more or less ignores the strand of justice that takes into account civil stability (and hence the consent of the governed), it takes most seriously the other strand of justice that promises to provide true virtue and happiness to all, including those capable of attaining the peak of virtue.

Justice and Divine Law

Let me try to summarize the preceding and bring out its implications for my theme. In every political community, human beings hold fast to deeply opposed opinions concerning the true political or common good. These conflicts over what constitute the essentials of a good life impose limits on the extent to which any one faction can force its own view of the good on the citizen body as a whole, for the group in question would be compelled either to yield to the conflicting claims that always threaten to erupt into civil war (i.e., dilute its claim to rule on the basis of X) or to resort to violence to enforce it (i.e., pollute its claim to rule on the basis of X). Moreover, if a human being should arise who embodies what is according to Aristotle the genuine peak of human excellence—philosophy, or contemplation—the legislator must nonetheless act "with a view to the advantage of the whole city and the common [advantage] of the citizens" (*Politics* 1283b40–42). Even the "most correct laws," then, look not to the highest that a human being can attain but to the advantage of the whole or to that which is common to all the citizens (ibid. 38). It is too much to hope that laws can look to—much less secure—the highest human good. This means that even the best law or the best regime is only imperfectly just: every community is compelled to secure what I have called civil stability. The attainment of justice in this sense prevents the community from being just in the higher sense of giving to each what is his due, that is, what is good for him.

Any appeal to the divine, then, insofar as it wishes to be political, is similarly confronted with the brute fact of the persistence of conflicting opinion regarding the good and of the recalcitrance on the part of most human beings to alter or adapt their deepest convictions. In the absence of a wholly unambiguous sign available to all alike, the appeal in question would not enjoy the unanimity that proceeds from knowledge alone (see Isaiah 11:9). The heterodoxy of nay-sayers or "heretics" would pose a *political* problem whose resolution would require either the dilution or corruption of the claim to rule and therefore would cast a shadow on the justice of the claim in question.

More important, if the general thrust of the preceding analysis of "absolute kingship" is correct, Aristotle means to suggest that no political community can be fully just because none can give to the peak of excellence its due within the confines of a community. The highest human good is then suprapolitical. By contrast, the divine law, as law, maintains that human happiness is attainable on the plane of politics (properly guided and supplemented) or that the problem of justice admits of a political solution. The most powerful reason for this greater optimism concerning politics is the contention that the gods are not only political but also providential; that is, they look after the city and its citizens and provide for their well-being in accord with the justice or injustice of their actions:

> It is quite clear that both Greeks and Barbarians believe that the gods know all things, present and future. All cities, at any rate, and all tribes ask the gods, by means of divination, what they ought to do and what not; all at any rate ask the gods to avert wretched things and grant the good. So you see, these gods who know all things and are able to do all things are my friends in such a way that, through their care for me, I have never yet escaped their notice, night or day, wherever I may be setting off or in whatever I may be about to do. Through their foreknowledge of what will result from every action, they signify to me whatever I must do and what I ought not to do by sending me voices, dreams, and birds of omen as messengers. Whenever I have obeyed them, I have never yet repented of it; but now and again, when I failed to trust in them, I was punished. (Xenophon, *Symposium* 4.47–48)

At the core of the law, then, is the belief in providential gods. Such gods know full well that "some excellent individuals are in a sorry and grievous plight whereas some wicked individuals are in good and pleasurable circumstances" (Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* 3.16). They know "the private and public fortunes of bad and unjust human beings . . . and that there are some who have partaken of many terrible impieties and through these very things have risen from low positions to tyrannies and the highest stations" (Plato, *Laws* 899e–900a). Being manifestly concerned with human affairs, however, the gods will rectify, in this life or after death, any discrepancy between merit and reward. In short, providential gods ensure the eventual prosperity of the just and the suffering of the unjust. It is not only the attachment to political justice, then, that might lie behind the rejection of Aristotle's rational science of the divine city but rather or more precisely the understanding that the gods support that attachment by making justice unambiguously good for one. It follows that however perplexing the *means* of providence may appear to us here and now (e.g., the very destruction of the political order based on the law), no one who is seriously devoted to the law would deny *that* the gods will, in their manner, provide for the good of the just. Even the destruction indicated must ultimately be held to be for the best. And to defend the law by appealing to the mysteriousness of Zeus runs the risk of blasphemy if in so doing one renders doubtful the fact of the goodness of the law and hence of divine providence.

The necessity of this recourse to providence implies that justice or moral virtue is, by itself, an insufficient end of political life because it does not, by itself, always provide for the happiness of the just or virtuous. It is important to see that so far from denying this view implicit in the law, Aristotle agrees with it: "Now someone might suppose that this [i.e., moral virtue] is even more an end of the political life [than honor]. But virtue too seems to be a rather incomplete end. For it seems possible for one to possess virtue . . . while suffering terribly and undergoing the greatest misfortunes. No one would say that a person living in this way is happy" (*Ethics* 1095b30–1096a2). The question with which we are concerned may now be made more precise: Since Aristotle, too, concedes the difficulty with moral virtue that belief in providential gods would solve, why does he look not to piety but to contemplation as its necessary supplement?

To begin with, the resolution of the problem of the goodness of justice by recourse to providential gods bears witness to Aristotle's dictum, "Everyone does everything for the sake of what is held to be good" (*Politics* 1252a2–3; see also, e.g., *Politics* 1324a33–35; *Ethics* 1129b5–6 and context, 1155b23–26, 1159a10–12, 1166a14–18). For the devotion to the common good and the willingness to sacrifice oneself on its behalf, while noble and hence attractive on their own, do not go unnoticed by superintending gods. Such sacrifice is as a result made still more attractive because it holds out the promise of our happiness: "One who, in accord with his capacity, does not fall short in honoring the gods should take heart and hope for the greatest goods. For one who is sensible would not have greater hopes from others than from those who are capable of bestowing the greatest things, nor would he be more sensible in any other way than by pleasing these [gods]" (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.3.17). Human beings cannot but pursue what seems good to them, and the very belief in providential gods concurs with—in fact it affirms and underscores—this philosophic view according to which what we hold to be good is our primary end or aim. Here too, then, Aristotle and the divine law are at one.

It is at this point that one comes to something of a crossroads, for much (not to say everything) depends on one's understanding of the manner in which the good appears to us. Aristotle's own view is difficult of access, and it may be helpful first to sketch a philosophic position he presents but explicitly rejects in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. According to it, not only is the good primary, but human beings are not in the end responsible for the manner in which that good appears to them. It is therefore irrational either to praise or to blame another on moral grounds. Aristotle reports this contention as follows:

> Someone might say that all seek what seems good, but that they are not in control of the appearance [of the good]; rather, whatever sort of person each one is determines the sort of end that appears to him. Now if on the one hand each one is somehow responsible for his own character [*hexis*], then he will be somehow responsible also for the appearance [of the good]. If on the other hand he is not responsible, no one would be responsible for his acting badly; instead, he does what he does through ignorance of the end, supposing that through these actions, he will attain what is best for himself. The aiming at the end is not of one's own choosing, but necessarily arises by nature, just as one possesses sight, by means of which he shall judge nobly and choose what is truly good. He is of a good nature to whom this has nobly arisen by nature. For this is the greatest and noblest thing, and cannot be taken or learnt from another; rather, such a one possesses it by nature. When this has well and nobly arisen by nature—this is the complete and true meaning of "good-natured." (*Ethics* 1114a31–b12)

According to this view, moral responsibility depends on our being in some way responsible for our *hexis* ("character," "fixed state [of soul]"). The *hexeis*, moreover, "arise from the corresponding activities. Hence it is necessary to make the activities of a certain quality, for the *hexeis* follow upon the differences among these [activities]. It makes no small difference, then, whether one is habituated in this or that way from early youth—it makes an altogether considerable difference, or rather the whole difference" (*Ethics* 1103b21–25). The familial circumstances into which we are born and the upbringing we receive are as little our own doing and so as little our responsibility as the still more determinative laws there current (see 1179b31–32). It is therefore difficult to see how, according to this argument, we are responsible for our *hexis* and hence for the way in which the good appears to us. But is it not up to us to seek out reason and instruction to remedy what our circumstances may have denied us? Alas, "reason and instruction are not effective in all cases. It is necessary instead to prepare beforehand the soul of the listener by means of habits with a view to rejoicing and hating nobly, just as the land that is to nourish the seed [must be prepared beforehand]" (ibid. 23–26). We seem to have arrived at the paradox that only a proper upbringing can make possible one's openness to the instruction capable of remedying a deficient upbringing. If some do seek out instruction and alter their behavior accordingly—if they pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, so to speak—what could either lead them to do so or enable them to be benefited thereby, apart from a particularly good nature? Yet "what comes from nature is clearly not present on account of us, but rather is present to those truly fortunate ones through certain divine causes" (ibid.

21–22). According to this view, then, some combination of nature and nurture always determines our *hexis* and hence the way in which the good appears to us.

This understanding of the determined character of the good would have important consequences for belief in providential gods and, therewith, the adherence to divine law. For the very gods who are concerned with human affairs make known that concern by punishing those who choose badly or basely and by rewarding those who choose well or nobly. One's own good, then, is provided for with the greatest possible certainty even as one attempts to secure, through self-sacrifice, the good of others. Moreover, since the determinants of the appearance of the good can always be traced, according to this argument, to some cause "outside" the agent (nature, upbringing, or both) we are not strictly speaking responsible for the choices in question. But this means that it would be wrong, precisely on moral grounds, to punish those who cannot help but pursue the good as they cannot help but conceive it. To suppose that the gods punish those who act under the force of compulsion would be to attribute gross injustice to them—to deny the fundamental character of the gods and hence of the law (see Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* 5.105.1–3). There is so to speak nothing left for the gods to do. The expectation of divine intervention would be irrational on terms ultimately agreeable to and even demanded by the suppliant. In brief, the divine law presupposes the rationality of responsibility while at the same time corroborating unawares the philosophic position that denies it, insofar as the law promises to secure the good of the obedient. The law therefore contradicts itself, and it could in principle be shown to do so to anyone willing to listen.

To repeat, Aristotle explicitly rejects the main premise of this argument, as appears toward the end of his discussion of responsibility (*Ethics* 3.5): "Whether indeed the end, of whatever sort it may be, appears to each not by nature but is to some extent present in himself, or whether the end is natural, virtue is voluntary in that the morally serious man [*spoudaios*] does all else voluntarily. . . . If then, as it is said, the virtues are voluntary (for we are somehow jointly responsible for our characters and we have posited this or that end by virtue of our being of a certain sort), the vices would be voluntary as well" (1114b16–24 and context).

One might say provisionally that Aristotle's own, more moderate approach is a mean between the view just sketched and the understanding presupposed by the law, for while refusing to call into question the responsibility of the individual, he takes a step in this direction as regards the regime. We have seen that according to Aristotle, every regime understands itself to be based on the truly relevant claim to political rule and therefore to embody and to foster true virtue. Every regime, in other words, is concerned to justify its rule and believes that it can do so. The variety of regimes is therefore traceable to the variety of the views of what is truly good (see the beginning of *Politics* 4.3, 1289b27–1290a13 and 1328a40–b2). All are concerned with (what they take to be) the highest things and strive after (what they take to be) the good. As Aristotle states at the beginning of the *Politics*, "*Every* community has been constituted for the sake of some good, for everyone does everything for the sake of what is held to be good" (1252a1–4, emphasis mine; see also the beginning of the *Ethics* 1094a1–3).

This means in the first place that since all regimes are concerned with what they believe to be good, it cannot be said that they knowingly or voluntarily found a vicious regime or that they voluntarily instill vice either in themselves or in others. As a result, the distinction that Aristotle draws in *Politics* 3.7–8, according to which the unjust regimes look to the advantage of the rulers rather than to the common advantage, or ignore justice in order to pursue their own good, is too simplistic because it overlooks the concern present to all regimes to justify their rule in terms of a common good. In chapter 13, Aristotle maintains rather that the "deviations" are simply *mistaken* as to what they take to be the just basis of the distribution of prerogatives. They are nonetheless very much concerned with justice. Aristotle accordingly concludes there that "*all* dispute in a certain manner justly, but *all* do not do so justly without qualification" (1283a30–31, emphasis mine)—that is, democracy and polity, oligarchy and aristocracy, tyranny and kingship are all to some extent just but none is so unqualifiedly (see 1279b11–15). In the *Ethics*, Aristotle gives a more adequate statement of the distinctions among regimes that takes into account the primacy of the good on the level of the regime: "By instilling [good] habits in the citizens, the legislators make them good, *and this is the wish of every legislator*. All those who do not do so well, miss the mark; it is in regard to this that a good regime differs from a poor one" (1103b2–6; emphasis mine). It is therefore more reasonable to conceive of defective regimes as foolish, blind, or mistaken than as unjust or evil. To demand retribution or revenge—to call upon the gods to punish them—may be politically salutary, but it is strictly speaking irrational (cf. Plato, *Laws* 860d and 873e–874a).

There is thus a gradual movement in Aristotle's political science away from considerations of justice toward those of what is good for human beings. This movement, which begins by "listening" to political argument and by taking seriously the self-understanding of the regimes, culminates in the denial of the possibility of perfect justice on the level of the regime. Not so much justice and its demands, then, as human nature and its health take pride of place. And as the good ascends in importance, so too does theoretical virtue, for in the end the greatest task comes into sight as the pursuit of those virtues whose very possession constitutes the happiness of their possessor and that therefore require no external support or reward. Such is the description in the *Ethics* of theoretical, as opposed to practical, virtue (see

1178a23–1178b5). However rare the full embodiment of that higher virtue may be, however fleeting or occasional its pleasures for the rest of us (see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1072b25), the peak of human happiness (according to Aristotle) consists nonetheless in the activity of philosophy. Aristotle's political science would therefore seem to deny the necessity, in order to be happy, of the support that providential gods supply. There is so to speak nothing left for such gods to do.

By thus thinking through our profound longings for happiness, which most naturally find their first expression in the hope for a "best regime" guided by a perfect law (i.e., in political terms), we may come to see the transpolitical activity that is according to Aristotle their true fulfillment. We may become genuinely open to the possibility that the human mind is at home in this world, that looking upon or contemplating it is in principle sufficient for happiness, and that there is as a result no need to make further demands upon the given world. One could put this another way by saying that according to Aristotle, human beings are by nature best suited to worship the god he sometimes describes—the god, that is, who "rules" by being the object of our love and who seems in the end to be indistinguishable from the activity of contemplation (*Eudemian Ethics* 1249b13–25; *Ethics* 1178b21–22 and context; *Politics* 1323b23–26; 1325b28–30).

CONCLUSION

By sketching Aristotle's critique of divine law and his corresponding defense of the possibility of political science, I have tried first and foremost simply to recover as a genuine problem the difficulty with which Aristotle dealt. I cannot hope to have done more than offer a tentative and heuristic outline of the premodern understanding of political things that affirmed the sufficiency of human reason to guide political life against those who, by appealing to suprarational edicts or to special knowledge, would deny it. The preceding remarks, that is, are intended merely to indicate the nature of the doubts that Aristotle's analysis seems to raise concerning divine law as such. For those who remain dissatisfied, I appeal to the authority of the great medieval student of Aristotle, Moses Maimonides (*Guide of the Perplexed* 2.22):

> You may say: Can doubts disprove an opinion or establish its contrary as true? Surely this is not so. However, we shall treat this philosopher [Aristotle] as his followers have enjoined us to treat him. For Alexander [of Aphrodisias] has explained that in every case in which no demonstration is possible, the two contrary opinions with regard to the matter in question should be posited as hypotheses, and it should be seen what doubts attach to each of them: the one to which fewer doubts attach should be believed. Alexander says that things are thus with respect to all the opinions regarding the divine that Aristotle sets forth and regarding which no demonstration is possible. For everyone who has come after Aristotle says that what Aristotle stated about them arouses fewer doubts than whatever else might be said about them.

As for the applicability of this analysis to the comparable challenges that liberalism is now, once again, beginning to face, it would be premature to attempt to traverse the very great distance between Aristotle and ourselves before grasping adequately Aristotle's own understanding, and in what follows I shall remain at the level of the difficulty at hand, rather than its resolution. I suggest that reflection on the problem at the core of Aristotle's science of the best regime can help us to make full use, on an individual or private basis, of the extraordinary freedom we enjoy, in the first place by bringing home to us the considerable price at which that freedom was purchased; for in order to quell the political tumult that had plagued the "petty Republics" of antiquity (*Federalist* 9), the modern liberal state saw fit to secure principally those conditions of communal life needed to avoid the incontestable summum malum—violent death—while relegating to the private sphere the necessarily controversial questions concerning the summum bonum. Chief among the latter, however, were opinions about God, the coming into being of the universe, and man's place in that universe. In the end, it was only by "detaching religion from the soul" that liberalism could secure the stability and liberty it sought, and the best way to "attack a religion" proved to be "by favor, by the commodities of life, by the hope of fortune; not by what draws attention to it, but by what makes one forget it; not by what makes one indignant but by what leads to indifference." Even the question of the immortality of the soul belonged, in the final analysis, to the class of "indifferent things," men being made "to preserve, feed and clothe themselves, and to do all the things of society" (Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois* 25.12; see also 24.11, 19–22).

This public and therefore respectable indifference to matters of religion eventually made it possible—and perhaps even necessary—for the citizen of the liberal republic to believe, with Jefferson, that "it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg" (1984, 285).[15] Reflection on Aristotle's science of the best regime is therefore helpful in counteracting this indifference, engendered by liberalism, to serious thoughts about God or "whatever it is that keeps this All together" (*Politics* 1326a32–33), thoughts that in every nonliberal time and place are held to be of first importance for human beings. Once alerted to this deficiency, moreover, there is no manifest reason why one cannot subsequently revive the debate indicated between the two competing accounts of the world, that is, make an attempt to secure, on an individual basis, the liberation that the core of Aristotle's political science seems to promise and that can be achieved, according to him, only by individuals as such.

It is true that no direct benefit is therefore likely to accrue to modern republicanism with the recovery of Aristotelian or classical rationalism (but see Pangle 1992, 105–59). Indeed, Aristotle would have considered irrational any attempt to found a society on purely rational principles in the absence of all public belief in the gods, his own expectations in this respect being extremely modest (*Politics* 1328b11–13; 1329a27–34; 1330a11–13; 1331a24–30 and b4–6, 17–18; 1336b16–17).[16] Still, it is not irrelevant to the health of liberal democracy if some of its members come to understand and make use of Aristotle's powerful arguments in favor of common decency, responsible self-government, and political moderation wherever these may arise—arguments grounded in neither party interest nor "ideology" but philosophy. And however different that philosophy surely is from modern liberal rationalism, precisely as an attempt to perfect human reason it is closer in spirit and a greater friend to the liberal rationalism embodied by the original principles of the American founding than are the many varieties of irrationalism that would supplant and to some extent have supplanted those principles.

The self-understanding of science or rationalism, ancient or modern, is destined to be revealed as an empty posture or groundless act of the will unless it takes seriously the question of the *possibility* of science or rationalism, and this means above all a confrontation with the claims of the divine. The present study has tried to bring to light and to life those claims, albeit in a context very different from our own, together with the outlines of one attempt to meet them, in order simply to encourage the kind of reflection necessary to the reinvigoration here and now of reason or that which is, according to Aristotle, closest to the divine in man (*Ethics* 1177b26–78a8, 1178b20–28).

Notes

1. Numerals indicate book and chapter; and where a more precise reference is required, I have used the standard Bekker numbers as these appear in Dreizhenter's edition. Translations from the Greek are my own.

2. This is not to deny that attempts have been made to graft liberal principles onto Islam, but the cool reception such efforts have received underscores the fact that the separation of church and state is essentially foreign to it. See Binder 1988, esp. chaps. 4 and 9.

3. Whereas according to the Islamic philosopher Avicenna, in his *Division of the Rational Sciences*, "the treatment of prophecy and the Law is contained in their [Plato's and Aristotle's] two books on the laws," modern scholars have all but forgotten this aspect of classical political science (Lerner and Mahdi 1972, 97). Two recent essays have broached the subject of the religious implications of Aristotle's political philosophy, although each differs substantially from the procedure and findings of the present study (Lindsay 1991; Ponton 1991). Otherwise helpful general accounts include Barker 1959, Bluhm 1962, Huxley 1971, Mulgan 1977, Morrall 1977, and Newman's (1973) standard commentary on the Greek.

4. The turn is prepared by the end of book 1 (1260b8–24).

5. The precise identity of this Thales is not known. At the very least, his name recalls (one could almost say "stands for" philosophy. See *Politics* 1259a6, 18, 31; Newman 1973, 2:379. Jaffa (1972, 91) and Nichols (1987, 172–75) assume that the philosopher is meant.

6. Thus *Politics* 2.12, far from being a spurious or random sampling of the deeds of various legislators, reiterates the crucial question informing the whole of book 2 (see, e.g., Newman 1973, 2:373 and the helpful remarks in Keaney 1981).

7. This is Aristotle's frequent formulation. See *Politics* 1260b29, 1265a17–18, 1288b23, 1295a29, 1325b36 and 39, 1327a4, 1331b21.

8. It is true that Aristotle often appears to disregard or dismiss the peculiar status of laws of an emphatically divine origin and to consider piety and the divine in terms of their political utility (*Politics* 1252b26–27, 1269a28–31, 1335b12–16; *Ethics* 1133a2–4). Priests, for example, should be separate from and subordinate to political rule strictly speaking (*Politics* 1299a17–19; 1322b18–22; 1328b11–13; see also 1314b38–1315a4). Nevertheless, according to Aristotle, " 'to philosophize' means both wondering precisely whether or not one *should* philosophize, as well as pursuing philosophical contemplation" (*Protrepticus*, fr. B6; emphasis mine). Philosophy requires, in other words, that one reflect on the goodness of the philosophic life as compared with its principal contenders, such as the life of pious devotion. Moreover, the history of the transmission of the *Politics* itself suggests that Aristotle was very much concerned with the question indicated. For no translation of the *Politics* (at any rate, no complete version) was available to the Islamic and Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, and one must at least consider the possibility that this was "the result of a deliberate choice, made in the beginning of this medieval development" (Strauss 1937, 97; see also Pines 1986; Strauss 1990, 5 and 24 n. 2). That is, in contrast to Plato and to his own theoretical inquiries strictly speaking, Aristotle in his *political* philosophy may address the grounding of the superiority of the philosophic life most directly and hence be particularly obnoxious to the competing claims appealing to divine revelation understood to be the perfect law given by God to a prophet. The testimony of Hobbes supports the view that Aristotle's more "philosophical" writings were in crucial respects exoteric, above all in regard to religious belief. After enumerating the influential errors of Aristotelian metaphysics, Hobbes says, "And this shall suffice for an example of the errors which are brought into the Church from the *entities* and *essences* of Aristotle; which it may be he knew to be false philosophy, but wrote it as a thing consonant to and corroborative of their religion, and fearing the fate of Socrates" (1968, 692). I mean to suggest that one should look first and foremost to Aristotle's moral and political writings to discover the rational grounding of his otherwise cavalier view of the gods. Such a grounding, if it exists, would have made difficult or impossible the reception of the *Politics* in the Jewish and Islamic Middle Ages and may be sufficient to explain the apparent absence of the book. As for the enthusiastic reception of the *Politics* in the Christian Middle Ages, the critique of the divine city and the divine law present in the *Politics* have little direct bearing on Christianity, which is strictly speaking without a law or a political teaching. Moreover, insofar as Christianity came to wish to be political, it found itself very much in need of and hence receptive to the science of politics provided by Aristotle's treatise (see Fortin 1987, 248–51).

9. See Leyden 1967 and Schroeder 1981 for helpful discussions of Aristotle's view of law.

10. The classical accounts concerning Minos are somewhat ambiguous. The reports of his education at the hands of Zeus and his justice in general must be balanced against his demand for human sacrifices, for example, as a result of which he was hated by Athens. See Plato, *Laws* 624b4–25a1, 706a4–c1; idem, *Minos* 318d4–10.

11. Aristotle may refer to the attack of Phalaecus and his mercenaries in 345 B.C., the subjugation of the island at the hands of the Spartan Agesilaus (brother of Agis III) in 333 B.C., or both. See Newman 1973, 2:360.

12. Interpretations of kingship in the *Politics* fall into roughly two groups. According to the first, Aristotle had a

genuine interest in and (qualified) preference for absolute monarchy, either on political grounds (Kelsen 1937) or philosophical grounds (Newell 1987; Vander Waerdt 1985). According to the latter, Aristotle denied the possible goodness of kingship and consistently preferred a more "republican" form of government. A recent and extreme example of this line of interpretation is that of Nichols (1992), who writes as if the absolute king were, according to Aristotle, a would-be tyrant. See the helpful remarks of Vander Waerdt (1985, 251, n. 4) and Mulgan (1974a and b). My own interpretation is perhaps closest to Vander Waerdt and Newell.

13. I therefore agree with Vander Waerdt that the virtue characteristic of this somewhat mysterious absolute king is "more exalted than any moral excellence ordinarily attainable by human beings" (1985, 267), but I am not persuaded that the virtue in question is "a kind of heroic or even divine virtue which differs in *eidos* from both moral and philosophical virtue" (p. 264). Vander Waerdt himself expresses some puzzlement as to why this lofty virtue is not equivalent to philosophic or theoretical virtue (1985, 268, n. 25). It is true that Aristotle's discovery or invention of practical wisdom (*phronêsis*) as a sphere of knowledge essentially distinct from theoretical science would seem to make impossible the identification argued for in the text. Even the sober Aristotle, however, is compelled to address questions of metaphysics or theology when speaking of the best regime—the highest theme of practical or political philosophy (see, e.g., *Politics* 1323b21–27, 1325b28–32). The distinction between theory and practice, in other words, breaks down when one attempts to answer adequately the question of the best way of life for a human being. The invention of *phrônesis* does have the politically salutary effect of bestowing a science upon morally virtuous actions and thus supports the view that such actions are simply rational.

14. Aristotle begins by mapping out the four principal kinds of kingship to which he curiously appends, after a summary and conclusion (*Politics* 1285b20–29), a fifth sort, namely the rule of one person who is authoritative over "all" in the manner of economic (household) rule and who "does everything in accordance with his own wish" (1287a1, 9–10). This fifth sort, the only one of which no example in any time or place is given, is at the opposite extreme from the strictly limited Spartan kingship, and Aristotle very quickly narrows his focus—first to these two, then to the fifth sort alone. He thus makes it clear that what follows will be concerned with a certain extreme case.

15. Consider also Jefferson's remarks concerning the absence of established religion in Pennsylvania and New York: "Religion is well supported; of various kinds, indeed, but all good enough; all sufficient to preserve peace and order. . . . They have made the happy discovery, that the way to silence religious disputes, is to take no notice of them" (1984, 287).

16. Aristotle brings "enlightenment" to the political community only insofar as he attempts (1) to subordinate (but by no means eliminate) the care of the divine vis-à-vis political office strictly speaking (*Politics* 1299a17–19, 1322b18–22, 1328b11–13); (2) to make plausible the contention that the city is a natural rather than a divine entity, the burden of book 1; and (3) to elevate the avowed aim of political life from action (especially war) to rest or leisure properly understood. The strictly limited nature of Aristotle's political enlightenment and his corresponding (and qualified) endorsement of the divine as a necessary object of political concern, stem from his doubts about the possibility of a universal or even widespread freedom from the need to make demands upon the world and hence from the need to believe in the extraordinary means required to satisfy those demands.

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OASES IN THE DESERT: HANNAH ARENDT ON DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

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Hannah Arendt never wrote systematically on the subject of democracy. In her book of greatest relevance to the subject, On Revolution, *she criticized liberal democracy, and defended a conception of virtuous political "elites," leading most commentators to view her as an opponent of democracy. I argue that Arendt defended a distinctive conception of grass-roots democracy, and that her conception of elites is distinctively democratic rather than anti-democratic. I bolster this argument by examining her historical context, and conclude by assessing the relevance of Arendt's conception of democracy.*

When considering the subject of democracy, the name of Hannah Arendt does not quickly spring to mind. Arendt's work is sometimes considered classical, sometimes Nietzschean—but almost always elitist and thus antidemocratic. She argued strenuously in favor of a vigorous, participatory politics. Yet, as Sheldon Wolin has pointed out, she never, in her many books, systematically addressed the topic of democracy (Wolin 1983, 3). She surely was no "democratic theorist" as this term has usually been understood.[1] In her most important work of relevance to the subject—*On Revolution,* in which she endorses spontaneous forms of political insurgency—Arendt disparages representative government in favor of a politics conducted by an "aristocratic elite," drawing from, among others, John Adams, hardly renowned as a partisan of democracy (1977a, 275–76). These heresies of omission and commission have led many theorists to concur with Margaret Canovan, who has argued that there is a "deep and serious contradiction" between Arendt's elitist and democratic sides, a contradiction that severely limits the relevance of her thought to democratic concerns (1978, 5–6).[2]

I believe that this interpretation is mistaken, both about Arendt and about the subject of democracy. It would be foolhardy to insist upon a perfect fit between Arendt and democratic ideas, but for *two* reasons. The first, which scholars have often noted, regards the ambivalences in Arendt's work. While not a nostalgic thinker, she was clearly drawn to certain features of ancient politics and was revolted by many features of modernity, most notably its vast, impersonal character. Arendt disavowed all labels, including the label "democrat"; and her writings elude easy political classification.[3] The second reason for the imperfect fit between Arendt and democracy has less frequently been noted. It is that there is no neat, consistent, and self-sufficient package called "democratic ideas" in connection with which Arendt's writings can be judged.

Democracy is a complex set of ideals and possibilities. The clear-cut association of democracy with liberal constitutional regimes is a fairly recent—and problematic—development (Hampsher-Monk 1983; Hanson 1985, 1989). Arendt was often elusive to be sure, a source of continuing frustration for political theorists. But on the subject of democracy, she was less elusive than scholars have believed. Although she refused the label "democrat" because she correctly saw that in the modern world, this term admitted of different, sometimes hostile, interpretations, this did not make her an antidemocrat. On the contrary, while Arendt was quite clearly against mass democracy, she was not against democracy per se. Indeed, *On Revolution* advances a vision of grassroots politics that is supremely democratic in its emphasis on the participation of ordinary people in their own governance. Even here, things are more nuanced, for to say that she was against mass democracy is not to say that she anywhere proposed its wholesale transformation. Rather, she supported a kind of insurgent politics, rooted in civil society, that would invigorate rather than replace mass democratic politics.

My argument will turn the conventional argument about Arendt and democracy on its head. Far from there being a tension or contradiction between Arendt's elitist and democratic sides, Arendt's unique contribution to thinking about democracy resides precisely in her argument in favor of elites. While most political theorists have sought to adapt democratic ideas to the requirements of mass politics, Arendt insisted on the deep tension between mass behavior and meaningful citizenship. For her, this meant that citizenship must be bounded, insulated from the masses, and made the province of elites in order for it meaningfully to embody democratic ideals. First, I shall make the case for Arendt as a kind of democrat through exegesis of her writing. I shall bolster this case by reconstructing the historical context within which Arendt thinks about elites, a context ignored in most of the critical literature. Finally, having established the view that Arendt offers a democratic conception of politics, I shall assess the plausibility of this conception, paying particular attention to the arguments about a "parallel polis" that were developed by Czech democrats associated with Charter 77.

My argument is self-consciously reconstructive. While there are no doubt other themes in Arendt's work, her conception of grassroots democracy is a theme that bears reexamination, especially in light of the current wave of "democratic revolution" that has overtaken us. I view her thoughts on democracy as a kind of "lost treasure" that needs to be retrieved. But retrieving this treasure does not commit me to a wholesale defense of her political theory. I do not believe that Arendt presents a sufficient account of everything democrats need to consider. But I think she does present a necessary account of a kind of democratic politics that is too often ignored.

ON REVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY

On Revolution is a book intent on retrieving the "lost treasure" of modern revolution. According to Arendt, this treasure has been buried beneath the sands of liberalism and Marxism. Neither of these ideologies understands the distinction between liberation (the removal of impediments to action) and freedom (the exercise of capacities for participation in collective self-government). It is above all such participation—and the empowerment that it imparts to political agents—that Arendt wishes to rescue from a world overcome by a preoccupation with mass consumption and the ritualized spectacles of mass politics.

Arendt's lost treasure is less a tradition than an antitradition, a loose assortment of political visions, experiments, and institutions that includes the writings of Jefferson, Proudhon, and Bakunin, the innovations of the American and French Revolutions and the workers's councils that briefly flourished in Russia, Germany, and Hungary in the twentieth century.[4] What unites these phenomena is a revolt against the principle of concentrated state power and against the party institutions that seek to organize such power. They resist oppression and prize the spirit of political freedom. As such, they might seem supremely democratic. Yet Arendt's description of revolutionary politics strikes a paradoxical chord.

First, it is described as a "regeneration of democracy." Whereas representative institutions produce a professional political class, the councils institutionalized "the average citizen's capacity to act and to form his own opinion." Tragically, these political forms did not—perhaps could not—last. This is tragic because, as Arendt insists, "whenever knowing and doing part company freedom is lost." The councils incarnated a vigorous, participatory, and egalitarian politics. They represented "a new form of government that would permit every member of the modern egalitarian society to become a 'participator' in public affairs" (1977a, 262–64).

Second, Arendt maintains that such councils did not and could not accord with the democratic spirit of the egalitarian age. They are contrary to the typical institutions of modern democracy (political parties, competitive elections, representative government), because of the oligarchical character of such institutions. They also reject the essential principal of modern democratic politics—the principle of mass politics itself, with its watery, fictive equality and its tendency to homogenize public affairs, reducing citizenship to infrequent forms of vicarious participation and public discourse to a kind of public relations game.[5] In one of the most famous—and notorious—passages in the book, Arendt describes revolutionary forms as "islands in a sea or oases in a desert." Freedom, she avers, is possible only among equals, but equality itself is not a universally valid principle and requires limits in order to operate. For this reason, Arendt supports the idea that politics be the province of elites; for "the political way of life has never been and will never be the way of life of the many" (1977a, 275). If the spirit of freedom is to be preserved, such elites must strive "to protect the island of freedom they have come to inhabit against the surrounding sea" of necessity and banality.

Arendt's conclusion has chilled the hearts of many a democrat: "To be sure, such an 'aristocratic' form of government would spell the end of general suffrage as we understand it today; for only those who as voluntary members of an 'elementary republic' have demonstrated that they care for more than their private happiness and are concerned about the state of the world would have the right to be heard in the conduct of the business of the republic" (pp. 277–79). Arendt understands that her proposal is highly unconventional, but she allows that "it is not the revolutionary spirit but the democratic mentality of an egalitarian society that tends to deny the obvious inability and conspicuous lack of interest of large parts of the population in political matters as such" (p. 277). Only someone misled by the prejudices of a democratic mentality, she tells us, could fail to see the merit of her argument. This sounds pretty antidemocratic, indeed. Yet Arendt has earlier described her elementary republics as the *regeneration* of democracy. How can we explain this apparent contradiction?

The answer, I would submit, is that Arendt recognizes two different, competing conceptions of democracy. Both derive from the same three distinctively modern, egalitarian principles: that matters of public concern ought to be contestable, rather than insulated from public debate; that forms of contestation be opened up to all who wish to be heard, rather than to a privileged few; and that "the average citizen's capacity to act and form his own opinion" should be recognized. She rejects the logic of mass democracy because, in spite of its inclusiveness, mass democracy is a form of oligarchical politics, in which political parties, through their monopoly upon nominations and upon public debate, serve "as very efficient instruments through which the power of the people is curtailed and controlled" (1977a, 269). In such a system, public debate is characterized by an "obvious phoniness." In spite of the rhetoric of popular will, "the voter can only consent or refuse to ratify a choice which . . . is made without him," a choice that is embellished by techniques of propaganda and political advertising "through which the relationship between representative and elector is transformed into that of a seller and a buyer" (p. 276). Arendt criticizes, then, precisely what defenders of democracy like Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl have presented as the cardinal features of modern democracy.

But she criticizes this system in the name of the regeneration of a grassroots democracy. She loudly celebrates the average citizen's ability to think, deliberate, and act. All of this clearly seems democratic. Yet Arendt paradoxically links such action with a system of elites, a system premised upon the insulation of politics from the masses. How can it then be democratic?

Consider first that the model here is not the so-called democratic elitist model. Arendt's elites are not selected by the electorate in order to rule over them. Arendt's elites select themselves, represent none but themselves, and rule over none but themselves. Arendt quite clearly rejects the common association of the term elite with "an oligarchical form of government, the domination of the many by the rule of the few" (1977a, 276). Her elites are distinguished by their *insulation from* the many, not by their rule over them. While Arendt acknowledges that some of her examples of revolutionary elites, like the Russian soviets, did "determine the political destinies of the many," she maintains that this was secondary to their principal concern, which was their own freedom to act according to their opinions. Furthermore, such elites are self-selected and self-constituted. Arendt is insistent on this point. Her elites are not authorized or privileged by any official political bodies like states; and they do not, in principle, exclude anyone. They are open, she insists, to "those few, from all walks of life, who have a taste for public freedom and cannot be 'happy' without it" (1977a, 279). To be more precise, there is a principle of exclusion, but it is a flexible one, not discriminating against particular kinds of people, certainly not barring ordinary people. The principle is the principle of interest. Put simply, all you need to do to belong is to care about matters of common concern and to act on this concern in concert with others of similar opinion. There is a certain virtue or nobility involved in such participation, but it is not necessary to accept Canovan's disparaging claim that for Arendt, "political freedom, which is the all-important glory of human existence, is possible only among an aristocratic leisure class undisturbed by compassion for their serfs" (1978, 15). Arendt certainly does not make this argument. Her "aristocracy" is an aristocracy of civic-mindedness, not a hereditary elite based on access to wealth. Indeed, she insists that participation be open to those, from all walks of life, who have a taste for freedom. Her most vivid examples of such an elite are *modern workers' councils*, hardly the organizations of a leisure class (see Arendt 1977a, 255–75).[6] The virtues exhibited by the participants in these councils (the extraordinary courage of their convictions, a willingness to put one's reputation on the line, rhetorical and pedagogic skills) certainly distinguish such citizens from those many others for whom participation exerted no appeal. But they are hardly the province of a privileged group.

Finally, Arendt does not speak of a single elite. Her language is decidedly pluralistic. She writes about voluntary participation in "*an* elementary republic," not *the* elementary republic. She clearly envisions that there will be many kinds of elementary republics and many levels of authority. This is perfectly consistent with her emphasis on plurality in *The Human Condition* (Arendt 1958). Difference, for Arendt, is an intrinsic feature of human existence. There is no reason to assume that she imagines that political virtue can be located in a single place.[7]

Thus Arendtian elites are not conventionally understood elites at all. If in one sense they are extraordinary, in another they are quite ordinary. They are not privileged, and they are open to all who wish to participate. It is their multiplicity and openness, their self-constitution and self-government, that distinguishes them, and it is no doubt for these reasons that Arendt considers them a regeneration of democracy, a new form of government that would permit every member of the modern egalitarian society to become a participator in public affairs.

But what about the masses? Even if it can plausibly be argued that Arendt's conception of vigorous participation has democratic features for the limited and exclusive (even if self-selected) demos, what about the rest, the excluded, those too caught up in the everdayness of social life to take an interest in politics? Arendt's comment about the end of suffrage as we understand it today (she is talking here about universal suffrage) is quite vague, but it gives little succor to those democrats concerned about the condition of the masses, their rights, and the responsiveness of politics to their needs and demands. It also offers few clues about how her vision makes real the egalitarian promise of making participation available to *every* member of society. There are a number of answers here. While they are not explicitly developed by Arendt in the name of a democratic theory, it is possible to reconstruct them from her text. They can leave no doubt about her commitment to a plausible interpretation of democratic politics.

First, for Arendt, the concept of "the masses" is a sociological category. It refers to the members of a mass society, to the kind of character that is produced by a society based upon mass consumption. The member of the mass tends to be anonymous and is treated as anonymous by dominant corporate and state institutions. He or she tends to be what Robert Dahl (1961) called a "homo civicus," rather than a "homo politicus"—a privatized individual who participates only minimally in any kind of public discourse and whose infrequent acts of voting participation are based upon a narrow construction of private interest that is largely taken for granted. Sheldon Wolin (1983) links Arendt's aversion to the masses with Nietzsche. He might also have linked her with Heidegger, her teacher, for whom "Das Man" of modern society was a banal, mediocre, and pathetic creature overcome by forces beyond his control (see White 1991; Wolin 1990). There can be no doubt that she was influenced by the totalistic critique of modernity offered by these thinkers (see Habermas 1987; Megill 1985). But the critique of mass society need not have the kind of antidemocratic implications that Wolin attributes to it. Consider the words of John Dewey, who warned that democratic principles had been eclipsed by the *scale* of modern society and by the diversions from citizenship that modern society offers: "The confusion which has resulted from the size and ramifications of social activities has rendered men skeptical of the efficiency of political action" (1927, 134–35). Or consider C. Wright Mills, a contemporary of Arendt, who wrote about the "cheerful robots" of mass society—ordinary individuals caught up in disempowering, bureaucratic forces largely beyond their control. Such individuals become "adapted men." They gear their aspirations and their energies to the situation they are in; they become the consumers of products and images that the institutions of their society require them to be (Mills 1959, 170–73). These writers were not antidemocrats; they were democratic social critics, who sought to highlight the failure of modern societies to live up to democratic ideals. Arendt partakes of a similarly antiauthoritarian sensibility.[8] For her, what distinguishes the masses is their tendency toward conformity, a tendency engendered by the institutions of mass media, mass politics, and corporate mass production and consumption. Arendt believes that in the face of these institutions, it is futile to imagine that significant forms of popular empowerment and political participation are possible. Furthermore, to the extent that they are possible, they will be channeled not through these institutions but *in response* to them, against the conditions of impersonality and sameness that they promote. In this sense, Arendt's elites are counterposed to the masses. But the counterposition is not between a privileged few and an incapable many. It is not between two classes or types of people so much as between two competing *attitudes*. Those who revolt against the conformity of modern society constitutes themselves, through their action, as citizens of an elementary republic. In so doing, they exhibit a kind of virtue typically in short supply. But this is not a derogation of average people. It is an invitation, perhaps even an incitement, for them to surpass their ordinariness simply through their voluntary association and concerted action.

But again, what about the masses? What about those who, for whatever reasons, of which choice may simply be one, do not become politicized, do not associate, with others, into elementary republics? Once we see that "the masses" is not a psychological category intended to denigrate the capacities of ordinary men and women and that for Arendt, there is not one elite but many elites, it becomes clear that who is a member of an elite and who is a member of the mass is not a question that can be answered once and for all. At different times and for different reasons, some people will become politicized in the face of the disengagement of most others. But there is no reason to imagine that who these people are remains the same. The citizen is not, then, a higher type of person but an otherwise ordinary person who chooses, under specific circumstances, to throw caution to the wind, to disrupt the routines of mass society by acting against the grain of social routine. This helps to explain how it is possible for Arendt to consider modern labor movements—made up of ordinary proletarians distinguished only by their passionate commitment to justice—as exemplars of her political spirit, their activities constituting "one of the most glorious and probably the most promising chapter of recent history" (1958, 159).

Furthermore, those who at any time constitute the mass are not thereby subjected by Arendt to any particular exclusion or degradation beyond those exclusions and degradations that characterize modern society itself. They remain just as they were before—large groups of anonymous individuals, incorporated into the same remote forms of mass politics, subjected to the same social and economic forces, assuming their assigned places in the social division of labor in exchange for the material benefits that accrue to those places. Arendt is not condemning this way of life, though it is one that she clearly finds wanting. But she rejects the idea that it can meaningfully be considered a life of political freedom. And she also rejects the idea that it is possible to transcend such a society in the name of a "true democracy" based upon meaningful forms of mass political participation. For her, the ideas of mass and participation can have only the most metaphorical connection. She thus insists that only through more limited forms of participation is effective participation and empowerment possible.[9] The argument about insulating politics from the masses, then, is not antidemocratic, though it is unconventional. The point is not to exclude a class of people but to establish boundaries that keep out the impersonality and routine characteristic of mass society.[10] Such boundaries insulate the oases of civic engagement from the desert of mass politics. But they are no substitute for mass politics.

It is tempting to believe that Arendt's rejection of "general suffrage as we understand it today" requires a wholesale abandonment of representative democracy. But this is also mistaken. It is true that some of her examples of elementary republics, like the Russian revolutionary soviets, did claim to be alternatives to parliamentary institutions. But Arendt presents these as bearers of a certain political spirit rather than as literal examples to be emulated.[11] Nowhere does she advocate the revolutionary transformation of postwar liberal democracy. Indeed, the weight of her corpus leans heavily against such transformations. It is only with great circumspection, she held, that we can undertake to construct political institutions, and even then we cannot proceed ex nihilo. The problem with modern ideologues is precisely their unbridled confidence in themselves and in their projects of wholesale transformation: "Firmly anchored in the tradition of the nation-state, they conceived of revolution as a means to seize state power, and they identified power with the monopoly of the means of violence" (1977a, 256). Arendt's model of elites is not an alternative model of state power. Rather than envisioning a total structure of power that might replace the institutions of representative government, Arendt envisions the pluralization of political space. Instead of a single project of mass empowerment, as envisioned in different ways by Marxism and populism, she endorses the multiplication of forms of popular participation. One way of accomplishing this is through a decentralization of political authority; alternative institutions, like the Jeffersonian wards, the council system, and confederal models of authority, play an important role in Arendt's thought (Sitton 1987). But Arendt never puts forth these models as wholesale alternatives. It is likely that she considered the normal institutions of liberal democratic politics too entrenched to be undermined and replaced. And it seems certain that she recoiled from the prospect of such a total transformation in any case.

An overlooked passage in *On Revolution*—part of the same paragraph as the notorious comment about suffrage—serves to clarify. Commenting on elementary republics, Arendt notes, "it would be tempting to spin out further the potentialities of the councils, but it certainly is wiser to say with Jefferson, 'Begin them only for a single purpose; they will soon show for what others they are the best instruments'—the best instruments, for example, for breaking up the modern mass society, with its dangerous tendency toward the formation of pseudo-political mass movements, or rather, the best, most natural way for interspersing it at the grass roots with an 'elite' that is chosen by no one but constitutes itself" (1977a, 279). Arendt refuses to say too much about the councils. Instead of identifying them with a grandiose program of transformation, she identifies them with nothing more than the impulse toward empowerment itself. Yet while she refuses to turn the councils into a counterideology, she does indicate their political significance. They are instruments not for replacing but for *breaking up* mass society, countering its homogenizing tendencies, interspersing modern society at the grass roots with forms of voluntary association. I think it is clear in these comments that Arendt sees her elites not as alternatives to the formal institutions of representative government but as complements to them, reproaches to their tendency to treat people as subjects rather than citizens, as consumers rather than makers of their own destinies. As such, her revolutionary elites represent an invigoration of democracy, which takes the democratic idea of citizenship seriously but sees it being most appropriately applied in the domain of civil society rather than directly in the sphere of the state itself.

Margaret Canovan is thus mistaken when she claims that Arendt failed to notice the difference between normal and extraordinary politics and wrongly desired "the replacement of parliamentary government by this council system" (1978, 18). In advocating the end of universal suffrage as we mean it today, Arendt was not urging a restricted franchise or advocating the abolition of parliamentary institutions. She was arguing that we ought to cease treating these institutions as the essence of politics and the apotheosis of democracy and that we should deprive them of their sovereign status. She was advocating an opening up of political space, rejecting the presumptions that only a professional class can act politically and that citizenship is an identity more or less defined by the occasional act of designating those who claim to act on your behalf. In Arendt's democracy, it is reasonable to infer, there would still be elections and representative institutions. But there would also be alternative forms of activity, debate, and participation and alternative forms of membership and citizenship more vital and empowering than the metaphorical equality of membership in the nation-state. The extra-ordinary—that which stands outside the norm—would constitute a form of empowerment in its own right. But it would also stand as a reproach to the political system as a whole, challenging the boundaries of acceptable discourse, keeping political parties honest and accountable, and nurturing a healthy suspicion of constituted authority and a healthy respect for democratic values.

PARTIES, ELITES, AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

Canovan considers it "baffling" that Arendt "should have thought such a utopian system obviously preferable to the system of representative democracy existing, for instance, in America" (1978, 19). Kateb makes a similar point, arguing that Arendt failed to appreciate the virtues of representative government, which preserves accountability of officials and (by institutionalizing partisan competition) generates public debate (1983a, 56–58). While Arendt did not offer a system in place of representative democracy, she was a severe critic of it. This is perfectly understandable when we place her criticisms in their appropriate historical context. Arendt was a German Jew who was forced to flee Hitler. She was the product of the failure of Weimar democracy. The experience of her generation was an experience of failed parliamentarism. Disillusioned socialists like Robert Michels (1962), critical theorists like Otto Kirchheimer (1966) and Franz Neumann (1957), and neofascists like Carl Schmitt (1988) concurred that the institutions of mass democracy had failed effectively to mediate between the state and the citizenry, that they had become corrupt vehicles of entrenched corporate interests, and that the public debate that had been generated by parliamentary institutions during the early modern period had given way to the engineering of mass opinion by increasingly remote political elites.[12] This view was particularly influential among those who had experienced the breakdown of parliamentary democracy, but it was not limited to them. And it was not only in Europe that it was articulated. It had an influential American supporter in John Dewey (1927), whose *The Public and Its Prob-*

lems, written even before the downfall of Weimar, developed similar themes. Democracy, Dewey argued, was possible only with a flourishing of independent publics, groups of citizens bound together by an articulate, common concern. But in the twentieth century such democratic publics had been eclipsed by the growth of a mass society. In such a system public debate had become corrupted and partisan competition ritualized; meaningful forms of civic politics had been rendered increasingly difficult to initiate, much less sustain (Westbrook 1991).

This critical perspective was current among American public intellectuals in the postwar period. For this group, fears of a closure of parliamentary democracy were exacerbated by the emergence of a national security bureaucracy and the spirit of McCarthyism. Perhaps the most notable critic of the American system during this period was C. Wright Mills (1956), whose *The Power Elite* built upon Deweyan themes in criticizing the growth of large-scale, bureaucratic corporate and state institutions. Arendt's political theory was developed in this intellectual milieu. As someone who had experienced the absence of constitutional government in Germany, Arendt was well aware of its virtues. Her criticism was not mindless. Consider this text, written in 1953 in response to the McCarthyite witch-hunts:

> America, this republic, the democracy in which we are, is a living thing which cannot be contemplated or categorized, like the image of a thing I can make. . . . It is not and will never be perfect because the standard of perfection does not apply here. Dissent belongs to this living matter as much as consent does. The limitations on dissent are the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and no one else. If you try to "make America more American" or a model of democracy according to any preconceived idea, you can only destroy it. Your methods, finally, are the justified methods of the police, and only of the police (1953, 599).

Note the conjunction of themes: a staunch commitment to civil liberties, praise for the Constitution as a framework of such liberties, and a vision of democracy as an inherently open-ended process, not to be identified with any formal political arrangements or any end-state. Arendt's critique of McCarthyism points beyond normal constitutional politics in its emphasis on experimentation and dissent, but it also recognizes the value of such a normal politics.[13] Arendt never dismissed the importance of the constitutional "fences" established by liberal democratic regimes.[14] Yet events had instructed her that it was not in the parliamentary arena that democracy could most effectively be defended or deepened. The experience of parliamentarism in Europe and the closure of American domestic politics during the Cold War led her to conclude that it was through vigorous resistance and dissent, including forms of civil disobedience, that liberal democratic values could be preserved at the same time that more participatory forms of democracy could be experienced. Arendt's idea of "oases in the desert" was thus very much informed by the crises of representative government in our time and by the need to go beyond normal forms of mass politics even to defend constitutional liberties, much less to develop more effective forms of empowerment (see Arendt 1972).

A number of critics (Jay 1978; McKenna 1984) have likened Arendt's conception of extraparliamentary civic action to neofascist views prevalent in late Weimar Germany. Arendt, it is argued, like the so-called "political existentialists" (among whom Carl Schmitt was the most notable), rejected the liberal parliamentary state and sought more direct, unmediated forms of popular action. In the name of authenticity, she thus repudiated modern democracy. These critics are right to note the presence of existential themes in Arendt's work and also to establish the antiparliamentary context in which she wrote. But they are gravely mistaken to conclude that she can thus be linked with the antidemocratic sentiments of such thinkers.

It is worth underscoring again that for Arendt, what distinguishes such elites is not simply that they affirm a sense of personal identity and worth but that they embody *democratic* ideals. They make real the possibility of participation of every member of society (though not at the same time) in public affairs. Such elites are clearly democratic in their own constitution. They are also democratic in a broader sense, as forms of popular empowerment that seek to contest existing forms of authority. The withdrawing of consent—the refusal any longer to submit to authoritative forms of power—is for Arendt a principal feature of a "revolutionary" politics (1972, 82–102). Such a politics claims power for the powerless, but it does not seek to rule over anyone. Any politics that seeks to vilify, exclude, or rule over others or to limit the scope of public debate would seem plainly inconsistent with the spirit of Arendt's argument. While Arendtian citizenship seeks authenticity, it also recognizes the partiality of all political movements and the *plurality* of the world.[15] This chastened sense of empowerment is the direct antithesis of the romantic appeal to national homogeneity and *Volk* that characterized fascist ideology.

Fascism, after all, was antiparliamentary and fundamentally *antidemocratic.* It was, above all else, a form of mass mobilization intent on eliminating cultural and political diversity. Schmitt, for example, invoking Rousseau, writes chillingly about a homogeneous "people's will" that is mobilized by, and organically linked to, a Caesaristic dictator. In contrast to parliamentary democracy, he insists, such an "authentic democracy" involves the immediate rule of the people, conceived as an organic unity, a people seeking "elimination or eradication of heterogeneity" (1988, 15–17, 9). Arendt's notion of citizenship is radically at odds with any such conception. Indeed, given her own experience as an "eliminated" Jew, whose closest friends had been eradicated, it could not have been otherwise. In *On Revolution,* she explicitly rejects the conception of popular sovereignty traceable to Rousseau, which connotes "a mass that moves as one body and acts as though possessed by one will." In its stead, she recommends the view of the early Americans: "The word *people* retained for them the meaning of manyness, of the endless variety of a multitude whose majesty resided in its very plurality." Instead of seeking unanimity, "they knew that the public realm of the republic was constituted by an exchange of opinion between equals, . . . a multitude of voices and interests" (1977a, 92–93, emphasis mine). Arendt's critique of parliamentarism, then, is eminently democratic. The authentic citizens are those who acknowledge the limitations of even their most justifiable claims—acknowledge, in other words, the rights of others to press their claims as well.[16]

Her endorsement of small dedicated groups—elites—is no less democratic. While the idea of democratic elites may seem oxymoronic, it is important to see that Arendt was not alone in thinking in these terms. Indeed, she was connected with a group of intellectuals, distinguished by their participation in the resistance to totalitarianism, whose democratic credentials can hardly be questioned (Summer 1992; Wilkinson 1981). These figures were radicals whose revolt against Leninism and, indeed, all forms of vanguardism led them to reconsider the possibility of meaningful forms of mass politics. Consider Dwight Macdonald, editor of *politics* [*sic*] magazine and Arendt's close friend, whose influential 1946 essay "The Root Is Man" offered a withering critique of mass parties for having failed as vehicles of democratic empowerment. "The only way, at present, of . . . acting," he writes, "seems to be through symbolic individual actions, based on one's personal insistence on his own values, and through the creation of small fraternal groups which will support such actions, keep alive a sense of our ultimate goals, and both act as a leavening in the dough of mass society and attract more and more of the alienated and frustrated members of that society" (1946, 213). Andrea Cafi, the Russian anarchist who was an important influence on the *politics* circle, concurred: "Today the multiplication of groups of friends, sharing the same anxieties and united by respect for the same values, would have much more importance than a huge propaganda machine. Such groups would not need any compulsory rule. They would not rely on [mass] collective action, but rather on personal initiative and effective solidarity, such as can be developed only by friends who know each other well" (quoted in Sumner 1992, 240). C. Wright Mills, another *politics* associate, placed a similar emphasis on the importance of local forms of dissent and resistance (1959, 177–94). Perhaps the most influential articulation of this theme was Albert Camus's (1947) novel, *The Plague*, an allegory of the resistance to Nazism. The protagonist, Dr. Rieux, a leader of the resistance, refuses any macropolitical program, preferring to work tirelessly with his small band of dedicated colleagues. "Salvation," he declares, "is just too big a word for me. I don't aim so high. I'm concerned with man's health; for me, his health comes first" (p. 177).

Arendt was closely acquainted with this circle and their ideas. It is not by mistake, then, that she closes *On Revolution* by memorializing Rene Char, the French poet who had participated actively in the Resistance. This is one of a number of places where she quotes his aphorism, "Our heritage was left to us by no testament," expanding upon the feeling of empowerment and authenticity that was experienced by Char during the Resistance (Arendt 1977a, 280). Arendt elsewhere writes of the resisters that "without premonition and probably against their conscious inclinations, they had come to constitute willy-nilly a public realm where—without the paraphernalia of officialdom and hidden from the eyes of friend and foe alike—all relevant business in the affairs of the country was transacted in deed and word." Her point is that the resisters had gone beyond resisting oppression, in the way, for example, that Allied soldiers had resisted Nazism: they had *constituted themselves* as political agents. Drawn into the struggle against the Nazi Occupation, they "had become challengers, they had taken the initiative upon themselves, and therefore, without even noticing it, had begun to create the public space between themselves where freedom could appear" (Arendt 1977b, 3–4). They had become citizens of an elementary republic and experienced the joy of inserting themselves, through their voluntary action, into the public realm.

There is no question that the experience of totalitarianism and the resistance to it had an enormous impact upon Arendt's political thought. Her ideas about revolutionary elites were shaped by her reading of the tragic history of twentieth-century politics, but also by the ideas about the limits of mass politics and the importance of more local forms of resistance to oppression that were prevalent in her milieu. This milieu sheds a new light on Arendt's elitism. In such light, Arendt's argument need not appear either baffling or antidemocratic. Instead, it can be seen as an argument about the importance of new forms of empowerment at a time when the more conventional forms of representative democracy seemed in eclipse.

ARENDTIAN DEMOCRACY ASSESSED

Proving that Arendt's conception of revolutionary elites represents a coherent vision of democratic empowerment does not prove the merits of such a vision. Is it plausible? Is it practical? It is impossible to ignore these questions. The most commonly adduced charge against Arendt here is the charge of utopianism. Arendt, it is said, presents a vision that is contrary to the spirit of modern society. The kinds of spontaneous praxis she endorses are evanescent, insubstantial, pathetic glimmerings of long-past ancient glory.[17]

This charge of utopianism is, I think, unfair. It suggests that Arendt's vision exists *nowhere*, that it occupies no identifiable political terrain. But this is plainly untrue. Her argument was a self-conscious effort to capture the reality of a kind of insurgency and empowerment whose significance had been lost to mainstream political thought. Arendt's works furnish many examples of "elementary republics": the French and Danish resistance to the Nazis, the Hungarian workers' councils set up in 1956, the Israeli kibbutzim, and, in America, the Civil Rights movement, Students for a Democratic Society, and the whole antiwar movement. Each of these was a consequential form of resistance to unjust authority. Each sought to open up, to *democratize,* the space for civic activity. Does Arendt romanticize these episodes? Perhaps she does. Clearly, she fails sufficiently to explore the limits of these forms of resistance or to explain their connection to more normal forms of democratic politics. But before we move too quickly to this criticism, we might consider her vision in the light of the dissident movements for democracy that struggled against communism in Europe.

Among the most instructive of these movements was the Czech opposition rooted in the Charter 77 movement. Charter 77 was started in 1977 as an ad hoc community of individuals who sought to protest the arrest of Plastic People of the Universe, an avant-garde rock band. Charter 77 was formed around the drafting of a declaration of protest that appealed to the principles of legality affirmed by the Helsinki Accords, to which the Czech regime had been a signatory. But it soon became the nucleus of a number of independent initiatives aimed at the democratization of Czech society (Ash 1990; Goldfarb 1989, 1992; Havel 1990; Skilling 1981). In the course of its evolution, the members of the Czech democratic opposition converged upon a conception of politics with remarkable affinities to Arendt's view.

Among the many parallels to Arendt, three stand out. First, the Czech democrats viewed politics in nonstrategic (though not antistrategic) terms. While they always sought particular objectives (indeed, in their revulsion against grandiose ideologies, they turned particularity into a virtue) they had little aspiration directly to influence public policy. For them, politics was primarily a way of being and acting so as palpably to experience one's power and affirm one's dignity. As Ivan Jirous wrote of the "parallel polis": "It does not compete for power. Its aim is not to replace the powers that be with power of another kind, but rather under this power—or beside it—to create a structure that respects other laws and in which the voice of the ruling power is heard only as an insignificant echo from a world that is organized in an entirely different way" (quoted in Benda et al. 1988, 227). It is, of course, important to remember that the "entirely different way" to which he refers is the deadening and repressive mode of decaying totalitarianism. But his point has, perhaps, a broader relevance. In the face of a political system whose power seems secure and beyond radical transformation, he insists on the necessity of creating independent poleis—elementary republics—beneath and beside it. Such republics do not principally direct themselves toward the state or the formal political system. The activities they sustain are their own goals: "In them, the intrinsic tendency of people to create things of value is realized. By giving meaning to their lives and the lives of those close to them, people are able to resist the futility that threatens to swallow them up" (ibid. 228–29). Ladislav Hejdanek sounded a similar theme: "Such a [democratic] regeneration is possible only in the form of free initiatives undertaken by individuals and small groups who are willing to sacrifice something in the interest of higher aims and values. . . . The beginning of all independence is taking our lives seriously, deciding for something that is worth taking responsibility for, being prepared to devote our energy, our work, and our lives to something of value, or, more appropriately, to someone rather than something" (ibid., 242–43). The Arendtian resonances—creating value, resisting futility, regenerating democracy—are striking.

Second and equally remarkable is the metaphor with which the Chartists described their community. They called it a "small island in a sea of apathy," the "visible tips of the iceberg" of discontent (Benda et al., 1988, 232). For the Chartists, the parallel poleis' insularity was among their prime virtues. Such insularity afforded protection from a repressive state but also established protective walls around activities otherwise threatened with being "swallowed up" by the conformity and consumerism of modern industrial society. As Havel wrote: "It seems to me that all of us, East and West, face one fundamental task from which all else should follow. That task is one of resisting vigilantly, thoughtfully, and attentively, but at the same time with total dedication, at every step and everywhere, the irrational momentum of anonymous, impersonal and inhuman power—the power of ideologies, systems, apparat, bureaucracy, artificial languages, and political slogans" (1992a, 267).[18] The islands of civic engagement and solidarity improvised by the Czech democrats represented, for them, the most effective way to practice such a resistance. The courage and conviction exhibited by the citizens of such islands distinguished them from the mass surrounding them, threatening to engulf them. The proximity of membership and of objective bound them together in ways that mass organizations could never hope to accomplish. These citizens could see and hear their fellows. They could directly experience the results of their action. They could personally be affirmed by their citizenship. Who were these citizens? Artists, writers, historians—persecuted, underemployed, insecure to be sure—but also shopkeepers, housewives, students, even factory laborers. They came from all walks of life, and what distinguished them was their commitment to principle, not their origins or their social status.[19]

Finally, Charter 77 and its adjuncts were not elites in the conventional sense. They were elites only in the sense of people bound together by a common refusal to be swallowed up by the conformity that surrounded them. Their members lived in truth where most lived a lie. Where most lived as subjects, accepting the disempowering structure of society, performing rituals of obedience in spite of their misgivings, the Chartists lived as *citizens* with the courage of their convictions. Yet the Chartists refused to consider themselves a higher type of person, just as they refused to consider more ordinary, conformist individuals to be inherently corrupt. As Vaclav Havel noted in his famous essay, "The Power of the Powerless," it is impossible categorically to distinguish between the conforming member of society and the true, independent citizen because the line separating the two "runs de facto through each person" (1987, 53). Everyone is in some respects complicit in the ongoing structures of mass society, and no one is so utterly entrapped within them that he or she is incapable of some kind of independence on some occasion. The boundaries separating the islands and the seas are thus ever shifting. At the same time, the connections between islands and seas varies. As Havel maintains: "It is probably not true to say that there is a small enclave of 'completely independent' people here in an ocean of 'completely dependent' people with no interaction between them. There is an enclave of 'relatively independent' ones who persistently, gradually, and inconspicuously enrich their 'relatively dependent' surrounding through the spiritually liberating and morally challenging meaning of their own independence" (quoted in Benda et al. 1988, 237). In this way, the elementary republics are not wholly self-absorbed in spite of their insularity. They point beyond themselves, having a "radiating effect" on their environment, an effect caused by the force of their example, by the embarrassment felt by those who failed to act, by the indirect moral pressure exerted on the regime. At the same time, they discover the appropriate locus of political responsibility—the civic initiative of concrete human beings acting on their own behalf, thinking and speaking for themselves (Havel 1987, 103–4).

There can be no denying that this conception of democratic praxis has proved itself to be enormously powerful, having inspired the most potent democratic movements of our time. But it might still be asked whether it has any relevance in a posttotalitarian world, where the problems of democracy no longer center around how to resist totalitarian rule but, instead, on the problems of orderly government.

The answer, I think, is *yes*. In a posttotalitarian world, resistance movements no longer have such an obvious antagonist. But this hardly means that the practice of resistance to unjust authority has become a thing of the past.[20] The problem of justice can never finally be solved; believing that it could be so solved was one of the most grotesque errors of revolutionary Marxism. And as long as there is the problem of justice, there will be political argument and contestation. But is it not precisely the virtue of liberal democracy that it institutionalizes such argument and contestation (see Kateb 1983a, 43–59)? What can be the relevance of Arendt's vision of elementary republics to a posttotalitarian world in which liberal democracy has triumphed? The answer here must be twofold.

First, liberal democracy has *not* triumphed. It is in some sort of crisis in every posttotalitarian society. Is Austria the future of Central Europe, or is Bosnia-Herzegovina? The owl of Minerva cannot furnish an answer. I would submit that it is precisely because liberal democracy has not triumphed that it is important to sustain the kinds of independent initiatives pioneered by the former anticommunist opposition, initiatives prefigured in the writings of Arendt. As Arendt saw, in order to achieve liberal democracy, liberal democratic means (parties, constitutional machineries) are not enough. Equally important are the democratic habits of mind that can only be sustained in civil society, in initiatives (publications, civic associations, social movements, forms of disobedience) undertaken at the grass roots (Isaac 1993; Kaldor 1991).

Moreover, just as it would be mistaken to view liberal democracy as the future of excommunism, it would be equally mistaken to view it as the riddle of history solved, the terminus at which we in the so-called West have fortunately arrived. Actually existing (as opposed to possibly emerging) liberal democracy has profound problems of its own, problems identified by Arendt in her critique. It seems unable to sustain high levels of political participation beyond—and even including—voting. It establishes a distance between citizens and their state that generates serious problems of legitimacy. Furthermore, the kinds of bargaining encouraged by liberal democratic political culture tend to produce a government colonized by special interests, impeding effective public policy and further alienating citizens. All of these defects in the functioning of liberal democracy are fairly well known and have been commonplace among political scientists for decades (Dahl 1989; Lowi 1969; Schattschneider 1960). But as important as they are, none of them speak to the *normative failings* of liberal democracy.

It is fairly well known that in the twentieth century liberal political theorists inspired by Joseph Schumpeter attempted, with some success, to redefine the meaning of *democracy* in a way consistent with the factual realities of liberal democratic politics (Dahl 1956; Schumpeter 1947). These theorists were certainly correct in arguing that liberal democratic government, based upon competitive elections, political bargaining, and a high degree of political passivity on the part of ordinary citizens, was the most realistic macropolitical system of government even remotely consistent with the idea of democracy (see Ackerman 1992; Havel 1992b; Kiss 1992). The existing macropolitical alternatives (fascism, communism, and various combinations of the two) had clearly proved themselves disasters. In the name of authentic people's democracy and unmediated popular rule, they produced great misery and injustice.[21] But the Schumpeterian redefinition of the term left a good deal—too much—of its meaning behind (Skinner, 1973). In the name of realism, the idea of rule by the people became wholly metaphorical, meaning nothing more than the right of citizens occasionally to select candidates who appeared to offer them some of what they wanted from government. As Arendt put it, the relationship between politician and citizen was transformed into that of a seller and a buyer, under conditions of a seller's market. This is clearly wanting from the perspective of the democratic ideal of self-government. And simply redefining the term will hardly convince those whose take this ideal seriously. Yet the great difficulty of much so-called participatory democratic and communitarian criticism of liberal democracy has been its imprecise character (see Pateman 1970). The criticisms always seem to imply either a reform of the system that leaves its bureaucratic and mass character intact (as in variants of social democracy) or an alternative system of sovereignty that is left unspecified. In neither case is it clear just exactly how the alternatives represent an advance in terms of democratic values.

The Arendtian conception of elementary republics helps us to refocus this debate. The liberals and the social democrats are right: a wholesale democratic alternative to liberal democracy is inconceivable. At the level of the nation–state, the "rule of the people" must always be more or less metaphorical—channeled, diluted, and corrupted by mass political organizations and bureaucratic structures. But not only are partial alternatives to such a politics (elementary republics, parallel poleis) conceivable, but such oases are a part of our political landscape, though an often-ignored part. What do they look like? Among their more dramatic forms are the Green movements in Europe; the civic initiatives, like the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, that continue to operate in Central Europe; feminist groups like National Abortion Rights Action League and the many local chapters of Planned Parenthood; and environmental activist groups like Greenpeace. But the less dramatic forms are equally significant. I am thinking here of the many battered women's and rape-crisis shelters, the many local environmental groups and coalitions seeking to clean up their community or to resist the construction of toxic incinerators or hazardous waste dumps, local parent–teacher associations, the religious and social action committees of synagogues and churches, community development organizations, and so on (see Barber 1985; Boyte 1980, 1990).[22]

These more participatory forms of democratic citizenship are not alternatives to mass democratic citizenship. They are complements to it.[23] As Arendt put it, they break up modern mass society, interspersing its large-scale organizations and imperatives with more grassroots activities and with concerns that cut against the grain of ordinary politics centered around the sovereign nation–state. As such, they incarnate the spirit of association that might serve to invigorate the normal institutions of the liberal democratic state. But, it must be repeated, they are not and cannot be complete alternatives to these normal institutions. It is scarcely conceivable that members of modern society can experience any civil or political freedom worthy of the name in the absence of a constitutional system based upon the rule of law (see Walzer 1991). Furthermore, a system of competitive political parties to coordinate social interests on a large scale freely is an indispensable condition of any meaningful democratic citizenship. Without such parties, as remote and bureaucratic as they may be, political power will inevitably concentrate in even more centralized and bureaucratic institutions with even less accountability (Kiss 1992). Finally, the imperatives of advanced industrial society make some forms of state regulation of economic and social life inevitable. Such conditions make reformist labor movements and social democratic parties equally indispensable; for without these organized political forces publicly articulating questions of regulation and justice *through* the liberal democratic process, such matters will surely be articulated in ways even more remote from any kind of civic oversight, much less participation (Esping-Andersen 1985; Harrington 1989).

On all of these important matters, Arendt's conception of a democratic politics centering on a plurality of elementary republics has little to say. Because these concerns have rightly preoccupied political theorists writing about democracy and because Arendt adamantly refused to address them directly, it has been common to consider her beyond the pale of democratic theory. But as democratic theorists wrestle with the legitimation problems that have long plagued liberal democracy, it is perhaps time to reopen the question of what democracy means in the late twentieth century.

Arendt's work addresses an important dimension of this question that has until recently been ignored, for she recognized a paradox that democratic theorists could do well to ponder: the effort to irrigate the deserts of liberal democratic mass politics can only draw from the wellsprings of a robust civil society of elementary republics; and yet the effort fully to incorporate these oases can only lead to their eventual evaporation. Parliaments, courts, and bureaucracies are indispensable, but when civic associations are reduced to being the target constituencies of politicians and the supplicants of judges and bureaucrats, then they are on the road to ruin. This would deprive liberal democracy of its nourishment. It would also mean the end of the most meaningful forms of democratic participation possible under modern conditions. For this reason, Arendt insists that while the oases of civic initiative may engage and invigorate the larger system, they must always prize their own independence and insularity or else risk their own demise. While such a politics would not necessarily be averse to broader strategies of coalition and movement building, it would always be wary of the diluting—the corrupting—effects of such efforts. There is thus a tension between meaningful participation and strategic effectiveness built into such a politics. Perhaps this tension between civic initiative and mass political organization is the terminal condition of modern democratic politics.

Notes

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1. For two fairly conventional accounts of the enterprise of democratic theory, see Pennock 1980 and Dahl 1989.

2. Canovan's article, because of its sophisticated treatment of ambiguities in Arendt, is particularly notable, because even she assumes that Arendt's talk of elites must be antidemocratic. See also Kateb 1983a.

3. On her rejection of all labels, see Arendt 1979, 336.

4. On the elusive, almost mythical character of Arendt's construction of a revolutionary tradition, see Miller 1979.

5. The classic statement of this theme is Michels 1962, esp. 43–51.

6. See also Arendt's comment that "from the revolutions of 1848 to the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the European working class, by virtue of being the only organized and hence the leading section of the people, has written one of the most glorious and probably the most promising chapter of recent history" (1958, 215).

7. This is why she so strenuously objected to Rousseau's conception of the general will (Arendt 1977a, 74–89). Arendt rejects the ideas that there is a single authoritative source of power and that "the people" can be seen as a homogeneous entity in which this power resides. Her clearest statements of the theme of plurality are Arendt 1958 and 1982.

8. Kateb acknowledges this (1983b, 70–74).

9. The metaphorical character of the connection between mass politics and democratic participation has long been acknowledged by democratic theorists. Dahl, for example, strenuously distinguishes between democracy and polyarchy, claiming that the latter only approximates the values of the former. Under polyarchy, elections are the central means of citizen participation, and elections reflect the preferences of the citizens in only the roughest of senses, "insuring that political leaders will be *somewhat* responsive to the preferences of *some* ordinary citizens" (Dahl 1956, 130–32).

10. The same point can be made about her argument for excluding "the social" from politics, namely, that "the social" is for her a functional, rather than a structural category, denoting an unreflective *way of being* rather than any particular kinds of concerns. On this, see Honig 1992 and Fraser 1989. I examine inconsistencies in Arendt's treatment of the social in Isaac 1992, 158–66. Arendt's view of the social question does not sit easily with any conception of democracy. But for the purposes of this paper, which is principally concerned with Arendt's conception of elementary republics and elites, I shall bracket this issue.

11. Arendt's method is indicated in an essay on Walter Benjamin, in which she writes about a kind of thinking that "delves into the depths of the past . . . not in order to resuscitate it the way it was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct ages [but to help it] survive in new crystallized forms and shapes" (1968a, 205–6).

12. These same problems were identified even earlier by Max Weber (1978, 1381–1469). For a more recent account, see Habermas 1989.

13. For acknowledgements of the virtues of representative government, see Arendt 1977a, 32–33, 268–69; for "the protecting mask of a legal personality," see p. 108.

14. See, especially, Arendt's discussion of legality and favorable references to Montesquieu (1968b, 465–67). It is worth noting that Arendt was a consistent supporter of civil liberties, (see Young-Bruehl 1982, 273–75, 288–89).

15. See, especially, Arendt's essay on judgment, "Truth and Politics" (1977b, chap. 7); see also Isaac 1992, 166–76.

16. It is true that Arendt often failed to couch her arguments in these democratic terms, thus lending credence to those who criticized her for counterposing civic virtue and democratic rights. The most egregious instance of this counterposition was her notorious essay "Reflections on Little Rock" (Arendt 1959), in which she criticized federal efforts to desegregate southern schools in the name of republican values. The subject of this subtle and complex essay is beyond the scope of this paper. But it is clear that at least in this instance, Arendt's conception of extraparliamentary elementary republics put her in close proximity to the "state's rights'" arguments of southern segregationists, however different her reasoning was. See the discussion of the antidemocratic potential of grassroots politics with specific reference to the Ku Klux Klan and the Southern White Citizens' Councils in Evans and Boyte (1986, 52–60). I am indebted to Michael Wreszin and Frank Warren for calling attention to this problem in Arendt's writing.

17. This kind of criticism is presented in different ways by Canovan (1978) and Wolin (1983). Miller (1979) offers a more appreciative account but also suggests a kind of practical irrelevance.

18. Havel consistently related the tyranny of communism to broader tendencies of modern industrial life and mass society. In his open letter, "Dear D. Husak," for example, he decries the fact that in Czechoslovakia, man is treated as "an obedient member of a consumer herd": "Instead of a free share in economic decision-making, free participation in political life, and free intellectual advancement, all people are actually offered is a chance freely to choose which washing machine or refrigerator they want to buy" (1992a, 60). While Havel, of course, recognized the importance of civil liberties in the West, his essays "The Power of the Powerless" and "Politics and Conscience" clearly relate this consumerism to modernity itself (see Havel 1992a).

19. "Dissident" is a label attached to "ordinary people with ordinary cares, differing from the rest only in that they say aloud what the rest cannot say or are afraid to say" (see Havel 1987, 77–80).

20. This would seem to be the argument of Francis Fukuyama (1989).

21. An interesting argument that both Marxism and fascism represent authentic, antiliberal democracy can be found in Schmitt 1988.

22. Would Operation Rescue also qualify as a grassroots democratic movement? This is a difficult question to answer within the terms of Arendt's theory. On the one hand she does not offer any explicit principles of right or justice that would allow one to distinguish Operation Rescue from Planned Parenthood. On the other hand, she does insist on certain values—equality, participation, plurality, reflexivity—that would exclude certain kinds of political formations, like neofascist organizations or revolutionary sects. These values would also clearly exclude the most extreme antiabortion protest groups. The question is whether Operation Rescue is such an extreme group. Arendt would probably hold that Operation Rescue is an example of democratic civic initiative as long as it operates in a respectful, peaceful, self-limiting way. She clearly does not offer a theory of prepolitical rights (e.g., the right to privacy, central to liberal democratic theory) on which one could ground criticism of a group like Operation Rescue. This may constitute a serious limitation of her thought. On the other hand, current debates about whether abortion rights are natural or conventional and about whether they are appropriately secured through the courts or through political contestation suggest that Arendt's view has certain merits in underscoring the political (i.e., contestable) character of such matters.

23. The current literature on the importance of civil society develops similar themes and occasionally acknowledges Arendt's influence. See Arato and Cohen 1984; Habermas 1989, 1991; Keane 1988; Lefort 1986; and Touraine 1989.

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MULTICULTURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF PARTICULARISM

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When Kant first used the term "culture," he referred to the human capacity to will universal moral laws. Multiculturalists object to the denial of "difference" implicit in Kantian as well as all other Enlightenment forms of universalism. Their objection stems from their more particularistic understanding of culture, which for the most part everyone shares today. Plato is frequently said to be the fount of (universal) natural law theory; yet a medieval Muslim philosopher, Alfarabi, presents a Plato who denies moral universalism but acknowledges the possibility of some form of universalism, at least in the realm of knowledge. Alfarabi's Plato thereby provides a corrective for both extreme contemporary particularism and extreme Kantian universalism.

Multiculturalism encompasses a wide variety of viewpoints. Nevertheless, there is at least one thing that multiculturalists hold in common—an opposition to traditional universalism. We are familiar with the purpose of universalism as it is conveyed in the expression *melting pot*. The United States was to become a melting pot in which people from many different countries and religions would come together and, by adopting the "American way of life," become "Americans." Today the melting pot is viewed as a sham. Some say that immigrants to the United States have not become "Americans" but merely assimilated themselves to the dominant white European male culture. Of course, the citizens of the United States who devoted themselves to the melting-pot ideal did not hold such a disenchanted view of it. According to them, the common denominator in the United States was not the white European male but shared devotion to the principles of U.S. government, such as the principle that all men are created equal with respect to their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Many multiculturalists, especially the more radical among them, have attacked even these once-cherished ideals. They detect in the principles of U.S. government a tendency to condemn other cultures for not embracing them. They are not mistaken: it is for this reason that presidents of the United States since Wilson have viewed it as part of their duty to promote democracy throughout the world. Presidents have championed these principles because they have viewed them as the best principles of government for all nations in the long run. Some multiculturalists take this as evidence that universalism is merely a means to the end of cultural hegemony.

In lieu of the cultural universalism of the melting pot, multiculturalists prefer a more particularistic view of culture. Their watchword is *difference*: we must all maintain our own cultures even while respecting the cultures of others. Multiculturalism's particularistic view of culture is not anomalous. As we shall see, it grows out of the contemporary meaning of culture. Although the particularistic meaning of culture has come to predominate in our community, there are still many who cling to the universalism of the melting pot.

I shall explore the reasons for our having arrived at such a divide over our culture and its purposes. In the first part, I describe the conflict between Kantian universalism and multiculturalism because this conflict reveals how the unrealistic demands for inclusion by Kant and even some multiculturalists give rise to a particularistic reaction by other multiculturalists. I argue that cultural universalists should temper their universalism and that multiculturalists should not abandon the moral foundations of U.S. government. In the second part, which consists of two subsections, I describe a different understanding of the relation between the universal and the particular in the hope of tempering both extreme universalism and extreme particularism. This different understanding, namely, Plato's natural right teaching, is closely related to the natural law tradition, the source of our own moral universalism. The traditional Western Christian reading of Plato (shared by multiculturalists in general) is that he is the source of Western moral universalism. Consequently, multiculturalists believe that in opposing moral universalism they are opposing the whole Western tradition—above all, Plato. I believe that moral universalism has been read back into Plato in the Christian West. The nontraditional reading I will describe is found in a medieval Muslim thinker, Alfarabi.

KANT AND THE MULTICULTURALISTS

Multiculturalists and their critics frequently describe multiculturalism as the "politics of difference" (Taylor 1992, 38; West 1990, 19; Young 1990, 300). Charles Taylor has traced this politics of difference to an earlier Kantian conception of the "politics of universal dignity." Kant argues that we deserve respect as human beings because of "our status as rational agents, capable of directing our lives through principles" (Taylor 1992, 39, 41). These principles are, of course, Kantian universal moral laws. Kant considers the possession of such universal principles (as opposed to mere particularistic manners) to be the mark of true "culture" ([1983] 1988, 128). In other words, for Kant culture is at least potentially universal. In contrast, multiculturalists, like all of us in contemporary society, speak not of the one true culture but of cultures. Our view of culture has been shaped by nineteenth-century German historicism.[1] To a great extent, this historicism developed a particularistic view of culture in reaction to Kantian universalism. The historicists were reacting against what they viewed as rootless cosmopolitianism. Multiculturalists share with earlier historicists the view that it is impossible to send down roots in universal soil. Universalism undermines our rootedness, rather than serving as its ground. Furthermore, multiculturalists believe this universalism imposes a false form of homogeneity on the world's multiplicity of cultures or moralities. Kant accords respect to human beings who have rational agency in common; most multiculturalists claim to accord respect to all human beings in all their diversity. By making (cultural) difference the basis for respect, these multiculturalists hope to succeed in being all-inclusive where Kant failed. Multiculturalists are justified in asserting that Kant's universal moral laws exclude not only individuals but cultures. I will show, however, that their politics of difference excludes as well. Difference or heterogeneity can run only so deep in political life: Politics always demands a certain amount of homogeneity. And it cannot help but justify such exclusive (particularistic) homogeneity with appeals to something universal. Where Kant went wrong was in treating the universal as if it could become concrete, rather than as if it were something to be appealed to. Although multiculturalism was correct in reacting against this attempt to make the universal concrete, it succumbs inadvertently to the same temptation. Finally, multiculturalists are tempted to attribute Kantian follies to the whole Western tradition. I hope to show that Alfarabi's Plato has a more accurate understanding than either Kant or the multiculturalists of the appeals we make to universal principles and of the limits of inclusion in politics.

Of course, multiculturalism or the politics of difference is itself internally diverse. To understand fully the dispute between multiculturalism and Kant, we must be cognizant of this variety. Multiculturalists can be divided into three types: *egalitarian antiessentialists*, their *fellow travelers*, and *separatist essentialists*. Egalitarian antiessentialists believe that cultures do not have essences. Because cultures are constructed by their adherents, they may be deconstructed. By means of deconstruction, rather than universal principles of action, one can achieve a truly inclusive society. Fellow travelers of the egalitarian antiessentialists acknowledge that difference may in the long run be capable of deconstruction, but they deny that every community in the United States has achieved sufficient cultural identity to have its identity deconstructed. Separatist essentialists view each culture as possessing an essence. They object to the Western claim to have access to universal principles of action. They hint, however, that their own culture may be better, if not more universal, than Western culture.[2]

The leading theoretical sources of the first two types of multiculturalism are the French postmodernists, Derrida and Foucault. Taylor characterizes this body of multicultural theory as "neo-Nietzschean" and is eager to dismiss its subjectivism "shot through with confusion" (1992, 69–70). Derrida (1973) also makes ample use of structuralism, Heidegger, and Freud. Both Derrida and Foucault owe much of their egalitarianism, however, to the influence of Marx on the French Left. Their multicultural followers probably owe their egalitarianism as much to the egalitarianism of the principles of U.S. government as to neo-Marxist theory. Derrida, Foucault, and these multiculturalists are all unabashedly eclectic.

Egalitarian antiessentialists have a closer affinity with Derrida than with Foucault. They are not as eager to identify power and knowledge as Foucault (1984, 57, 72–73), probably because they do not find themselves so excluded from power as the other multiculturalists. Unlike Nietzsche, who originally described philosophy as a form of the will to power (1966, 16), multiculturalists identify power and knowledge in order to serve notice on the powerful that the things they pass off as knowledge will no longer be accepted as such. Rather, they will be contested. In other words, however Nietzschean these multiculturalists may be in their subjectivism, they are eager to avoid Nietzsche's antiegalitarianism.

These multiculturalists are devoted to so profound a politics of difference that they are uneasy about employing the term *community* to describe the practical manifestation of their politics. As we will see, they go so far as to doubt whether even individuals possess a coherent self or subjectivity—not to mention the cultures formed by these individuals (see Young 1990, 320).[3] They claim to respect all human beings as equals, not because of what they have in common but because of their differences. One cannot help but suspect, however, that they also have recourse to some notion of what human beings have in common. If not rational agency, perhaps human beings share something like a will to culture. Because of their egalitarianism, these multiculturalists attribute to all human beings the power to make or contribute to the making of a culture—unlike Nietzsche, who restricts the power of creating a new culture to philosophers of the future (1966, 136). Perhaps they would not find it troubling that they, like Kant, have some vision of common humanity, as long as this vision does not exclude anyone. Willing universal rational laws would provide a standard on the basis of which one might exclude certain human beings from equal respect; for in many communities, Kantian practical reason is not considered the guiding light for political life. In contrast, willing a culture in the egalitarian antiessentialist mode would seem not to provide a standard for exclusion: all human beings belong to some culture; therefore, they must partake of the culture-forming instinct.

In principle, these multiculturalists should refuse to judge any culture as better or worse than any other: even a culture that on principle does not respect other cultures should be worthy of their respect. They employ Derridean deconstruction precisely to overcome cultural difference, or (as they would put it) to show that difference has no essence (Derrida 1973, 134). Such deconstruction may prove to the respectful multiculturalist that difference can be overcome, but would it not be viewed by the adherent of a culture that refuses to respect others as an act of disrespect? Although these multiculturalists might try to respect such a disrespectful culture, I doubt whether the adherent of the disrespectful culture and the multiculturalist could live side by side in the same community. Try as they might to escape exclusion, these multiculturalists can achieve with respect for cultures no more than the founders of the United States achieved with religious toleration, that is, toleration of all religions that tolerate other religions but intolerance of religions that do not. If I am correct, then respect for difference proves that it cannot escape the exclusion of difference for which it condemns Kantian universalism.

Fellow travelers of the egalitarian antiessentialists have a closer affinity with Foucault than with Derrida. Like Foucault, they are eager to emphasize the identity of power and knowledge, probably because they find themselves excluded from power—or having been excluded from power in the past. As I have implied, this identification of power and knowledge is used to reduce all claims-to-knowledge by those who hold political power to ploys for increasing their power—at the expense of others. Like egalitarian antiessentialists, they are Nietzschean in their subjectivism; however, they are eager to avoid Nietzsche's antiegalitarianism.

These multiculturalists are fellow travelers of the first type because they agree with the long-term goal of deconstructing difference. They, too, hope for a time when exclusion will be at an end. In the meantime, however, because they find themselves excluded from power and their culture insufficiently respected, they must give full expression to their culture before they are willing to part with it. The most thoughtful and articulate spokesperson for this type of multiculturalism is Henry Louis Gates, Jr.[4] As perhaps the world's leading scholar on African American literature, Gates has led the effort to establish a canon of African American literature. Indeed, W.W. Norton chose to publish a *Norton Anthology of African-American Literature* as edited by Gates which was intended to stand at the center of any such canon. Of course, literary critics following the lead of Derrida have attacked Western (i.e., dead, white, European, male) canon formation on theoretical grounds: canons are intended to generate a subject. Subjectivity, however, is one of Western rationalism's many contributions to ethnocentrism. Derrida hopes to undermine ethnocentrism by showing that there is no solid core to the self. Following Freud, he raises doubts about our ability to grasp all of our motivations consciously.

With this attack on subjectivity in mind, Gates anticipates the criticisms he is bound to encounter from his friends in literary criticism for the formation of an African American canon.

> The classic critique of our attempts to reconstitute our own subjectivity, as women, as blacks, etc., is that of Jacques Derrida. "This is the risk. The effect of Law is to build a structure of the subject, and as soon as you say, 'well, the woman is a subject and this subject deserves equal right', and so on—then you are caught in the logic of phallocentrism and you have rebuilt the empire of Law." To expressions such as this, made by a critic whose stands on sexism and racism have been exemplary, we must respond that the Western male subject has long been constituted historically for himself and in himself. And, while we readily accept, acknowledge, and partake of the critique of *this* subject as transcendent, to deny us the process of exploring and reclaiming our subjectivity before we critique it is the critical version of the grandfather clause, the double privileging of categories that happen to be *preconstituted*. Such a position leaves us nowhere, invisible and voiceless in the republic of Western letters. Consider the irony: precisely when we (and other third world peoples) obtain the complex wherewithal to define our black subjectivity in the republic of Western letters, our theoretical colleagues declare that there ain't no such thing as a subject, so why should we be bothered with that? (1992, 11)

Gates views his defense of the formation of black subjectivity as an interim measure. Gates leads one to wonder, however, whether the Derridean hope of deconstructing the self and in turn culture (for all its theoretical interest) can overcome the human attachment to "one's own," that is, one's "self" and to one's community. (The clearest evidence that it cannot is, as we have seen, that even Derridean respect for difference succumbs, in practice if not in theory, to a refusal to respect those who belong to disrespectful cultures.) Even though Derrida provides the leading theoretical arguments for contemporary multiculturalism, most multiculturalists share Gates's unwillingness to part with their own subjectivity. Indeed, most of the passion behind multiculturalism aims at the reassertion of one's subjectivity. Although Derrida would have us respond to Kantian rational universalism by extending its inclusiveness to those who do not share Kant's rational principles, most multiculturalists respond by intensifying their attachment to "their own."

One might be tempted to call this parochialism. One wonders, however, whether such multiculturalists are not simply more honest. One finds in Gates an admirable candor about the limits of inclusiveness demanded by egalitarian antiessentialists. When one takes one's culture seriously, when one recognizes that it is "one's own," it becomes far more difficult to submit to an assimilating deconstruction.

If one finds a refreshing candor among egalitarian antiessentialist fellow travelers, one finds a disheartening rancor among the separatist essentialists. The most outspoken proponent of this view is Molefi Kete Asante, who claims to have originated the idea of *Afrocentricity* (1987, 6). I should note from the start that some multiculturalists try to exclude Asante from the multicultural group. I include his approach for three reasons. First, he claims that he is a multiculturalist.[5] Second, his claim to be a multiculturalist must ring true to some extent, because many multiculturalists, especially of the second type, are inclined to support the adoption of an Afrocentric curriculum in inner-city public schools in cities such as Detroit and Washington. They are so inclined because they see that such a curriculum would contribute to the constitution of black subjectivity. By analyzing separalist essentialism, perhaps I can shed some light on the credibility or lack thereof of adopting such a curriculum. Third, his approach reveals some of the problematic tendencies of that historicism which is a key theoretical source of multiculturalism.

I have identified Asante's views as essentialist because, unlike the first two types of multiculturalists, Asante holds that there is a hard core to African culture around which African Americans can rally. Because he is an essentialist, we are not surprised to see what scorn he heaps on Derrida (Asante 1987, 160). Egalitarian antiessentialists and their fellow travelers frequently deny the existence of a cultural essence, because they believe that their cultures change constantly over the course of history. Such arguments are most often made by those who are eager to refashion their own culture so that they might be better suited to modern (which often means Western) conditions. It may be that because African culture is not highly codified, Asante feels no need to make such arguments. However this may be, he is an essentialist not merely because he has no tactical reason for being an antiessentialist but also because his thinking is so deeply indebted to nineteenth-century German historicism—which was both essentialist and particularistic.[6]

One reason Asante appears to be a multiculturalist is that he shares a central view of all multiculturalists—that Western rationalism, purporting to be the universal culture, is, in reality, merely a particular culture with imperialistic ambitions. As I have shown, there is an element of truth to this argument. Kant's universal claims are the basis for casting doubts on the humanity of certain cultures. Nevertheless, Asante himself can be shown to make similarly universalistic and exclusive claims. He condemns the "Eurocentric view" for failing to integrate reason with feeling, and he implies that African culture, or the Afrocentric view, achieves this integration (1987, 15–18). By implying the superiority of his own culture, he implies the existence of some external (universal) standard by which cultures may be judged. Afrocentrism, despite disclaimers to the contrary, proves to be at least as ethnocentric as the Western culture that Asante condemns. An Afrocentric curriculum would have as one of its leading purposes to convey to students the superiority of African over European and Asian culture (ibid., 18).[7] Unlike the other two types of multiculturalists, Asante is all too clearly antiegalitarian. Asante pretends to share in the multiculturalist respect for difference. He proves, however, to haunt the other multiculturalists as their antithesis: Is Asante not one of those adherents of a disrespectful culture (i.e., Afrocentrism, not African culture itself) that troubled the first type of multiculturalist? Perhaps we should not be surprised that Asante finds it advantageous to ally himself with multiculturalists. The willingness of the egalitarian antiessentialist to show respect for the adherent of a disrespectful culture might prove the former's own undoing.

Wisely, Charles Taylor is highly suspicious of multiculturalism in its third, ethnocentric type. He recognizes how contrary it runs to the Kantian politics of universal dignity. To moderate the ethnocentrism of this form of multiculturalism, Taylor proposes a resolution of the conflict between the Kantian politics of universal dignity and the third (ethnocentric) type of multiculturalist politics of difference. This resolution is supposed to be a compromise between these two views (Taylor 1992, 72). I believe that it is less a compromise than an attempt to compel ethnocentrists to submit before the Kantian position. Rather than accord all cultures equal respect (as the first two types of multiculturalist require us to do), Taylor proposes according all cultures a "presumption" of equality (ibid., 66). But equality as compared with what? One comes to suspect that Taylor admits an *implicit* standard, namely, the standard of our own neo-Kantian liberalism, although Taylor denies this. Having recourse to a proposal of Gadamer, he calls for a "fused horizon of standards" (ibid., 67, 70). As he explains elsewhere, reason is to be a neutral judge among the various horizons of standards. Try as he might to respect difference, then, Taylor is clearly unable to respect ethnocentric cultures (1990, 46–50). Taylor succumbs to the Kantian tendency (as well as the tendency of the first two types of multiculturalism) to strive to be all-inclusive. Perhaps the ethnocentric multiculturalism of the third type, feeling its particularity threatened, will not choose to abandon its disrespectful view of other cultures. It may even be driven to the surface again by advances made by those who long for universal inclusion. Contrary to what one might expect, we may better moderate ethnocentrism by tempering our demands for inclusion in politics. We should doubt the wisdom of Taylor's attempt to fashion a Kant-friendly form of multiculturalism, because Kant's universalistic ambitions (like those of some of the multiculturalists) seem unable to avoid giving rise to a particularistic backlash.

In spite of the multiculturalist attack on rationalism, Kant and the multiculturalists prove to share an intense ambition to be all-inclusive. Among the first two types of multiculturalists, this ambition appears as an ambition to include all differences. By including all differences, one cannot help but exclude those who do not respect the difference of others or ethnocentrists: even multiculturalism must exclude. Similarly, Kant aimed at the inclusion of all human beings by showing them how to live up to their full humanity. By acquiring the universal culture of willing universal laws, all human beings were to become included in the human family. Needless to say, cultural practices that emanate from some source other than Kantian practical reason could not be accommodated in Kant's vision of humanity. As admirable as our desire for inclusion may be, it has perhaps made us forgetful of the ineradicable character of exclusion and attachment to "one's own" in politics.

We are tempted to forget these things because the *spirited anger* that fuels this attachment has been a leading enemy of modern, especially late modern, political theory. As early as Hobbes, the Enlightenment launched an all-out attack on spirited anger in the form of the love of glory and honor. Others (e.g., Epstein 1984) have argued that at least the early moderns redirected spirited anger into other channels. Assuming that the founders of the United States possessed such an awareness of the role of spirited attachment to "one's own" in politics, one would expect that their vision of inclusion was sufficiently moderated by an appreciation for its limits. One must assume that they, like "their theorist," Locke, recognized that religious toleration could not be extended to the intolerant (see Locke 1955, 24, cf. 17 and 42–43).[8] Kant and the multiculturalists, however, seem eager to forget altogether the particularistic attachment to "one's own." For Kant, in the long run politics in all its particularity is to be subject to universal moral laws. All human beings everywhere should subject themselves to these laws. Kant thereby not only elevates morals to new heights of universalism but also displaces metaphysics. The universal ceases to exist in the realm of metaphysics when it becomes the ambition of the moralist.

In contrast, according to Alfarabi's Plato, although one always *appeals* to universal (metaphysical) principles to justify particularistic politics, these principles never become concrete in morals or politics. Metaphysics always remains somehow beyond direct application to politics. However much it may serve as a rhetorical justification, it never becomes a demonstrative foundation. In other words, for Alfarabi's Plato, Kant's effort to bring the universal into morals and politics is doomed to failure. Furthermore, it leads to the destruction of metaphysical inquiry. Although spirited anger requires universal principles as justification for its less-than-strictly-rational attachment to its own political community, universal principles—and the longing for universal inclusion that they inspire—cannot be fulfilled by spirited commitment to one's own community. This longing can only be fulfilled by inclusion in the only truly universal community, the community of philosophers (see Alfarabi: 1964, 80; idem 1986b, 37).

Although the role of spirited attachment to "one's own" may have become submerged in our political theory, it has come back to haunt us in practice repeatedly. Today this anger manifests itself in two ways: in spirited assertions of the supremacy of one's own culture and in spirited demands that one's group be not only included but celebrated and promoted. Those making the demands often invoke the term *empowerment* and the equation of knowledge with power. The neo-Nietzschean assertion that knowledge is power is used by those who sense that they have been oppressed in the past to justify a blanket assertion that only those oppressed in the past (and therefore deserving to exercise power now) have access to the truth. From the adage that knowledge is power some multiculturalists infer that the founders of the United States were not unusually thoughtful men but merely unusually powerful men who intended to enshrine their power by legislating the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. It is natural to want to respond to such claims with spirited arguments for the superiority of the moral principles of U.S. government to the principles of all other governments. I hope to show that a far less contentious response is appropriate. First, one should assert in a pragmatic vein that experience bears out the superiority of our principles at least for citizens of the United States. Although experiences bearing this out are not difficult to find, I shall not provide such proof here. Second, one should show the limitations of the view that knowledge is power or that everything human is essentially particularistic.

The multiculturalist identification of knowledge and power, like so much else in multiculturalism, stems from the Kantian attempt to make the universal manifest in particularistic politics. As we saw, having brought the universal down to the earth of practice, Kant withdrew the universal from the precincts of the theoretical. Morality and politics were to become the realm of the universal. Kant's argument for an all-inclusive moral theory inevitably gave rise to a particularistic backlash against it in the form of historicism. (This relation between Kant and historicism is highly similar to the relation between egalitarian antiessentialism—with fellow travelers—and separalist essentialism.) Having reasserted the particularity of the political world, the historicists had no desire to return the universal to the realm of theory. Kant had cured them of this impulse. Today, the universal is nowhere to be found. By avoiding the Kantian mistake of attempting to make the universal concrete, Alfarabi's Plato does justice to the particularity of politics and its inability to partake of the universal inclusiveness of theory. Furthermore, he reminds us that however deeply the universal may inspire politics, it may not become a part of politics. Once we have remembered the distance of the universal from politics, it will be enabled to reacquire its place in theory or philosophy.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO KANT AND THE MULTICULTURALISTS

Kant and the first two types of multiculturalists pursue an illusory politics of absolute inclusion. Let us turn to Alfarabi's politics in the hopes of learning something about the ineradicability of exclusion and the relation of the universal to political particularity.

Political Science Versus Theology

Because Alfarabi's Plato lived in a different time and place than did Kant and the multiculturalists, it is useful, at least to begin with, to contrast this Plato's politics with a politics of inclusion from the medieval period that is highly similar to the Kantian and multiculturalist politics of inclusion, namely, natural law theory. Like Kant's rational moral laws, Thomistic natural law is supposed to be universal. Kant and Thomas agree in the crucial respect: they identify the universal with the realm of practical politics. Although Thomas speaks of natural rather than rational law, he also holds that natural laws are rational. In contrast, Alfarabi's Plato belongs to the *natural right* tradition. As we shall see, this tradition denies that law (or politics) is, strictly speaking, rational, natural, or universal. To arrive at an accurate understanding of natural right, it is necessary to counteract our tendency, under the influence of natural law, to read moral universalism back into natural right. In this spirit, I turn from the traditional Western understanding of natural right to the nontraditional understanding of a non-Western interpreter of Plato, Alfarabi.

To show what I am contrasting natural right with, I need to say a little more here about the natural law tradition. Natural law attained its full form as a doctrine of moral universalism in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The source of natural law's universalism is the universalism of the metaphysics or theology upon which it is founded. Of course, metaphysics claims to provide an account of the whole or of everything. It also claims that its insights are not restricted to a particular time or place. If a metaphysics is universal and a law is derived from such a universal ground, then that law should also have universal validity. Thomas identifies the ordering principle of the metaphysical realm as eternal law. Natural law, which derives from eternal law, rules the human things (Aquinas 1988, 20). Natural law is in human beings as a *habitus* called conscience. The principles of conscience are the principles of practical reason (pp. 1–4, 45). Thus, natural law is both universal and rational. Nature implants in man an awareness of a hierarchy of human ends.

The structure of Thomas's account is essentially the same as that of biblical revelation: God creates the world, human beings are a part of the created world, and their laws come from the God who orders the world. In brief, politics derives from metaphysics. In spite of the differences between the natural law of the moderns and Thomas, modern natural law has the same essential structure as Thomas's: law derives from one or another metaphysical ground, whether that ground be the ego or something else. Heidegger and his postmodernist (and multiculturalist) followers have detected this kinship between the structure of medieval Western Christian and modern Western thought. Consequently, they refer to the Western tradition as "ontotheological."

I hope to show that they subsequently made the mistake of projecting the ontotheological tradition's structure of inquiry back onto Plato. Consequently, I have sought the guidance of a non-Western, non-Christian thinker in order to recover this understanding of Plato. If I am correct that Plato does not derive a (universal) natural law teaching from a (universal) metaphysical teaching, then how does he structure his inquiry? According to Alfarabi, Plato begins with political things. He does not offer a demonstrative metaphysics: he derives a rhetorical theology from his inquiry into politics. In other words, the structure of his inquiry is the reverse of the ontotheological tradition.

The most obvious implication of this structure is that it does not guarantee (as beginning with metaphysics does) that one's account of politics will yield universal moral laws. For Plato, all laws—even moral laws—are best when their rule is limited in space and time. It is for this very reason that theology must be rhetorical. In lieu of a universal demonstrative foundation for a universal (or all-inclusive) politics, theology must provide a rhetorical defense of a particular community's laws. Precisely because laws are particularistic, however, a community's theology must appear to provide universal support for that community's laws. Individuals do not sacrifice their lives in the name of laws they view as merely their own. To do so, they must believe that their laws are the best as measured in accordance with some universal standard of justice. Consequently, the particularity of laws is not Plato's final word. Political science reveals the particularity of laws precisely because it can see beyond them to a community that transcends particular political communities, the universal community of philosophers.

This theology, then, must defend the beliefs of a particular community but in the guise of a universal account of the whole. By so appealing to the universal, it excludes those who do not share the proposed view of the whole. This theology is conceived under the guidance of the political scientist who is able to keep in view (1) the particularity of the community's laws; (2) the apparent universality of the community's theology; and (3) the genuine universal community of those who, rather than settling for a particular dogmatic theology, lead a life of inquiry into the whole. By promoting a particular theology, the political scientist creates a certain homogeneity among the members of the political community. Without some degree of homogeneity and exclusion, citizens could not be expected to get along with one another. Although the theology has the appearance of having universal validity or of being demonstrative, it is in fact particularistic and rhetorical. In contrast, the political science that promotes such a theology oversees both the theology in all its particularity and the universal community or inclusion toward which politics strives. It is worth contrasting the *complementary* relation between this theology and political science with the *synthetic* relation between the natural law theorist's theology and political science. For the natural right tradition, even though theology does not provide the demonstrative foundations of political science, it does provide indispensable rhetorical support. Consequently, even though the political scientist may be responsible for laying down the theology that supports his or her politics, the theology is not inextricably entwined with the political science as a foundation is entwined with what it founds. For the natural law tradition, on the other hand, theology provides the demonstrative foundations of political science. Its theology and its political science are inextricably entwined.

Alfarabi's community did not originally feature a complementary relation between theology and political science, however. Rather, Alfarabi transformed their relation into a complementary one in his *Summary of Plato's "Laws"* (1991a and b) and in other of his works of political philosophy. In traditional Islam, the art of defending the law is called *kalâm*. This Arabic term is usually rendered as "dialectical theology." (Taken literally, the term is roughly equivalent to the Greek *logos*, i.e., word, speech, reasoning, and argument. Rather than "theology," *kalâm* is usually rendered as "*dialectical* theology" because of the dialectical form in which its theological arguments or disputes took place.[9] Alfarabi describes the original, antagonistic relation between theology and political science in his *Enumeration of the Sciences* (1949, 1986a). He says that he is setting forth the "generally known" sciences. In other words, his account of political science and theology reflect the popular perception of the sciences, especially of the bearing of the so-called non-Islamic sciences, such as political science, on Islam (see Mahdi 1975, 113). Political science was viewed popularly as having nothing to say about the divine law (*sharî 'a*) of Alfarabi's community: it spoke only about the various kinds of regimes. Consequently, when he describes political science in the *Enumeration*, Alfarabi says nothing about law, much less divine law (1949, 102–8; 1986a, 24–27).

Alfarabi's discussion of political science and the Islamic political arts of jurisprudence and theology are to be found in chapter 5 of the *Enumeration*. In this chapter, divine law is not even mentioned until immediately after Alfarabi has finished describing political science, when he begins to describe the art of "jurisprudence" (*fiqh*). With the description of the art of jurisprudence, he turns from the foreign, or non-Islamic, sciences to the Islamic sciences or arts. Unlike the original relation between theology and political science, the relation between jurisprudence and political science was not antagonistic at first or in the long run. Jurisprudence is not in contention with political science, because the jurisprudent, unlike the political scientist, takes the goodness of the Lawgiver's purpose for granted. In the *Enumeration*, the Lawgiver's purpose is to inculcate belief in certain opinions about God and to regulate certain actions relating to God and to interaction with other human beings. (These beliefs and actions are called "roots.") Needless to say, jurisprudence is not in the habit of questioning the roots, because its task is not even to defend them. Rather, its task is merely to infer new laws from the roots or from laws laid down by the Lawgiver. The first to inquire into the roots are those who are appointed to defend them, the theologians (Alfarabi 1949, 107–8; idem 1986a, 27).

Of course, doubts about the purpose of the Islamic divine law (*sharî 'a*) are raised by other monotheistic faiths that counter Islam's claim to possess the correct account of divine law's purpose. Maimonides, a student of Alfarabi's philosophical corpus and a philosopher and political theologian in his own right, has suggested, however, that *kalâm* (dialectical theology) first appeared not in debates between the monotheistic faiths but between Greek and Syrian Christianity and philosophy. These Christians—in particular the rulers and the learned among them—held that the philosophic opinions were ruinous of "the foundations of their [divine] Law" (Maimonides 1963, 177). Alfarabi hints at this antagonism between traditional theology and philosophy by saying that whenever it serves their defense of the divine law, one group of theologians embrace "what our intellects reject" and another group rejects what the objects of sense tell us (1948, 109, 111; 1986a, 28–29). Of course, philosophy is possible only if one does not reject out of hand what intellect and sensation provide us. Traditional theology ignores these things because its sole aim is to defend the purpose of the divine law. It will use practically any weapon ready at hand to fight what it deems to be its leading opponent, philosophy.

Although there also existed animosity between ancient Greek paganism and philosophy, it was less intense than that between the revealed religions (e.g., Islam) and philosophy. In no small part, this more intense animosity was due to the aim of revealed religion. Some have noted that revealed religion, unlike ancient Greek religion, had a (universalistic) suprapolitical, religious aim (Strauss 1959, 164). Philosophy also has a universal, suprapolitical (albeit nonreligious) aim. Consequently, philosophy and revealed religion are at odds about the suitable suprapolitical aim of human beings. Philosophy, however—and more specifically, political science—views religion in light of its (particularistic) political aim. The aim of religion within the political sphere is the attainment of human happiness, insofar as this is possible within a particular political community. The traditional theology, which Alfarabi describes in the *Enumeration*, defends the suprapolitical, universal purposes of revealed religion in spite of the effects that these purposes might have on human happiness within politics. This art of theology is antagonistic to political science, because it is blind to the particularistic character of politics. And political science runs the risk of antagonizing theology until it makes divine law its theme.

Political Science and Political Theology

In the *Summary of Plato's "Laws,"* Alfarabi describes both a political science that takes divine law as its theme and a political theology that defends his community's divine law with weapons compatible with philosophy. This theology is, however, merely compatible with philosophy. Although it does not contravene what sensation or intellect tell us, it is not a demonstrative metaphysics. Not only may limitations on human knowledge prevent us from attaining such a metaphysics, but also (and more importantly) the heterogeneity of human and natural things precludes *any* metaphysics from being an adequate ground for politics. Although this theology must try to pass itself off as a demonstrative theology or metaphysics to provide sufficient support for a particular community, its content cannot be truly demonstrative or philosophic, because it is conceived with an eye to supporting a particular community. Consequently, I have chosen to refer to it as "political theology," rather than philosophic theology.

The logical (although not the temporal) order in the division of labor between political theology and political science is that political science investigates the opinions and actions advocated by the law with a view to human happiness and perhaps offers some revisions of these opinions and actions, whereas political theology defends the revised law. This division of labor is not temporal, because political science never engages in such an inquiry without the cover provided by political theology. Because political science questions the universal authority of any particular divine law, political theology is always required as an adjunct to defend the law's authority.

There are two principal reasons why I believe that Alfarabi's Plato intends theology to play a particularistic, rhetorical, and political role, rather than a universalistic, metaphysical, and scientific role: (1) Alfarabi's Plato attacks universal law and thus any universal metaphysics that might underlie such a law and (2) Alfarabi downplays the importance of theology while elevating political psychology as the true (nonmetaphysical) foundation of the law. I begin with the attack on universal law of Alfarabi's Plato to make clear that Alfarabi repudiates the revealed religions' ambition for universal rule. Although a theology must appear to offer universal justification (viz., must appear to be a demonstrative metaphysics) for the politics of a particular community, it should serve to support only that particular community. Alfarabi argues that diverse communities are best served by diverse laws (*Summary* 1.2).[10]

By placing such limited demands on theology and law, he withdraws the longing for universal inclusion from religion and politics into the realm of philosophy, where it belongs. The philosopher, rather than reveling in dogmatic certainty about the universal order of the whole, is able to lead a life of inquiry into this order. In contrast, political life requires that its principles at least appear to possess a degree of certainty; it requires that political theology appear to be a dogmatic metaphysics with universal validity. I turn, then, to discuss Alfarabi's downplaying of theology and playing up of political psychology because it is only through political psychology that one comes to understand why theology should be apparently universal and in fact particular. Political psychology reveals that our spirited attachment to our political community (the attachment to "one's own") depends on our belief that our merely particular community receives universal support from a just god or gods. Without such support, spirited human beings become eager to oppress rather than serve their community.

A good theology and law (or divine law) serves to attach citizens to their community and to one another: in other words, it homogenizes and excludes by demanding adherence to certain supposedly universal principles. Although these principles may appear to be universal, their particularity is revealed through political psychology. Rather than stifle inquiry, such theoretically defective principles inspire the inquisitive to search for principles beyond politics that are truly universal. In other words, such a divine law points beyond itself to the philosophic way of life. For Alfarabi's Plato, although a universal standard does exist for politics, it resides just beyond the limit of politics.

First, Alfarabi's Plato uncovers the particularistic character of all theology by leveling a stinging critique of universal laws. Rather than subject politics to a dogmatic (universal) theology, as Thomas Aquinas does, Alfarabi's Plato begins his inquiry into political things with what citizens believe about their particular divine law. In this, Alfarabi's Plato resembles the Plato of the *Laws* known to us. According to the Cretan citizen in the opening of the *Laws*, the purpose of his city's laws is to make citizens capable of victory in war. Even within the first book of the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger, who leads the discussion, shows his two interlocutors that laws have or should have, a purpose above and beyond this (625c7–635b). Nevertheless, in book 3, the Athenian returns to this martial purpose. Here, however, the stage is wider. He describes a league of three Dorian cities: Argos, Messene, and Sparta. He notes that this league fell apart. Furthermore, he implies that this was fortunate because the league's ambition was to rule the world (687b). It may not be surprising that the Athenian opposes such imperialism. In a Greek world filled with small poleis, it is perhaps hard to imagine world rule. When we turn back from Plato to Alfarabi, the picture remains constant. To be sure, we might have assumed that as a member of a monotheistic community, Alfarabi would favor the ambition of world rule. Instead, he intensifies the Athenian's condemnation of such imperialism. Rather than describe a failed league of three cities, he describes an alliance of two cities against a third city to impose their "divine law" (*al-nâmûs al-ilâhî*).[11] The result of imposing the divine law is not the redemption but the "corruption" (*fasâd*) of the conquered city (*Summary* 3.4).

The Athenian Stranger attributes the undesirable imperialistic aspirations of the Dorian League to that spirited desire to "have things happen in accordance with the commands of one's own soul—preferably all things, but if not that, then at least the human things" (*Laws* 687c5–7). Human beings become enamored of great things that offer the prospect of fulfilling this desire (686d). Alfarabi begins by alluding to the prospect (which laws often hold out to their adherents) of fulfilling this desire. He turns quickly to consider analogues to the law in the form of a wonderful ship and splendid riches. Although riches might appear to be an end in themselves, a wonderful ship is more evidently an instrument for something else. Both of these, along with the law, appear worthy of approval merely because they are sources of immense power. Alfarabi warns, however, that one should judge such things not by the quantity of their power but by whether they are "conducive to happiness." He suggests that such judgments are best made not by our passions but by our intellects (*Summary* 3.5). The human desire that all things should happen in accordance with the commands of one's own soul is so great, however, that human beings are led not just to desire but to pray for what is not really good for them (*Laws* 687c9–e). A law is truly divine only if it promises a happy political life, not world hegemony. Of course, all of the monotheistic religions, including Islam, ultimately promise world hegemony. Alfarabi's opposition to a divine law that aspires to universal hegemony is therefore especially striking. Apparently, law as such is unsuited to universal application.[12]

A brief comparison of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* makes apparent why law is unsuited to universal application. The city in speech in the *Republic* is to be ruled by philosophic rulers without the aid (or, rather, constraint) of written law (423d8–426a4). Philosophers are capable of adjusting their judgments to the particular place, time, and actors involved in each case that comes before them. In contrast, in the city in the *Laws*, nonphilosophers rule with the guidance of written laws.[13] Although written laws help to compensate for the defective judgment of some of these rulers, they also limit the rulers' ability to adjust for differences of place, time, and actors (Strauss 1959, 163). Consequently, Alfarabi's Plato opposes universal laws. Furthermore, if the best laws are limited in their application, then one would not expect to be able to derive them from a universally valid metaphysics. Alfarabi's Plato denies the homogeneity of nature and politics, which the natural law tradition affirms.

One might be tempted to infer then that Alfarabi's Plato abandons the task of laying down a theology. On the contrary, although he does not need to offer a demonstrative metaphysics in order to establish an account of politics, human needs require that politics receive rhetorical support from theology. The guiding animus of such a theology is provided by political science, rather than the reverse. Politics requires theological support precisely because politics is always partisan. Each of us obeys the laws of our own city in spite of the existence of other cities with different laws, because we believe that our laws are truly just. We believe that justice receives universal support. Yet because politics and laws are visibly partisan, they are incapable of providing such support for themselves. Consequently, they require theological support or the support of some form of moral beliefs.

The Athenian Stranger accommodates our requirement that laws receive universal support by arguing in favor of the existence of astral, that is to say universal, gods (*Laws* 821d, 892a, 896e–97d). A theology that provides such universal support without, however, promising universal political hegemony is best. Consequently, in contrast to Homer's anthropomorphic gods, the Stranger's astral gods are hardly partisan when it comes to war. Each of the revealed religions, by virtue of its claim to offer the sole means of access to the one God, aims at universal rule. Of course, their leading purpose is not to acquire political hegemony but, rather, to reveal the religious truth about the one God to the whole created world. Nevertheless, their leading purpose has the same partisan political effect. Because Alfarabi begins with the political effects rather than the religious ambitions of the divine law, he is able to counteract the profound partisanship or intolerance fostered by the revealed religions. He does so by acknowledging the existence of a multiplicity of particular laws rather than only one universal law (*Summary* 1.2).

I will turn now to the second reason for believing that Alfarabi's Plato intends his theology to play a particularistic, rhetorical, and political role. Book 10 of the *Laws* is the primary locus of that work's theology. In the *Summary*'s conclusion, Alfarabi says that he was unable to copy book 10 in order that he might comment on it. He does not say why he was unable to do so. Although he gives the impression of not knowing even how many books there are in the *Laws*, he indicates by means of hints how many there are (Strauss 1959, 134). If I had only the evidence provided by Alfarabi's silence on book 10, I could not conclude that Alfarabi denies that Plato's politics has a theological starting point. I also have, however, as evidence the fact that throughout the *Summary*, Alfarabi habitually omits Platonic references to the gods or god. Above all, Alfarabi omits any reference to what, at least in the Christian tradition, came to be the most frequently cited lines of the *Laws*, the Athenian's assertion in book 4 that the god is the beginning, middle, and end of all things (*Laws* 716a; cf. *Summary* 4.9 and Strauss 1959, 148). Alfarabi omits reference to this although commenting rather closely on the rest of the passage.

Alfarabi, however, is not absolutely silent about book 10. In the opening of his summary of book 9, he says that Plato presents his discussion (*kalâm*) of the laws' roots in books 1–8. But it is undeniable that book 10 contains the roots as they are traditionally understood, namely, the opinions about god. Books 1–8, then, must contain the roots of the political scientists' revised law, by which I mean not what are traditionally understood to be the roots but the purposes of the revised divine law. In the defense of the revised law, unlike the defense of the traditional law, there exists a divergence between the theological opinions that the political theologian defends and the ultimate purpose of these opinions. The ultimate purpose of political theology is not belief in certain opinions about god so much as the formation of certain kinds of souls. Although this theology defends certain opinions about god, its purpose in doing so is not essentially theological or metaphysical but political or psychological (see Pangle 1976, 1077). Thus, in his summary of book 9, Alfarabi goes on to say that what follows the opening of book 9 (in other words, most of book 9 and books 10–12) "explain things that adorn and embellish the law and things that are the consequences of the roots" (*Summary* 9.2). Insofar as the roots are the purposes of the laws, the laws are themselves the consequences of the roots. Most of book 9 and books 11–12 concern laws, or (as Alfarabi says) "the consequences of the roots." What is left over once one subtracts from books 9–12 most of book 9 and books 11–12—namely, book 10—is what "adorns and embellishes the law." Far from containing the foundations of the law, the theology in book 10 provides the necessary adornments and embellishments of the law. In opposition to this view, Kleinias, the Athenian Stranger's leading interlocutor, asserts that book 10 presents "just about [the] noblest and best prelude on behalf of all the laws" (*Laws* 887c).

In spite of Kleinias' objections, the theological prelude in book 10 is merely an adornment—which is not to say that adornments might not have substantial purposes. The political theology in book 10 is indispensable as a defense of the divine law. An account of the gods of the sort described in book 10 is indispensable for the cultivation of the spirited kind of soul, like Kleinias', that will rule the city in the *Laws* (Pangle 1976, 1062–65). In summarizing the first nine books of the *Laws*, Alfarabi reveals the psychological purpose of the laws and of the political theology presented in book 10. The heart of the *Summary*, then, is Alfarabi's summary of book 5, whose theme is how to honor the soul properly (see Strauss 1959, 149–50). Plato presents the purpose of book 10 in book 5.

In contrast with Kleinias, the Athenian presents *his* version of the prelude on behalf of all the laws in books 4–5. This version of the prelude falls into two parts, or preludes, along the line separating book 4 from book 5. First, in book 4, he presents a "prelude as regards the gods, those who come after the gods, and the living and dead ancestors" (*Laws* 724a). Second, in book 5, he presents a prelude as regards "how [human beings] should be serious and how they should relax as regards their own souls, their bodies, and their property" (724b). Alfarabi's interpretation of these two parts of the Athenian's prelude strips away the Athenian's adornments of the law to reveal the purposes of the laws.

In his summary of the first part of the prelude, Alfarabi quickly undermines any inclination one might have to view the account of the gods in this first part as belonging to the prelude on behalf of all the laws (*Summary* 4.9). As I noted, he omits any mention of the striking opening of this part, in which the Athenian announces that the God is the beginning, middle, and end of all things. Alfarabi only notes that the gods are displeased with the arrogant man. Nor does he make mention, as Plato does, of man's need to sacrifice to, pray to, or serve the gods (see *Laws* 716c–18a; cf. *Summary* 4.10). The gods' "support" is acquired, at least by the ruler, merely by avoiding arrogance—which, it so happens, is a way of serving other human beings, rather than gods. The only things that Alfarabi suggests human beings need to care for are their own bodies, souls, and property, both for the sake of themselves and for the sake of their families. In other words, Alfarabi gives an account of the first part of the prelude (in book 4) that leaves it indistinguishable from the second part (in book 5). Finally, when he turns to summarizing book 5, he does not mention the gods as those beings who must be honored before the human soul (*Summary* 5.1). He merely notes that the human soul ranks third in divinity, and he chooses to add to what the Athenian says the following statement, "The human soul is the noblest of things." Thus, the gods nearly vanish from the prelude of the law as a whole, leaving an account of the human being and, above all, of the human soul. Psychology, rather than theology, is the foundation of Plato's politics. This is by no means to be taken as a sign that Plato views psychology as providing a metaphysical ground in the same way that the ego does for modern political philosophy. For the moderns, the ego is the ground for politics because it is the ground for the whole. For Plato, the human soul is not the ground of the whole. Rather, the soul is the foundation of the law because the purpose of the law is the formation of certain kinds of souls.

From the point of view of philosophy, the political theology is merely an adornment; from the point of view of the spirited soul, the theology provides universal support for its belief that just service of the city will be rewarded and injustice punished. But the theology is intended to serve both the political ends of spirited human beings, which root them in their political community, and the philosophic ends of philosophic human beings. It serves the former by appearing to provide universal support to their particular political community, and it serves the latter by constantly revealing the incompatibility between the form of universal support offered and the particular political ends served. Although Kleinias has no doubt that astral gods should care about the justice or injustice of particular human beings, the Athenian Stranger cannot help but wonder whether astral gods would recognize human injustice as such, let alone care for human beings.

CONCLUSION

Thomas Aquinas, like Kant, believed that politics could become rational. Consequently, he, like Kant, retained the ambition, which they both inherited from the revealed religions, of establishing an all-inclusive politics. The search for an all-inclusive politics leads to the particularistic reactions of German historicism and, nowadays, of Asante. Try as Kant and Thomas do to extirpate our attachment to "our own," they are unable to do so. In spite of the Enlightenment attack on spirited attachment to one's community, this feeling is not to be eradicated among human beings. Spiritedness is the basis both for that sense of self or subjectivity that Derrida attacks in the spirit, if not the manner, of the Enlightenment and for that sense of responsibility that will not vanish from human life until politics vanishes from human life. How ironic it would be for politics to vanish from human life at the very moment that human beings were willing to say that all knowledge is political or serves the political interests of certain individuals or groups. We have been led to this point by stages: first, Kant repudiated metaphysics and drew the universal down into morals and politics; then German historicism affirmed the particular as against the universal in morals and politics. Although multiculturalists repeat the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion between Kant and the historicists, they have come to share the historicist view that all knowledge, like politics, is contingent and particular. If knowledge is as contingent and particular as politics, then it is not difficult to see how knowledge would become identified with politics. By avoiding the temptation to pursue a politics of absolute inclusion, Alfarabi avoids the dialectic of denying the existence of exclusion only to then see (as we have seen all too often in the last two centuries) exclusion raise its head in the ugliest forms. By relegating absolute inclusion to the realm of philosophic inquiry, he keeps sight of just how much homogeneity and exclusion political life requires. By distinguishing politics from knowledge, he enables us to see the difference between spiritedness and the love of knowledge. Needless to say, politics will not vanish from among us. The politics of inclusion could, however, compel us to forget, if only temporarily, the difference between spirited self-assertion and the self-forgetful desire to know.[14]

In conclusion, Alfarabi provides us with a revised understanding of Plato, an important source of our tradition. In so doing, he enables us to reevaluate the natural law tradition from which the moral universalism of the United States derives. Alfarabi's Plato raises doubts about the usefulness of universal laws yet recognizes our need to view our laws as receiving universal support. On the one hand, multiculturalist opponents of Western moral universalism would do well to recognize and respect this need. On the other hand, defenders of U.S. government might do well to temper the fervor of their claims that the moral principles of our form of government are the best principles for all people everywhere in the long run. Would it not be sufficient to remind the doubtful of the great advantages these principles have provided even them?

By reminding us of the possibility of the philosophic way of life, Alfarabi's Plato raises doubts about the claim that all things, including knowledge, are particularistic or partisan. He shows that knowledge, unlike power, need not be partisan. The claim that knowledge is power misleads us into believing that all claims to possess knowledge are merely plays for power. Instead, we should realize that we are well served when, as in the case of the founding of the United States, knowledge and power can come together to form so rare a combination.

Notes

I would like to thank the Symposium on Science, Reason, and Modern Democracy in Michigan State's Department of Political Science and the Carthage Foundation for providing me with the opportunity to write this essay. Furthermore, the theme of the symposium's 1992–93 lecture series and conference, multiculturalism in the university, served as an inspiration for my theme. I thank my colleagues in the symposium, Jerry Weinberger and Werner Dannhauser, for their helpful insights over the course of the year. M. Richard Zinman, the director of the symposium, made very useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Ralph Lerner, Muhsin Mahdi, and Nathan Tarcov suggested revisions on an earlier version of the second part.

1. See, e.g., the account of *Cultur* (*sic*) given by Ranke (1881, 1:v–vi) and the overview of historicism given by Schnadelbach (1984, 33–65).

2. My typology owes something to Michael Geyer's (1993, 517–26).

3. To some extent, Young is uneasy about using the term *community* simply because she opposes the communitarian conception of community. I fully agree with her opposition to communitarianism on the grounds that it lends itself to totalitarianism. Nevertheless, I would agree with another multiculturalist, Minnich, who is evidently indebted to communitarianism, that in the formation of community one cannot avoid exclusion (1992, 189 and references to Arendt).

4. Some other adherents of this type of multiculturalism are Cornel West and Henry Giroux, both of whom, however, are more self-consciously eclectic and make more ample use of Marx or class analysis than does Gates. See Giroux 1992, 13; West 1990, 30–31, 35–36; idem 1992; see also Butler 1991.

5. Asante defends his multiculturalism in a response to Diane Ravitch's identification of him as a "particularistic multiculturalist," (Asante 1992, 303–8; Ravitch 1992, 276–79). Although Asante defends his multiculturalism, another multiculturalist, Charles V. Willie takes Ravitch to task for including among the multiculturalists those who would link biological race and culture (1992, 72). Asante claims not to link biology and culture, though he also cites the theories of biological Afrocentrists with approval (1987, 62–63, 124).

6. Cf. Asante's (1987) praise of Africa with Ranke's (1888) belief in the cultural supremacy of Germany. One of the gravest errors Derrida makes—repeated constantly by his multicultural followers—is the identification of Western rationalism with racism and ethnocentrism (1976, 120–21, 130–35; idem 1985, 293, 297). Although nineteenth-century German race theory was originated by historicists and although historicism is essentialist, race theory and historicism are *not* rationalist. Indeed, they constitute a reaction against Kantian universalist rationalism. Historicism found its primary source in German romanticism, which found its source, in turn, in

Rousseau's attack on Enlightenment rationalism in favor of feeling or instinct. The Enlightenment had engaged in the most concerted opposition to the human attachment to "blood and soil" in Western history. Far from being of a piece with Enlightenment rationalism, nineteenth-century race theory was a reaction against its excessive universalism.

7. Contrary to those who might want to include Asia together with Africa as a non-Eurocentric culture, Asante makes it clear that he has no intention of allowing Asia to share in the cultural outsider status (and thus supremacy) of Africa.

8. Following Derrida, multiculturalists often accuse Locke's Enlightenment rationalism of excluding, for instance, women and minorities. They imply that the appeal to universal rights (sameness, rather than difference) must always exclude (e.g., Fish 1992, 249, 258). As I have explained, they are in a sense correct: an appeal to such rights does exclude those who would deny such rights to others. They are wrong, however, in implying that these principles exclude women and minorities. No doubt certain distorted interpretations of them might, but the principles themselves do not. Our failure is not in adopting such principles but in failing to live up to them.

9. For more background on *kalâm*, see Frank 1992.

10. Both the Arabic and the English translation (Alfarabi 1991a and b) of the *Summary* attempt to follow Alfarabi's divisions into discourses and paragraphs. (At present, the English translation is more successful in doing so and will serve as the model for correcting the Arabic edition when it is published.) I cite both editions with the abbreviated title *Summary*. However, when discrepancies exist between the two editions, the reader should refer to the translation.

11. Lest he be seen as indicting Islam, Alfarabi uses a very unusual locution for "divine law," rather than *sharî 'a*, the term appropriate to a revealed religion.

12. The regime Alfarabi envisions in the *Summary* is not as limited in size as Plato's city in the *Laws* (737d). Indeed, it appears to cover more than one climatic region. Nor does this regime appear to contain a multiplicity of different divine laws. Rather, it appears to contain one religious community with a multiplicity of governors ruling the various climatic regions (*Summary* 8.7–8). Consequently, it is tempting to suppose that Alfarabi here envisions a single homogeneous regime encompassing the entire inhabited world. In the *Summary*, Alfarabi addresses the aspiration to world rule of his religious community perhaps more realistically than anywhere else in his corpus.

In other writings such as the *Virtuous City*, he imagines the formation of a *virtuous* association of the inhabited world. As others have explained, such an association would be composed of associations of virtuous nations, which in turn would be composed of virtuous cities (Alfarabi 1985, 228–31; Mahdi 1987, 220, 222–23; cf. Galston 1990, 150–53). The formation of one virtuous city (let alone such a multiplicity of virtuous regimes) is not realistic. Nevertheless, Alfarabi's vision of this virtuous association of the inhabited world does one crucial thing: it replaces his monotheistic community's aspiration for world hegemony with an aspiration for a unified but heterogeneous world regime composed of a multiplicity of religious communities (Mahdi 1987, 223). In view of the ideal described in his other writings and Alfarabi's criticism of laws seeking world hegemony in the *Summary*, I believe that Alfarabi's realistic aim in the *Summary* is that his own community, in view of its religious homogeneity (though it may stretch over a multiplicity of climatic regions) be limited in size (Parens 1992, 143–55).

13. For the relation of the ruler to the laws, cf. *Laws* 729e and 770b5–71a6. And for Alfarabi's views on the relative rank of the city ruled by living wisdom and of the city ruled by written laws, see Alfarabi 1964, 80–81; idem 1968, 50, 56; idem 1985, 248–53; idem 1986b, 37; idem 1991c, 10, 18.

14. On the respective roles of spiritedness (*thumos*) and love (*eros*) in *Laws*, book 10, see Pangle 1976, esp. 1074–77.

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RESEARCH NOTES

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SOCIAL CHOICE IN A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

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Citizens of a representative democracy are twice removed from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation. Rather they elect assemblies that enact such legislation in their stead. Second, and less commonly remarked, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies. Rather they vote for individual candidates, with the candidates receiving the most votes elected. We examine the efficiency properties of these voting systems.

In a representative democracy, citizens stand at two removes from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation: rather, they elect assemblies, which enact such legislation in their stead. Second, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies: rather, they vote for individual candidates, and the winning candidates then constitute the assembly. Thus, although in the elections of city councils, school boards, the U.S. Congress, and the legislatures of the states, in each case an assembly is being chosen, voters are called upon to vote for *candidates*, and these candidates have their votes tallied as *individuals*.

Perhaps because these elections are candidate-based, analyses of them have often taken voters' preferences over candidates as their starting point. There is something peculiar in this approach, however. At least since Black (1958) and Arrow (1963), social choice theory has viewed society's decision problem as one of choosing an outcome based on the preferences of the individual members of society. That is, the theory assumes that each person has an ordering over the possible outcomes and compares various functions from these orderings to an outcome. In the present context, an outcome is an assembly. Therefore, preferences over assemblies, not candidates, are fundamental. Indeed, any ranking of the candidates must be understood relative to the ranking of the assemblies. An appreciation of this simple fact has important implications for the understanding of our political institutions.

Several authors have argued that voters have preferences first over legislative programs and that these legislative preferences then induce preferences over assemblies (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Downs 1957). To the extent that there is a definite correspondence between assemblies and the programs they enact, this approach is not in conflict with the approach adopted here. Since preferences over legislative programs induce preferences over assemblies, authors who adopt this approach recognize the primacy of assembly orderings over candidate orderings. However, these authors have been primarily concerned with the fact that the assembly preferences may not be separable.[1] As far as we know, no one has considered the difficulties that arise even when assembly preferences are separable.

Moreover, voters may evaluate assemblies only partially (or not at all) on the basis of the legislative programs that they enact. A voter may prefer an assembly that represents all the relevant constituencies to one that does not. Or, not knowing (and unable to imagine) what substantive issues may arise, a voter may have to evaluate the assembly on other grounds. In each of these cases, the voter's preferences over assemblies will be more fundamental than preferences over legislative outcomes or candidates.

We shall show that unless preferences over assemblies satisfy strong conditions, typical procedures for electing assemblies are inefficient. We identify conditions that ensure the election of a Pareto-optimal assembly but also show that regardless what neutral restriction is imposed upon preferences, an "almost inefficient" assembly may be elected. We also briefly discuss proportional representation from an assembly-based perspective. (All proofs are in the Appendix.)

Candidate-based and Assembly-based Procedures

We classify procedures for electing assemblies along two dimensions: (1) whether candidates must declare which post they contest and (2) the scope of the electorate that votes for each position in the assembly (see Benoît and Kornhauser 1991). We call assemblies in which candidates do not declare which post they contest *at-large* assemblies. An assembly in which candidates must declare the post they contest is a *designated-post* assembly. We divide designated-post assemblies into two types: if the entire electorate votes on each post, the assembly is a *numbered-post* one; if different portions of the electorate vote on specific posts, the assembly is *districted*.[2] Note that our definition of designated-post assemblies encompasses not only legislatures but also governments composed of separate houses and an executive.

Let $N = \{a_1, a_2, . . ., a_n\}$ be the set of candidates. Let $\mathcal{A}_m$ be the set of all possible assemblies. Let v be the number of voters. Let $\Gamma(N)$ be the set of all possible orderings of the elements of N;[3] let $\Gamma(\mathcal{A}_m)$ be the set of all possible orderings over $\mathcal{A}_m$.

Definition 1. *An* assembly-based procedure *is a function* $f\colon \Gamma(\mathcal{A}_m)^v \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_m$.

Definition 2. *A* candidate-based procedure *is a function* $g\colon \Gamma(N)^v \rightarrow \mathcal{A}_m$.

We assume that each voter i has a well-defined preference ordering $R_i(\mathcal{A}_m) \in \Gamma(\mathcal{A}_m)$ over assemblies, with "$A > B$" meaning "Assembly A is strictly preferred to assembly B" and "$A \geq B$" indicating weak preference.

We note that while our definitions do not immediately apply to party systems such as party-list proportional representation, our ensuing discussion (esp. theorem 1) can be applied to these systems.

Separability

In some situations, complementarities among the candidates may determine the desirability of an assembly. In such cases, it may be that some voters' favorite assembly consists, for instance, of candidates a_1 and a_{10} but that these voters only like a_1 because of how well a_1 works with a_{10}. If a_{10} is not present, these voters do not want a_1 on the assembly. Other voters may like the way that a_6 and a_8 interact; and so forth.

When preferences over assemblies have this interactive nature, choosing assemblies by voting for individual candidates does not seem sensible; the "wrong" combination of candidates might easily be elected. Indeed, with this type of preferences, there is no immediate way for voters to rank individual candidates.

On the other hand, it may be that the desirability of a candidate can be determined independently of the composition of the rest of the assembly; that is, preferences may be *separable* so that a voter who prefers the assembly $\{a_1, a_{10}\}$ to $\{a_2, a_{10}\}$ prefers $\{a_1, a_7\}$ to $\{a_2, a_7\}$ and, in fact, prefers a_1 to a_2 on any assembly. In this case, there is a natural ranking of the candidates, and one might think that candidate-based procedures are then appropriate. However, as we shall show, even in this "good" case, common candidate-based procedures fail to have minimally desirable properties.

Formally, we define separability as follows. For any two candidates a_i and a_j, let X_{ij} be a set of $(m-1)$ candidates not including a_i or a_j.[4]

DEFINITION 3. *An individual has* separable assembly preferences *if and only if, for all* a_i, a_j, A_{ij}, *and* B_{ij}, $\{a_i\}UA_{ij} > \{a_j\}UA_{ij}$ *implies* $\{a_i\}UB_{ij} \geq \{a_j\}UB_{ij}$.

A separable assembly ranking *generates* a unique candidate ranking in the obvious way: $a_i > a_j$ if and only if there exists an A_{ij} such that $\{a_i\}UA_{ij} > \{a_j\}UA_{ij}$, and a_i is indifferent to a_j if and only if $\{a_i\}UA_{ij}$ is indifferent to $\{a_j\}UA_{ij}$ for all A_{ij}. Many assembly rankings, however, are *consistent* with any single candidate ranking; that is, a single candidate ranking could be generated from many different separable assembly preferences. The following proposition elaborates this idea:

PROPOSITION 1. *Let* $a_1 > a_2 > \ldots > a_n$ *be a candidate ranking and* A *and* A′ *be two assemblies. If and only if there exist* i *and* j *such that the* ith-*highest-ranked candidate in* A *is higher ranked than the* ith-*highest-ranked candidate in* A′ *but the* jth-*highest-ranked candidate in* A′ *is higher ranked than the* jth-*highest-ranked candidate in* A, *then* A *is ranked above* A′ *by some consistent assembly rankings and below* A′ *by others (see Benoît and Kornhauser 1991).*

Nonstrategic and Simple Voting

A strategic voter tries to anticipate the votes of others when deciding how to vote. A *nonstrategic* voter, on the other hand, votes solely as a function of personal preferences. Of course, voting nonstrategically may not be optimal. Nonetheless, in what follows we often assume that voters act nonstrategically.

We make this assumption for three reasons: (1) in many situations, nonstrategic voting may reasonably describe voter behavior; (2) an understanding of nonstrategic voting is an important first step to the understanding of the candidate-based procedures that predominate in our political institutions; and (3) most importantly, the assumption of nonstrategic behavior simplifies the exposition without undermining the force of the argument, as our results do not hinge upon this assumption.[5]

When preferences are separable, a salient nonstrategic way of voting is for a voter with k votes to cast these votes for the top k candidates in the candidate ranking generated from the voter's assembly ranking. Such voting is akin to sincere voting and maximizes a voter's expected utility with respect to a uniform distribution on the behavior of other voters. Elsewhere, we have termed this *simple voting*.[6]

WHY ASSEMBLY PREFERENCES MATTER

Candidate-based procedures ought to be evaluated in terms of preferences over assemblies. Put differently, preferences over assemblies, not individual candidates, are fundamental. Adopting this perspective has significant consequences for an understanding of representative institutions. We shall first offer examples concerning efficiency and proportional representation that illustrate this claim. Later, we shall offer some general theorems concerning the efficiency properties of candidate-based procedures.

An Example

Our first example shows that candidate-based procedures may elect Pareto-inferior assemblies. There are five candidates contesting two seats on an at-large assembly. The voters divide into four groups. The first group ranks the 10 assemblies as follows: $\{a_4, a_2\} > \{a_4, a_3\} > \{a_4, a_1\} > \{a_4, a_5\} > \{a_2, a_3\} > \{a_2, a_1\} > \{a_3, a_1\} > \{a_2, a_5\} > \{a_3, a_5\} > \{a_1, a_5\}$.

Notice that preferences are separable. This assembly ranking generates the candidate ranking $a_4 > a_2 > a_3 > a_1 > a_5$.

Other separable assembly rankings are consistent

TABLE 1

Example of Four Groups' Ranking of Five Candidates

RANKING OF CANDIDATES	GROUPS OF VOTERS 1 15 VOTERS	 2 5 VOTERS	 3 5 VOTERS	 4 15 VOTERS
1st	a_4	a_1	a_1	a_3
2nd	a_2	a_2	a_5	a_5
3rd	a_3	a_3	a_3	a_1
4th	a_1	a_4	a_4	a_4
5th	a_5	a_5	a_2	a_2

Note: Candidates are a_1 to a_5.

with this same candidate ranking. For instance, reversing the preference between $\{a_3, a_1\}$ and $\{a_2, a_5\}$ in the assembly ordering produces separable preferences that generate the same candidate ranking.

The remaining three groups also have separable assembly preferences, which generate candidate rankings. Table 1 presents the four rankings of candidates. The number at the top of each column gives the number of voters in that group.

Suppose (as is often the case with two-person assemblies) that everybody casts two votes for two different candidates and that the top two vote-getters form the assembly. We assume that everyone simply votes for their top two candidates. The assembly $\{a_2, a_5\}$ is elected with 20 votes for a_2 and 20 votes for a_5. But *every* voter prefers $\{a_1, a_3\}$ to $\{a_2, a_5\}$! In fact, the last three groups of voters rank $\{a_1, a_3\}$ second, while they rank $\{a_2, a_5\}$ no higher than seventh. (More precisely, in every assembly ranking consistent with these candidate rankings, $\{a_1, a_3\}$ is ranked second by the last three groups, while $\{a_2, a_5\}$ is ranked seventh or eighth.)

The election of the inefficient assembly $\{a_2, a_5\}$ is not due to an assumption of nonstrategic voting or a failure of the voters to recognize the superiority of $\{a_1, a_3\}$. If the voters agreed to vote for a_1 and a_3, the first two groups (for instance) would have a strong incentive to deviate from the agreement and vote for a_2, instead of a_3, since each member of these groups prefers $\{a_1, a_2\}$ to $\{a_1, a_3\}$.[7]

Although the prevailing candidates in Table 1 do not win decisively, it is easy to write down examples in which the winning candidates receive votes from an overwhelming majority of the voters or form a Condorcet set of candidates capable of beating all other candidates pairwise and in which the winning assembly is still inefficient.[8] Furthermore, an elected assembly could rank, say, in the bottom 20% of all possible assemblies for all voters, while all voters agree that a certain other assembly ranks among the top 10%. Hence, the election results themselves provide no indication of the existence or severity of a problem.

Strategic Voting and Endogenous Preferences

In Table 1, the list of candidates is given exogenously. We now present a simple game-theoretic example in which the positions of candidates is determined endogenously, voters use dominant strategies, and the final outcome is inefficient. Thus, the cause of the inefficiency is the use of the candidate-based procedure and not that the "wrong" candidates have been assumed at the outset or that voters are not acting strategically.

The assembly is a numbered-post one in which the three posts consist of different offices (e.g., sheriff, school superintendent, and sanitation chief). Two candidates are running for each office. For each office, a candidate can adopt a position that is described by a real number from 0 to 1.

The voters divide into three equal-sized groups. Group 1's favorite positions on the three offices is given by {1, 0, 0}. Members in group 1 care most about the first office, so that they prefer the assembly {1, 1, 1} to the assembly {0, 0, 0}. Group 2's and Group 3's favorite outcomes are given by {0, 1, 0} and {0, 0, 1}, respectively. Individuals in groups 2 and 3 care most about the second and third offices, respectively, so that they, too, prefer the assembly {1, 1, 1} to {0, 0, 0}. Preferences are separable.[9]

The game is in two stages. In the first stage, candidates choose a position. In the second stage, individuals cast their votes, one for each office. Each office is decided by majority rule. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies.

Since preferences are separable and there are only two candidates per office, it is always dominant for an individual to vote for the candidate that is closest to the voter's ideal position for each office. Since for each office, two-thirds of the voters have 0 as ideal point, in equilibrium, both candidates will enter at 0 (the median). Thus, we have the following:

PROPOSITION 2. *The unique, subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in undominated strategies is the election of the assembly {0, 0, 0}.*

The assembly {0, 0, 0} is elected although all voters prefer {1, 1, 1}.

Proportional Representation

At its most basic level, the concept of proportional representation holds that if $x\%$ of the electorate has identical preferences, then that group is entitled to choose $x\%$ of the members of an assembly. We shall argue that if preferences are only assumed to be separable, this candidate-based concept is suspect. The concept of proportional representation, however, can be defended if assembly preferences satisfy a stronger restriction on preferences.[10]

Consider 10 candidates running for five seats and suppose that each voter has separable preferences over assemblies. Suppose 40% of the voters have identical preferences and that the voting procedure perfectly realizes the group's entitlement under proportional representation to elect 40% of the assembly. That is, the group can assure the election of its top two candidates. As 56 of the 252 possible assemblies include these two candidates, the voting procedure eliminates 196 possible assemblies.

But these are not just any 196 assemblies. If the coalition were, instead, given the right to eliminate any 196 assemblies, it might well have chosen to exclude assemblies that contained undesirable candidates, rather than those that did not include desirable ones. In other words, although the outcomes have been restricted to 56 assemblies, the resulting assembly does not necessarily rank among the coalition's top 56. In fact, the elected assembly may rank as low as 232d. Even a coalition that finds its top four candidates (80% of the assembly) elected may rank the resulting assembly no higher than 125th.

Thus, allowing a group to include its top candidate(s) in an assembly may accomplish very little. To make sense of proportional representation, an additional assumption is required. Separable preferences are *lexicographic* when assembly A is preferred to assembly B if and only if the highest-ranked candidate in $A/(A \cap B)$ is preferred to the highest-ranked candidate in $B/(A \cap B)$. An individual with lexicographic preferences always chooses to eliminate first those assemblies that do not include his or her top candidates. Under proportional representation, candidates are also eliminated in this way and the resultant assembly is efficient. In the example, with lexicographic preferences, the coalition of 40% of voters elects an assembly that is ranked no lower than fifty-sixth (or in the top 23% of all assemblies). While it may be too strong to say that the assumption of lexicographic preferences "justifies" proportional representation, at least there is a certain sense to it in this case.

THE EFFICIENCY OF CONSTANT SCORING SYSTEMS

The inefficiency in both Table 1 and the game-theoretic example is due to the candidate-based nature of the voting method used. This inefficiency arises with a wide range of candidate-based voting methods and with a wide range of assumptions about voter behavior. Rather than give the most general possible theorem, however, we offer a fairly broad theorem that is easily stated (and proved).

DEFINITION 4. *A* constant scoring system *for an at-large assembly of size* m *is one in which each voter is given some number,* $k \leq m$, *of votes to be distributed among* k *different candidates and the assembly elected consists of those* m *candidates receiving the* m *greatest total number of votes.*

ASSUMPTION 1. *The size of the assembly is* $m \geq 2$, *the number of candidates is* $n \geq m + 3$, *and the number of voters is* $v \geq max(m, 6)$. *When preferences are separable, individuals vote simply for their top* k *candidates.*

THEOREM 1. *Under assumption 1, even if voters have separable preferences, a constant scoring system may result in the election of an at-large assembly* A *although there is an at-large assembly* B *that everyone prefers.*

Pareto-optimality is generally considered to be a rather weak requirement and is satisfied when individuals vote directly for the outcomes, using, for instance, plurality rule, plurality with a runoff, and a Borda count. Theorem 1 shows, however, that when assemblies are being chosen but candidates are being voted upon, this requirement is, in general, too strong.

We now offer a condition on preferences that is sufficient to guarantee that a constant scoring system yields a Pareto-optimal assembly. Let $|S|$ denote the number of elements in S.

DEFINITION 5. *An individual has* k-block preferences over assemblies *if and only if there exists a set* B(k) *of candidates such that for any assemblies* A *and* A', *if* $|A \cap B(k)| > |A' \cap B(k)|$, *then* A *is strictly preferred to* A'.[11]

We will say that an individual whose preferences are *k*-block for some *k* has block preferences. Preferences that are block may or may not be separable. In either case, voting for the block set of candidates is simple.

An individual with block preferences has favorite candidates and is most concerned with getting the maximum number of these candidates elected. Thus, someone with 1-block preferences has a most preferred candidate and prefers any assembly with this candidate to any assembly without. A person with 2-block preferences has two preferred candidates and prefers any assembly with one of these candidates to any assembly without either and any assembly with both these candidates to one with fewer than both. No further restrictions are imposed. An individual with strong dislikes who is concerned with keeping certain candidates out of an assembly is not likely to have *k*-block preferences.

As the next theorem indicates, k-blockness guarantees Pareto optimality in constant scoring systems. In the proof of the theorem, we ignore the possibility of two candidates' receiving the same number of votes. Ties may be broken by using an arbitrary voter as tiebreaker. Breaking ties by randomly selecting candidates, however, may be inefficient.

ASSUMPTION 2. *A voter with* k*-block preferences and* k *votes casts these votes simply for the block set. The electorate is sufficiently heterogeneous that at least* m *candidates receive votes.*

THEOREM 2. *Under assumption 2, if every voter has* k*-block preferences and* k *votes, then a Pareto optimal assembly is elected.*

While this is a positive theorem for voting over candidates, several comments are in order. First, the theorem requires not only that voters have block preferences, but also that all these preferences be k-block for the same k and that this k be the number of votes that each person is to cast. This is a lot to ask. However, if individuals are given either too few or too many votes, efficiency cannot be guaranteed.

Approval voting offers some hope in this regard. Under approval voting, each person can cast as many votes as desired. One reasonable way for a person with k-block preferences to vote in such a system would be to cast k votes for his or her block set.[12] This assumption gives the following:

THEOREM 3. *If every voter has block preferences than approval voting (with each individual voting for his or her block set) elects a Pareto-optimal assembly. If preferences are only separable, a Pareto-inferior assembly may be elected.*

Blockness is quite a strong assumption. Nevertheless, it is not easily relaxed. If even a few people have nonblock preferences a Pareto-inferior assembly may be elected. Furthermore, as Theorem 4 will indicate, even if all preferences are block or satisfy stronger restrictions, a "nearly inefficient" assembly may be elected. To state the result, we need some preliminaries.

A restriction is on *individual preferences* (rather than across preferences) if it can be verified by checking preferences in isolation. Thus, separability is a restriction on individual preferences, since any single preference ranking can be checked for separability; single-peakedness is a restriction across preferences, since it can only be violated by a set of preferences.

A restriction is *neutral* if it is independent of the labeling of candidates; that is, if a preference ordering P satisfies a neutral restriction, then P' will satisfy the same restriction, where P' is defined as follows: for all assemblies A_i, let A_i' equal A_i, with a_r replaced by a_m and a_m replaced by a_r (if a_r or a_m occurs in A_i; otherwise, A_i' equals A_i). Then in the ordering P', A_i' is ranked ahead of A_j' if and only if A_i is ranked ahead of A_j in the ordering P.

All the restrictions that we have considered so far are neutral restrictions on individual preferences. An example of a nonneutral restriction on individual preferences would be that the assembly A be ranked first.

A neutral nonstrategic voting rule for a voter with k votes is a function $h\colon \Gamma(\mathcal{A}_m) \rightarrow \mathbf{C}_k$ such that $f(P) = C_k$ implies $f(P') = C_k'$ where $\mathbf{C}_k$ is the set of all subsets of size k of the set N of candidates, C_k is an element of $\mathbf{C}_k$, and C_k' is the permuted element.

Theorem 4 will indicate that no matter what neutral restriction on individual preferences is imposed, an assembly that is nearly inefficient may be chosen by a constant scoring system.

ASSUMPTION 3. *The size of the assembly is* $m \geq 2$, *the number of candidates is* $n \geq 4$ *and the number of voters is* $v \geq \min(3, m)$. *All voters use the same neutral nonstrategic voting rule.*

THEOREM 4. *Consider any neutral restriction on strict individual preferences. Under assumption 3, there exist preference profiles in which all individual orderings satisfy this restriction, an assembly* A *is elected, and all but one or two voters prefer an assembly* B.

DESIGNATED POSTS

Theorem 1 was stated for at-large assemblies. With suitable modifications, the theorem extends to the case of districted and numbered-post elections. For these assemblies, too, candidate-based elections may produce inefficient assemblies or governments.[13]

Designated-post assemblies are of special interest because they are so common. These assemblies may have two very distinct characters. The designated-posts may be different seats in a legislature, or they may be different offices in a government. One might thus characterize the president of the United States and the members of both houses of Congress as a designated-post assembly with the president elected at-large and senators and representatives elected by different districted procedures.

We now turn to assumptions that guarantee the election of efficient designated-post assemblies. As the ensuing discussion indicates, these assumptions may be more plausible than the assumption of blockness used earlier.

In a numbered-post election, suppose a voter assigns an order of importance to the posts (e.g., the mayoralty is most important, followed by district attorney, and so forth).

DEFINITION 6. *Let* A *and* A′ *be two assemblies, with the posts listed in declining order of importance. Suppose that the two assemblies first differ in the* j*th position. Then preferences are said to be* top-lexicographic *if an individual always prefers* A *to* A′ *when the* j*th candidate in* A *is the individual's most preferred candidate for post* j.

ASSUMPTION 4. *Preferences are separable. Each voter gets one vote per post and votes simply for his or her top candidate for each post.*

THEOREM 5. *Suppose each individual agrees on the order of importance of the posts in a numbered-post assembly and that preferences are top-lexicographic. Then under assumption 4, a Pareto-optimal assembly is always elected.*

For simplicity, our analysis of districted procedures considers only those elections in which each individual votes in a single district. In this context, an individual's preferences are 1-block if there is a district and a candidate in that district, such that the individual prefers any assembly with that candidate to any assembly without that candidate.

THEOREM 6. *If each individual votes in a single district and has 1-block preferences with respect to that district, then a Pareto optimal assembly will be elected.*

If voters in a numbered-post election have top-lexicographic preferences but disagree on the order of importance of the posts, then an inefficient assembly may be elected. Similarly, if voters in a districted election have 1-block preferences but not with respect to the district in which they vote, then an inefficient assembly may be elected.

The assumptions on preferences in theorems 5 and 6 are both nonneutral, because they are tied to specific posts. In a numbered-post assembly where the different posts have different titles and responsibilities, a nonneutral assumption may be reasonable. If the differently numbered posts are identical in duties and numbered merely for electoral purposes, a nonneutral assumption is unwarranted. In such a case, there are neutral assumptions that will guarantee the election of an efficient assembly.[14] However, this efficiency can only be assured with respect to those assemblies which can be formed respecting the posts for which each candidate has declared. It cannot be guaranteed with respect to the at-large assemblies that could be formed. In the neutral case, this broader notion of efficiency would seem appropriate.

The nonneutrality in the assumption of theorem 6 may be warranted when voters elect local representatives whose responsibilities are primarily to their district. Again, if all representatives have identical duties, a nonneutral assumption is not justified. In districted elections, no neutral assumption can guarantee the election of a Pareto-optimal assembly, even among the restricted set of assemblies.

When there exists a Condorcet winning assembly in a numbered-post election with only two candidates per post (e.g., a Democrat and a Republican), each candidate in this assembly is a majority-rule winner in his or her individual post election (Kadane 1972). Thus, majority rule will produce this Condorcet winner. In a districted election, however, majority rule may fail to produce a Condorcet winner (see Benoit and Kornhauser 1991).

CONCLUSION

Jurisdictions generally adopt candidate-based procedures—in particular, constant scoring rules—to elect assemblies. This common practice poses a problem, since such procedures do not possess minimal efficiency properties; the elected assembly may be nearly inefficient.

These results suggest two types of inquiry. First, one might design and study fully assembly-based procedures for the election of assemblies. This task faces both practical and theoretical problems. Consider, for example, three different assembly-based procedures for an at-large election with 10 candidates running for five seats. In procedure 1, each of the 252 possible assemblies are listed on the ballot and the assembly that receives the most votes is elected. Procedure 1 presents practical difficulties. In procedure 2, each voter marks five candidates on the ballot, ballots are counted as groups of five, and the group that receives the most votes is elected. Under this procedure (as under procedure 1), the winning assembly might garner a very small percentage of the ballots cast and thus appear undesirable. Voting for candidates, of course, only gives the illusion of performing well in this respect. Although the winning candidates may receive many votes, the resultant assembly may well have received no votes in a direct assembly election. In procedure 3, the 10 candidates divide into two slates of 5, between which the voters choose by majority vote. Here, the electorate might all prefer some other group of 5 candidates as the assembly. Finally, note that while any procedure in which individuals vote for candidates will be dominated by some assembly-based procedure, there is no presumption that a particular assembly-based procedure is superior to a particular candidate-based procedure.

A second inquiry pursues further the investigation of candidate-based procedures. While no ordinal restriction on individual preferences can justify the use of candidate-based procedures, one might identify restrictions across preferences that assure the good performance of specific procedures. Alternately, one might conjecture that individuals do not perceive much difference between many of the assemblies, so that candidate-based procedures do not perform too badly.

Finally, we underscore our initial observation. Any discussion of preference restrictions must be made on assembly preferences, and the selected assembly must be judged with respect to these assembly preferences. To evaluate an election method, one must start with the recognition that preferences over assemblies, not candidates, are fundamental.

APPENDIX: PROOFS

Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose the two candidates enter at positions $x, y \neq 0$ and suppose y is elected. This is not an equilibrium. If x enters at position 0, instead, two-thirds of the voters will switch and vote for x, since this will be a dominant strategy for them. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies is for both candidates to enter at 0. Voters then vote at random and each candidate has a 50% chance of being elected.

Proof of Theorem 1. The proof consists of constructing preference profiles such that the assembly $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{m-1}, a_m\}$ gets elected even though everyone prefers $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{m-2}, a_{m+1}, a_{m+2}\}$. Assume that all preferences are separable. The proof considers two cases:

Case 1. $k < m$. Let the population be divided into m equal-sized groups (plus or minus 1, since all groups must be integral numbers) with generated candidate rankings as shown in Table A-1. Note that for $k < m$, candidates a_1–a_m each receive at least one vote, and no other candidate receives any votes. Therefore the assembly $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m\}$ is chosen. However, we can assume that everyone would like to replace $\{a_{m-1}, a_m\}$ by $\{a_{m+1}, a_{m+2}\}$; that is, these candidate rankings are consistent with assembly preferences

TABLE A-1

Example of m Groups Ranking N Candidates

	GROUP				
RANK	1	2	. . .	$m-1$	m
1	a_1	a_2	. . .	a_{m-1}	a_m
2	—	—	. . .	—	—
. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
$m-2$*	—	—	. . .	—	—
$m-1$	a_m	a_m	. . .	a_1	a_1
m	a_{m+1}	a_{m+1}	. . .	a_{m+1}	a_{m+1}
$m+1$	a_{m+2}	a_{m+2}	. . .	a_{m+2}	a_{m+2}
$m+2$	a_n	a_n	. . .	a_n	a_n
		{the remaining candidates}			
. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .**
n	a_{m-1}	a_{m-1}	. . .	a_m	a_{m-1}

*In positions 2 through $m - 2$, the first $m - 2$ groups rank candidates from a_1 through a_{m-2} arbitrarily (making sure no one lists the same candidate twice, of course). Groups $m - 1$ and m arbitrarily rank candidates a_2 through a_{m-2}.
**The remaining candidates.

that rank $\{a_1, \ldots, a_{m-2}, a_{m+1}, a_{m+1}\}$ over $\{a_1, \ldots, a_{m-1}, a_m\}$.

Case 2. $k = m$. Let the population be divided into four groups of two different sizes (plus or minus 1), p and q, $p < q$, as in Table A-2. Again, $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_m\}$ is elected even though we can assume that everyone would prefer to replace candidates a_{m-1} and a_m with a_{m+1} and a_{m+2}. Q.E.D.

Proof of Theorem 2 *(Reductio).* Suppose that A is elected but B is Pareto-superior. Let $A^* = A/(A \cap B)$ and $B^* = B/(A \cap B)$. Consider any individual. Since the individual likes B at least as much as A, B^* must have at least as many elements that are in the individual's block set as A^* does. Since the individual has k votes, he or she casts at least as many votes among the elements of B^* as among A^*. This is true for all individuals, so the total number of votes received by the members of B^* is at least as great as the total received by the members of A^*. In particular, the maximum number of votes received by an element of B^* must be greater than the minimum number received by an element of A^* (assuming no ties), so that an element of B^* must have been elected, a contradiction. Q.E.D.

TABLE A-2

Example of Four Groups of Two Different Sizes (p and g) Ranking N Candidates

	GROUP SIZE			
RANK	p	p	q	q
1	a_1	a_1	a_1	a_1
2	a_2	a_2	a_2	a_2
. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
$m-2$	a_{m-2}	a_{m-2}	a_{m-2}	a_{m-2}
$m-1$	a_{m-1}	a_m	a_m	a_{m-1}
m	a_{m+1}	a_{m+1}	a_{m+2}	a_{m+3}
$m+1$	a_{m+3}	a_{m+3}	a_{m+3}	a_{m+1}
$m+2$	a_{m+2}	a_{m+2}	a_{m+1}	a_{m+2}
$m+3$	a_n	a_n	a_n	a_n
. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .	. . .
n	a_m	a_{m-1}	a_{m-1}	a_m

Note: Group size $p < q$.

Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is virtually identical to the proofs of theorems 1 and 2.

Proof of Theorem 4. First, it is easy to see that if the voting rule does not involve voting for a subset of a voter's top assembly, an inefficient assembly can be elected. For instance, if $k = m$ and the preferences of all votes are identical, an assembly different from the voters' unanimous first choice will be elected. Therefore, assume that the voting rule involves voting for a subset of a voter's top assembly.

Suppose that $k = m$. The population divides into three groups, and each individual preference ordering satisfies some neutral restriction. Without loss of generality, assume that each individual in the first group has as favorite assembly $\{a_1, a_2\}UB(m - 2)$, where $B(m - 2)$ is a set of $m - 2$ candidates disjoint from $\{a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4\}$. Furthermore, we can assume that $\{a_1, a_3\}UB(m - 2)$ is ranked above $\{a_2, a_4\}UB(m - 2)$. (Suppose, instead, that $\{a_2, a_4\}UB(m - 2) > \{a_1, a_3\}UB(m - 2)$. By neutrality [interchanging a_1 and a_2], a group with favorite assembly $\{a_1, a_2\}UB(m - 2)$ and $\{a_1, a_4\}UB(m - 2) > \{a_2, a_3\}UB(m - 2)$ also satisfies the restriction. Again by neutrality [interchanging a_3 and a_4], a group with favorite assembly $\{a_1, a_2\}UB(m - 2)$ and $\{a_1, a_3\}UB(m - 2) > \{a_2, a_4\}UB(m - 2)$ also satisfies the restriction.) Similarly, we assume that the second group's favorite assembly is $\{a_3, a_4\}UB(m - 2)$ and that they all also rank $\{a_1, a_3\}UB(m - 2)$ above $\{a_2, a_4\}UB(m - 2)$. Finally, the third group's favorite assembly is $\{a_2, a_4\}UB(m - 2)$.

We assume that the three groups are, respectively, of size $(V - 1)/2$, $(V - 1)/2$, and 1 if V is odd, and $(V - 2)/2$, $(V - 2)/2$, 2 if V is even. The assembly $\{a_2, a_4\}UB(m - 2)$ is elected, but all but one or two people prefer $\{a_1, a_3\}UB(m - 2)$.

Now suppose that $k < m$. The population divides into m groups. The first $m - 1$ groups are of (approximately) equal size. All members of these groups have $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{m-1}, b_m\}$ as their favorite assembly. Afterward, their preferences differ in such a way that each element of $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{m-1}\}$ receives at least one vote and only these candidates receive any votes. (This can be done because each voter uses a neutral nonstrategic voting rule.) The last group has one member who votes for a_m and candidates drawn from $\{a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{m-1}\}$. The assembly $\{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}$ is chosen; but all save one voter (possibly) prefers $\{a_1, \ldots, a_{m-1}, b_m\}$. Q.E.D.

Proof of Theorem 5. Let A be the elected assembly and let A' be a different assembly. Suppose that the two assemblies first differ in position j. The candidate chosen to fill that post must be someone's most preferred candidate for that post, and that individual prefers A to A', since preferences are top lexicographic. Q.E.D.

Proof of Theorem 6. Theorem 6 is obvious.

Notes

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1. Separable preferences exhibit a form of independence; separability is defined formally below.

2. In the United States, school boards and the legislative bodies of many cities are elected at-large. The United States Congress, as well as the legislatures of the states, are elected using districted procedures. The election of the executive in many cities and states uses a numbered-post procedure: each candidate declares which executive post—governor, attorney general, or treasurer—he or she seeks, and then the entire electorate votes on each post.

3. When candidates are running for different posts, $\Gamma(N)$ is the set of all possible orderings of the candidates grouped by their respective posts.

4. For designated-post assemblies, a_i and a_j must contest the same post, and X_{ij} draws its $(m - 1)$ candidates from each of the remaining posts.

5. For instance, see the discussion of Table 1. Also see the game-theoretic example, where voters use dominant strategies.

6. See Benoît and Kornhauser 1991, where we also discuss simple voting more fully. Separability is a sufficient but not necessary condition for simple voting. A necessary and sufficient condition is "top-separability."

7. This reasoning is in the spirit of Nash equilibrium analysis. Any assembly, however, could be elected in a Nash equilibrium.

8. If there exists a Condorcet assembly, however, then those candidates also form a Condorcet set; in this case, a Condorcet set is necessarily efficient. As the text implies, the existence of a Condorcet set of candidates does not imply the existence of a Condorcet assembly (Benoît and Kornhauser 1991; Kadane 1972). Note also that even when there is a Condorcet assembly, common voting procedures do not guarantee the election of the Condorcet candidates, and these procedures may still be inefficient.

9. The preferences described here model some actual situations reasonably well. For example, from 1964 through 1986, the four resident commissioners of Etowah County, Alabama, were elected by a countywide vote even though each resident commissioner had to reside in his or her district. The county commission, as a whole, allocated money among districts, but each commissioner controlled funds allocated to his or her district. Residents of a district presumably had preferences like those described in the text. The commission is described in *Presley* v. *Etowah County Commission* 1992.

10. Our discussion abstracts from many of the issues that have prompted most discussions of proportional representation. For example, we ignore problems of implementation as well as problems that arise when voters have heterogeneous preferences.

11. Fishburn 1981 assumes that A is strictly preferred to A' if *and only if* $|A \cap B(k)| > |A' \cap B(k)|$. This implies blockness and is, in fact, a much stronger assumption. For instance, suppose $B(k) = \{a_1, a_2\}$. Let $A = \{a_1, a_3\}$ and $A' = \{a_2, a_4\}$. Fishburn's definition requires indifference between A and A' but our definition permits $A > A'$, $A < A'$, or $A = A'$. Fishburn restricts the assembly ordering to one with $k + 1$ indifference classes.

12. Voting in this manner is simple, but it is not the only simple way to vote. Fishburn 1981 shows that under a stronger assumption than blockness, voting in this manner is a dominant strategy.

13. See Benoît and Kornhauser 1991. The Ostrogorski paradox can be understood as a special instance of our inefficiency results for numbered-post assemblies (see Anscombe 1976; Bezembinder and Van Acker 1985; Daudt and Rae 1976; Deb and Kelsey 1987).

14. For instance, if assembly A has more first choices than assembly B, than A is preferred to B.

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INDIVIDUAL AND CONTEXTUAL VARIATIONS IN POLITICAL CANDIDATE APPRAISAL

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In this note we elaborate on the conditions under which on-line and memory-based strategies of political candidate evaluation can be implemented. We suggest that the structure of information may be an important contextual variable affecting the voter's choice of these strategies. In addition, we propose that citizens with less political sophistication are particularly sensitive to structural differences in the political information environment. We use an experimental design that manipulates the information-processing context to test these ideas. Our results suggest that the context in which information is presented plays a critical role in moderating the influence of individual differences in political sophistication.

Recent theories of vote choice have focused on the role of information in voters' decision making (see, e.g., Popkin 1991). Today's candidate-centered campaigns supply citizens with ample information. When presented with these data, how do voters use them to assess the candidates? Current cognitive models of candidate evaluation suggest that the answer to this question may depend on whether the raw data are processed on-line, as the voter acquires it, or whether the information is stored away, perhaps to be retrieved sometime later (see Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989).

The timing of the voter's production of candidate judgments is the key element differentiating on-line and memory-based modes of processing. If voters begin evaluating candidates at the time of information acquisition, judgments are said to be made on-line. In this mode of processing, each new piece of information that voters receive about a candidate is used to update the judgment, similar to the way in which Fiorina (1981) envisions a "running tally" of partisan evaluations. When voters need to produce an overall judgment about the candidate (whether in the voting booth or in order to answer a "feeling thermometer" question on a national survey), they would simply retrieve the tally without *reviewing the information upon which it is based*. By contrast, in memory-based judgments, voters have not constructed a running tally; instead, they pull together pieces of information they retrieve from memory, integrating them into an overall evaluation at the time that the judgment needs to be produced. The terminology used to describe these processes is somewhat misleading, because both modes are memory-based (see Hastie and Pennington 1989). However, if processing has been on-line, what is retrieved from memory is the previously constructed summary judgment. With memory-based judgments, on the other hand, this overall evaluation has not been made. Therefore, the voter must retrieve specific items from memory in order to construct it.

The difference in memory retrieval in the two modes leads to a critical prediction. If voters have computed a judgment on-line, then there is no need for them to review the specific information upon which it is based in order to make most decisions. The evaluation *has already been constructed and stored in memory*, so that there is no need to review the information from which the global summary was abstracted. The voter simply retrieves the summary judgment. Empirically, this translates into a prediction of the relative independence (in a correlational sense) of summary candidate evaluations and the evaluative implications of the specific information that individuals can recall about a candidate. Conversely, if voters have not been engaged in on-line processing, then when asked for a summary assessment, they must construct one at that time, based on the specific information they can recall about the candidate. When the judgment is memory-based, then, we can expect a strong correspondence between the specific information that individuals can recall about a candidate and their general assessments of the candidate.

CONTINGENCIES IN THE PROCESS OF CANDIDATE APPRAISAL

Both motivation and cognitive capacity appear to affect individuals' choices about which processing strategy to employ. If individuals approach an information acquisition situation with the explicit goal of forming an evaluation of someone, then they appear to adopt an on-line strategy (Srull and Wyer 1986). Indeed, on-line processing of information is so pervasive that investigators have had to go to extraordinary lengths to disrupt what appears to be a natural inclination to evaluate other people spontaneously (see Hastie and Park 1986). Motivation, however, may not be sufficient under some circumstances.

Bargh and Thein (1985), for example, suggest that individuals must have adequate processing capacity to perform the information integration activity that is required in the on-line processing mode. If individuals' capacities are overwhelmed, they may not be able to implement an on-line strategy, even if they are specifically motivated to form an impression of another person. If cognitive capacity is overloaded during information acquisition, individuals are not able to construct—and subsequently store—an on-line evaluation. When these individuals are later asked to make an overall evaluation, they must perforce rely on the relatively "raw" information they were able to encode in order to construct their judgments (i.e., memory-based processing). Under these overload conditions, then, we can expect to see a strong correlation between the information that is recalled and the summary judgments that individuals generate.

Both motivation and ability to process may be influenced by individual differences. For example, Bargh and Thein (1985) found that for individuals with "efficient processing structures," information overload did not appear to affect their ability to implement an on-line strategy. McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh (1990) obtained similar results in their study of political candidate evaluation. Political sophisticates were much more likely to process information on-line, a finding that they attribute to political sophisticates' more efficient processing capacities.

We shall contribute to the growing recognition of the heterogeneity in information processing by suggesting that the information context may also influence individuals' ability to implement an on-line appraisal strategy. We present some results from an experiment designed to investigate the role of context in candidate evaluation processes. Our results suggest that the structure of the political environment may compensate for individual differences in cognitive resources under some circumstances.

CONTEXT AND CANDIDATE EVALUATION

Scholars have recognized that variations in the quantity and quality of information available affect how voters make up their minds (see, e.g., Bartels 1988; Popkin 1991; Westlye 1991). A more subtle constraint imposed by the context of candidate evaluation may inhere in the *structure* of information. Some information environments are organized rather simply. For example, a presidential nominee's acceptance speech or a candidate "infomercial" is a simple information structure, at least in terms of forming an evaluation of that candidate. While a lot of information may be presented at one time, the structure is nonetheless highly person-centered. By contrast, a debate between candidates is a more complex setting. It features two or more individuals, each of whom presents information on a number of different dimensions, usually in some alternating format. Early televised debates among the contenders for the 1992 Democratic nomination, for example, included as many as five participants talking about issues that ranged from nuclear power to tax cuts.

These two kinds of information structures—person-centered and dimension-centered—capture a wide variety of political communication settings. Newspapers and news magazines, for example, often present long profiles of the candidates one at a time. Candidates' stump speeches are also person-centered forms of communication. These same candidates, however, will also appear in political debates, and the news media often compare the candidates along specific issue dimensions. These two types of formats are perhaps no better epitomized than by the two vehicles through which Ross Perot introduced himself to the public in the 1992 campaign: "infomercials" and participation in the presidential debates.

We believe that information structure can affect voters' processing strategies by influencing both the motivation to process and the ability to process the information presented. Dimension-centered formats, such as political debates, may attract viewers' attention (all else equal) because of the inherent conflictual nature of such presentations. The proposals by the Bipartisan Commission on Debates to eliminate the journalist panel of questioners from the 1992 presidential debates, for example, were justified largely on the grounds that this change would force the candidates to challenge each other directly, thus making the confrontation more interesting to the viewer. Furthermore, the added complexity of a multiple-person stimulus environment may arouse viewer attention, in part because the requirements of television as a medium necessitate more complex structural features (e.g., frequent cuts from one candidate to the other) in order to capture the ongoing communication in a debate context. The structural features of television (e.g., cuts, zooms, and edits) have been shown to affect viewers' attention involuntarily (see Lang 1990; Thorson, Reeves and Schleuder 1985).

Although person-centered structures may be less involving than debatelike confrontations, we believe they may require less effort and resources to process the information. For the same reasons that debates capture viewers' attention, they may also interfere with other processing tasks if individuals' processing capacities are exceeded. The interference seems the most pronounced when the material is unfamiliar to the viewer (Thorson and Lang 1992). Unfamiliar information requires more capacity to process. This may explain why Just, Crigler, and Wallach (1990) found that levels of learning about a candidate's issue positions were actually lower when this information was conveyed in a political debate than when it was presented in the form of a political commercial. For familiar information, on the other hand, emotional arousal and complicated structural features may enhance processing, because viewers are less bored.

These findings suggest that the relationship between motivation and ability to process may be complex. At high levels of viewer involvement, the resources necessary to attend to the information may compete with the resources necessary for other tasks such as comprehension and information integration that are required in on-line processing. At low levels of involvement, however, viewers may not be as interested in attending to the messages and therefore may not pay enough attention to the information to absorb its implications.

Different types of voters may be affected differently by the structure of information presentation. We hypothesize here that individuals with less political sophistication may be especially affected by contextual features. The politically sophisticated know more than the unsophisticated. This knowledge enables them to handle new political information with greater facility, for any new morsel can be integrated more easily into what is already known. This greater cognitive capacity gives sophisticates more flexibility in their use of cognitive strategies (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Showers and Cantor 1985). Given this cognitive dexterity, they should be less constrained by the structure of information imposed on them. For individuals less well versed in politics, on the other hand, following public affairs is more strenuous. Nonsophisticates may find their capacities overwhelmed by the attentional demands of a more complicated, debate-focused presentation format. Thus our central hypothesis is that there is an interaction between the type of information environment and the individual's skills, a contingency that should moderate the importance of sophistication in the use of on-line or memory-based strategies.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURE

In a real campaign, it would be virtually impossible to isolate voters before they have had any exposure to the candidates. Even if we could, we could never measure all the information to which they subsequently would be exposed. We believe, therefore, that an experimental design is necessary to test our hypotheses about information structure. By employing fictitious candidates as stimulus material and manipulating information structure, we are able to have control over the voters' information environment.

With the assistance of a local playwright, we crafted a "political campaign" that pitted two candidates against each other in a race for a state legislative seat. Our candidates, Ron Vanderkenning and Larry Drake, were actually professional actors we secured through a local talent agency. We filmed the "candidates" at a university television studio in a setting resembling a public affairs program.

Research participants viewed a 15-minute campaign composed of three distinct types of information: personal background, policy positions, and political party membership. In the personal background component, each man spent almost two minutes providing the audience with details of his upbringing, education, occupation, family life, previous political experience, and religious affiliation. The candidates were evenly matched on each feature. For example, both were married and each had an upper-middle-class profession.

In the policy portion, each candidate described his position on six issues: family farm policy, education, the business climate and taxes, social service spending, defense spending, and trade policy. Each issue statement lasted from 30 to 45 seconds. Ron's platform was moderately conservative, and Larry's was moderately liberal.

In the third informational component, each candidate paid tribute to his respective political party. In this segment, the candidates extolled the virtues of past party heroes and highlighted established party cleavages but did not mention any specific issues.[1]

In the present study, we varied the *focus of comparison* by manipulating the videotaped debate. In the high-person focus, or *candidate-centered* condition, subjects viewed Ron's exposition in its entirety before they were introduced to Larry. In the *debate* version of this manipulation, a dimension-centered presentation was created by having the two candidates take turns delivering information in response to prompting from an off-camera narrator. Importantly, the information conveyed by the candidates *was precisely the same* in the debate condition as in the candidate-centered condition, but the addition of the narrator's voice and the intercandidate shifts transformed the context from one focused on each candidate into one more centered around a comparison of the various political characteristics of the two men.

In exchange for a cash payment, 126 individuals participated in our study. We recruited participants through advertisements in a daily newspaper. Approximately half of the subjects were undergraduates at a large midwestern university. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 79, with a mean of 26 years. Most of the subjects (75%) were political independents. Of the independents, 16% leaned toward the Republican party, and 37% leaned toward the Democrats. The high degree of independence may be an artifact of how we ascertained partisanship, a single seven-point scale, rather than the conventional three-part National Election Study (NES) question.[2]

Upon arriving for their appointments, subjects were presented with a letter of instruction to read. They also listened to a tape-recorded version of the letter in order to reinforce the instructions. This letter was printed on official-looking letterhead stationery bearing the name of a fictional public relations firm, BARK Associates, Inc.

Subjects watched the video after receiving the instructions. In the debate condition, the opening shot of the video showed both Ron and Larry seated around a small table. An off-camera voice welcomed the men to "Inside Scoop." The narrator then told the candidates that the audience would like to hear a little bit about their backgrounds and invited Mr. Vanderkenning to go first. The camera then cut to Ron, who provided the biographical information contained in the personal background vignette. After Ron finished, the camera focus shifted to Larry, who then proceeded to share his biography with the audience. This back and forth between the two men was repeated for each of the six policies and the political party segment, with the narrator's voice providing brief transitions between each area. During each of these candidate alternations, the camera came back to the two men seated around the table. In the person-centered condition, the two candidates were never pictured together and a narrator was not used.

Immediately following the presentation, subjects were given eight minutes to complete a distractor test. It contained questions of general knowledge in history, science, geography, and literature. Subjects then filled out a questionnaire testing their memory for the material presented, asked for their evaluations of the candidates, measured their perceptions of the candidates' stands on the issues, surveyed their knowledge of politics, asked for their political predispositions and basic demographic characteristics.

MEASURES

Sophistication. The measurement of political sophistication has been contentious (see, e.g., Luskin 1987; Krosnick 1990). We followed the common practice of building a composite index from several different measures. To form our index, we standardized and then summed four variables: self-reported interest in politics, exposure to television news, behavioral participation in political activities, and the number of correct answers to a five-question political information test. Coefficient alpha for the scale is .62. A median split was used to create two sophistication groups: political sophisticates and nonsophisticates.

Party Identification. Subjects' party identification was measured with a single seven-point scale ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican.

Policy Similarity. We created a measure of policy similarity in order to assess the degree to which a subject's issue preferences matched our candidates' platforms. Subjects indicated their attitude toward several public policies on seven-point scales. For each issue, subjects were given a policy similarity score. If their attitude fell on the Republican side of the scale, subjects received a score of 1, indicating similarity to Ron. If a subject's attitude rating was closer to Larry's (the Democratic) position, on the other hand, the subject received a similarity score of −1. And if subjects rated their attitude at the middle of the issue scale, at position 4, or did not have an attitude on the issue, they received a similarity score of 0 for that issue. To obtain an overall measure of policy similarity, the policy similarity scores were summed across the five issues areas for which we gathered subjects' attitudes. The resulting measure of policy similarity variable had a range of −5 to 5, with 5 indicating maximum similarity to the Republican, and −5 denoting maximum similarity to the Democratic, candidate.

Comparative Candidate Evaluation. Comparative candidate evaluation is the dependent variable in our regression equation. Overall evaluation of each candidate was assessed by a seven-point semantic differential with anchors of *dislike* and *like*. A comparative candidate evaluation variable was constructed by subtracting subjects' rating of Larry on the liking scale from their rating of Ron. The resulting variable ranged from −6 to +6, with higher scores indicating greater liking for Ron.

Comparative Candidate Memory. Subjects were given a free recall task after viewing the video and completing a distractor test. They were told to write down everything they could remember about what they had heard and seen on the video, numbering their thoughts as they went. They were given as much time as they needed to do the task. The next page of the questionnaire instructed them to go back through their entries, indicating whether what they had remembered was positive, negative, or neutral about the candidates. We used positively and negatively valenced recall memory to construct a measure of comparative candidate memory. For each candidate separately, a "net" memory score was obtained by subtracting the number of negative items subjects recalled about the candidate from the number of positive items recalled. If subjects recalled more positive than negative attributes about Ron, for example, their net memory scores for Ron would have been positive. A comparative candidate memory variable was constructed from these two net scores by subtracting the net score for Larry from the net score for Ron. If the net scores for Ron and Larry were the same, the subject's comparative memory score would have been 0. If Larry's net score was higher than Ron's, then the comparative memory variable would have been negative, and if Ron's net score was higher than Larry's, the comparative memory variable would have been positive.

EXPECTATIONS AND RESULTS

To examine our expectations about the interaction of sophistication with information structure, we correlated the measure of comparative candidate memory with the comparative candidate evaluation variable within the four groups of subjects defined by the combination of the two levels of sophistication and the two different information formats. As can be seen in Figure 1, consistent with our reasoning, the correlation is quite a bit stronger for the debate–low sophistication group, indicating greater memory-based processing. Furthermore, the difference between the correlation in the two different structures is much smaller for those individuals defined as high in

FIGURE 1

The Correlation Between Comparative Memory and Comparative Candidate Evaluation by Candidate-centered and Debate Information Structures and Political Sophistication Levels

	Candidate-Centered	Debate	Row r
Low Sophistication	.28	.69	.57
High Sophistication	.49	.31	.39
Column r	.42	.54	

Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.

sophistication than the corresponding difference for those low in sophistication, also supporting our contention that the low sophisticates would be more sensitive to the different information environments.

To test the statistical significance of these differences, we use a regression-based model. It assumes that comparative candidate evaluation is a function of subjects' partisanship, policy predispositions, and valenced recall memory of the information presented on the videotape. By construction, party identification, policy similarity, and comparative candidate memory should be positively related to the dependent variable. We test our hypothesis by using two-way and three-way interaction terms. The candidate-centered information structure is coded as 0 on a dummy variable and the debate condition as 1. Political sophistication is also a dummy variable, scored 1 for sophisticates and 0 for the nonsophisticates. If sophistication moderates the relationship between memory and judgment, as others contend (McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990), then the coefficient for the interaction of the sophistication dummy variable and the comparative memory variable should be statistically significant and negatively signed. If the debate structure interferes with on-line processing, as we argue, then the coefficient for the interaction of the structure dummy variable and the comparative memory variable should be positively signed, indicating that in the debate condition, the relationship between memory for information and overall candidate judgments is significantly stronger. Finally, if structure and sophistication interact as we hypothesize, then memory-based processing should be significantly greater for the nonsophisticates in the debate condition. If our key hypothesis is correct, then the coefficient for the three-way interaction term formed by multiplying the memory variable by the sophistication and structure dummy variables should be significant and negatively signed. This result would indicate that in the debate condition, the relationship between memory and overall candidate judgments was significantly weaker for political sophisticates.

These expectations produce the following equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\text{Comparative candidate evaluation} = b_0\\
&\quad + b_1\,(\text{party identification}) + b_2\,(\text{policy similarity})\\
&\quad + b_3\,(\text{comparative memory})\\
&\quad + b_4\,(\text{sophistication dummy})\\
&\quad + b_5\,(\text{structure dummy})\\
&\quad + b_6\,(\text{sophistication} \times \text{structure})\\
&\quad + b_7\,(\text{structure dummy} \times \text{sophistication dummy})\\
&\quad + b_8\,(\text{memory} \times \text{structure dummy})\\
&\quad + b_9\,(\text{memory} \times \text{sophistication dummy})\\
&\quad + b_{10}\,(\text{memory} \times \text{sophistication dummy}\\
&\qquad \times \text{structure dummy}).
\end{aligned}
$$

Given our a priori expectations, our key hypothesis tests are one-tailed.

The results of our estimation are displayed in Table 1. Recall memory, other things being equal, appears to bear little on subjects' overall evaluations of the two candidates once partisanship, policy similarity, and the interactions are controlled. Contrary to recent research on on-line processing (McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990), sophistication per se does not seem to influence the strength of the relationship between memory and judgment. The interaction term does not have a significant coefficient and its sign is in the wrong direction. Structure, on the other hand, has the hypothesized impact on the ability to implement an on-line strategy. The significant interaction coefficient is consistent with the interpretation that a debatelike format overloads individuals' capacities, forestalling the kind of integrative activity that is required in an on-line strategy. This forces individuals to rely on the information they can recall at a later time to make their candidate judgments, producing a significant memory–judgment relationship. Finally, the strongly significant three-way interaction supports our central hypothesis handsomely. For the sophisticates, information structure matters little. The resulting memory coefficient in the debate condition is virtually zero (i.e., .02 + .16 + .32 − .47 = .03), and in the candidate-centered condition it is just slightly higher (i.e., .02 + .16 = .18). For the nonsophisticates, on the other hand, the candidate-centered condition results in no linkage between memory and judgment (B = .02), an indication that they were able to implement an on-line strategy in

TABLE 1

The Relationship between Comparative Memory and Comparative Candidate Evaluation by Information Structure and Political Sophistication

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS
Party identification	.28* (.16)
Policy similarity	.18* (.09)
Comparative memory	.02 (.11)
Comparative memory × sophistication	.16 (.14)
Comparative memory × structure	.32** (.12)
Comparative memory × structure × sophistication	−.47** (.17)
Sophistication dummy	−.68 (.56)
Structure dummy	−.18 (.54)
Structure dummy × sophistication dummy	−.37 (.81)
Adjusted R^2	.33
N	104

Note: Structure = 1 if debate, 0 if candidate-centered. Sophistication = 1 for high, 0 for low. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is comparative candidate evaluation.

*$p < .05$.

**$p < .01$.

the less cognitively demanding person-centered condition. However, the strength of the memory–judgment relationship is considerably higher in the debate condition for the nonsophisticates (.02 + .32 = .34).

Table 1 strongly demonstrates the role of context in the cognitive processing of political information. The candidate-centered condition seems to have encouraged an on-line appraisal strategy among the nonsophisticated. Consistent with our argument about the conditional impact of sophistication, there is no significant relationship between recalled information and summary candidate assessments for the nonsophisticated in the less cognitively demanding environment. Under this condition, in fact, it is experts who appear slightly more dependent on memory for their judgments, suggesting that the candidate-centered format was not as motivating to them as the debate format. The debate format, however, was *not* conducive to on-line processing among those with less well developed political skills.

CONCLUSION

Political candidate information comes packaged in different ways, particularly as candidates look for ways to exploit new technologies. Presidential candidates in the 1992 campaign were responsible for many information innovations, including videocassette distribution, talk show appearances, and "infomercials." Interestingly, many of these new ways of communicating with voters featured the candidate in a structure that we have been describing as person-centered. Indeed, the Discovery Channel took cues from the candidates when it sponsored a very nontraditional presidential candidate "debate" during the primary season that featured each of the remaining contenders (except the president) giving a 20-minute "talking head" presentation. If we are to discover what voters know and when they know it (to borrow the Watergate phrase of former Tennessee senator Howard Baker), it is essential to understand how these different types of information environments affect the processing of information. Our results suggest that information structure does matter, particularly for those voters who are more sensitive to the information-processing demands of the environmental setting. Our results, therefore, may help us understand why candidate commercials have been found to be particularly important sources of information for voters as they consider their choice. Our results also suggest that some contextual tinkering with traditional debate formats may be necessary if they are to be more useful for voter learning about the candidates.

Our results point to the conclusion that citizen differences in political sophistication may be less consequential in some circumstances than political cognition research typically suggests. According to our findings, an on-line type of information-processing strategy is equally available to all types of voters—as it should be, given that we employ it so routinely in everyday life (see Rahn et al. 1990)—but the sophisticated, perhaps because of their greater skills, can implement it even in a cognitively demanding environment. Thus the nature of the political environment, through its influence on both motivation to process and ability to process, may be as important as individual differences in understanding the heterogeneity of political information processing.

Notes

A version of this note was presented at the 1991 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. We are grateful to Susan Klein for her able research assistance and John Richardson for his deft scriptwriting. We also thank John Bruce, Greg Diamond, Jack Dennis, Norman Luttbeg, Richard Merelman, and John Sullivan for their comments on earlier versions. Jon Krosnick provided us with especially helpful insights. The research reported here was funded, in part, by grants from the University of Minnesota Graduate School, Duke University, and the National Science Foundation (SES 92-96046).

1. Transcripts are available upon request.

2. Aldrich and his colleagues (1982) found similar results in their report of experimental question designs in a 1979 NES pilot study. In a split-half design, half of the respondents were asked the usual NES partisanship questions, while the other half were presented with a seven-point-scale format for measuring partisanship, similar to the seven-point-issue-scale design. They found that one in six respondents were "pure" independents when the traditional measure was used but that one in two were "pure" independents (i.e., chose the midpoint, or 4, response) when presented with the seven-point-scale measure of partisanship.

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NOTES FROM THE MANAGING EDITOR

FORTHCOMING IN JUNE, 1994

The following articles, research notes and controversies have been tentatively scheduled for publication in the June 1994 issue:

Courtney Brown. "Politics and the Environment: Nonlinear Instabilities Dominate."

Darrell Dobbs. "Choosing Justice: Socrates' Mythical City and the Practice of Dialectic."

James D. Fearon. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes."

Morris Fiorina. "Divided Government in the American States: An Unintended Consequence of Legislative Professionalism?"

Andrew Gelman and Gary King. "Enhancing Democracy through Legislative Redistricting."

Micheal W. Giles and Kaenan Hertz. "Racial Threat and Partisan Identification."

Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson. "Economic Security and Value Change."

Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro. "Issues, Candidate Image, and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy's 1960 Presidential Campaign."

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Melissa A. Orlie. "Thoughtless Assertion and Political Deliberation."

John E. Roemer. "The Strategic Role of Party Ideology When Voters Are Uncertain about How the Economy Works."

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Alexander Wendt. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State."

Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger. "Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR." A Research Note.

Bruce Western and Simon Jackman. "Bayesian Inference for Comparative Research." A Research Note.

James Johnson; Dana Villa. "Public Sphere, Postmodernism, and Polemic." A Controversy.

ERRATUM

"Electoral Competition in the American States" by Thomas M. Holbrook and Emily Van Dunk, December 1993, pp. 955–62. On p. 956, column 2, the sentence beginning on line 8 should read, "Though there is some disagreement on this matter, we define a safe seat as one that is won by a margin of victory of five or more percentage points."

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THE NATURE OF LAW TODAY

Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy. By David Dyzenhaus. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 289p. $69.00.

Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays. Edited by Robert P. George. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 371p. $39.95.

Law and Objectivity. By Kent Greenawalt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 288p. $45.00.

Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and Life. By Frederick Schauer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 254p. $39.95.

Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought. By Roger Shiner. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 348p. $49.95.

The legal system is a major political institution; and it would be a poor theory of politics, whether normative or descriptive, that lacked an account of the law. Most legal theorists writing in English have thought that any such account will need to accommodate the following truths: that to claim to be governing by law sounds like a good thing, and yet laws and legal systems can be more or less just. One strand of thought, sometimes called *natural law*, explains it by saying that law is an essentially moral enterprise, of which unjust legal systems are defective specimens—in some cases so defective as to be denied the title *law* save in some ironic sense. A competing strand, *legal positivism*, denies that, insisting that there is no necessary connection between law and morality, at least none that guarantees that every full-blooded legal system will have some positive moral worth. Law is just an institutionalized mode of rule application, rules being identified by considerations of social fact and without recourse to moral arguments. Under typical conditions, law is normally a valuable institution; but that—and *how* valuable it is—is contingent on its content.

Such is the core of one important dispute among legal theorists today. Obviously, natural law theory in this sense need not be committed to the existence of a law of nature; nor need legal positivism deny it. And legal positivism need not be committed to a sociologically "positivistic" account of the nature of social facts: on that point, they can be just as interpretative or hermeneutic as you please. So the terminology is bound to leave some in honest confusion (and provide others with a chance to mislead the sophomore); but we are probably stuck with it—and thus with the natural-law-versus-positivism debate.

The five books considered here aspire to join, or intersect with, that famous debate. Kent Greenawalt and Frederick Schauer treat different aspects of the notion of ruling; the collection edited by Robert P. George and the books by Roger Shiner and David Dyzenhaus examine the relationship between law and morality. It is of interest that a number of these authors think that the debate is now fruitless, although—characteristically in political theory—they offer conflicting accounts of why that is.

Kent Greenawalt's *Law and Objectivity* ranges widely over three questions about whether law is, or should be "objective": (1) the problem of determinacy, that is, whether legal rules can, if properly interpreted, uniquely determine the answer to a case; (2) how law treats people, for example, whether it should appraise their behavior by an individualized standard tailored to the situations and capacities of each, by some uniform external standard of what might properly be expected of the reasonable person, or by abstract classifications that are fair and reasonable; and (3) the relationship between law and other standards, such as those of custom, morality, and economics.

Greenawalt is reliably clear and interesting on most of these topics; the first section, in particular, provides a nice summary and critique of the debate around indeterminacy, one that will prove useful to many students. But there is more coherence within his treatment of each topic than there is among them. In part, that is inevitable; for valuable as it is to collect, distinguish, and assess the ways in which law may be called objective, the topics treated here are but homonyms; it is as if one opened a book on banks and found chapters on central banks, snow banks, and river banks. No doubt, when the objectivity of law is praised or criticized, all sorts of things might be in issue; and this clearly written and accessible text touches on most of them. At the same time, it is hard to get to the bottom of any one of these disparate issues in the short compass that a chapter or two allows.

With Frederick Schauer's *Playing by the Rules*, we have a clear and interesting account of one type of social rules (i.e., prescriptions) that are of special relevance to legal systems. His core idea is that such rules are "entrenched" generalizations—middle-range principles that stand as instruments for achieving their deeper justifications but instruments that inevitably involve some suboptimal decisions. To favor rule-based decision making is thus to be committed to some kinds of error. A justification for such a seemingly conservative procedure is to be given in terms of the benefits of allocating jurisdictional authority to some people, rather than others.

This excellent book shows that a work can be both compact and important. I hesitate, therefore, to note that it leaves out a significant possibility. No doubt some prescriptive rules do have the function of entrenching generalizations as instruments to further certain goals. But is that true of all prescriptions? What, for example, is the underlying justification of the rule "Honour thy father and thy mother"? One possible explanation is that it enjoins children to a certain behavior as a fitting expression of a valued relationship. From Weber to Wittgenstein, many have suggested that rules may have not only instrumental but also expressive, or communicative, functions. To see them as aiming, indirectly and perhaps imperfectly, at certain underlying justifications is to distort their actual role in practical thought. This suggests that Schauer's account may, in fact, be something other than a general theory of what rules *are*; for a noninstrumental prescription is still a rule. To say that rules are not ultimate justifications in practical reasoning is not to say that they are always instrumental, although, to be sure, many legal rules are. This may limit the generality of Schauer's account. Still, his work now joins that of David Lyons and Joseph Raz as indispensable treatments of the subject.

Greenawalt's and Schauer's treatments, in their different ways, focus on the first part of the problem: What is so good about ruling by laws? The remaining three books tackle the relationship between law and morality. The oddly conceived volume, *Natural Law Theory,* offers, as the editor, Robert George, fairly warns, a "remarkable assortment" of theories (p.v). It ranges from Hadley Arkes on Cicero to Jeremy Waldron on metaethics and adjudication. Many of the pieces (those by Joseph Boyle, Robert George, Russel Hittinger, Jeffery Stout, Hadley Arkes, and Lloyd Weinrib) will be of interest only to philosophers working on moral realism or to historians concerned with the classical or Thomistic moral traditions. The social theorist interested in the bearing of these ideas on legal systems will need to turn to the other contributions, some of them excellent, to find out anything about law.

Consider the question of moral realism—the idea that there is a fact of the matter (an "objectivity" if you like) in morality. Contributors John Finnis and Michael Moore have done more than any other contemporary writers to explore the relevance of this for legal theory. Finnis, in his landmark *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (1981), updated the Aristotelian–Thomistic line in a way that made it join squarely with contemporary social theory. Michael Moore's rejection of positivism begins at a different point, drawing on recent work in the philosophy of language and in metaethics. He makes explicit and rigorous an argument that has been drifting around since Lon Fuller's famous interchanges with the late H. L. A. Hart—that only its purpose, goal, or function makes law what it is; and since it is trivially true that a thing ought to fulfil its proper function, positivists must be wrong to think that there is a difference between law as it is and law as it ought to be.

One might ask what such functionalism has to do with any natural law thesis. After all, "credit card" is a functional kind because all and only those things that have the purpose of providing credit are credit cards. But one can still say whether something is a credit card and identify its credit limit, expiry date, and so on without thinking that all credit cards are morally good and even while thinking that all credit facilities, being usury, are immoral.

Functionalism helps natural-lawyers only if the function of legal systems is a moral one. Moore says, "If law is a functional kind then necessarily law serves some good and thus, necessarily, law is in that way related to morality" (p. 221). But that does not follow. Suppose, as some Marxists think, law is a functional kind whose purpose is to legitimate class domination. Good law is law that does that well and to be a legal system is to have some threshold ability to do that. Does this establish a necessary connection between law and morality? Certainly not. Moore tries to advance the case by saying that for law to be necessarily moral, it must promote some goal that is related to all human goods. Yet he leaves to another occasion the demonstration that there is such a goal and that it distinguishes law from other social institutions.

Similarly, Roger Shiner ducks at the very last minute in his *Norm and Nature*. Acknowledging that some functional kinds have nonmoral functions he says, without argument, that law is different, that "the judgement of some system of norms that it is a legal system is at one and the same time a candidate judgement of critical morality that the system fulfils well some moral purpose" (p. 129). Such remarks are puzzling, and I am unsure what Shiner means by a "*candidate* judgement" (one that might turn out to be false?). But things are even worse than these functionalists imagine, for two reasons.

First, some moral functions of law are compatible with the separation of law and morality. Suppose that the distinctive function of law is to *make justice possible,* by giving people control over their lives and the capacity to coordinate the common activity on which justice depends. Although law therefore necessarily makes justice possible, it is still possible that a legal system does not make justice actual. Indeed, it is consistent with this that *all* actual legal systems are unjust. If that is natural law, then any positivist may accept it.

Second—and worse—law is simply not a functional kind in the requisite sense. Theorists as diverse as Weber, Kelsen, and Pashukanis have all cogently argued that it is impossible to give a nontrivial functional account of law, in part because no function is unique to, or universal among, those forms of social order that we identify as legal systems. Law is in fact a *modal kind;* it is a specific means of doing things—in Kelsen's language, a "specific social technique." Note that this is not the objection that there is no universal agreement on an end for law. As Moore rightly says, that is beside the point. The question is whether *there is* a specific function of law, not whether theorists agree about it. But that is where the case fails. There just is no interesting and distinctive function of all legal systems.

In his perceptive and helpful essay in *Natural Law Theory,* Jeremy Waldron sets out the case against the relevance of metaethics to legal theory (a case also made by both Hart and Dworkin). It is a excellent piece for students needing both a reliable sketch of modern debates about the objectivity of ethics and a compelling argument for their irrelevance to jurisprudence. In brief, Waldron says that our concerns focus not on whether there are, in some sense, objective values but on whether and how these might be identified by courts and guide their judgments. Without an epistemology (and maybe even a methodology), all the talk about ethical objectivity has no cash value. Thus, our political worries about the unpredictability, irrationality, or illegitimacy of judicial decisions are not allayed by adopting moral realism.

At the same time, Waldron dismisses the whole debate about the nature of law. In this respect a good Dworkinian, he thinks that the central problem of legal theory is one of articulating the sort of standards on which judges should base their decisions. These obviously include moral considerations, particularly in countries like the United States, England, and Canada, where some laws *direct* adjudicators to apply moral judgment in deciding cases and others leave enough indeterminacy in meaning that they cannot sensibly be applied in any other way. Thus, Waldron confidently declares that positivism is "almost certainly false."

Yet all positivists *agree* with his observations about judicial decision making. They insist that a lot of what goes on on the bench is moralizing, or politics in the broad (and sometimes even the narrow) sense. But they explain this by a theory that allows that law is not everywhere dense, that it has gaps that leave room for discretion. To a positivist, a theory of law and a theory of proper adjudication are different enterprises. Law often gives judges the power to decide whether a certain delay is "unreasonable," whether a wage rate is "fair," whether procedures accord with "fundamental justice," and so on. And these powers may also include a duty to exercise them in accord with certain moral considerations. In other cases, discretion arises from the inherent, though marginal, indeterminacy of every rule. (As Kelsen rightly argued, this is true not merely in hard cases: *every* case contains both rule application and rule creation.)

Waldron thinks that this reply is just sophistry: "As far as I can tell, the motive behind such moves is to secure a victory . . . for a position *called* 'legal positivism', no matter what that position turns out to be" (p. 160). But that is not the motive. Positivists are simply seeking an account that is properly sensitive to the different ways in which rule application and rule creation engage our theoretical and practical interests. For example, we tend to hold decision makers more responsible when they have more power to create rules; one who is merely applying rules laid down by others attracts criticism of different kinds.

None of this is a matter of semantics. A view of where to draw the line between law and moralizing, between applying and creating rules, is linked to a whole family of other evaluative and theoretical judgments. Perhaps it is possible to accommodate these *within* a moralistic view of law. (One might say that judges *can* be blamed for bad decisions even if the rules are not of their creation [if things get bad enough, they should break the rules] or that provided they act in good faith, they should not be blamed even for bad moralizing, because the job is a difficult one.) My point is not that there is *no* other way to get at the substantive issues. That is hardly ever the case in political theory: our idioms are usually both flexible and dispensable. Rather, it is that the distinction between law and discretion has natural roots and cannot be dismissed as a quibble.

In any case, consider the alternative, first proposed by American legal realists like Karl Llewellyn: the law is *whatever* can be done about a case. If this is right, then not only does law fuse with morality but we cannot even distinguish the law of the United States from the law of Mexico (since conflict-of-laws rules may direct United States courts to apply Mexican law) nor from accounting practice (since courts may be bound to apply this in figuring damages in a civil case)—and so on. Some doctrine of the limits and unity of a legal system therefore appears indispensable.

Waldron is not the only contributor to think the debate superseded. Neil MacCormick (whose *Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory* remains the best account of its subject matter from a broadly positivist perspective) has been persuaded by reading Finnis that "the issue of the mutual opposition [between positivism and natural law is] . . . now closed and unfruitful. There are elements from works in both schools which any sound theory of law should embrace" (p. 130). He finds that Finnis, at any rate, does not deny the separation thesis and that positivists should accept that both law and morality are species of practical reasoning, that certain moral aspirations (if not achievements) are intrinsic to law, and that the rule of law is, at least prima facie, always of moral value.

In his own essay, Finnis himself says, for example, that the law of England, being a "cultural object, constructed or (as we say) posited by creative human choices, is an instrument, a technique adopted for a moral purpose, and adopted because there is no other available way of agreeing over significant spans of time about precisely how to pursue the moral project well" (p. 141). Thus, legal reasoning is largely *technical* reasoning, "not moral reasoning," though it is in some ways structured by "moral absolutes" such as the prohibition on intentional killing or deliberate deceptions (p. 142). Finnis now thinks that it is the value of impartiality that drives the law toward the artificial technique of deciding disputes by positive norms identifiable "as far as possible" on the basis of their sources.

While there is something undeniably genial at promise of such a peaceful coexistence between natural law and positivism, others will have nothing of it. The volume concludes with a pair of essays by Joseph Raz and Ernest Weinrib, testing the power of Weinrib's no-compromise, naturalistic essentialism in jurisprudence. Weinrib offers a sketch of his high conceptualist position: a solution of Kant plus Aristotle in Hegel. (This piece is mostly about tort law.

Weinrib sometimes writes as if the nature of law itself can be decoded from certain tort doctrines, rather like making a complete dinosaur from a couple of DNA sequences preserved in amber.) Raz's piece is an effective demolition, though it will be of interest mainly to readers of Weinrib. In a few paragraphs of reply, Weinrib complains of being misread when he writes things like this: "By suggesting that the rationality of law lies in a moral order immanent to legal material, formalism postulates that juridical content can somehow sustain itself from within" (p. 310). My own sympathies lie with those who struggle to construe such passages.

A very different form of antipositivism, one more agreeable to the more empirically or institutionally minded reader, is contained in David Dyzenhaus' book, *Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems*. He sets out to test the merits of positivism by considering how it fared in South African legal practice. The book is a rich resource for its illuminating discussions of the style of judicial reasoning that the South African judiciary brought to the apartheid laws and related apparatus of oppression. Unsurprisingly, the judges were not revolutionaries; with a few heroic exceptions, they deferred to an oppressive regime. What is, perhaps, surprising is that Dyzenhaus lays the blame at the door of positivism.

Can the issue finally be resolved by such a pragmatic test? There is a deep-threshold issue that Dyzenhaus does not quite surmount. Legal positivism does not *have* a distinctive theory of adjudication. It has a theory about the nature of law, according to which judges often have discretion. To decide how such discretion should properly be exercised requires a normative theory of justice and political responsibility. If South African judges failed to do justice, then either this theory failed them, or they failed to act on it. If they were blind to discretionary powers that they, in fact, had, then their theory of law may have failed them; but by the same token, it was surely not a positivist theory.

At best, Dyzenhaus may have shown that certain judicial *interpretations* of positivism gave rise to bad judgments, primarily through excessive deference to an unjust legislature and executive. There is no guaranteeing that any complex and abstract theory will find itself fairly employed in practice. But this truth is quite general. Dyzenhaus apparently believes that a different theory would, in the South African context, have given rise to better judgments. In particular, he would have preferred the judges to give more weight to a "common law" style of adjudication more attentive to individual rights. I am not sure that "common law reasoning" is, in fact, so sensitive to rights, as opposed, for instance, to some conception of the public good. Nor is it clear that a rhetoric of rights would have made a substantial difference (though here I am only speculating). The evils of the unreformed South African state were probably sufficient to withstand almost any judicial rhetoric. Would it have been safer, for example, for the oppressed African majority if the judges had gone all the way and become natural-lawyers, enforcing in their courts not only the law of the land but the law of nature *as they saw it*, or if they had become Dworkinians, seeking to extend to hard cases the underlying spirit of law, *as they saw it?* I am not confident.

Behind this, there is a still-larger question. Should legal theories be accepted or rejected according to the political payoffs of endorsing them in a particular jurisdiction? It seems likely that the consequences of judges' coming to endorse one view or another depends on the local context and political culture. Yet it seems odd to suppose that naturalism is a good account of the nature of law for South Africans but a poor one for, let us say, the French.

The ideas that the debate between natural-lawyers and positivists does not matter, has been superseded, or is settled by history are all very remote from Roger Shiner's approach to the issue. His fascinating book, *Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought*, argues that there is deep significance to a feeling that every undergraduate must have had in first considering the modern classics of legal theory: that there is something good to be said on each side yet not enough to promise a final and conclusive argument. Shiner's original and provocative claim is that *this is itself the nature of law*. He complains that most think of legal theories

> as careful mappings, with various degrees of accuracy, of the legal landscape. The model presupposed by this study is, on the contrary *dynamic*—that is, one sees past the different theories to the entities they illuminate, not by seeing the different theories as partial pictures juxtaposed, but as partial theories *interacting* with each other, and by that interaction providing the deeper understanding sought in legal theorizing." (p. 13)

Shiner's thesis is thus metajurisprudential: law is that thing which sets up the dynamic between positivism and antipositivism in legal theory.

This complex idea is more exemplified than defended in his book, as it moves through a discussion of the "simple" positivism (Bentham or Austin), to its more sophisticated variants (Hart and Raz), to the replies of antipositivists (Finnis and Dworkin). Shiner's heart is clearly on the side of the antipositivists, though, at the end, he honestly points up their weaknesses, too. There is much that is worth considering here and much of value in his deft reconstruction of the arguments of the various sides (though it is sometimes hard to think of writers who endorse the composite positions he describes). But most challenging for present purposes is his metajurisprudential thesis: Is it sound?

Since there might have been legal systems and yet not *any* legal theory, we should refine it somewhat. Let us say that Shiner takes law to be that thing which, when presented to philosophic reflection, calls forth such debates—or (since the writers Shiner considers are mostly English or American) that thing which, when presented to the Anglo-American philosophic mind, calls forth the natural-law-versus-positivism debate. Is *that* what law is? Is the structure of challenge and response in a theoretical debate like a piece of litmus paper that tells us something about the nature of thing being debated?

I have no doubt that for almost any *x*, if asked to choose between a static and a dynamic theory of *x*, we would all prefer the latter. (Who would want to miss out on the action?) But that does not support Shiner's thesis. We need to notice an important distinction between a theory of the dynamics of *x* and a dynamic of theories about *x*. Legal systems are historical entities: laws and legal systems come into being, are enforced, are repealed, fall in disuse, and so on. So any theory of law must cope with the dynamic character of law in this sense. But Shiner has something different in mind. He moves from an observation about the inherent dynamic of *theories about* law to a conclusion about the nature of law *itself*. That is a more exotic—and original—claim.

It is also hard to interpret and—I think—to defend. The structure of much theoretical debate in the social studies involves the kind of movement of hypothesis and attempted refutation that Shiner traces. The debate between positivists and their critics resembles many other enduring debates in philosophy, such as those between realists and nominalists, libertarians and determinists, and so on. In all of these cases, we find a dynamic interplay of debate, a shifting and refining of positions, and (often) an enduring sense that no one has got it quite right. Where the disputes are conceptual, rather than empirical, replies and reformulations are normally forthcoming. Does this suggest further metalevel theses of Shiner's sort?

There is reason to be skeptical. What Shiner needs to show is that it is proper to impute such theoretical (not to say literary) dynamics back to the *object* level and thus to say, "That is what *law* is like." And to show that, we would need to be confident that the movements in legal thought reflect only the dynamic of the subject matter. That is doubtful. It seems much more likely that the structure and content of the debate is conditioned by a number of different factors including, for example, political ideologies, professional ambitions, cultural biases, and (of course) chance. The movements of legal thought lie within the province of the historian of ideas. I am not denying that there may sometimes be fully adequate "internal" explanations for growth in any branch of knowledge; but it is obvious that there are *also* "external" explanations, and I can see no way to disentangle their effects in the present case. That being so, the movements of legal thought may not be a significant guide to the nature of law itself.

So the debate seems here to stay, at least for the moment. That it continues to attract such imaginative and fertile minds is surely encouraging.

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POLITICAL THEORY

Moments of Decision: Political History and the Crises of Radicalism. By Stephen Eric Bronner. New York: Routledge, 1992. 164p. $49.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

With the emergence of the New Left in the 1960s, the recent fall of communism, and the disconcerting rise of religious fundamentalist and ethnic-based movements around the world, it has become something of a truism to speak of a theoretical crisis on the Left. Stephen Eric Bronner, who has given us insightful works on Rosa Luxemburg and on the history of socialist political theory has again offered a thoughtful contribution to this necessary rethinking in *Moments of Decision*. Lest there be any mistake deriving from the use of the word *radicalism* in the book's subtitle, Bronner writes from within the tradition of democratic socialism. His goal is to reappropriate this tradition from communist totalitarianism, the Marxist legacy from Marxism–Leninism, and (more generally) the Enlightenment values and aspirations that made socialism possible from the recent postmodern derogation of that heritage.

Though this vantage point is hardly unique today, it is the approach that makes this book uniquely valuable. Bronner seeks nothing less than a radical rethinking of the history of the Left so as to establish a usable legacy for constructing a viable Democratic Socialist movement today. The book's central argument is that the socialist movement took a wrong turn on the eve of World War I, when it reached a fateful fork in the road and split into Communist and Social Democratic movements. Bronner seems to want us to believe that under slightly different circumstances during these crucial moments, a revolutionary but still democratic socialist movement could have survived and prospered. But the book is not an exercise in counterfactual speculation. Bronner recognizes that at key moments in the twentieth century, structural constraints prevented the forces of human emancipation from being realized. By laying out in excruciating detail the relationship between these constraints and the possibilities not realized, the former take on the same contingent character as the human responses to them, and the path not followed begins to look like a real possibility.

It is impossible to do full justice to the subtleties of argument that are woven tightly within a dense, analytical narrative; but some of Bronner's arguments can be briefly summarized. In his account of the Left's response to World War I, he absolves the socialists of responsibility for causing the war. Yet pacifism, too, was an unrealistic response when each country was faced with a looming invasion. Bronner argues that the socialists could have taken a more independent position within their respective governments, including support for the emerging decentralized participatory democracy inherent in the council movement, which survived the war.

The book's strongest arguments are in two chapters narrating the history of attempts to form a popular front of socialists and communists against fascism. Hitler's ascent to power in Germany could have been prevented. It was not an irresistible imposition by the bourgeoisie, nor was it ordained for political economic reasons. Both socialists and communists made grave misestimates of their opponents, which prevented antifascist collaboration, while Hitler confounded "instrumental reason" with his daring gamble to seize power. Bronner reminds us of the incredible fact that the combined vote of the socialists and communists would have been sufficient to overcome Hitler's plurality.

Turning to France, the book examines with great sensitivity the valiant efforts of Leon Blum to hold back the fascist tide through a coalition of liberals, communists, and socialists, reflecting what Bronner calls "the last great expression of *fin de siecle* Marxism" (p. 59). Blum is usually dismissed as vacillating, aloof, and elitist; but Bronner convincingly argues that he faced unresolvable political dilemmas, considering the irresponsible role played by both communists and liberals. Though Blum's Popular Front government fell in 1938, its effort to reconcile mass mobilization from below with democratic procedures from above and to establish a European antifascist resistence stand as a legacy that the present can honor and draw upon.

With the discrediting of the parties representing Europe's established order in the fight against fascism, one might have expected that democratic socialism's time had come. But the structural constraints defined by the elimination of the fascist enemy, the rise of the Cold War, and the devastation of Europe which made the American blandishment of the Marshall Plan irresistible, again prevented Western socialism from coming into its own. The Cold War solidified the popular identification of socialism with communist authoritarianism, rehabilitated the Western bourgeoisie's democratic credentials, and left the socialists increasingly aloof from their working-class base as they embraced a strategy of partnership with their capitalists. But Bronner does not view this as a sell-out; for he gives full credit to the European capitalists not only for accepting the liberal welfare state but for establishing their own form of democratic internationalism—both of which gripped the popular imagination far more than the old proletarian internationalism.

The book's odyssey through modern history only arrives in the United States in the 1960s, thereby missing the chance to assess the possibilities in Eugene V. Debs's pre-World-War-I-era Socialist party or the New Deal. This part of the book, however, is the most difficult and problematic for Bronner's project of reconstructing and inspiriting a democratic socialist tradition. He tries to steer a perilous course between the Scylla of poststructuralist endorsement of the particularism and relativism manifested in the fragmented "new social movements" that survived the 1960s and the Charybdis of excoriating the new social movements for abandoning universal values and ignoring the working class. Bronner finds his alternative path in the leadership that Martin Luther King, Jr. sought to provide to the Civil Rights, antiwar, and poor people's movements in the critical moment between 1965 and 1968. Bronner writes that King "objectively represented the most radical *socialist* possibility in America since the start of the Second World War" (pp. 119–20). Though Bronner is sympathetic with the cultural critique and accomplishments of the 1960s, he emphasizes the unwillingness of new leftists to do the tough intellectual and political work to build a movement to confront capitalist hegemony. The book concludes with a spirited rejoinder to Francis Fukuyama's contention that with the fall of communism and the uncontested rule of liberalism, we have entered a postheroic, posthistorical age.

At times in this book, the reader cries out for a more in-depth portrayal of the historical paths not taken. This is particularly the case with King's leadership, but this book should not be judged on whether his alternatives were realistic possibilities. It is enough that Bronner's historical imagination compels us to pause and reconsider the inevitability of what we know happened, thereby contributing to the task of breaking free of the present's chains.

Indiana State University RICHARD SCHNEIROV

Virtue Transformed: Political Argument in England, 1688–1740. By Shelley Burtt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 182p. $42.95.

One of the more remarkable developments in political theory in recent years has been the rediscovery of what J.G.A. Pocock terms the "Atlantic republican tradition." And central to—indeed, constitutive of—republican political thought is the ideal of the virtuous citizen. Public-spirited, self-abnegating, solicitous of the common good, eschewing wealth, luxury and ease, and prepared to fight for his and others' liberties, the virtuous citizen is a veritable paragon. On Pocock's telling, this republican ideal, as espoused by James Harrington and others, flourished briefly but brilliantly as an opposition ideology but fell victim to the prosperity stemming from English commercial expansion in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Except for a few dissidents—Bolingbroke and the Country Whigs, most notably—civic virtue was eclipsed if not erased entirely, and the republican citizen was replaced by the self-interested but "sociable" man of "manners" and commerce.

Shelley Burtt attempts to show how "virtue," far from being abandoned, was in important ways transformed in late seventeenth and early eighteenth century England. No brief review can do justice to her intricate, detailed, and well-told tale. But, very roughly, the story she tells is this. "Virtue" represented the moral high ground, and those who (like Mandeville in *The Fable of the Bees*) dismissed or actively argued against it were themselves dismissed. Every political faction, whether "Court" or "Country," had good reason to lay claim to what was quite clearly a key concept in the political discourse of the day. He whose (re)definition of "virtue" seemed most sensible had an advantage in the rhetorical combat that characterized English politics in this period. But the older ideal of public virtue suffered from a singular liability: it was too restrictive, strenuous and demanding an ideal to have widespread appeal in practice. And yet, at the same time, to envision a Mandevillian world without virtue was well-nigh unthinkable (it remained for later Scotsmen to think the unthinkable). If virtue could not be abandoned, then it must be amended. "Virtue" was accordingly transformed, and from two sides.

On the one side were those "Old" or "Country" Whig ideologists and pamphleteers who engaged in a war of words with the "New" or "Court" Whigs who were allies of and apologists for the Walpole government. The former included such founts of republican rectitude as Trenchard and Gordon's *Cato's Letters* and Bolingbroke's *Crafstman* essays. But, Burtt notes, this Country ideology did not simply return to or revive the older ideal of public virtue. Far from being backward-looking or (in Isaac Kramnick's term) "nostalgic," they were hardheaded enough to understand that any ideal of strenuous self-denial was unlikely to have much appeal in a prosperous commercial society. And so they subtly trimmed and qualified "virtue" to make it more palatable, and, in so doing, transformed its meaning in ways and with consequences that they did not always wish or intend. For example, *Cato's Letters* cleverly intertwined appeals to self-interest with those of civic virtue and attentive citizenship, thereby helping to legitimize the former and transform the latter.

At the same time, and from the other side, Court apologists and ideologists were attempting to counterattack, not by eschewing but by embracing and redefining "virtue" and redescribing the sorts of people who could possess it. The best and most virtuous sort of citizen, on their telling, is one who attends to the public business by minding his own.

Out of these contending arguments came a new, non-public conception of virtue that Burtt calls a "privately oriented civic virtue" which viewed considerations of self-interest as compatible with and complementary to attentive citizenship. One can of course quibble about her choice of phrase—why not a "publicly oriented self-interest" or an "enlightened self-interest" or even "self-interest rightly understood"? But her larger point remains: A supposedly antiquated republican (read "communitarian") politics of virtue was not defeated and replaced by a new and altogether alien "individualist" competitor called liberalism, but was instead transformed in the course of argument and debate, and for good reason. We should not, she concludes, mourn the passing of "public" virtue, nor should we welcome and embrace a more Mandevillian alternative. Perhaps the time is ripe for reconsidering the current liberalism-communitarianism debate in light of this earlier episode.

This is not a book for those who like their history of political thought served up simply and *seriatim*, as a succession of disembodied ideas or hermetically sealed and discontinous "discourses." But it is a book for those who like their histories interesting, riveting, and richly textured.

University of Minnesota TERENCE BALL

Political Psychology. By Jon Elster. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 204p. $44.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.

The Restless Mind: Alexis de Tocqueville on the Origin and Perpetuation of Human Liberty. By Peter Augustine Lawler. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993. 200p. $52.50 cloth, $21.95 paper.

The rise and fall of totalitarianism and the renewed appeal of democracy have made Tocqueville seem the most prophetic of the nineteenth-century "grand theorists." He predicted that autocratic Russia and libertarian America would each "hold in its hands the destinies of half the world"; but more striking still is his delineation of the underlying forces of modern history: revolutions of rising expectations; egalitarianism leading to communism; mass society turning totalitarian; democracy, if protected against its diseases, restoring and universalizing the liberty lost when centralized monarchy replaced feudalism.

Such prescience has inspired close study of Tocqueville in the past few years alone, including a biography by André Jardin, an interpretive study by Saguiv Hadari, and retrospectives on *Democracy in America* in a collection edited by Abraham Eisenstadt and in books by John Koritansky and Henry Steele Commager. The two volumes under review show that with heightened interest comes more critical scrutiny and more questionable attributions.

Both authors use Tocqueville's work for purposes that he himself did not explicitly pursue. Elster construes him as a behavioral psychologist, turning Tocqueville's *aperçus* into "psychological mechanisms." Lawler sees him as a moral philosopher. Tocqueville's *oeuvre* consists of the study on the old regime and the French Revolution, *Democracy in America,* an uncompleted study of the Revolution, a book of memoirs, and correspondence. The letters contain interesting clues to his own beliefs, as in the quarrel with Gobineau over the latter's infamous *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races;* but the ensemble hardly amounts either to a systematic account of social psychology or to a philosophical treatise on human nature and morality.

True, Tocqueville announced that a new world needed a new political science, but he used this term rather as the authors of the *Federalist* had when they dressed up pragmatic arguments with historical examples in support of a new constitution. In discussing Machiavelli, who made a similar pronouncement, John Plamenatz, in *Man and Society* (1963, I, 3) entered a memorably tart caveat against treating him either as a political philosopher in the traditional sense, "which he is so clearly not," or as a political scientist: "A writer on politics is not scientific merely because he is interested in facts rather than ideals, and rests his advice on what he takes to be the facts." Tocqueville deals with ideals, as well as facts; but the same caution applies.

If he can be neatly characterized at all, it is as a student of historical change and comparative political sociology like Montesquieu, but with a nineteenth-century historicist bent. Compelled to accept the rise of egalitarianism by what he described as "religious dread," he set out to account for the transition to democracy by identifying the universal tendencies that seemed to make it inevitable. He also sought to show that the laws, mores, and institutions of democracy generated patterns of behavior, opinion, and expectation different from those of aristocratic times. Skeptical that any deterministic principle could account for everything or predict more than tendencies, however, he twice notes in his memoirs (echoing Machiavelli) that accident has as much to do with history as necessity and explicitly rejects deterministic theorizing: "For my part, I hate all those absolute systems that make all the events of history depend on great first causes linked together by the chain of fate and thus succeed, so to speak, in banishing men from the history of the human race."

But does his description of American democracy amount to an analysis of behavior in a state of equilibrium? Elster devotes two chapters to showing that it does, relying mainly on *Democracy in America.* (Earlier chapters sift the classicist Paul Veyne's study of Roman patronage and the novelist Alexander Zinoviev's satirical fiction for clues to psychological mechanisms in oligarchical and totalitarian settings.) Mixing praise with criticism, he begins by commending Tocqueville for appreciating that democracy compensates or neutralizes its own excesses. Thus, in politics, bicameralism, indirect elections, and guarantees of individual rights (all constraints foreign to the nature of democracy) are imposed to correct excesses. These prescriptions, however, amount to a "repertory of democracy-stabilizing mechanisms, not a theory of democracy" (p. 105). Otherwise, the analysis suffers from "prejudices and moral clichés" (e.g., biases for aristocracy, monarchy, and masculinity) and from "many ambiguities and even flagrant contradictions" (pp. 107, 112). The indictment presses a lengthy bill of contradictions but is followed by a final chapter praising Tocqueville's "path-breaking analyses of the interaction among desires and opportunities" and setting out to "reconstruct" his thinking to bring out several motivational mechanisms: spillover, compensation, and crowding-out effects (pp. 139–40).

Elster's findings and procedure, while stimulating, are themselves open to question. One of the contradictions he cites is Tocqueville's observing, in volume 1, that newspapers proliferate in America because they are cheap and easy to found and in volume 2, that they "do not multiply because they are cheap" but because groups of people feel a need to communicate with each other. This is, indeed, a contradiction but one that results from the character of Tocqueville's work. He did not set out to write a systematic treatise that would avoid ambiguity and inconsistency. The first point occurred to him while fresh from his visit to the New World. Five years later, immersed in French experience, he evidently realized that the degree of political and administrative fragmentation was, as we might say, a better predictor of why newspapers were more numerous in federal America than in centralized France. Perhaps he should have alerted his readers that he had come to this new understanding, as Elster notes; but rather than tax Tocqueville for inconsistency, we would do better to profit from his second thoughts.

A more serious problem with Elster's approach is that while glossing various texts to compile a catalog of psychological mechanisms, he becomes entangled in an apparent inconsistency of his own. In explaining his examination of observed behavior in three different social settings, he argues that they exhibit a "plurality of mechanisms" at the same time that he endorses rational choice theory, which not only postulates "methodological individualism" but denies that different settings produce different modes of behavior (p. 7). The exegeses provide materials for a sharp critique of this sort of decontextualized theorizing, but no alternative is offered. The book might have addressed or clarified this apparent inconsistency in a closing chapter.

Lawler's Tocqueville is a moral philosopher who introduced a different liberalism, said to be remarkably similar to that of the classical thinkers identified as ancient, rather than modern, liberals by Leo Strauss (p. 101). Lawler seems to mean that while Tocqueville had a Pascalian sense of the human instinct for restlessness and self-doubt, he rejected the dubious solace of bourgeois (modern liberal) hedonism and materialism—in Strauss's nice phrase, "the joyless quest for joy." Instead, he advocates a Christian conception of equality and liberty (both restrained by moral law) as the proper foundation of the democratic ideal.

There is much to be said in favor of this reading of Tocqueville's frame of mind, even though he did not write a systematic moral or political philosophy. But Lawler's work has serious flaws. Although he rashly purports to offer the "most comprehensive account" of Tocqueville's life and thought (p. v), he ignores Tocqueville's historical theories and empirical analysis (as well as the details of his marital, religious, and political experience) in order to make him more of a moral philosopher than he was or claimed to be. The presentation also suffers from the Straussian penchant for reading too much meaning into too little text and dismissing whatever is inconvenient as exoteric dross. Although there is good evidence for Tocqueville's affinity with Pascal, for example, he is cited only a few times by Tocqueville, fleetingly, which does not deter Lawler from expatiating on the affinity over some 50 pages. And while he goes into contortions in admitting that Tocqueville "understood himself not to be fortunate enough to have faith" (p. 157), he does not mention that on his death bed Tocqueville stubbornly refused the last rites of the church, leading analysts like Hadari to conclude that he did not believe in God.

These books make clear anew that Tocqueville is worth careful study but remind us of the need to keep in mind what he set out to do and how he did it. He was not a scientific theorist or a systematic philosopher but an extraordinarily gifted enquirer fascinated by history and social and political life. Admirably frank about his biases, he admitted having only a *goût de tête* for equality but a heartfelt concern for the fate of liberty. What is especially exemplary about his work is that even as he tried to account for the interplay of social forces and free agency, he remained open to possibility and sensitive to the dialectical—even paradoxical—character of thinking and behavior.

University of California, San Diego SANFORD LAKOFF

Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. By Bonnie Honig. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. 269p. $35.00 cloth, $15.95 paper.

Ever since Plato chose to rid his *Republic* of disruption and dissent, political theorists have attempted to strike a balance between political contestation and the administration of justice. Bonnie Honig's *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* also concerns itself with "negotiating positions" between politics and justice. Honig formulates this negotiation as a confrontation between theories of virtue and theories of *virtù*. The former is oriented to the promotion of civic virtues best described as hybrids of Aristotelian means and Rawlsian reflective equilibria. The job of the virtue theorist is to chart the oscillations of human interests and reason and to promulgate a set of principles, judgments, laws, and institutions that might fairly accommodate these oscillations and perhaps narrow their arc. On the other hand, theories of *virtù* are oriented neither to the administration of means nor the coordination of equilibria but to virtuosity, to greatness in striving, and to a celebration of the excesses and unconformities that necessarily accompany such agonism.

Virtue theorists within "republican, liberal, and communitarian" positions, Honig claims, attempt to eliminate all dissonance, resistance, conflict and struggle from their regimes (p. 2). They attempt to wedge the amorphous, polyvalent, and unstable subjectivities of citizens into determinate, stable institutions. Honig accuses them of obscuring and concealing the "remainders" (a term used by Jacques Derrida and Bernard Williams) that writhe and linger after their Procrustean work is done. These remainders might be the "criminal" individuals we would rather ignore, hide away, or blamelessly punish. Alternatively, the misfits might be the agonistic pieces of our own multifaceted souls. In either case, a deconstructive *virtù* theorizing is proposed as the needed recourse. Despite the obscurantism of many such deconstructive approaches, a straightforward logistics may often be discerned. This logistics is also evident in Honig's work: where there is truth, she uncovers (con)textuality; where there is putative essence, she discloses exclusion; where there is suggested identity, she displays difference; where there is metaphysics, she contaminates with psychology; and where there is consolidation and stability, she exposes subjectification and violence. Like William E. Connolly's *Identity\Difference* (1991), which offers similar "democratic negotiations of political paradox," Honig proves very much up to her deconstructive task.

Honig's encomium of *virtù*, however, ends by "renegotiating" the same "positions" she at first had diametrically opposed. The deconstructive moves that Honig executes against the virtue theorizing of Kant, Rawls, and Sandel, are thus also turned upon the *virtù* theorizing of Arendt and Nietzsche and, eventually, upon Honig's own categories and consolidations. Such self-destabilizing strategies are de rigeur for postmodernists, who—following Derrida following Nietzsche—generally begin tugging at the loose strands of their own tapestries even while undoing the weavings of others. To put the point in somewhat antiquated, Marxian language: the task of the postmodern theorist is not simply to describe the camera obscura of an opponents' ideology. Rather, the theorist must also disclose his or her own reconstructions as necessarily ideological. In turn, the theorist must, following Foucault, shatter the opposition between ideology and truth itself; for the assumption is not that certain political theories simply invert reality. The claim is that any view we might gain of politics or justice can only be got through the prism of power. Our colored, coherent vision—our *theoria*—necessarily remains a product of exclusions and violent integrations. Hence, those of us initially astounded at Honig's bold claim that liberalism seeks to suppress all dissonance and resistance in the political realm are subsequently mollified by her later admission that this "position" was an artificial, strategic consolidation that ignored as much as it uncovered. *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics* thus ends with a rapprochement. The choice, we are told, is not really administration *or* disruption, identity *or* difference. The ecumenical declaration *both/and* is made. Justice and politics exist as poles of a tension: neither can be experienced or understood apart from the tension itself.

Still, Honig's balancing act leaves her leaning heavily in the direction of a deconstructive *virtù*. While admitting that Arendt and other *virtù* theorists cannot escape the consolidations and exclusions so evident in virtue theorists like Rawls and while admitting that Rawls and other virtue theorists never totally displace politics, Honig nonetheless maintains that only *virtù* theorizing contains within it the "resources" to overcome its own shortcomings (p. 204). In other words, theories tipped in favor of politics are potentially self-correcting in a way that theories tipped in favor of justice are not. The reason appears to be that the self-conscious contextuality of agonistic political theorizing allows compromise without conformity, while architechtonic theories of justice do not. Yet it is unclear why compromise, rather than intensified and perhaps bloody factional conflict, would not be the practical outcome of theories of agonistic politics. One is reminded of William Corlett's *Community without Unity* (1989), which offers the reader a similarly insightful "politics of Derridean extravagance" without, however, offering sufficient assurance that an agonistic theory of politics would or could stem violence and foster justice.

The world of liberal virtue, Honig admits, is safe—at least for those willing to conform to its rules. How safe is the world of agonal politics? Honig has faith that the nobility of the souls of those engaging their agonism will foster appropriately civil virtues. Neither repressing their own agonism nor resentful of such repression, they might be expected to display compassion and magnanimity. Honig thus approvingly quotes Alan White: "Let us be charitable to Nietzsche as to Aristotle: let us grant that those who are most noble, admirable and self-affirming will not attempt to exploit others" (p. 230, from White's *Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth* [1990]). One imagines, however, that Aristotle's numerous slaves, not privy to Honig's and White's faith, might object to such charity. As for Nietzsche, he made it clear enough that his multiple soul allowed not only for magnanimity and compassion but for cruelty without bounds.

Honig's faith in the kindness of agonistic actors is problematic. So is her vague treatment of practical matters as a whole. The goal of *virtù* politics is to stimulate "practices of citizenship" that proliferate the sites of politics—practices that, identified as neither "state centered" nor "state centering" (p. 255n.), might be understood to refer to social movements and citizen coalitions. Yet social movements and citizen coalitions also seek consolidations of their members' identities—even if only negatively, in protest to state-centered subjectifications. Such consolidations are often much looser and healthier than statist ones and more in keeping with the needs and concerns of an increasingly global polity. But they are consolidations, nonetheless; and they demand justification. Honig can ignore this, I suspect, only owing to the isolation from grassroots politics granted her within the higher realms of theory.

Whatever the shortcomings of Honig's balancing act, however, one thing is clear. Her strategy of agonistic deconstruction offers immense insight into the troubled hearts and minds of fellow theorists. Honig's brilliant analyses justify neither the tilted position she maintains on the fence nor her unwillingness to dismount into the real world of politics. But this is forgivable. For the vista offered is quite spectacular.

University of Florida LESLIE PAUL THIELE

Cultural–Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment. Edited by Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. 314p. $16.95 paper.

In 1989, Surhkamp came out with a hefty volume of 30 essays in celebration of Jürgen Habermas' sixtieth birthday. The table of contents read like a who's who of German philosophy and social theory, as well as its American reception. The English translation of these essays has been published in two separate volumes. The first includes the philosophical contributions, while the second, *Cultural–Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment*, brings together the 13 essays that loosely fall under the heading of social theory.

Although Habermas himself does not contribute to this volume and less than half the papers address his work directly, the title is a dead giveaway that the book deals with a certain cluster of issues for which Habermas has become the leading spokesman. Habermas is most famous for defending modernity as being not all bad. In opposition to Frankfurt School pessimism, postmodern skepticism, and neo-Aristotelian disenchantment with disenchantment, Habermas champions the emancipatory potential of Enlightenment rationality. Although modernity brings with it new forms of domination, it also brings with it new potentialities for rational criticism and, through criticism, the opportunity to emancipate ourselves from oppression, injustice, and domination. Habermas has been led into a plethora of research areas in his search to rehabilitate reason: linguistics, ethics, jurisprudence, systems theory, rational action theory, developmental psychology, social evolution, hermeneutics, aesthetics, methodology, democratic theory, legitimation theory. The breadth of his research interests is reflected in the broad range of contributions to this book. There is something here for everyone. However, only those readers who have the same eclectic and encyclopedic interests as Habermas himself will find it easy or captivating from cover to cover.

My own research interests bias me toward the four essays by Helmut Dubiel, Seyla Benhabib, Clause Offe, and Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato. All four take their departure from Habermas' theory of discourse ethics and, as such, form a minority group that addresses Habermas' work directly. Dubiel's essay speaks most directly to the title of the book as he compares the pessimistic view of the Enlightenment as domination (associated with the work of Horkheimer and Adorno) and the optimism of Habermas, which sees an emancipatory potential in the rise of rationalization. Dubiel cautiously comes out in favor of Habermas, correctly pointing out that Habermas' championship of the Enlightenment is not a naive faith in progress but, rather, an elucidation of the contradictory forces of the Enlightenment that allow us to criticize the Enlightenment tradition itself.

Against communitarian ideals of an integrated and harmonious community, Benhabib defends a participatory community. This latter compensates for the disenchantments of modern society not by means of collective notions of good but, rather, by giving citizens control over their lives—a sense of efficacy and political agency. Offe investigates the need for a self-limiting public spirit to motivate citizens if the rational potential of the Enlightenment is to be realized. He explores the types of institutionalized interaction that might promote such a public spirit. (Some might find his style difficult: his prose is dense, and his sentences often run a hundred words or more.) Cohen and Arato defend a revitalized conception of civil society as the arena for radical democratic politics. The emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment is seen in the development of an autonomous, power-free, self-regulating but also self-limiting civil society structured along the lines of undominated discourse.

Taken together, these essays represent an excellent sample of what might be called the democratic wave of critical theory—theorists who use discourse ethics as a starting point in developing theories of democratic legitimation but go beyond Habermas in their elaboration.

The question of the unfinished project of the Enlightenment can be taken in many more directions than democratic theory. Also represented in this volume are contributions in the areas of legal theory (Günter Frankenberg), history of political thought (Axel Honneth), developmental psychology (Gertrude Nunner-Winkler), and theology (Johann Baptist Metz). Frankenberg takes Habermas' distinction between system and life world into the legal arena to defend a critical legal theory that contains a much harsher indictment of systems theory than Habermas himself is willing to make. Honneth, in a well-written and lucid essay, offers an interpretation of Hegel's early writings that he hopes will shed light on the moral logic of social conflict. Honneth argues that contemporary social theory would do well to follow Hegel in seeing social conflict as a struggle for recognition, rather than competition over scarce resources. Nunner-Winkler challenges Lawrence Kohlberg's thesis that the first stage in moral development is amoral, that is, that children respond to sanctions and rewards and are not motivated by any moral sense. With a great deal of empirical evidence at her disposal, Nunner-Winkler argues that the situation is much more complicated: although not thoroughly moral in their motivations, young children nevertheless appeal to moral rules when justifying their actions. Metz argues in a short and somewhat opaque piece that the current crisis in Christianity as well as the human sciences can only be overcome by anamnestic reason. Only reason that is constituted through historical remembrance "enables enlightenment to enlighten itself again concerning the harm it has done" (p. 191).

Hauke Brunkhorst and Hans-Georg Gadamer both discuss the idea of culture, Brunkhorst by tracing its many variations in the history of social theory and Gadamer by pondering its meaning in relation to mass media. Although full of interesting ideas, Brunkhorst's piece pales by comparison with Gadamer's. An engaging exercise in hermeneutics, Gadamer reflects on the changes and continuity in the meaning of the terms *culture* and *mass media*. Although he ends on a very Enlightenment note—that culture involves cultivating "the freedom to make decisions using one's own judgment" (p. 187)—he is not optimistic that the leaps and bounds of mass media technology are conducive to this end. Simple yet full of insights gathered over a long and venerable career, Gadamer's essay is one of the best in the collection and one of the few that requires no specialized knowledge but should be of interest to anyone who has ever wondered how computers, television, interactive media, and virtual reality may shape modern culture.

Although those readers who are looking for depth in their own research area will find only a fraction of the book interesting, the simple variety of contributions is testimony to the vast influence of Habermas' work. As the preface to the German edition points out, Habermas has been an important figure in shaping the ideas of each of the contributors. This fact would be even more impressive to an American audience if the original 30 essays had been kept together in one volume. But this book is not really about Habermas. It and its companion volume are testimony to the fact that the Enlightenment project is, if not completely well, at least very much alive and the center of some of the most interesting political philosophy today. Postmodernism has been somewhat premature in proclaiming the death of reason.

University of Colorado, Boulder SIMONE CHAMBERS

Sharing Responsibility. By Larry May. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 204p. $31.95.

In the years following World War II, many Europeans were profoundly troubled by the failure of their fellow citizens to prevent or protest the actions of the nazis. Philosophers such as Sartre, Jaspers, and Arendt turned to existentialist thought to explain this deeply troubling failure and to design a theory of responsibility that would allow the ascription of collective responsibility to large groups of people who do nothing to prevent such evils from befalling society.

Larry May observes that existentialism is no longer in fashion; but in *Sharing Responsibility*, he develops a theory of responsibility that is inspired by existentialist thought, in particular, "social existentialist" thinkers who emphasize that the self is constructed by social experience, as well as by individual choosing. May anticipates that many readers will be reluctant to take his social existentialist proposals seriously, especially British and American readers for whom, he believes, it is not customary to set the requirements of morality very high. But he is convinced that until people begin to feel responsible for the actions of others, great social tragedies are more likely to occur.

May argues persuasively that it is sometimes possible for people to be responsible for attitudes they hold even when these attitudes are not at a given time fully within their control. Moreover, they can be responsible for harms brought about by holding these attitudes. Thus, when racial violence occurs as the result of the racial attitudes that several people hold, one can hold them responsible for this violence even if they are not fully capable of changing their racial attitudes at the time and even if they themselves do not actually participate in the violence. Along similar lines, people should guard against moral insensitivity. Sometimes harm is produced as the result of a group's insensitivity; and May argues that when this happens, the members of the group share responsibility for the harm.

It is well known that groups have a strong influence over the attitudes and behavior of its members; and May shows that this is true of groups with minimal internal structure, as well as with highly structured groups. Part of this influence takes the form of members' transforming the attitudes and values of one another, and out of this comes a sharing of attitudes and values within groups. Because of this, it makes sense to acknowledge that there is frequently a sharing of responsibility for harms produced by the actions of such groups.

But it is not enough just to acknowledge a sharing of responsibility for what happens as a result of group actions. Frequently, the real problem comes as a result of group *inaction*. May concentrates upon cases in which a harm can be prevented if enough people band together into a group to prevent it, and he argues that it is frequently possible to ascribe collective responsibility to the people who have the ability to form such groups and do not do so. For example, groups such as OXFAM have done tremendous good for the victims of famine; and often, it is the simple failure of people to come together that accounts for the continued existence of many grave social problems in the world. To the extent that people have the ability to come together in this manner and do not, they are collectively responsible for their collective inaction.

This is perhaps the point in May's book that poses the sharpest challenge to those who are a product of the dominant Western tradition of morality. To many, it may seem overly severe to judge that all of us are collectively responsible for our failure to do something about the overwhelming number of problems that affect the world. May assures his readers that he does not intend to judge that people who do not form such groups are guilty for their inaction. But he does feel that it is appropriate for them to feel a sense of shame for their inaction. It is shameful for them not to have organized themselves into a group to prevent the harms in question.

It is May's intent to offer an account of responsibility that is provocative in two ways. First, people who are a product of the dominant Western tradition of morality tend to think of agency and responsibility in very individualistic terms and, he argues, to set a very modest level for the amount of responsibility that is assigned to moral agents. May is attempting to challenge this way of thinking. Second, it is his intent to inspire people to think in terms of how they can solve the world's problems by taking collective action. People tend to think that it is only when the problems are of their own making that they have any responsibility to deal with them. But from the social existentialists, we learn that taking these problems collectively upon us is the price we pay for the fact that we live in the human community and that whether we are innocent or guilty of these problems is irrelevant.

Although *Sharing Responsibility* is intended to provoke and unsettle readers who are comfortable with conventional Western approaches to morality, it is also designed to make a plausible case for the alternative view that May wishes to defend. Even those who are the most hostile to his point of view will find themselves compelled to admit that he does an impressive job of defending it. May deserves high marks for reviving existentialist themes that are quite out of touch with the way that most people, especially British and Americans, think about morality. But he likewise deserves high marks for treating these themes skillfully enough so as to present them as a credible alternative to traditional ways of thinking about morality.

This is not to say that all readers will be *persuaded* by his arguments. Many will come away from this book with the feeling that he has done a valiant but ultimately unsuccessful job of defending views that are so extreme that they cannot be defended persuasively. Nevertheless, all readers will be challenged to reevaluate their own ideas about moral responsibility in the context of doing something to help solve the tremendous social problems in today's world.

Calvin College GREGORY MELLEMA

The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke's Political Thought. By Uday Singh Mehta. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 186p. $24.50.

Most Lockean scholars, according to Mehta, focus on the circumstances under which individuals agree to and maintain the establishment of peace, order, and authority. Mehta expands this understanding in arguing that "Locke is concerned not merely with settling the boundaries *between* individuals . . . but also . . . with settling the internal boundaries *of* individuals . . . Locke is concerned not merely with individuals' interests but also with their subjective identities" (pp. 3–4). More specifically, Locke's liberalism attains its coherence and stability because it fosters a particular self-understanding. This self-understanding depends on individuals being embedded in liberal institutions, and these in turn "furnish the conditions for a transformed self-understanding—a self-understanding that buttresses political institutions as credible expressions of moral norms" (p. 13). Mehta thus points not only to the crucial role of cultural mores in sustaining liberal society, but also to the possibility that the vaunted natural freedom, equality, and rationality of the individual merely serve as "the gloss, the caption, to a well-manicured set of latent culture dispositions and sensibilities" (p. 18). In its emphasis on education for self-control and moderation, then, "Lockean liberalism, while forming the individual, compromises his or her full potential and thus betrays an underlying conservatism" (p. 11).

Mehta looks to Locke's *First Treatise*, often neglected, as revealing substantive political concerns with the cognitive dimensions of the Lockean individual. Filmer's doctrines are of course politically absolutist in sanctioning the unlimited exercise of political power. But as an exercise of scriptural politics, they are also methodologically absolutist by their "reference to a body of knowledge that is presumed to be absolutely true and hence authoritative" (p. 46). By sequestering political power from its scriptural origins and the implied legitimacy resulting therefrom, Locke grounds a politics which is historically embedded within a specific time and space. In particular, Locke seeks to bind the conscience so that individual judgments accord with socially required political and moral norms, thus circumscribing "the politically significant potentialities of human subjectivity" (p. 79).

In short, those who assume the foundational or essentialist freedom, equality, and rationality of the Lockean individual overlook the educational and cultural institutions

> "through which the individual hopefully *comes to be* free, rational, and equal in the appropriate manner . . . through which the individual—not the natural individual with reason and interests, but the individual with strange passions, with a frenzied imagination, with undisciplined and chaotic urges—is molded and transformed to have particular passions, an ordered imagination, controlled and well-occasioned urg-

> es; in brief, to be rational and self-interested and as a result perhaps also strangely confined" (p. 85).

Mehta perceives in Locke a cautiousness towards unbounded curiosity which one would not expect in an age of reason, especially from a philosopher reputed to celebrate human rationality. In fact, Locke blurs the distinction between the normal and the pathological, so that madness connotes no deficiency, but simply involves the mind "in an overexcited frenzy of activity. Its regal pretensions indicate nothing sinful or sedentary but rather an extravagant imaginative profusion" (p. 107). The mad possess the faculties requisite for reason and freedom. Thus the freedom of "normal" liberal politics is not natural, "but rather a carefully created artifice framed with reference to a particular vision of society and the individuals who inhabit it" (p. 177).

Since for Locke "it is the capacity to reason that is natural, not its actual exercise" (p. 121), Mehta concludes his book with an analysis of how education molds and transforms the individual. First, education inculcates self-restraint and submission to authority in a way that resembles Calvinist self-discipline. Second, the individual internalizes public standards of virtue through the devices of shame and reputation, beginning at a tender age. Finally, the principles inculcated do not encourage an open encounter with the world, but instead encourage individuals to "find their places in it by leaning against the solidity of private dispositions that are no more than the hardened surface of habits instilled in them before they could think, remember, and hence reconsider" (p. 153). Mehta briefly applies these propositions to the *Second Treatise*, concluding that freedom of the will is "curbed without being openly dominated" (p. 158), so that "the political society made necessary by the subjective potential of the Lockean subject in turn excludes precisely this potential" (p. 167). Alternatively, "individuality is what is valorized in the process of constructing and sequestering normality from what one might loosely call social and individual pathology" (p. 170).

Mehta is right to suggest Lockean scholars have not traditionally concerned themselves with the subjective identities and self-understandings of Lockean individuals, and his book constitutes a definite contribution in this regard. My concerns about the book, however, are two. First, I should like to have seen more detailed consideration of how his conclusions apply to the *Second Treatise*. Since on his interpretation the individual is not naturally free, equal, or rational, but is instead molded to be such, does this vitiate the meaningfulness of consent as a foundation for political legitimacy? The socially constructed individual will consent only to that which he or she has been taught to approve. As Mehta states, for Locke "the correspondence between negative and positive liberty, and between political freedom and self-mastery, is ultimately untenable because self-mastery or self-control is required as a condition for negative liberty itself" (p. 30). Thus consent loses its meaning as an expression of free will, and one wonders if we can make distinctions regarding political legitimacy as it is affected by choice.

Second, all individuals are to some extent embedded in and molded by the political, social, and moral norms of their society. The crucial question is that of *how much* these norms shape or ought to shape the individual, and that is part of the issue between liberals and communitarians to which Mehta alludes. In discussing Sandel's emphasis on the acknowledgement of constitutive attachments, Mehta states that the Lockean individual, "though being informed and supported by these prenatal horizons, could stand apart from them, critically evaluate them, and, despite the inevitable pain and struggle involved in estranging oneself from one's inheritance, also therefore ultimately reject them" (p. 30). The remainder of Mehta's book, however, renders one highly doubtful that Lockean individuals as Mehta describes them will be able to separate themselves enough from the social fabric in which they are embedded to "think, remember, and hence reconsider" (p. 153). Thus Mehta needs to ask himself under what circumstances these individuals might indeed cast off their socially cultivated self-understandings and espouse new ones. Otherwise, the iron fist of Hobbes remains, though clothed with a velvet glove.

Bradley University Emily R. Gill

Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain. Edited by Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 444p. $59.95.

This is a *festschrift* for the indefatigable J. G. A. Pocock (indefatigable indeed: the volume closes with a daunting nine-page bibliography of Pocock's work to date, a veritable flood of erudition that shows no signs of ebbing). The essays are better than what usually end up stuck in such volumes: better as a simple matter of scholarly quality, but better too as exemplary models of what is distinctive in Pocock's approach. I suppose that at this price, no one will consider asking impoverished graduate students to purchase the volume. But there are always reserve desks, not to mention xerox machines and copyright violation.

The finicky among us might want to insist on several distinctions between Pocock's conception of the history of political thought and that of what is sometimes labelled the Cambridge school, associated especially with Quentin Skinner and John Dunn. Any such distinctions are generously elided here. The history of political thought, we are instructed, is centrally a history of *discourse*, a labor-intensive study of how particular languages of politics, or conceptual frameworks, are shaped and reshaped by successive writers. Pocock and his followers have wanted to abandon the struggle of titans, the dubious spectacle sometimes exhibited to hapless undergraduates in which Plato and Hobbes, Locke and Marx take their crack at a set of putatively timeless questions. They want instead a more genuinely historical history of political thought, in which chronology matters, questions change, and dozens of desperately obscure pamphleteers appear right alongside—and sometimes instead of—the honored dead.

So this is not scholarship to be produced by theorists who want to cozy up with their favorite text for a year or two and write an internal textual commentary on it. Here, for instance, J. H. Burns writes about "George Buchanan and the anti-monarchomachs"; Michael Mendle comments in passing that "Some elements of Henry Parker's thought . . . are reminiscent of Johannes Althusius's populist reversal of Bodinian absolutism" (p. 110); and Richard Tuck refers to Henry Hammond, Matthew Wren, Thomas White, Pierre Charron, Denis

Petau, Henry Holden, John Sargent, Kenelm Digby, and more. It is sobering to realize how very few theorists, even those describing themselves as working on early modern Britain, will have a clue what such titles and comments and references refer to. Here too we find some remarkable—some will say alarming—recontextualizations. Quentin Skinner situates Hobbes's *Leviathan* in the context of a Latin dispute about rhetoric, unearthing an elaborate conceptual inheritance underlying Hobbes's own sizzling rhetoric and his notorious diffidence about his own eloquence.

Skeptics will think that this is not even scholarship to be *consumed* by those without reasonably extensive historical learning of their own, that the density of references to arcane sources is high enough to make any underlying arguments opaque. Maybe, though I suspect that is just special pleading for the lazy. Whatever else one might say about it, Pocock's concluding essay, a critical review of the preceding essays, offers a perfectly straightforward vision of the period, one in which the concept of sovereignty and all its vicissitudes are front and center.

Indeed, for all its contributions, the real problem with this sort of scholarship seems to me to lie in precisely the opposite direction. It needs to become more extensively historical, not less: that is, to pull in more sustained accounts of social and political change, instead of brief stage-setting references that get the contested discourses up and running. Pocock describes the enterprise as "the exploration of Anglo-British history as presented in its political literature and the history of its political discourse" (p. 377). But surely, then, we need to be interested in the possibility that that discourse is opaque, confused, meretricious, shot through with pretexts and sinister interests, ideologically loaded in offering too complacent a vision of political possibilities and problems, happily oblivious to what seem on reflection the most pressing political developments of the day, and so on.

Or again: the very thought of writing a history of discourse depends, for all of Pocock's antimarxism, on the cogency of some deep distinction between the ideal and the material. In this light, it is not surprising that Pocock would refer to the "intellectual and material forces" (p. 428) transforming England after the French Revolution. But if we take seriously the claim that society is partly constituted by concepts and categories, any such distinction is confounding or worse. For then, as Pocock has sometimes recognized, social change is always already conceptual change—and vice versa. (Well, not always: think about demographic shifts or currency inflation.) And then we can sharpen the senses in which all those pamphleteers are creative agents engaged in political struggle—and victims along for the ride in large-scale social changes intended by nobody.

University of Michigan DON HERZOG

Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community: Power and Accountability from a Pragmatic Point of View. By Marion Smiley. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 286p. $44.50 cloth, $17.95 paper.

Marion Smiley has written a very interesting book on moral responsibility that is really three books in one. First, she surveys the history of philosophy, examining the differences between classical, Christian and modern conceptions of free will and responsibility. Second, she surveys some recent work in applied ethics and social theory, laboriously reconstructing and criticizing the positions of John Harris, John Casey, Dennis Thompson, Peter Singer, and H. L. A. Hart, as well as many others. Third, Smiley sets out her own pragmatic view of moral responsibility. Each of these tasks is important, and rarely does anyone attempt so much in one volume. Perhaps Smiley should not have done so, either, because her original contribution to the literature on moral responsibility (in chapters 8 and 9) is dwarfed by rather uninspired and lengthy discussions of the work of dozens of philosophers and social theorists, both major and minor, in the majority of the chapters. I shall focus on her original offering.

Smiley presents her main thesis as follows:

> I argue throughout what follows that if we want to argue openly with one another about our responsibility for the suffering of others and explain the differences that arise among us, we will have to stop thinking about responsibility as a purely factual discovery and begin thinking about it on the basis of our own social and political points of view. One of these judgments is that harm was the consequence of a particular individual's action. The other was that the individual was herself worthy of blame. (p. 4)

Smiley takes up the first of these points in chapter 8 and the second in chapter 9.

Smiley argues that our assessments of causal responsibility are not "purely objective or independent of our normative expectations of those being blamed" (p. 179). Three specific practical or political questions are shown to be intertwined in the question, Who is causally responsible for a certain harm?: (1) Who has the power to hold another accountable? (2) Who is expected to act in a certain situation? (3) Who is considered to be a member of the relevant community in which this harm occurred? Throughout this chapter, Smiley examines examples in which different answers to these three questions will produce different assessments of who is causally responsible. But she then goes beyond this to claim that we can never transcend such questions to arrive at anything like an objective or scientific understanding of who is causally responsible for a particular harm.

In my view, Smiley has performed the valuable service of pointing out very explicitly how assessments of causal responsibility are often far from being mere factual determinations. She has done a much less credible job, however, in showing that judgments about causal responsibility for harm must be seen as a subspecies of political or ideological judgment. Smiley too often places great emphasis on what some people think. She claims, for instance, that "even if we agree that starvation should be prevented and that we could prevent it, we do not place such expectations on ourselves or hold ourselves causally responsible for the starvation" (p. 193). But surely, there are some other people that do hold themselves causally responsible for starvation in distant parts of the world. Even if no one did, it is a mistake to think that this supports the view that judgments of causal responsibility must be strongly influenced by social and political expectations.

In chapter 9, Smiley argues that our judgments of who is morally blameworthy for a particular harm are similarly a function of our social and political expectations.

Smiley claims that "blameworthiness turns out to be conventional rather than metaphysical" (p. 235). Judgments of whether someone should be excused from blame because compelled to act in a certain way or ignorant of acting in a certain way are understood within particular cultural frameworks that vary quite considerably. Excuses from blame thus turn out not to be objective at all, in Smiley's view. Whether someone is blamed or not is a matter of power: "When we blame individuals we make known to them not only that they have acted badly, but that they are 'bad persons', persons whom we consider to be less than worthy members of our community. Blame is thus, among other things, exclusionary: by blaming individuals for acting badly, we threaten to exclude them from our community of respect" (p. 248).

Surely, if nothing else, Smiley has overstated her case. Not all—or even most—judgments of blameworthiness are equivalent to judgments that someone is a "bad person"; and while power does sometimes enter into the picture in assessments of blameworthiness, metaphysical and universal moral judgments also enter into the picture. Late in the book, Smiley admits that someone might make a judgment of moral responsibility that is not based in considerations of power, but she considers such cases to be so "rare" as to be barely worth discussion (p. 262). This is a serious flaw in Smiley's project: she fails to take seriously the possibility that while many people do make judgments of blameworthiness so as to exert power over, or exclude, others, nevertheless, some people do not, and many others should not. Hence, she fails to confront opponents who claim that judgments of moral responsibility *should* be about more than pragmatics.

Smiley is on much firmer ground concerning her weaker thesis, namely, that theorists have ignored the importance of power and convention as ingredients in the judgments of moral responsibility people actually make. Indeed, Smiley provides us with a very nuanced view of the role of power in moral judgment:

> For as I have tried to show, the relationship between moral responsibility and power is dialectical in nature. On the one hand, our judgments of moral responsibility for external harm are grounded in, among other things, the distribution of power in our society. On the other hand, these same judgments help to shape our configurations of social roles and our conception of communal boundaries, as well as the distribution of power on which both are based. (p. 257)

This is an original and fascinating view. Marion Smiley's book should be read just so that this view gets wide attention, even if her arguments in support of this view will be unsatisfactory to many of us.

Washington University, St. Louis LARRY MAY

Justice and Interpretation. By Georgia Warnke. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993. 178p. $27.50.

In her book *Justice and Interpretation*, Georgia Warnke embarks on a theoretical endeavor attempting to find a way out of the impasse represented by liberal and communitarian arguments on the issues of justice, tradition, and interpretation. Drawing on the hermeneutic tradition in general and on Hans-Georg Gadamer's ideas in particular, the author proposes a "hermeneutic conversation" to address the conflicting views that characterize democratic societies. Her goal is not to provide solutions in the form of another "original position" or another paradigm of justice, but to suggest a way of addressing our disagreements in order to learn both from each other and from the interpretive diversity of the liberal public sphere.

Her project seems to suggest two important shifts or displacements in the way theoretical and political issues are addressed. The first shift is a move from justice to conversation; the second one is a turning away from the tendency to see our positions as representing *the* right and true alternative toward a recognition that, in the public realm, we may have an aggregate of views that are equally valid interpretations of the political culture of liberal societies. This claim is the cornerstone of her hermeneutic conversation. These two displacements entail a conception of political theory according to which its task should not be one of adjudicating principles of justice, but of promoting discussion (p. 11).

The author develops her views by offering an intelligent discussion of the arguments put forward by Michael Walzer, Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair MacIntyre.

Warnke's book is illuminating in the expectations it creates and disappointing in the solutions it offers. Once she announces, at the very outset, that she will present another vision of political theory, one is led to expect some criteria to guide our conversation or some standards to discriminate between the plethora of positions inundating the public sphere. Instead, she ends up with a "hermeneutic political theory" which is not different from John Rawls' version of political liberalism and with a "hermeneutic conversation" that is the same program that Charles Larmore has already defended and that Richard Rorty offers in his liberal utopia. In effect, Warnke's "hermeneutic political theory" "takes its task to be that of interpreting shared social meanings, public values and common political traditions with the aim of formulating a conception of justice that is congruent with these" (p. 130). This is, precisely, the same project John Rawls advocates. Warnke follows the Rawlsian path without considering the moral and political impasse to which the Rawlsian formulation may lead. For if a conception of justice has to be "congruent" with the existing values and traditions, that requirement may represent a straitjacket to any project attempting a transformation of entrenched social meanings and practices. She claims that we should be open to learn from others and that we have to interpret our traditions without adopting a dogmatic perspective. Rather, she argues, we should assume that different valid interpretations may issue from a common history. These claims are hardly new; by now they constitute commonplaces of the liberal discourse.

It is thus unfortunate that a book with an auspicious theoretical agenda ends up in the status quo of present political theorization on the issues of justice and interpretation. Warnke's idea of hermeneutic conversation, all her claims to the contrary notwithstanding, is, essentially, a Rortyan one. She defends the importance of a hermeneutic conversation, and so does Rorty. She advocates "the idea that an interpretive pluralism can be educational for all the parties involved" (p. 157) and so does Rorty. She insists on democracy, equality, and fairness, and though Rorty does not address the issue of equality, his liberal utopia is supposed to be democratic and fair. Furthermore, his position is not necessarily opposed to the notion of equality to which Warnke subscribes. One is surprised that though Warnke apparently thinks that her views are different from Richard Rorty's ideas, there is no reference to his *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989) in which he proposes arguments that are similar to Warnke's views.

For Warnke, the principles of democracy, equality and fairness provide the framework in which interpretations are going to compete. Hermeneutic conversation seeks to "guarantee a level playing field for *all* the competing interpretations" (p. 155, emphasis added). It is important, she claims, to assure "the fairness of the conversation" and "to give *all* possible voices equal access" (p. 157, emphasis added). Presumably, the implication of this view is that our task as interpreters is to try to understand sexists, racists, fascists, and all other doctrines that may be offensive to our sense of human dignity.

Yet this is not Warnke's contention. She is well aware that there are certain views which, far from educating us, will degrade us. There are other views (the Ku Klux Klan's interpretation of American history, for example) that do not resist the historical record. So she seems to advocate the exclusion of certain views from the public domain, but her argument, in this regard, is ambiguous. She first defends a marketplace where all interpretations are allowed to compete with one another (pp. 155, 157). Then, in the conclusion, she says that some interpretations may be excluded (p. 162).

We are at a loss. How could we deal with those views that may degrade us? How could we determine that some views are "ideological" or "pathological" and, accordingly, should be excluded (p. 159)? Warnke's answer is to invoke the Habermasian notion of systematic disturbances in communication whose roots can be found in the social and economic conditions of society (p. 140–157). Habermas' premise is that the deep structures of society may lead people to a false consensus or to being deluded by ideas and practices that are not rational. This is, for him, the insurmountable barrier a hermeneutic approach faces. For hermeneutics concentrates on the people's expressions, their language, while their problem lies in the deep structure shaping their lives. That a psychoanalysis-laden thinker such as Habermas has come up with that notion is understandable. That a person who is trying to offer a hermeneutic interpretation would adhere to the same argument is rather amazing. This may explain why Warnke shifts gears when subscribing to the Habermasian notion of systematically distorted communication and forgets the same standard she has used in her discussion of most of her interlocutor's positions. Again and again, she insists that different people may have different understandings of the same traditions and practices. It is a claim presented against Walzer, Rawls, Dworkin, Habermas, and MacIntyre. But when she invokes the Habermasian view, she does not even consider the possibility that there might be different and conflicting interpretations of what constitutes a systematically distorted communication. For it is clear that the same structures that, for Habermasians, contribute to a false consensus, for other people may constitute the necessary framework for a meaningful agreement. Warnke does not tell us who is going to determine that some people suffer from a systematically distorted communication and, accordingly, are in need of a Habermasian therapeutic guidance. Nor does she tell us the criteria that the social scientist (presumably the person who knows that others are deluded) will use to make his or her diagnosis. It is perhaps more telling that a scholar on Gadamer has nothing to say about Gadamer's own critique of the psychoanalytic model Habermas presents.

Warnke's text is thus symptomatic of a liberal discourse that seeks to address all moral issues by proposing that we all should adhere to the standards of a liberal conversation. One crucial question that is not addressed by Warnke's hermeneutic conversation is the status of social practices. That is, what are we going to do with the disputed practices which continue to hold sway, while we talk? The book is also representative of a tendency in contemporary liberal discourses to colonize all subjects in dispute by arguing that all parties involved should accept liberal values or rules to continue their conversation. Thus Warnke recommends that the debate on abortion should shift from one over two opposing rights or correct principles to one over two interpretations that are consonant with the traditions of the American society (p. 162). This proposal eschews the issue, which is that some people adhere to values that depend on comprehensive doctrines, and in the light of those doctrines, their position is the "right" one.

One important upshot of Warnke's hermeneutic project is a redefinition of political theory. Its role, she claims, should not be one of deciding which interpretations are better than others (p. 155). Rather, its role should be procedural: to identify the conditions that are necessary for a fair conversation. Warnke seems to be unaware that her proceduralist vision of political theory does not seem to be consonant with the major traditions of liberal societies, and it is rather a recent expression emerging from contemporary liberal discourses.

Unfortunately, Warnke's book does not advance our knowledge of the problems besetting the liberal-communitarian divide. And the solution she offers is by now part of the liberal canon. The claim that we have an interpretive pluralism is a commonplace in the liberal critique of communitarianism, and the view that we should carry out a conversation has been already defended by both Richard Rorty and Charles Larmore. So let's talk. The stalemate continues.

University of Massachusetts, Amherst ROBERTO ALEJANDRO

AMERICAN POLITICS

Runoff Elections in the United States. By Charles S. Bullock III and Loch K. Johnson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. 206p. $32.50.

Runoff primary elections are used primarily in the South and in local elections. A runoff primary election follows a primary election in which no candidate receives a majority. Most party primary elections in the United States involve the plurality rule, which means that the candidate winning the highest percentage of votes becomes the party nominee. In runoff elections, if no candidate receives a majority, the two candidates with the highest vote totals then compete in a runoff election. The analysis by Charles Bullock and Loch Johnson focuses on the origins of this system, the frequency of its usage, and several allegations about the impact of the runoff system.

The runoff election system has disputed origins. Some argue that it was instituted in the one-party systems of the South to reduce the fragmentation that emerges in such systems. The requirement of a runoff forces candidates to broaden their appeal to achieve a majority. Others argue that it was established to limit black election success in the South. The percentage of the population that is black is relatively high in the South, and a black candidate might be able to mobilize a bloc of black votes to win in a plurality system. The requirement of achieving a majority may have been to make it difficult for blacks to win primaries.

Regardless of its origins, critics have argued that the dual primary system has very specific effects. The primary concern of Bullock and Johnson is the alleged effects of the runoff system. They investigate four effects: (1) the initial leader is presumed to lose in the runoff, perhaps because of sympathy for the underdog; (2) incumbents who are forced into a runoff are likely to be weak, and incumbents in runoffs tend to lose; (3) women are presumed to be losers in the runoff system, because they cannot create majorities; and (4) blacks tend to be losers in runoffs, because they cannot overcome white reluctance to vote for blacks and cannot create a majority. The two final allegations have drawn the most attention. The book focuses on these alleged effects. The authors characterize these four alleged effects as myths, because it is not known whether any of them are really true. The strength of the book is in sorting them out.

To assess the myths, the authors assemble runoff results for statewide and congressional elections from 1970 through 1986. They also draw on available municipal-level results, though these data receive less attention. For the data covering 1970–86, runoffs were required in about 10% of the races. The analysis focuses on those races where a runoff occurred. They analyze results by office, by state, and across time. They also incorporate information on incumbency and the initial vote proportion of candidates. The analysis reveals that several of the expected effects are, indeed, myths. The central question asked in the analysis is how candidates who lead in a first primary do when they have to enter a runoff. For women and blacks, the question is whether their success rates in runoffs are less than those of males and whites.

Candidates who lead the first primary do not tend to lose in runoffs. Seventy percent of first round leaders win the runoff. The runoff does not appear to create erratic results. The success rate does decline for governors and when there are more candidates in the first round, but most initial leaders win runoffs. Incumbents who lead in the first round also win about 70% of their runoffs. Those who trailed in the first round are likely to lose in the runoff. While not all incumbents win runoffs, it does not appear to be the case that incumbents forced into a runoff are likely to lose.

With regard to the success of women, they also find that women are not disadvantaged by runoffs. Women who lead the first primary do as well in runoffs as men who lead the first primary. They do find, however, that female success in translating initial leads into success is less for higher offices such as governor or seats in the House. The success rates of women are highest for state legislative office.

The main criticism of the runoff has revolved around its alleged negative effects on the success of blacks. The argument is that blacks can capitalize on black constituencies to do well in an initial primary but that they have a difficult time in runoffs because they cannot overcome racial voting. The argument is that blacks tend to lose runoffs, while they might be able to win plurality primaries.

The allegation that blacks face problems in runoffs does not prove to be a myth. The average success rate for all candidates who lead in the first primary is 70%. Blacks who led the first primary win only 50% of runoffs (p. 114). This holds for elections at different levels. The authors are careful to try and point out that this does not necessarily mean that blacks would do better in a plurality system. Blacks might not do better in a plurality system, because whites, seeking to prevent elections of blacks, might change their strategy in a plurality system. They might seek to mobilize white support around a single white candidate to limit white vote fragmentation and elect white candidates. Their evidence, however, does suggest some qualified support for the allegation that blacks do not do well in runoffs.

The analysis presented by the authors is careful, and the presentation is clear and well presented. The one exception is in the presentation of the arguments about the effects of runoff elections. These assertive arguments are scattered throughout the book, and might better have been combined into one thorough presentation near the beginning. What is most disappointing about the analysis, however, is what is not done. This book neglects some very important questions regarding runoffs that deserve attention if we are to fully understand this selection mechanism.

The essential problem with the analysis is that it focuses only on election results. The arguments about the runoff involve much more than just election outcomes, and the analysis concludes with no information on the dynamics of the dual primary system. Five concerns are neglected. First, how does this system affect the candidate field? Does the dual primary system attract more candidates than plurality systems? Does it attract more candidates who appeal to specialized blocs? The authors mention these issues, but they conduct no relevant analyses. Second, there is the issue of how candidates position themselves in such a system. Do candidates who are trying just to get to the runoff (not necessarily win the first primary) behave differently than in a plurality system? Is there a process of trying to fragment or polarize the electorate to carve out a faction? Or does the ultimate necessity of building a majority constrain such behavior? Third, is there greater electoral polarization in such a system? This is particularly important in the South, where the black population is a larger percentage of the population than in most states. Do black and white candidates lead to strict racial voting blocs? Fourth, what dynamics occur from first primaries to runoffs, particularly when black candidates are involved? Which voters move from one candidate to another? It would also have been helpful to know what percentage of an election jurisdiction was black when assessing black success in runoffs. Finally, for all of these questions, do candidate, press, and electoral behavior within the dual primary system differ from that in plurality systems?

The authors present thorough analyses of election results. Our understanding of this system is improved by this book. What would have made it far more informative would have been a few careful case studies incorporating information on candidate positioning and polling results across the primary process. This would have provided some answers to the questions indicated. We are given considerable information about results but not much about the process that leads to those results.

Syracuse University JEFFREY M. STONECASH

Money Talks: Corporate PACs and Political Influence. By Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and Denise Scott. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 272p. $25.00.

Money Talks consists of two books. The first is a fascinating and illuminating set of interviews with 20 directors of corporate political action committees (PACs). The second is an analysis of the sources and scope of corporate political power in the United States. I shall review each in turn.

Political scientists have long been puzzled by the lack of any measurable relationship between the patterns of campaign contributions and the behavior of elected officials. This book suggests that they have looked in the wrong places. The impact of campaign contributions lies not on the voting behavior of congressmen and senators but, rather, on what Lowi has termed "distributive politics."

Campaign contributions give firms access to members of Congress, who then influence the ways laws are written in committee or interpreted or enforced by regulatory agencies. Thus, the power of corporate PACs lies in their ability to affect the details of policy, not its broad outlines. And this, in turn, helps explain why corporations, with the exception of a brief period during the early 1980s, give a disproportionate amount of their funds to incumbents: the latter, regardless of their party affiliation or ideology, are in a better position to give companies what they really need from Washington, namely, special help with their unique problems.

The book's extensive quotations from corporate PAC managers offer a revealing portrait of the complex, mutually dependent relationships between PAC managers and legislators. They demonstrate that politicians pressure PAC managers for contributions as much as corporate lobbyists pressure politicians for favors. These interviews are supplemented by analyses of the patterns of donations from 1975 through 1988 by the 309 largest corporate PACs. The result is a useful contemporary portrait of the world of corporate PACs and the executives who manage them.

The second book is an essay on corporate power in America. In contrast to the first, it is driven by ideology, rather than evidence. Its central assertion is that the political contest between business and its opponents (who, however, are never clearly defined) is akin to the battle between a professional and high school football team—a conclusion to which the authors had evidently come before they began their book.

This conclusion is not, in principle, incompatible with the authors' portrait of the strategy and influence of PAC managers. But neither does it logically follow from it. To connect the two, the authors must make a series of leaps that leave their data far behind.

The authors recognize that their argument about business power requires that the interests of corporations complement, rather than contradict, one another. After all, if corporations often took opposing positions, the pluralist model of power in America might be a plausible one. They therefore assert that the interests of business are much more likely to converge, rather than diverge. But they offer as evidence only two facts: corporate PACs rarely contribute to opposing candidates, and the PAC managers they interviewed could only come up with two examples of intrabusiness political differences.

Their argument about the lack of political competition among corporations flies in the face of an enormous literature by political scientists, economists, and students of corporate strategy, whose central finding is that for many corporations, politics has become an important source of competitive advantage. Firms and trade associations regularly use the political process to make themselves better off at the expense of their competitors. Somehow, the authors have managed to miss the fierce interindustry rivalries that dominate so much of the agenda of business–government relations, especially in the area of economic (de)regulation and trade policy.

The analysis of business power in *Money Talks* rests on a second unsupported assumption, namely, that the losses that many businesses experience on the floor of Congress are largely symbolic. According to this study, companies more then make up for their highly visible legislative "defeats" in the influence they are able to exert over the details of legislation or in the way in which laws are implemented. This is an important argument, but the authors offer only anecdotal evidence to support it. They make no effort to look carefully at any particular piece of legislation to show the extent to which its implementation has actually been undermined by politicians acting on behalf of corporations who contributed to their campaigns.

Had the authors done so, they would have discovered that industries do sometimes experience real political losses and that these losses can have important economic consequences. After all, businesses in America spend upwards of a hundred billion a year complying with various environmental laws. This may be less then they are supposed to spend, but it is nonetheless substantial. Yet *Money Talks* only tells us about the regulations that business does not comply with.

To be persuasive, any analysis of business power must systematically compare the political resources of business with those of other political constituencies. However this book makes no effort to do so. Thus, the authors simply assert, without offering any evidence, that lobbyists and lawyers for environmental groups do not have the expertise or resources to counter the efforts of business to shape the "fine print" of regulatory legislation. And their notion that public acceptance of business exempts corporations from public criticism for the failures of government flies in the face of considerable survey data.

The fundamental problem with *Money Talks* is that it makes a series of arguments about policy outcomes, while its data is all about one (albeit important) dimension of the political process. When the authors stick to their research, their analysis is compelling. But when they go beyond it, their argument looses credibility. *Money Talks* is a well-written empirical study that has unfortunately been overshadowed by the political biases of its authors. They should have written two separate books.

University of California, Berkeley DAVID VOGEL

Renewing Cities. By Ross J. Gittell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 232p. $39.50.

The study of urban politics is in trouble. Strongly influenced by a neo-Marxian perspective, much of the work in the field diverges from the theoretical interests and terms of analysis found in other major subfields of the discipline. Ross Gittell's book shows that he has the skills and the inclinations to integrate theories drawn from institutional economics and other branches of political science to address problems central to the analysis of urban politics.

Gittell's book is a study of economic growth and decline in four medium-sized cities in the "rust belt" of the northeast (Lowell and New Bedford, Massachusetts; Jamestown, New York; and McKeesport, Pennsylvania). Gittell's book is divided into three logically defined parts. Part 1 provides an overview (chapter 1), summarizes and discusses existing theories of urban politics and economic development (chapter 2), and uses techniques of urban economics to develop the base line data to show how far these cities have deviated (either better or worse) from regional trends. Part 2, the longest, consists of four chapters, each one a detailed case study of the trends in, and politics of, economic development in each of the four cities. These case studies are informed by the theoretical discussion of part 1 and offer detailed analysis of the actors, institutions, and political interplay of the forces involved in the economic development in each city. Finally, part 3, the shortest, consisting of two chapters, presents the most interesting theoretical arguments and insights of the entire book and makes me look forward to future theoretical contributions by Gittell. Unfortunately, since Gittell uses an "inductive" approach to theory building (p. 3), the reader is led through a long development process to reach the final stage. Moreover, the book is marred by traces of its origin as a doctoral dissertation.

Chapter 2, "Theories of Local Development," is an example of both the strengths and the weaknesses of Gittell's approach. Gittell summarizes a large number of theories of development, drawn from economics and political science. He divides these approaches into *static models*, "useful at identifying the influence on local economies of national, regional, and industry changes and competition among localities," and *dynamic models*, which "provide insights into the internal dynamics of local economies, help explain turning points in local economies, and suggest why local economies diverge from national, regional, and industry trends" (p. 19). Gittell emphasizes the importance of "dynamic cycle theories" developed in economics to highlight tendencies in local development. The most important contribution of this chapter is Gittell's demonstration that politics is central to the process of economic development. His argument ensures the centrality of models of local politics in the study of economic growth, by showing that local politics can significantly influence a city's position in the product and process life cycles that define the broad constraints within which growth occurs.

In developing this argument, Gittell summarizes a wide variety of political theories, including those developed by Kantor, Peterson, Stone, Mollenkopf, and others. Unfortunately, this section reads like the "mandatory" literature reviews found in so many dissertations and betrays the origin of the book; that is, rather than using the work of these analysts to develop new insights or to present a thematic development of the issues of economic development, Gittell presents seriatim a one- or two-paragraph discussion of each author. The writing is often belabored; and it is not until the end of the chapter, where Gittell focuses on collective action problems and the role of individual leaders, that we begin to find new insights, in part because Gittell devotes substantial time and care into integrating the work of Mancur Olson and Robert Axelrod to say something new about local politics.

After presenting the case studies, chapter 8 returns to the theoretical issues underlying the analysis. Gittell summarizes 10 factors that he found to be central to successful local economic development: local leadership, strategic development agencies, institutional arrangements (especially public–private partnerships) that foster new relations more fitting to changing economic reality, local development capacity that lowers the cost of growth, regional analysis, sensitivity to labor force characteristics and dynamics, a broad conception of economic development, a positive city attitude toward development efforts, sensitivity to city history and political and social culture, and recognition that success is not forever and that cities will therefore require continual attention to revitalization (pp. 157–58).

Gittell then turns to the identification of the political factors that are crucial to each of these processes. He touches on the importance of entrepreneurial politicians, analyzes the distributional consequences of various growth strategies, and discusses Peterson's argument that the politics of development is consensual and in the city's interest. In dealing with each of these issues, Gittell emphasizes the importance of entrepreneurial politicians, repeated transactions, and reputations in solving collective-action problems. The analysis in chapter 8 melds insights from public finance, institutional economics, and organizational theory with more established approaches to the study of city development processes.

While Gittell himself recognizes that he offers no new theory (p. 171), the discussion and analysis of chapter 8 begins to show how concepts and theories from new approaches to institutional analysis can be integrated into the study of urban politics. This I believe is the direction in which Gittell's contribution to the field will lie. Unfortunately, this book would have been much better if chapter 8 had taken the place of chapter 2 and if the analysis presented in chapters 3–7 was informed by the more rigorous theoretical statements that Gittell finally develops at the end of book. In other words, while Gittell went through a long process of "induction" to arrive at the theoretical insights with which he concludes his book, the book would have been much improved if Gittell had given us more quickly and more concisely the fruits of his long and careful analysis.

State University of New York, Stony Brook MARK SCHNEIDER

The Right To Die: Policy Innovation and Its Consequences. By Henry R. Glick. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 238p. $32.50.

From time to time, the pitiful plight of a hopelessly dying or vegetative patient dramatically calls attention to our vulnerability to a uselessly prolonged life. There was Karen Quinlan in the mid-1970s and Nancy Cruzan a decade later, both in seemingly endless comas and litigation; and there was fully paralyzed Elizabeth Bouvia, who had to go to court to keep from being force-fed forever. As modern medicine develops technology able to keep our bodies alive for months or even years, many wonder whether they can avoid such a fate. Is there a "right to die"? When the Quinlan, Cruzan, and other dramas fade, however, most people give little thought to the right to die: neither the prolongation of a terminal illness nor life as a vegetable make pleasant thinking.

Even those who want to think about the right to die as a public policy question cannot do so easily. The law of death is among the last areas of unfettered state policymaking. Meaningful federal intrusion, while perhaps inevitable, is not likely in the near future. A right to die exists to some degree in 48 states (if you plan to die in Michigan or Nebraska, hope that you go quickly); but no two states have quite the same policy. In some states, the right is very restricted; and even the most facilitative policies leave many situations uncovered.

In *The Right To Die,* Henry Glick gives us a comprehensive analysis of this emotional and increasingly visible issue. He does an excellent job. Glick records the issue's slow rise from political obscurity, noting that legislators' personal experiences served as the impetus for the first bills and enactments. California adopted a living-will law in 1976; but more often, such bills were defeated. Nonetheless, poll takers put the question on their surveys and began recording a rising and soon overwhelming sentiment in favor of a right to withdraw treatment. Legislation followed popular opinion in the next decade, with 23 states adopting right-to-die laws in 1984–86 alone. By 1991, legislation existed in 42 states (along with favorable judicial rulings in six others). But the adoption process did not always run smoothly: sponsors often had to compromise with state Catholic conferences, the primary opponent of right-to-die laws.

Glick looks at the policy's diffusion across the states, finding that the standard socioeconomic and urbanism variables do not explain innovation. The key variables are percent Catholic (negative) and the number of relevant state court decisions. The cycles of mass media attention help explain the timing of adoptions. He is unsure that Quinlan's and others' plights directly led to adoptions, although they certainly had an indirect impact. Original right-to-die laws centered upon a living will, but more recent ones are usually centered on health-care proxy laws that allow the designation of another to act on behalf of an incompetent patient. Even now, however, because most states require advance medical directives, Glick estimates that 85% to 90% of us do not currently have a right to die.

Foremost, *The Right To Die* is a study in public policy. It is set in the agenda-building models of Roger Cobb and John Kingdon and in the diffusion-of-innovations hypotheses that a number of political scientists have developed over the last quarter-century. Glick's research is not driven by a particular theory or school of public policy. In fact, at the book's end, he is somewhat deficient in explaining how his findings contribute to a broader theoretical understanding of policymaking. However, Glick tells us about as much as we need to know concerning the right to die as a political issue. (Given his focus on policymaking, he offers only a minimal discussion of the ethical questions.) Because the right to die is a complex matter, this is not an easy accomplishment. There are several variants of the living will and health-care proxy approaches and even *more* definitions of *terminal illness, brain-dead,* and other key terms. The question whether the right to withhold or withdraw life support systems applies only to extraordinary medical techniques or includes hydration and food is quite controversial and often goes unaddressed in statutes. Various combinations of options, definitions, and interpretations make for a myriad of possible policies. Glick sorts them out without getting the reader bogged down in undue detail. I finished *The Right To Die* feeling that I understood the main practical and legal problems rather well.

While short on a theoretical wrap-up, *The Right To Die* is analytically rich. Unlike many policy studies, it pays attention to interactions between the branches, especially between the judiciary and legislature. (No governor has advanced a right-to-die proposal, although threatened or actual vetoes occasionally bring governors into the policymaking picture.) Lawmakers unmoved by right-to-die advocates may well respond when court decisions threaten to cut the legislature out of a policymaking role. State high courts will sometimes alter their policies in response to legislative enactments. Glick also realizes that a focus on diffusion patterns alone can miss more than it catches and takes pains to note how later adopters often "reinvented" more facilitative policies. (Thus, California now has one of the most restrictive laws while comparatively recent adopters like Maine and Montana have the most facilitative.) He examines the strategies of major lobbying groups, particularly right-to-die organizations, state Catholic conferences, and state medical associations. But in a nice touch, Glick also looks at those interests that *did not* lobby, particularly the AARP and other groups of the elderly. These groups are more focused on federal policies, especially benefits, and tend to shy away from the depressing aspects of aging and from issues that may divide their members.

Although Glick does not emphasize this, *The Right To Die* is a comprehensive, cross-state policy study. This in itself is a valuable contribution, because there are so few similar comparative studies in book-length form. There are, of course, a number of comparisons of political processes across the states; and though they are not as frequent as a generation ago, "data in, correlations out" journal articles still relate states' political, social, or economic characteristics to their policy choices. Also, there are case-study comparisons that focus even on a handful of states' policymaking or implementation processes. (Glick has mini–case studies of three states.) But the present book is really the first to combine all these approaches and, more, to compare how all the states have handled an important and rising policy issue.

The Right to Die is a "must" book for those interested in the question or in the broader issues of government regulation of health treatment and the rights of individuals to live autonomous lives. It is also a must for those interested in comparing agenda building, policy choices, and diffusion across the states. For these reasons, it will be on the shelves quite a while, to be replaced, perhaps, by a second edition in the next decade, when right-to-die policy is more fully developed.

University of Kentucky BRADLEY C. CANON

Hollow Mandates: American Public Opinion and the Conservative Shift. By Howard J. Gold. Boulder: Westview, 1992. 214p. $35.00.

It would be hard to imagine a more dramatic transformation in American politics than that which occurred between 1964 and 1984. There are probably few more telling illustrations of this change than the fortunes of Ronald Reagan, the era's central figure. In 1964, an electorally inexperienced Reagan went on national television and spoke forcefully in favor of the ill-fated campaign of conservative Barry Goldwater. In 1984, Reagan was busily putting many ideas espoused during the 1964 campaign into public policy and getting reelected president in the process. Few would argue that politics of the 1980s had not changed from the 1960s; yet as striking as this turn right may seem, it is not as simple or enduring as some think. The nature and origins of this shift are the subject of Howard J. Gold's *Hollow Mandates*, a brief book well suited for advanced undergraduate or introductory graduate courses in public opinion or electoral politics.

As a backdrop for his analysis, Gold presents a useful summary of major changes in ideas, campaign rhetoric, and public policy that occurred in the 1960–80 era. Beginning with a sound, if brief, review of traditional and new conservative ideas that permeated this era, he considers if, when, and how these ideas came to infiltrate electoral politics by examining party nomination addresses and platforms. On the basis of a careful examination of nomination acceptance speeches and party platforms, he detects a fundamental shift to the right in the 1970s and early 1980s. Jimmy Carter's campaign of 1976 saw a major infusion of conservative ideas into Democratic campaign rhetoric. A shift rightward was also evident in the policy proposals (if not the candidate) of the Republican party that year. Gold makes a convincing case that Ronald Reagan's campaign of 1980 followed a conservative trend that had begun at least four years earlier. And while Reagan did not initiate the trend, his election and subsequent reelection translated conservative words into action. *Hollow Mandates* presents a detailed litany of the changes wrought in federal policies during the Reagan years.

Hollow Mandates overriding concern is with a basic and important question: Has the transformation of politics and policy resulted from, or caused, a rightward shift in public opinion? He presents three "theories" to account for the change: (1) a "cultural backlash" against the Great Society programs and upheavals of the 1960s; (2) reactions to the "institutional malaise," scandals, and economic upheavals of the 1970s; and (3) a "sweeping mandate" interpretation emphasizing the role of Ronald Reagan's 1980 election. Each perspective predicts different periods of change in the electorate and suggests differing content for any accompanying attitudinal change.

Examining CPS and NORC survey data, Gold finds changes that are far less remarkable than one might expect. Remarkably, the only major ideological change was a growth in hostility toward federal power. Beside this and growing support for capital punishment in the 1972–88 period, white Americans in the 1980s were not remarkably more conservative than their counterparts in the 1960s. The most notable shift in public opinion was in perceptions of the managerial capabilities of the political parties. Increasingly, the Republican party became viewed as more effective managers, as Democrats suffered on this dimension. The conservative shift in America, Gold argues, was to a de facto conservatism resulting from a deepening public affection for the Republican party but not for its ideology.

According to Gold, America's turn right was a hollow mandate (hence the title). The shift was limited to a managerial conservatism lacking explicit ideology. As long as the Republicans could manage the government (and particularly the economy) effectively, the public would support them and tolerate their conservative social pronouncements. Unfortunately for the Republicans, the publication of *Hollow Mandates* came too late to stop Bush from displaying the truth of many penetrating insights offered in the book.

The main faults I find with *Hollow Mandates* are with its rather simplistic research design and methodology and a greatly circumscribed theoretical focus. With only minor exceptions, public opinion is not broken down into subgroups. The sometimes sparse analysis would have been greatly enhanced with attention to geographical, gender, ethnic, racial, and other differences (if any) in public opinion about issues and parties over time. Added to this, with a minor exception in chapter 8, multivariate analysis is sadly lacking. At many important junctures, more sophisticated modeling could have allowed concise evaluation of the explanatory usefulness of the alternative "theories" of change and the examination of generational replacement presented in chapter 7. The "theories," furthermore, are nothing more than descriptions of historical events and, as such, provide little that is generalizable about the forces that may promote change in American politics. In this vein, Gold also does not attempt to push his findings to a general statement of the nature of public opinion in America like that offered in more general studies such as McClosky and Zaller's *American Ethos* (1984). This is unfortunate, because his findings point to important contradictions in the electorate that color so much of the American political landscape.

These methodological and theoretical limitations notwithstanding, *Hollow Mandates* makes a provocative point and should attract a broad audience. It is an easily accessible book; and students of American politics and public opinion, as well as those interested in the contemporary political milieu, will all find much to commend this interesting study.

Florida State University PAUL BRACE

Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Debate. Edited by Leslie Friedman Goldstein. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992. 286p. $65.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

"A shared concern with the legal significance of difference, that is, the difference between men and women" unites the contributors to this volume, according to its editor, Leslie Friedman Goldstein (p. 1). The authors are linked in another important respect, as well: they are all feminists with secular values. This is a debate about difference among friends of the women's movement. Their orientation is practical and political.

The book begins with a series of reflections on the first question that anyone concerned about using law for feminist ends must ask: To what extent should law acknowledge the fact that women are differently situated from men, biologically, culturally, and socioeconomically? The issue is how to accommodate aspirations for equality with the contemporary reality of difference. At one time, the feminist debate was between those who would launch a frontal attack on distinctions between men and women in the law and those who sought to retain the few protections the law afforded that were responsive to women's social and economic disadvantages. The contemporary battleground has shifted as law has been cleansed of most of its sexually explicit stereotypes. The issue now is whether the best strategy is sex-specific or sex-neutral.

Joan Williams argues eloquently that law should make no assumptions about men and women but must, instead, attack the roots of sexist oppression, particularly those associated with the workplace. The rules of work in contemporary society continue to be built around a model of the ideal worker who is either unattached or emancipated from family responsibilities by a partner who can take up the slack. Law must be changed to reflect the responsibilities of workers for their dependants. This would involve not just child-care options but paid leaves as needed, flexibility concerning hours and location of work, elimination of all forms of discrimination against part-time work, and other changes. We should insist that these changes be made in a sex-neutral way in order to break down old stereotypes about gender roles. Traditionalist judges can use women's culture against women, as the Sears case illustrates. The dangers of women's embracing domesticity are particularly great at this moment in history as men increasingly abandon their own commitments to supporting the household. Shanley and Battistoni endorse this position in a thoughtful final essay.

Mary Becker takes an opposing position. She is skeptical that this nation will find the determination to change its androcentric ways. We seem ready only for reforms that allow women to live like single men. Even the rare exceptions to neglect—sex-specific protections against the worst disadvantages women suffer—pose painful choices. Citing the famous California case on unpaid leave for women disabled by pregnancy, Becker argues that we must choose between protection for women and no protection at all. In an environment so hostile to fundamental structural change, sex neutrality is not an option. Law must be explicit in helping women achieve protection from socially imposed discrimination; and it must include affirmative action for women only, to begin to redress the gender-specific disadvantages women have suffered.

The book moves on from this general debate about equality in law to particular issues and arenas of conflict. These subsequent contributions help sensitize the reader to other dimensions of the problem of law as a vehicle for social change. Judith Baer begins this series of essays with an argument directed toward those feminist theorists who dismiss the enterprise of legal reform as hopelessly male in the values and practice it supports. She argues that there is nothing inherently male in the combination of abstract reason, practical compromising, and emotional commitment that together characterize constitutional jurisprudence. She, like Williams, is hostile to relational feminism, with its suggestion that there may be a distinctively female way of knowing that may be inherent or social but that in either event, should be acknowledged and celebrated. Baer does accept that there are certain typically male means of arguing about and interpreting law, but she sees these as artifacts of male power or male confusion about emotional data. She notes, for example, Justice Blackmun's effort to separate his personal distaste for the death penalty from the issue of its constitutionality. While no judge should let emotion *dictate* decisions, she argues, feelings *do* serve a purpose in guiding action. She concludes, with a touch of irony, "If integration of reason and emotion is essentially female, then women have much to bring to constitutional interpretation" (p. 155).

Other contributions focus on particular policy problems. Graber uses the contemporary debate on the constitutionality of abortion regulation to make a more general point about legal debate. To discuss constitutional norms or rules in the abstract, without considering the realities of implementation, not only is a sterile way to proceed and irrelevant to ordinary people but risks mistaking the fundamental constitutional norms at stake. If abortion is restricted by law, it will have a differential effect on rich and poor. The constitutional debate, in other words, should not simply revolve around the question of whether privacy is or is not protected by the constitution. Our norm of equality under law is also implicated whenever the state seeks to restrict the availability of abortion.

The book also contains essays on two other areas of hot debate: divorce reform and fetal protection laws. Lisa Bower shows how conceptions of conflict, of marriage, and of woman's interests influenced the recent wave of divorce reform that attempts to eliminate moral condemnation and gender stereotyping from divorce. The results, studies of divorced partners suggest, have not been beneficial for women (although there is little consensus on the dimensions of the problem). Joseph Losco provides an equivalent lesson in humility for those who would abolish laws designed to force expectant mothers to take responsibility for the fetuses they carry.

The book is stimulating because it combines serious attention to the roles of law in society without losing sight of the problem of developing progressive agenda for women. The authors show convincingly, particularly when they are read together, that there are no easy answers to the problem of law's contribution to women's emancipation. Even Shanely and Battistoni's final call for open debate is subject to a caveat. Graber suggests that the more we realize the social dimensions of some legal propositions, such as abortion regulation, the more entrenched our positions are likely to become. There are basic values at stake here, and nonfeminists oppose the whole enterprise of decoupling sex from gender.

We do not get a sense from this book of just how the nonfeminist majority is likely to respond to the legal initiatives under consideration here. A book that includes only essays written from a feminist persuasion can hardly give the reader a feel for opposing views. It might have been helpful to include a representative of the antifeminist position in a volume on the role of law in dealing with sexual difference.

Syracuse University DORIS MARIE PROVINE

Latina Politics, Latino Politics: Gender, Culture, and Political Participation. By Carol Hardy-Fanta. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993. 249p. $44.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

The steady increase in the Latino populations assures that cities that have not traditionally had politically organized or visible Latino populations now do. A case in point is Boston. Over the past decade, Boston's Latinos have elected a Latino to the state legislature and several others to school board positions. Further, they contributed to the governing coalitions of Mayors White and Flynn. The recentness of Latino political influence offers scholars a unique opportunity to examine the emergence and early evolution of local Latino ethnic politics. Hardy-Fanta seizes this opportunity in order to examine gender differences in the way Latino women and men (hereafter, Latinas and Latinos) understand and act on politics.

Hardy-Fanta offers an extensive review of the literature on gender differences in the conceptualization of politics and an equally thorough review of the more narrow literature on Latina politics. Her own research builds on these earlier findings of gender-based differences in the ways women and men envision the meanings of politics and political participation to identify several gender-based differences between Latinas and Latinos. Latinas, for example, envision a politics that is more participatory than do Latinos. Latinas seek collective political activity among community members who are connected to each other through common political objectives and friendship. Latinos, on the other hand, perceive politics in terms of personal advancement and hierarchical organization. Thus, where Latinas generate a sense of community and citizenship through interpersonal ties, Latinos rely on formal structures to organize politics.

Hardy-Fanta then identifies differences in the impetus to political participation. Politicized Latinas seek to raise the consciousness of the community; politicized Latinos respond to opportunity. Hence, she reports a pattern of Latinos forming community-based organizations and then leaving these organizations to work for the city. Latinas, on the other hand, are more likely to be involved directly in the community. While she finds that these patterns of behavior and understanding of politics dominate each gender's approach to politics, she is careful to note that there are exceptions. Some of the men interviewed sought a more participatory, inclusive politics; some of the women sought a more traditional, formal hierarchical politics.

Clearly, Hardy-Fanta's findings are politically charged and transcend the narrow focus on Latino politics. Regrettably, her discussion is unclear on the degree to which these are gender-ethnic traits or gender characteristics irrespective of ethnicity. The study recognizes this dilemma, but only confuses the analysis by taking each position at different points in the book. She only briefly touches on the degree to which one's class reinforces gender differences; a topic that merits further examination.

Hardy-Fanta bases her study of Boston Latino/a politics on ethnographic interviews and participant observation. The small number of interviews (n = 53) warrants caution in interpreting these findings. While she is sensitive to this issue, noting in the introduction that the findings are "suggestive, not conclusive" (xiv), she is not attentive to the weakness of the data in much of the analysis. At its extreme, this over-reliance on the results of a small sample leads to in claims like "Latino men were five times more likely to define politics in terms of positions and status than were the women" (48). This inappropriate quantification detracts from the importance of the questions being asked about gender and ethnicity and their relationship to politics.

The study could, however, have enriched these data and their interpretation by providing more extensive sociodemographic detail on the interviewees. While it is evident that the respondents trace their ancestry to several Latin American and Caribbean countries as well as Puerto Rico and that slightly more than half are organizational or political leaders, the reader would benefit from knowing such details as age, immigrant generation, length of time since immigration (or migration, in the case of the Puerto Ricans), period of residence in Boston, and citizenship. Each of these factors may have more influence than or interact with gender to produce the reported results. If the men in the sample, for example, are older than the women, they may have had greater opportunities to participate in non-Latino-based community political activities. The native born, regardless of gender, are likely to have experienced a different form of political socialization than the foreign born. With such a small sample, having a different distribution in terms of age or nativity between Latinos and Latinas could skew the findings. Thus, the absence of a clearer demographic portrait of the composition of the sample presents a serious gap in the study.

One area where such information is discussed—national origin, offers some interesting insights into the development of Latino politics, not just in Boston, but nationally. In most areas where Latinos are concentrated, one national origin group predominates—Mexican Americans in the Southwest, Puerto Ricans in New York and the Northeast, and Cuban Americans in South Florida. Few areas are genuinely "Latino" in the sense that they have two or more Latino national origin groups with each group sharing local political power. Traditionally, Chicago has been the best example of this phenomenon.

Hardy-Fanta clearly demonstrates the pan-ethnic nature of Boston's Latino identity. She finds that the individual concerns of one national origin group have not shaped the Latino political agenda. Instead, the groups unite around a series of public policy issues broadly identified as "the needs of the community." These include affordable housing, AIDS, and high dropout rates for Latino youth (138). Only one issue specific to any group appears in Hardy-Fanta's list of community public policy issues—Puerto Rico's status. This finding reinforces other empirical research into the foundations for a pan-ethnic Latino politics. It appears that if pan-ethnicity is to emerge, it will be built on a series of issues within the United States confronting a community in poverty rather than home-country issues. Interestingly, the identification of these issues crucial to the community did not differ between men and women.

Despite the limits imposed on the analysis by the small sample and limited sample demographics, Hardy-Fanta raises some very interesting questions about the role of gender in the development of U.S. ethnic politics. Further, she offers some insights into the emergence of Latino politics in an area where it has only recently begun to manifest itself. This early examination offers an important baseline for future studies of Boston Latino politics as well as a useful point of comparison for examining the emergence of ethnic politics in other cities.

Wellesley College LOUIS DESIPIO

The Promise and Paradox of Civil Service Reform. Edited by Patricia W. Ingraham and David H. Rosenbloom. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992. 329p. $39.95 cloth, $18.95 paper.

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) is one piece of legislation for which the Carter administration will long be remembered. Patricia Ingraham and David Rosenbloom's book grew out of a conference marking the tenth year of the reform held at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. The volume contains revised papers given at the conference as well as chapters from experts who did not attend the conference.

The book is a treasure-trove of information on the reform and its consequences. It is divided into sections on designing the reform, the institutions created by the reform act, processes and procedures under the reform, and the lessons of reform. Much of it is of interest mainly to specialists and inside players, but there are some big issues raised by the reform and addressed by many of the contributors to the book.

CSRA abolished the Civil Service Commission and established the Office of Personnel Management, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority. It also established the Senior Executive Service (SES), a monumental change that created a rank-in-the-person system for top federal executives. SES also features performance bonuses, a revised system for evaluating executives, expanded training and development opportunities, and a provision allowing up to 10% of the total SES positions to be filled by political appointees.

The reform has had an interesting history, to put it mildly. Jimmy Carter made it a priority in his campaign. In fact, notes Ingraham, Carter was the "first president in history to campaign with civil service reform at the top of his policy agenda" (p. 11). Initial problems with the reform emerged when Congress cut back on the bonuses promised to federal executives, but the real test occurred during the Reagan administration when provisions of the reform act were aggressively used to increase presidential control over the civil service.

Chester Newland argues that adoption of the act changed the balance of power in the executive branch between the president and Congress. The president was now acknowledged to be the dominant figure. CSRA, he says, was "a great departure from the earlier view of presidential responsibility, which held that the executive branch, in joint oversight with Congress, was to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed" (p. 64).

There is much evidence that the act did have a significant impact on presidential influence over the bureaucracy. Take two examples. The rank-in-the-person provisions of the act now allow an administration to move career SES executives from position to position, a power that can be used with telling political effect by a savvy administration. Ten percent of SES positions can be filled by political appointees, another provision of immense political significance. The question is why Congress enacted such provisions.

It is possible that Congress simply intended to change the balance of power between itself and the executive branch, but this does not fit well with the increase in congressional oversight during the 1970s, the enactment of statutes such as the War Powers Act and the Congressional Budget Act, and other attempts to increase congressional influence. Other explanations given by Newland (see also the chapter by Mark Huddleston) include Congress's tendency to focus on the areas of greatest concern to powerful interest groups (e.g. Veterans preference) rather than on issues related to the relatively small and unorganized corps of senior executives, a tendency to concentrate on electorally appealing issues such as whistleblower protection, and even the lulling effects on congressional thinking of the long-standing bias of the community of public administration scholars toward greater presidential influence over the executive branch.

Since Congress killed earlier attempts to enact versions of a senior executive service such as Eisenhower's Career Executive Service (Huddleston, pp. 171–2), we know that it is capable of focusing on such issues, and its other actions in the 1970s do not indicate an institution bent on diminishing its own prerogatives. In short, it is still not entirely clear why Congress gave such power over federal executives to the president. Much of our literature on the politics of administration emphasizes the special ties between Congress and top agency officials and the benefits that both obtain from these ties. When we have a comprehensive explanation for the adoption of the SES provisions of CSRA that increased the potential for an administration to control top executives, we will substantially increase our understanding of contemporary American politics.

Many of the contributors to the book do not evaluate either the reform or its results very positively. Beryl Radin discusses the multiple and often conflicting elements in its design. Robert Vaughan concludes that neither the Merit Systems Protection Board nor the special counsel have "provided the oversight and protection that many of the advocates of the CSRA predicted" (pp. 134–5). Rosenbloom's analysis of the Federal

Labor Relations Authority indicates that "FLRA has not yet molded Title VII into a coherent body of law for the creation and regulation of a vigorous bilateral collective bargaining system" (p. 154). James Perry concludes that merit pay "may have little consequence for individual and organizational performance" (p. 213). And J. Edward Kellough and Rosenbloom conclude that the equal employment opportunity provisions of CSRA did not lead to dramatic progress.

As Ingraham notes, some of the failures of CSRA can be attributed to the fact that the reform actually increased the complexity of an already complex system, some to the fact that it contained potentially contradictory elements which made the "effectiveness of the reform unpredictable" (p. 19), and some to the fact that many important parts of the reform rested on untested assumptions about the transferability of private sector management techniques to the public sector. The essays also indicate that one should not underestimate the import of the politics of budget austerity that affected implementation of the reform (the failure to live up to promises made with respect to bonuses for executives is the most prominent example), and the fact that many of the problems were due to an event unanticipated by the designers of the reform, namely that the Reagan administration would soon come to office and play a big role in shaping OPM and implementing CSRA.

Overall, the editors and authors of this book should be complimented for producing a valuable set of essays critiquing the CSRA and its implementation. Those who study the politics of federal personnel policy will find it an indispensable source of information and analysis. Those with an interest in presidential power, executive-legislative relations, and the complex role of bureaucracy in American government will also find much here to think about.

University of California, Los Angeles JOEL D. ABERBACH

Even the Children of Strangers: Equality Under the U.S. Constitution. By Donald W. Jackson. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. 282p. $35.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.

The Color-Blind Constitution. By Andrew Kull. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. 301p. $35.00

Andrew Kull traces the history of an idea—that our Constitution is, or should be, color blind. Despite the persistence of this idea, he points out, there is no ban per se on racial classification anywhere in the Constitution, nor has the Supreme Court ever assumed such a ban. On the contrary, far from heeding Justice Harlan's impassioned dissent in *Plessy* v. *Ferguson* (1896)—that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens"—the Court has almost invariably agreed with Henry Billing Brown, who declared for the majority in that same opinion that racial classifications are as permissible as any others as long as they are "reasonable." In his finely-researched and elegant book, *The Color-Blind Constitution*, Kull discusses the reasons for, and the consequences of, the Court's decision to side with Brown and not Harlan.

Kull begins by tracing the origin of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, and observes that in framing it the thirty-ninth Congress flatly rejected language favored by the abolitionists that would have expressly prohibited the government from engaging in racial discrimination. Such language was unacceptable, Kull explains, because of its "uncompromising effectiveness" (p. 87). The drafters preferred the "equal protection" language suggested by John Bingham because, apart from outlawing the detested Black Codes, it did not necessarily mean anything in particular. As William Nelson said, in an observation quoted by Kull, "Americans of 1866, like Americans of today, could all agree upon the rightfulness of equality only because they did not agree on its meaning" (*The Fourteenth Amendment* [1988]).

In the short run the fourteenth amendment's protean language meant its enforcement, "in an unsympathetic climate, would narrow to the vanishing point," yet in the long run, Kull points out, this same language would yield a virtual revolution in American law (p. 87).

The "revolution" began in earnest after *Brown* v. *Board of Education* (1954). By the mid-1960s most de jure segregation had been abolished on *Brown's* authority and Congress had passed major civil rights legislation. Ironically, Kull argues, it was at precisely this time, when the historic struggle for equal rights had fulfilled its goal, and the Constitution had come as close to being "color blind" as it ever would, that the "classical" civil rights movement came to an end.

The movement ended once African-Americans realized that guaranteeing legal equality to the residents of Watts and Harlem did nothing to ease the stark inequalities that still separated the races. Civil rights strategist Bayard Rustin was correct, Kull says, in his observation that the successful attack on the "imposing but hollow structure" of Jim Crow had involved institutions which were "relatively peripheral . . . to the fundamental conditions of life of the Negro people." Hereafter, Rustin predicted, the civil rights movement would concentrate on achieving "the fact of equality" ("From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement," *Commentary* 39:25–27 [Feb. 1965]).

In 1965 Daniel Patrick Moynihan noted, in his much-maligned and sadly prophetic Report, that "equality in fact" could never be achieved unless blacks as a group were helped in their efforts to become stronger competitors. Many of his specific recommendations were echoed in the subsequent Kerner Commission Report, which urged the government to implement a broad range of programs requiring massive public expenditure for education, housing, job creation, and social reform. These programs were necessary, the Commission explained, because "[w]hat the American economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was able to do to help the European immigrants escape from poverty is now largely impossible. New methods of escape must be found for the majority of today's poor" (*Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, 1968, p. 282).

These "new methods of escape" never materialized. The public was unwilling to pay for them, and many African-Americans were no longer willing to wait for them. After riots broke out in hundreds of cities during the summers of 1966 and 1967, public officials realized that something had to be done right away—something with maximum visibility and minimal cost.

Race-conscious "quick fixes" were thus adopted and, as Kull observes, "the color-blind consensus, so long in forming, was abandoned with surprising rapidity" (p. 183). Where the Kerner Commission had urged "a comprehensive approach designed to reconstruct the ghetto child's social and intellectual environment," judges could only mandate racially-proportionate school districts. Where the Commission had recommended large-scale job creation, the civil rights agencies and the courts "could only impose racial preferences in the zero-sum game of allocating existing jobs" (p. 189).

These race-conscious remedies were often accomplished, Kull says, by turning relevant laws on their head. The Civil Rights Act, enacted only after its proponents assured their southern colleagues that it would never result in preferential treatment, was soon interpreted to permit and even mandate such treatment. The Voting Rights Act, designed to prohibit racial discrimination in the electoral process, was by 1970 being used by the federal government to compel states and municipalities to alter systems of representation in order to facilitate the elevation of black and hispanic candidates. ("It followed," Kull observes, "that the statute's true purpose would be served by refusing its enforcement" [p. 207].)

When Kull turns his attention to affirmative action programs, he demonstrates the same circumspection that characterizes his work as a whole. He is clearly troubled by such programs, which are possible only in a society that has largely abandoned its color-blind ideal. Yet he appreciates the appeal of these "largely symbolic gestures" if the alternative is nothing at all, and he recognizes that people who are the descendants of slaves have a unique claim to governmental solicitude. His conclusion is unequivocal, however, that "the moral awkwardness of asking black Americans to be content with nondiscrimination should not stop us from giving that answer to everyone else" (p. 223).

If a policy of nondiscrimination becomes the exception, rather than the rule, Kull fears that "the convenient and destructive practice of allocating social resources by racial and ethnic groups" will become the American political model (p. 221). This, he says, would preempt "the belief in a transcendent individualism [that] once seemed central," and profoundly alter "the aspirations of American democracy" (pp. 221, 223).

Whereas Kull concludes by lamenting the proliferation of what he considers deleterious group-based remedies, Donald Jackson concludes *Even the Children of Strangers* by suggesting the opposite: that sometimes such remedies are both necessary and just. Despite this fundamental philosophic difference, however, the two authors have much in common: both discuss the evolution of equal protection jurisprudence, and do so within a distinctive moral framework; at the same time both avoid speaking in anything approaching simplistic or doctrinaire language.

The two books are different, however, in both tone and focus. Whereas Kull's is closely-focused and scholarly, Jackson writes primarily for the undergraduate and gathers his material from secondary sources. Yet Jackson, however modest his ambitions, nevertheless wrote a book that in its own way is as satisfying as Kull's—and, at least in those chapters where he challenges conventional notions of equality, also as provocative.

Jackson observes that Americans are thoroughly committed to "individual-regarding equality," as this term was defined by Douglas Rae and his co-authors in *Equalities* (1981). Accordingly, they tend to believe all human beings experience roughly the same "life chances," and thus should be treated alike. This attitude stems in turn from their devotion to the ideal of the self-reliant individual on the one hand, and to personal merit (as they conceive it) on the other. (While such views may be more mythical than ever, Jackson says, he cites recent studies showing that a large percentage of Americans still believe they compete in a world where success stems solely from intrinsic merit.)

Proponents of what Rae calls "group-regarding equality," on the contrary, favor policies that focus on the needs of a particular class, and Jackson concedes that such policies are troublesome for all the reasons Kull cites: They encourage a welter of competing group claims, and in time become seen as "entitlements," rather than as the strictly temporal and remedial expedients they were initially intended to be (witness the case of World War Two veterans, who successfully lobbied to retain their employment preferences long after the need for them ended). Finally, progress toward group-regarding equality in one context might deflect attention from "malignant inequalities in another" (p. 123).

Yet, Jackson notes, group-based remedies should not be dismissed out of hand, if only because they have gained broad, if hardly unqualified, acceptance in many other countries: the constitutions of both India and Canada explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of compensatory policies, for instance, and so do many international conventions (while simultaneously repudiating permanent proportionality).

More important, Jackson argues, group-regarding policies, however problematic, have their own claim to moral legitimacy: they offer some compensation to those victimized by institutional racism, and, short of undertaking the expensive structural reforms advocated by the Kerner Commission, they alone can reduce the deep socioeconomic gulf that separates the races. For example, without race-conscious programs the overall disparity in employment between blacks and whites, far from decreasing, will in fact continue to grow.

Finally, because proponents of individual-regarding equality minimize the enormous influence of socioeconomic forces, they tend to perpetuate the status quo by insisting upon what Jackson considers an artifically narrow and class-biased definition of "merit." Just as Britain once required its high-ranking civil service officers to be fluent in Latin and Greek, we also award positions of power and status to an elite whose qualifications (i.e., success in school or on standardized tests) may be equally unrelated to job performance. Anyone whose intelligence and ability fall within some broad "normal" range, including most beneficiaries of so-called preferential treatment programs, is capable of filling most positions in society, Jackson argues, and probably of filling them at least as well as someone with more "quantifiable" skills.

Jackson proposes a way we might retain our commitment to individualism and merit, as we define these terms, and still support programs that appreciably benefit members of disadvantaged classes: in assessing an applicant's qualifications we could consider the "distance they have traveled," i.e., the extent to which they have overcome, say, poverty, homelessness, or a physical handicap. We could thereby allocate valuable resources on the basis of criteria that are individual and neutral rather than collective or race-based, and, at the same time, rationalize our definition of merit. (While Kull and Jackson are guided by very different premises, they reach similar conclusions: Kull also recommends remedial policies that focus on disadvantage, not race, but which still promise "disproportionate benefits to blacks" [p. 222]).

Both authors also agree that individual-regarding remedies should remain the ideal, although Kull alone considers race-conscious ones inherently deficient. Kull also regards the individual as the only unit properly entitled to equal protection, and fears that any expansion of this unit could imperil the unifying principle of American democracy. He does not, however, explain (at least to this reviewer's satisfaction) why this is necessarily so. Jackson, by contrast, understands that our reverence for individual-regarding equality contributes not only to the nobility of our vision, but also to its limitation.

Rutgers University, Newark ELIZABETH HULL

Markets and Majorities: The Political Economy of Public Policy. By Steven M. Sheffrin. New York: Free Press, 1993. 285p. $24.95.

According to Steven M. Sheffrin, in the United States "when markets fail, governments intervene and impose regulations on the economy" (p. 2). But not all market failures are political magnets for regulations. Market failures, he argues, become politicized only when they cause distributional outcomes that public majorities find unacceptable. On a chapter-by-chapter basis, he discusses seven cases of politicized market failure: health care; social security; environmental policy; product liability; international trade; monetary policy; and fiscal policy. In each case, he finds, the regulatory process begets perverse and unintended consequences, both economic and political. The economic costs of regulation, he maintains, often outweigh the benefits. And the regulatory process, he claims, totally excludes average citizens.

As Sheffrin sees it, the regulatory process is dominated by "the Washington money-go-round," by which he means inside-the-beltway bureaucrats, lawyers, lobbyists, politicians, pundits, staffers, and think tankers who "keep track of the nuances" of regulations in order to protect "their own interests—sometimes financial, sometimes ideological, and sometimes just the quest for self-importance" (p. 254). To remedy the situation and enhance understanding, he promises readers "principles for reform" derived "from the science of economics and the art of government" (pp. 4, 253–54).

Markets and Majorities has some bright spots, but it does not deliver on this promise. General readers are likely to find parts of Sheffrin's discussion of market failure too esoteric. Specialist readers are sure to find his discussion of the political economy of regulation in the United States oversimplified, incomplete, or just plain wrong. Four shortcomings of the book are worth noting.

First, it adds little to the scholarly and popular literatures on the seven issues it covers. For example, chapter 2 is entitled "The Peculiar World of Medical Economics." It provides a brief introduction to the micro-economics of health-care market failure. "The market for medical services," declares Sheffrin, "differs dramatically from the idealized picture of perfect markets in almost every dimension" (p. 22). Indeed it does. But rather than cut through the "dizzying complexity of health care reform proposals," he glosses over their complexity, briefly discusses competing regulatory strategies, and concludes with a one-page summary of "the essentials of the story," including such banalities as "Federal and state governments have become dominant payers in the market for health" (pp. 57, 58).

Second, Sheffrin's thesis that regulations proliferate only when public majorities object to distributional outcomes remains unsupported, as does his thesis about the built-in failures of regulation. The conditions under which regulation occurs, the conditions that produce different types of regulatory regimes, and the relationships between regulatory structures and regulatory outcomes, are far more complex and varied than he allows. At a minimum, a better analysis of the political economy of regulation would draw on the extensive and increasingly sophisticated literature on the role of public opinion in national policy making, and systematically explore the reasons for differences in regulatory outcomes.

Third, while it may please some readers, Sheffrin's Washington-bashing tone, and tiresome references to "the Washington money-go-round," distract one from his more serious points about the limits of regulation, the degree to which economic policy has become the province of experts, and the democratic accountability problems that this may or may not pose. For example, he is certainly correct that monetary policy and international finance "raise difficult issues of delegation of authority and responsibility to the experts" (p. 160). His discussion of monetary policy and international finance is commendable.

But when it comes to regulation, Sheffrin overgeneralizes about how average citizens "are excluded from the process and viewed as naive by the Washington crowd" (p. 253). Much of the relevant political science literature indicates that regulatory accountability problems are often more apparent than real, as citizens are more capable of monitoring legislators' behavior, and legislators are more cognizant of citizens' preferences and more capable of monitoring bureaucrats' behavior, than is generally supposed. Unfortunately, he ignores this literature.

Finally, the book is not organized or edited as well as it might have been, and the concluding chapter reneges on the opening chapter's promise of general reform principles. In the concluding chapter, Sheffrin finds it necessary to remind readers that "an understanding of the tensions between market failure and political obsessions" is "the organizing theme of this book" (p. 254). On the excuse that "the application of these ideas are subtle and every area of economic policy has its own contours," (p. 254) he ends not by articulating and defending general principles for reform, but by rehashing chapter two's discussion of health policy and chapter eight's discussion of fiscal policy. The book's appendix is a fair annotated guide to Washington think tanks and sources of policy information (pp. 263–75).

Sheffrin is to be applauded for his ambitious effort to advance the political economy of public policy and bring it to a general readership. For the most part, however, the book is unsatisfying.

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COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform. Edited by Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993. 481p. $59.95.

This is a true work of comparative political economy. Each of the case studies is the collaborative product of a political scientist and an economist. The authors seriously analyze how politics shape economic policies and economic policies shape politics during the pre-reform, reform, and post-reform periods in eight developing countries: Brazil (Deepak Lal and Sylvia Maxfield); Chile (Philip Brock and Barbara Stallings); Ecuador (Francisco E. Thoumi and Merilee S. Grindle); Egypt (Robert Holt and Terry Roe); Ghana (J. Clark Leith and Michael F. Lofchie); Korea (Richard N. Cooper, Stephan Haggard, and Chung-in Moon); Turkey (Anne O. Krueger and Ilter Turan); and Zambia (Paul Collier and Robert H. Bates). Bates and Krueger provided the authors with an agenda of questions but also encouraged them to write detailed country investigations. The aim was to systematically evaluate existing hypotheses on economic policy reform as well as to generate new insights. The experiences and successes (and failures) of the countries are sufficiently different to raise skepticism about the validity of creating a single model of the reform process, but what is most remarkable about this book is the extent to which the editors are able to uncover some generalizable propositions about the reform process.

The amassing of such high-quality evidence has the effect of convincingly debunking some standard arguments while suggesting alternatives. For example, there is not a unique kind of crisis that precipitates the reform process, but economic deterioration does precede reform efforts. Nor is political authoritarianism a necessary condition for successful reform although a strong executive and an empowered technocracy may be. I am in agreement with Bates and Krueger that "one of the most surprising findings . . . is the degree to which the intervention of interest groups fails to account for the initiation, or lack of initiation, of policy reform" (p. 454). Rather, they find that political institutions often inhibit mobilization and that ideology transforms interests. Consequently, there is no apparent correlation between citizen interests and the initial policy content. On the other hand, as the study by Leith and Lofchie best demonstrates, the interest groups created by a policy may account for its stability.

The most important claims of the book have to do with ideology, political institutions, and implementation. Given the uncertainty of the effects of comprehensive reform, groups and individuals may not know where their interests lie. They are thus subject to the persuasive power of politicians. And what determines the ideological choice of politicians has a lot to do with the institutional rules of politics. The fact that at least half the authors are economists and others are rational choice scholars makes these findings particularly compelling. Certainly they help to account for some of the policy choices made.

Equally significant is the claim that neither good policies nor a commitment to reform are enough. A competent and strong technocracy is also necessary. The editors, drawing on the cases, on Barbara Geddes' forthcoming *The Politicians' Dilemma*, and on recent work in American politics by Keith Kreihbel and by Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew McCubbins, offer a series of interesting and testable explanations of why and how politicians might delegate power to the technocrats. The argument rests on the necessity of government providing credible commitments to its reform aims so that economic agents will then make the appropriate choices. As Bates and Collier so tellingly document in their discussion of Zambia, politicians must demonstrate to constituents that their self-interest and their policy commitments are compatible. Political institutions help to solve this problem.

The breadth of the book highlights the weak points in the text. First, the incorporation of other countries, particularly those of Eastern Europe, might affect the findings. Second, there needs to be more of a methodological discussion. A stockpiling of comparative evidence on the same issues is an important step in evaluating hypotheses, and it may even be enough. Is the underlying apologia for the failure to provide statistical tests appropriate or not? Third, there is too little attention to the design of the technocracy and other bureaucratic structures, by their own account so essential to the development enterprise. This is particularly surprising given that Krueger is one of the progenitors of the argument that regulatory design can promote rent-seeking and that Bates has used the rules that create rent-seeking and other institutional arrangements to explain how rational politicians can make nonrational policies.

The strengths of *Political and Economic Interactions* outweigh any weaknesses a reviewer is compelled to delineate. The work represents a significant contribution to the new institutionalism in political economy. It is not just a question of "getting the prices right." It is also necessary to get the institutions right. However, this book goes far beyond that insight. It demonstrates exactly where, and for what, institutions and ideology matter. It lays out the research agenda for scholars of development and offers an approach that integrates the skills of the area study specialist, the political scientist, and the economist. It indicates how one can have a concern with country specificity and, at the same time, with model building, model testing, and generalizability. And it does all this while improving our understanding of development and our capacity to initiate and implement economic reform.

University of Washington MARGARET LEVI

Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930–1985. By Catherine Boone. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 299p. $59.95.

The political roots of Africa's current economic crisis have become a favorite research topic for Africanist political scientists. The general conclusion of most of this work is that economic growth has been sacrificed at the altar of state consolidation and political stability. The economic policy choices of African leaders since independence have been motivated less by economic rationality and a coherent development strategy than by the political exigencies of state elites that lacked legitimacy and a stable social base. For example, much government intervention in Africa has been motivated by rent seeking and patronage and has proven impervious to reform despite its obvious economic costs, because it yields great political dividends. The inevitable consequence has been pervasive corruption, economic stagnation, and international debt.

This explanation for Africa's economic plight is, by now, a familiar one that most scholars share, albeit with wide variations in theoretical emphases and not always with adequate evidence. This excellent monograph by Catherine Boone tells the Senegalese version of this story with considerable insight and convincing empirical proof. Boone begins her story in the colonial era and shows how the interests of French commercial firms conditioned industrial policy and resulted in a weak industrial sector at independence. Focusing special attention on the textile sector, she then demonstrates quite convincingly how, in the first decades of independence, the state elite "senegalized" the sector so that its rent-seeking potential would benefit key elements of the national elite and at the same time maintained policies that undermined the expansion, vertical integration, and competitiveness of the industrial sector. Pervasive and often destructive state intervention in the economy facilitated "the fusion of elites" on which the postcolonial order was built. Such scholars as Bayart or Lonsdale have emphasized this process with regard to ethnically divided societies, but Boone convincingly demonstrates its applicability to the relatively homogeneous Senegal. In sum, "consolidating power and promoting economic growth proved to be contradictory imperatives" (p. 4) for the postcolonial Senegalese state. In turn, the increasing costs of maintaining political stability led to the economic crisis that erupted in full view in the early 1980s, where Boone concludes her analysis.

Boone places her analysis in the context of recent academic debates about state autonomy in the developing world, the social bases of state power, and the relationship between capital and state structures. Particularly interesting is her discussion of the state's highly ambivalent attitude toward indigenous capital. Again and again, Senegalese state elites have worked to undermine the emergence of an autonomous bourgeoisie, in contradistinction, Boone points out, to the Bonapartiste state of Marxist fame.

The book provides a trenchant contribution to these academic debates, which alone would make it highly recommended reading for anyone interested in state–society relations in the developing world. However, Boone's outstanding achievement rests in the empirical richness and care with which she documents these processes. Previous African studies in this area have either been inattentive to theoretical disputes, cavalier about evidence, or illiterate in economics. Boone makes judicious use of rich primary materials, notably from the colonial era, to promote a sophisticated theoretical argument. Her attention to economic logic makes the study *political economy* in the true sense of the term. I found particularly incisive the discussion of the textile sector since its origins in the colonial era. Descending to the level of individual firms, Boone expertly deconstructs the sector to reveal the social networks and interests being served by state policies. Fortunately, she never loses sight of the theoretical or comparative implications of her data, so that the argument never gets lost in the details.

Several minor flaws should be noted. The analysis ends in the early 1980s with the argument that the contradictions underlying the Senegalese regime prevented it from emerging as a developmental state and led it to an unstable impasse. During the 1980s, however, the regime parlayed tentative attempts at simultaneous political and economic reform into increasingly generous support from Western donors. Boone might have discussed whether and how access to international finance has increased the state's autonomy vis-à-vis various domestic interests. That the regime has persevered to this day suggests that Boone has underestimated its resourcefulness and adaptability. In addition, it forces us to reassess the earlier period, in particular, the extent to which the state in Senegal has been a prisoner of its social base. Boone underestimates the extent to which the absence of a developmental state reflects the ideological proclivities and personal interests of the state's elite, rather than only societal pressures. It is true that ISI policies served political interests, but they also conformed to the received wisdom of the entire policy community. Today, these policies remain largely sustainable thanks to donor finance, and individuals within the highest echelons of the remarkably stable political elite continue to derive material benefits from these arrangements. Why should they try to promote rapid economic development? Boone's answer to this question is not entirely persuasive.

The question is particularly pertinent given Senegal's limited resource base, which leads to a second criticism. In her discussion of policy outcomes, Boone pays insufficient attention to the economic constraints that have limited available choices. Agriculture is a good example: particularly insightful about the role of traditional rural elites and patronage on the failure of modernization, the book barely mentions the devastating impacts of persistent drought and increasing desertification or of sharp declines in the world price for groundnuts, Senegal's traditional export. Consideration of these nonpolitical constraints on development policy should lead to a more nuanced appreciation of the premium that Senegalese elites have put on political stability.

These criticisms notwithstanding, Boone has produced a splendid book. In its theoretical intelligence and empirical richness, it is one of the most important recent works on African political economy. It deserves to be widely read.

Michigan State University NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE

The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations. By Helene Carrere d'Encausse. New York: Basic Books, 1993. 292p. $24.00.

From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics. Edited by Gail W. Lapidus and Victor Zaslavsky. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 127p. $39.95 cloth, $12.95 paper.

The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR. Edited by Alexander Motyl. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 322p. $34.50.

Reading these three books completed in the fall of 1991 only reminds us how much has changed in less than two years and how quickly has faded the euphoria that the end of the Soviet Union would usher in a new era of world democracy and peace. As of Fall 1993, Soviet communism has been replaced not by liberal democracy but by an ideology of rampant ethnic tribalism. Autocracies as ruthlessly dictatorial as Soviet communism have already emerged in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, legitimating their rule on ethnic nationalism. In these and other Soviet successor states, tens of thousands have died from interethnic violence. Millions have become political refugees fleeing persecution by secessionist movements and even full-scale civil wars. Weak national governments and illegitimate policymaking structures commanding little political authority have sparked open warfare from Russia to Georgia and from Moldova to Tajikistan.

Ethnic nationalism throughout Central Eurasia has made the world a much more dangerous place than it even was with the armed threat of a nuclear Soviet Union. An arc of crisis extending along almost the entire perimeter of the 15 Soviet successor states threatens to flare into numerous regional wars before the end of this century. These are wars likely to dwarf even Bosnia–Herzegovina in the scale of casualties and atrocities and to escalate inevitably into wider conflicts with the intervention of border countries like Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan to advance their own geostrategic interests, defend various ethnic–religious minorities, and extend their political dominance. The *triumph* of the nations in the subtitle of Carrere d'Encausse's book has become, by 1993, a *revenge* of the nations. The USSR was replaced more by a state of chaos and anarchy than by 15 newly independent nation–states.

These somewhat dated retrospectives of recent history based on little original research can still be recommended to nonspecialists for their panoramic overviews of the cumulative factors leading to the rise of ethnonationalism in the former Soviet Union. They provide invaluable historical insights into the origins, in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1985–91, of the numerous ethnic conflicts alive in 1993. The authors in all three books contend that ethnic nationalism, more than any force, accounted for the demise of the Soviet Union and Soviet communism. Ethnic nationalism represented a series of spontaneous grassroots movements arising out of universal failures of the Soviet Union and communist rule but conditioned by unique historical circumstances and grievances among the various ethnic groups in different locales of the country.

All three books avoid polemics and the more simplistic one-dimensional view of Soviet ethnic policy and of Soviet leaders over generations as "nation-killers." With religious and racial hatreds inflaming the violence in Central Eurasia, the authors provide sober and balanced analyses of the complex causes for the many interethnic conflicts ringing the late Soviet Union. They eschew a tendency to blame one side or to attribute the outbreaks of interethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics solely to conspiracies hatched by hard-line pro-Unionist communists in Moscow. Dated as they are, all three books are also prescient in anticipating that ethnonationalism would remain the major irrational force to harness in building stable nations, creating political authority, and founding democratic governments after 1991 in the countries that arose out of the late Soviet Union.

The authors emphasize Soviet communism's foibles, failures, repressions, insensitivity, and contradictions in dealing with ethnic nationalities over seven decades. This was a system that attempted to assimilate over a hundred ethnic nationalities through modernization while encouraging them to retain their ethnic identities through a federation based nominally on ethnic self-determination. Ethnic self-determination was an improvisation and pragmatic accommodation forced on Lenin after 1917. Marxism–Leninism provided only the vaguest outlines of a policy to deal with a multiethnic country except for its admonition that ethnic consciousness was destined to wither away with communism. Soviet ethnic-nationality policy varied with the leader in power and actually constituted a hodgepodge of several often contradictory policies.

The improvisations, insensitivity, foibles, and failures in a context educating and modernizing these ethnic groups were fated to produce the very centrifugal force tearing the system and country apart. The catalyst was Gorbachev, who loosened authoritarian controls over the population after 1985 and encouraged citizen participation and civil society. The citizens rallied not in defense of Gorbachev's reforms of communism but in support of their own ethnic grievances. Civil society formed not around a democratic consensus and identification with a renewed Soviet Union but around the various and competing ethnic nationalities.

The two books edited by Gail Lapidus and Victor Zaslavsky and by Alexander Motyl overlap somewhat as a series of interpretive essays by noted Western and Russian social scientists and historians. They analyze ethnic nationality policy during the Soviet era; the impact and consequences of Gorbachev's reforms on ethnic nationalities after 1985; and the causes of challenges to Soviet rule in the Baltic region, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and others by 1990–91. The ethnic outbreaks and defiance of the Union spelled the end of any remaining central political authority and the de facto dismemberment of the country even before the abortive putsch in August 1991.

Three lengthy essays by Lapidus, Ronald Suny, and Victor Zaslavsky make up most of the Lapidus–Zaslavsky book. Ideal for graduate seminars, the three wide-ranging essays place the events of 1985–91 and the rise of ethnonationalism conceptually and historically in the broad evolution of the Soviet Union and the often contradictory phases of policies affecting ethnic nationalities. Lapidus singles out the impact of Gorbachev's "cognitive" and "political" liberation after 1985 on the explosion of ethnic discontent. Zaslavsky attributes particular importance to the rise of Russian ethnic national consciousness after 1985 in legitimating the demands for independence by all of the other nationalities. Suny, the eminent historian of twentieth-century Armenia, is perhaps the most successful of the three. Suny argues, contrary to conventional wisdom, that the Soviet era and policies actually, in many ways, heightened ethnic national identities and that ethnic discontent against the Soviet system in the conflicts between Abkhazians and Georgians and others antedated the Gorbachev era, appearing as anomic outbursts in the 1960s and 1970s. The book also includes briefer but insightful perspectives of ethnonationalism and the demise of the Soviet Union from two academic advisers to Boris Yeltsin: Leokadia Drobizheva and Galina Starovoiteva.

Motyl's contributors (notable Western Sovietologists like Walker Connor, John Hazard, and Theodore Friedgut) cover similar ground in well-focused chapters on specific dimensions of ethnic policies and the consequences of the changes brought about by Gorbachev after 1985. Amy Knight draws from her expertise to assess the role of the Soviet "political police" in regimenting ethnic nationalities over decades. Friedgut considers the change, after 1985, from mobilized participation to autonomous political behavior and diversity that quickly evolved into demands for ethnic independence. Ronald Hill points out the improvisational and contradictory nature of the communist ideology as a source of guidance for decades in dealing with Soviet ethnic nationalities.

Fortunately, except Motyl, Gregory Gleason, and Mark Beissinger, the contributors bypassed Motyl's secondary goal for the book, namely, to substantiate the failures of Western Sovietology in having underestimated or ignored the importance of ethnic nationalities as a political force in the former Soviet Union. No one would question Motyl's assertion that a post-Soviet scholarship must focus comparatively on the importance of ethnic nationalities and cultural pluralism in many countries of the world to understand the politics of these 15 countries. Yet his raising of the issue as an indictment of Western Sovietology and his insistence on defending the concept of totalitarianism to characterize the Soviet system even under Gorbachev seem completely out of place in what is otherwise an excellent series of individual essays.

His blanket condemnation echoes similar charges against the "Sovietology establishment" that others, notably Martin Malia and Robert Conquest, have recently sounded and that seem more akin to a settling of academic scores than serious methodological critiques. Motyl himself is best refuted by the insights on various Soviet ethnic nationalities provided over the past two decades by scholars like Ronald Suny (Armenians and Georgians), Nancy Lubin (Central Asians), Roman Solchanyk (Ukrainians), and even Motyl contributor Zvi Gitelman (Jews). As to the concept of totalitarianism, Ronald Suny points out in his essay in the Lapidus–Zaslavsky book that even Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his classic defense of totalitarianism in debate with Carl Friedrich, had failed to include nationalities among the "islands of separateness" potentially threatening to Soviet totalitarian rule (pp. 23–24).

French political scientist Helene Carrere d'Encausse is a member of the Sovietology establishment—lauded by Henry Kissinger and Richard Pipes—who can hardly be accused of having ignored Soviet ethnic nationalities. Ten years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, she had warned that Soviet ethnic nationalities would be a source of major turmoil and conflict in the Soviet system. In *The End of the Soviet Empire,* Carrere d'Encausse ambitiously attempts nothing less than to analyze and describe in great detail all of the major ethnic conflicts and sources of ethnic challenge to Soviet rule that arose from 1985 through the abortive August putsch of 1991. Her principle sources are the numerous reports in the Soviet media over this period of time, especially those appearing in the more liberal Soviet newspapers and journals.

The book is a highly readable overview of the events in 1985–91; but readers of similar books by Hedrick Smith, Stephen White, Roman Nachaylo and Victor Swoboda, Geoffrey Hosking, David Remnick, and others will find much very familiar. Subscribers to the weekly Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Institute *Report* in Munich would probably find the book even more disappointing in not providing anything original in its interpretation of the events or the factors surrounding the explosion of ethnic conflicts. The book is an excellent descriptive and historical account but lacks any overarching conceptual framework or integrated explanation for the rise of ethnonationalism.

It is a little annoying that the translation includes numerous errors. The Nineteenth Party Conference in 1988 is repeatedly called the Twenty-Ninth; Anastas Mikoyan, rather than Andrei Gromyko, is cited as the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1985–88; Geidar Aliyev is termed the first "vice-president," instead of the first deputy prime minister; the chairman of the KGB is described as KGB "president"; Kazakhstan, with a population of only 17 million in a territory the size of India, is termed "populous"; and so forth.

A best-seller in France and an alternate selection of the History Book-of-the-Month Club in its English translation, the book was clearly intended to reach a wide lay audience and would be an ideal choice for undergraduate courses in Russian and Central Eurasian politics and government.

Iowa State University JOEL C. MOSES

Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe. By James F. Hollifield. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. 305p. $35.00.

What a good idea to present a political theory of immigration not based on strictly economic (Marxist or liberal) theory or on international relations theory! These theories are clearly and very well presented at the beginning of the book. Hollifield's demonstration is built and tested on the French and German immigration policies. Expanding the European examples of Germany and France to the United States, he tries to demonstrate that a mixture of political and economic liberalism explains immigration phenomena: the strength of the market explains why states are unable to control entries, and political liberalism explains the rise of civil rights granted to illegals and the difficulty to implement their deportation even when it has been legally decided.

The problem is that Hollifield bases his demonstration of the weakness of the states on the activity of institutions whose role in immigration policy (in France, CES or ONI) is very small or uses very debatable statistics. The state cannot be considered a whole. It is split, particularly in the immigration domain, between a huge number of departments or agencies, all of them pursuing particular and sometimes contradictory objectives.

Sometimes Hollifield seems to forget (but he is not the first or the only one) that only one category of immigration flows have really been stopped in the European countries he studies—those of non–European Community unskilled workers. Others categories are still authorized: European Community citizens, spouses of citizens, relatives of legal immigrants, political refugees and skilled and seasonal workers.

To prove the failure of the French state to stop immigrations, Hollifield produces inadequate statistics of categories whose rights to immigrate were never abolished. A comparison of immigration flows of permanent workers before and after 1974 would have showed a huge decrease, affecting also such authorized categories as families. But these effects (sometimes but not always those wanted by policymakers) depend on some national specificities, such as history, geographical situation, and means or organization of implementation. European global figures must be used cautiously. Otherwise, how is one to explain the fact that France registered 27,000 applications in 1992, as against 438,000 in Germany?

Hollifield's book swarms with ideas, and he has some good intuitions. He has a good perception of the national and specific cultural backgrounds of France and Germany; and he explains why Germany applied to the Turks a liberal and pluralist policy, which differs from France's assimilationist tendency. Nevertheless, its too rapid global theorization and conclusions prevent the author from accounting for the recent rise of the extreme Right and xenophobic attacks against foreigners.

The best part of the book, which makes a valuable contribution to the European academic debate, is that in which Hollifield demonstrates the power of undocumented aliens facing the law. Too often, academics have pointed to the contrary—their absence of rights vis-à-vis the state. In this field, Europe has not followed but anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court's *Plyler* v. *Doe* decision. In France, for example, a 1884 law decrees that children of undocumented aliens be admitted to public schools.

Finally, Hollifield asks interesting questions and provides some pertinent answers. But some historical mistakes and the unfinished construction of the whole show that his theoretical demonstration should be further refined. The book can then be considered an *essai*, in the double sense of a general point of view, with the positive effect of creating a debate and a first attempt that needs to be pursued further—in rugby, one would say "transformed."

Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris PATRICK WEIL

Latin America's Christian Democratic Parties: A Political Economy. By Edward A. Lynch. Westport: Praeger, 1993. 244p. $45.00.

Edward A. Lynch has uncovered an important and underexplored theme in his treatment of Christian Democracy in Latin America. His ambitious effort constitutes one of the few attempts to analyze one of contemporary Latin America's largest political movements from a comparative perspective. If for this reason alone, Lynch's is a singular and welcome contribution.

At the outset of his book, Lynch presents the reader with an interesting puzzle. Given its great promise in the 1960s, why has Christian Democracy consistently failed to gain greater popularity in Latin America? His answer: Christian Democracy has failed because it has neglected Catholic social teaching, its ideological heritage. Driven by short-term, pragmatic considerations of office, Latin American Christian Democratic parties have repeatedly ignored the teachings of the Church, preferring, instead, to imitate the statist economic policy prescriptions put forward by their rivals. Veering unpredictably to the right and the left, Christian Democratic parties have consequently taken a beating electorally.

Lynch begins his book with a discussion of Catholic social teaching, "the acknowledged forerunner of Christian Democracy." According to the author, the social teachings of the Catholic Church from Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891) until John Paul II's *Centesimus Annus* (1991) provide "a coherent, consistent, and comprehensive basis for creating and implementing economic and social policy" (p. xiv). The fundamental tenet of this teaching for the purposes of this analysis is that "families, private schools, churches, unions, professional organizations, and even sub-state political entities are all anterior to the state in authority, even if they are created after a particular state is established" (p. x). Therefore, "the political, economic, and social thought of the Catholic Church is anti-statist in its essentials" (p. xii). Any alternative interpretation of Catholic social teaching, such as Alfred Stepan's rather opposite view in *State and Society*, (1977), is "simply incorrect" (p. x).

Once finished with his portrayal of the unambiguously antistatist character of Catholic social philosophy, Lynch moves to a brief discussion of Christian Democracy in Western Europe, particularly in France, Italy, and Belgium. He traces Christian Democracy's fall from grace to the postwar period in Western Europe when Christian Democratic parties suddenly found themselves in power and consequently came to view state power, under their control, as a benign force. The same basic story repeated itself in Latin America: once Christian Democrats came to power, they abandoned Catholic social teaching and allowed the state under their tutelage to become the principal agent of social and economic change. Like their European counterparts, Latin American Christian Democrats decided that state power in friendly hands was no longer a threat. Using the power of the state, Christian Democratic governments proved to be as grossly interventionist as their rivals, violating the independence of key social groups (e.g., the family, private schools, and labor unions). Lynch goes on to argue, in separate chapters, that Latin American Christian Democrats thoughtlessly mimicked the intrusive state-centered policy prescriptions proposed by their political adversaries in three arenas: land reform, natural resource policy, and the role of the state in the overall management of the economy. Lynch concludes his book with an analysis of how well Latin American Christian Democrats have performed in the current environment of economic liberalization. Not surprisingly, he finds that the statist Christian Democrats have been left "completely unable to take advantage of the most significant political and social change in Latin America in the last 50 years" (p. 141). He looks at Christian Democratic parties first in Central America and then in South America and argues that recent electoral outcomes provide ample support for his hypothesis; that is, where Christian Democratic parties have unambiguously embraced Catholic social teaching (as in post-Pinochet Chile), the party has reaped rich electoral rewards. Where it has been ambivalent (as in Costa Rica recently), the party won but barely. Finally, where Christian Democrats continued to call for statist policy responses (as in El Salvador or Guatemala), they went down in defeat.

Lynch's rather sweeping analysis provides a useful beginning for further study into the phenomena of Latin American Christian Democracy. In addition, however, the book raises a number of questions. Much of the argument depends upon a relatively unidimensional interpretation of what might more usefully be seen as part of a much more complex and multidimensional

Church social teaching. For instance, it is perhaps overly facile to dismiss alternative interpretations of the centuries-long tradition of Catholic social philosophy as simply "incorrect." Interpretations such as Stepan's "organic statism" differ from Lynch's not necessarily because they are incorrect but because the Catholic tradition lends itself (contra Lynch) to multiple and sometimes competing interpretations. Stepan, Wiarda, and others derive a "profoundly statist" view of Catholic social thought not principally from Aristotle (as Lynch claims) but from the foundational thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thomist philosophy became embedded, from the start, within the social, political, and economic institutions that developed in Latin America; and its impact has been even more pervasive than the tradition of Catholic social teaching since *Rerum Novarum*. To ignore the historical impact of St. Thomas on the one hand and, on the other, to overlook social teachings emanating from contemporary Latin American Episcopal Conferences (e.g., Medellín, Puebla, Santo Domingo) or, for that matter, national episcopal conferences, suggests that Lynch has relied on an overly narrow understanding of Church social teaching. As a result, his emphasis on private property and initiative and the inviolability of certain independent social groups could usefully be balanced by more attention to issues of equity and social justice, more the focus of recent Latin American Church teaching. I do not wish to imply that Lynch's interpretation of Catholic social teaching is in error but, rather, that his is not the only valid interpretation.

Nor should Catholic social teaching necessarily be presented as the only legitimate source of inspiration for Christian Democratic parties. While Lynch is surely correct that Catholic social teaching provided the initial inspiration for the Social Christian movement, it does not follow that the Church will forevermore be the only possible source of public policy for Christian Democrats. For example, Christian Democratic thinking on economic policy was profoundly and appropriately affected by the work of Raúl Prebish and economists at CEPAL in the 1940s and 1950s (as was the Latin American Catholic Church itself, later, at Medellín and Puebla). The state-centered development matrix that emerged from this context need not be viewed as simply an errant detour or a hopeless "waste of time" (p. 182) but, rather, should be viewed as an important and legitimate adaptation of economic policy to the developmental challenges of the times. Indeed, many have argued quite persuasively that the decades of institution building that accompanied state-centered economic policies in most of Latin America from the 1930s onward was a necessary prelude in order to endow state institutions with the capacity to pursue coherent policies of economic liberalization in the 1980s.

At every opportunity, the author points out the calamitous effects of state intervention in the economy, namely, rotund policy failures combined with party identity loss and electoral hemorrhage. Yet according to Lynch, Christian Democrats around the world cannot wait to make the same mistake all over again. Indeed, he presents his case so consistently that the reader is left to wonder, Why are Christian Democratic politicians so stupid? Lynch pins the blame on Christian Democratic "pragmatism" but then points out repeatedly that their pragmatism was utterly unpragmatic, consistently producing both policy failure and electoral failure. Unless we postulate that Christian Democratic politicians are quite dumb, we need to look beyond pragmatism as a motivating factor for policy choice. Very crucially, politicians and policymakers, most of the time, are not confronted with infinite policy options to chose from when they attempt to formulate policy. In order to understand their actions, we need to understand the structure of choice that Christian Democratic policymakers faced in most Latin American countries throughout the period of state-led development. What is viewed as mere "pragmatism" can, in fact, be seen as the practice of politics, the art of the possible.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of Lynch's work is its almost entirely descriptive character. There is no sustained attempt to explain why some Christian Democratic parties sometimes eschew pragmatism and maintain their fidelity to the Catholic social doctrine (as they apparently did in Belgium and in post-Pinochet Chile), while most parties do not. Why did Venezuela's COPEI craft a more faithful and more successful agrarian reform than the PDC in Chile or El Salvador? What shaped their respective choices? Missing from the discussion, for example, is some appreciation of how the structure of choice available to policymakers was radically altered in the late 1980s by the collapse of international Leninism and the resulting change in the role of the state. In place of explanation, the author often engages in disquieting counterfactual reasoning, always with the same underlying message: if only Latin American Christian Democracy had retained the movement's commitment, it could have become a genuine alternative to the right and left statism that have plagued the continent. Such an alternative would have had a broad and loyal constituency among Latin Americans left out by statist, insider politics (p. 48). The problem is, of course, that such statements are nearly impossible to falsify.

The evidence for Lynch's central claim that Christian Democratic electoral success (and failure) is highly correlated with its fidelity (or lack thereof) to Catholic social teaching is somewhat thin. His argument often presumes that the predominant cleavage underlying electoral politics in the region hinges on differences with regard to economic policy. Thus, he claims that the electoral success of Patricio Aylwin's Concertation government in 1989 in Chile was due to Aylwin's fidelity to Catholic social doctrine in economic policymaking, ignoring the key role of other, more salient issues, like the ongoing struggle against Pinochet and the authoritarian regime. Similarly, he attributes the loss of the Christian Democrats in El Salvador in 1988 to their betrayal of Catholic ideological roots, discounting popular dissatisfaction with the civil war. Lynch's claim that Alberto Fujimori's "Cambio '90" victory in the 1990 elections resulted from his adherence to Catholic social teaching even though the Catholic Church publicly supported his opponent ratifies the impression that the author's interpretation of the social teachings cannot be the only one.

Looking to the future, there is much to suggest that Edward A. Lynch is correct in arguing that Latin American Christian Democracy faces a watershed in how it responds in different national contexts to the contemporary challenge of economic liberalization sweeping the continent. Lynch's contribution, therefore, may prove to be timely reading for Latin American scholars and economic policymakers. Whether Christian Democrat or other, readers familiar with Latin America will most likely find this work lively reading.

University of Notre Dame TIMOTHY R. SCULLY

Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective. Edited by Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. 357p. $42.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

This volume presents some of the recent research emanating from the increasingly prominent Hellen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. While much has been written of late on the issue of democratization, the approach here has two advantages over many of its competitors. First, it is tightly focused geographically, confining itself almost entirely to South American cases. Some chapters focus on one country, such as Frances Hagopian's study of Brazil, others focus on a cluster of countries, such as Catherine Conaghan's study of Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, while still others range more broadly throughout South America. Second, and more importantly, the authors all concern themselves with the same theme, namely what the editors term "the second transition to democracy." In the first transition, authoritarian rule breaks down and governments are elected by universal suffrage and under conditions of respect for civil liberties. The second transition is the process by which these elected governments are consolidated. The book then, as the title states, is a study of the process of democratic consolidation. The term takes on a clearer, more operational definition in the excellent chapter by Adam Przeworski, in which he uses the term "self-sustaining democracy," a developmental stage in which all sides have agreed to accept the inherent uncertainty of electoral contests and abide by their outcomes. Self-sustaining democracies are ones in which opposition parties have a realistic chance of gaining office, policy changes can be affected by the victors and the military is controlled by the civilians.

An even broader definition of consolidation is provided toward the end of Guillermo O'Donnell's insightful introductory chapter. By this definition, a consolidated democracy will also be one in which democratic practices extend beyond political life and into social relations more generally. This perspective alerts us to the possible difficulties that consolidating democracies may face if democratic practices do not spill over into social life beyond politics. From this perspective, Japanese democracy would appear to be safe from decay since, as we understand it, consensual democracy within the work place is so central a component of industrial success in that country. More worrisome might be the U.S. model, in which corporations operate along vertical lines of authority and command, and in which work place democracy is feared as "creeping socialism." One could make the same critique of labor union organization and even university organization in this country. To understand more clearly the implications of O'Donnell's thesis, much more work needs to be done on the connections between democratic practices in the home and on the job, on the one hand, and those practices central to the managing of the political system, on the other.

A repeated theme in the volume is the importance of the development of a system of beliefs and behaviors that support democracy. Yet the book reverses the order of causation normally utilized by those who adhere to the "civic culture" thesis. O'Donnell explicitly stands on its head Inglehart's notion of political culture, by persuasively arguing that democratic beliefs emerge from democratic practices in societies in which authoritarian elites were in control of key political positions. O'Donnell states that if democratic beliefs were a prerequisite to the emergence of democratic systems, ". . . then no democracy would ever have emerged anywhere in the world; in no known case does there appear to have been a majority of democrats before the advent of political democracy" (pp. 91–92). J. Samuel Valenzuela, in his thoughtful chapter ranging beyond South America to include cases in Europe and Asia, also defines the achievement of consolidated democracy as in part being that point at which there is widespread belief that non-electoral politics is illegitimate.

The papers prepared for this volume were written over a span of several years, the earliest having been written in 1987. Each presents a hopeful perspective, noting with satisfaction the number of years that democratic government has ruled in a particular country, or the number of times democratic elections have occurred. Yet every chapter places great emphasis on the things that could go wrong and the distance that South American nations must travel in order for democracy there to become truly consolidated. Conaghan's chapter shows in great detail that in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, electorally democratic systems engage in systematic exclusionary policy making that has left domestic capitalists uncommitted to the process. We should take a lesson from Felipe Agüero's perceptive chapter on the role of the military in the democratization process, which begins by taking note that there had not been a single case of reversal of democratization in South America. Since his chapter was written, Peruvian democracy has been extinguished by an *auto-golpe*, there have been repeated attempts to overthrow the government in Venezuela, and civilian rule was briefly halted in Guatemala by an unsuccessful presidential coup.

It is always risky to criticize scholars for errors of omission, especially in a volume as comprehensive as this one, but the absence of a detailed treatment of Venezuela, the oldest extant democracy in South America, is problematic. Many readers also would be happier with the volume if more of the chapters contained the detailed election data that greatly enrich the Hagopian chapter on Brazil.

The book concludes with an able summary by Scott Mainwaring. He takes careful note of the disagreements in the volume, ranging from the definitional, through the role of elites versus masses, the problem of legitimacy, and the varying modes of democratization. Many will conclude that as a profession, political science was not successful in being able to predict the rapid expansion of democracy in the world and has yet to fully understand why the first transition occurred. This volume gives us many critical signposts to follow in attempting to predict the course of the second transition, the one to stable democracy. Unfortunately, we are still far from a comprehensive theory of transition and consolidation.

University of Pittsburgh MITCHELL A. SELIGSON

Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR. Edited by Alexander J. Motyl. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 284p. $45.00.

The unraveling of the Soviet system as a consequence of *perestroika* and the transformation of the 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union into independent states was largely unanticipated by scholars and policymakers alike. In Moscow, as in the West, the failure to anticipate how political and economic liberalization would ignite the "national question" left analysts, as well as political leaders, unprepared for the explosion of ethnopolitical mobilization that would ultimately undermine Gorbachev's attempt at reforms, as well as the Soviet state itself.

Curiously little of this unfolding drama—a drama of world-shaking significance—is captured in this volume of essays completed in late 1990. Prompted by dissatisfaction with the alleged failure of Sovietology to approach the study of the Soviet nationality question with sufficient theoretical imagination, the editor turned to a group of distinguished social scientists "unconstrained by Sovietological preconceptions and prejudices" to show the way. He holds out the expectation that by applying their impressive intellectual powers to an issue with which they were largely unfamiliar they would illuminate the subject in novel and fruitful ways, demonstrating how "conceptual rigor, comparative perspective and explanatory vision might be incorporated into the study of the Soviet Union and its nations." While a stellar cast of authors, including Donald Horowitz, John Armstrong, Crawford Young, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Ernest Gellner have contributed a valuable set of essays, the collection does not constitute a pathbreaking new departure. Few startling insights or promising new theoretical frameworks emerge from this collection, nor even does a deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics of the different but simultaneous patterns of ethnopolitical mobilization in the Soviet system. Even more surprising is the fact that virtually none of the authors, with the notable exception of Crawford Young, considers the breakup of the Soviet Union a serious possibility. Indeed, some of the contributions make it clear that if intimate familiarity with a particular region is no guarantee of wisdom, its absence can result in inapt comparisons if not grievous errors.

Part of the problem may stem from the very focus on ethnicity and ethnic mobilization, which understandably draws on the vocabulary and the metaphors used to examine cultural pluralism in multiethnic societies. Theories of collective protest or imperial decline might have better illuminated some of the broader trends of the late Gorbachev era. Perhaps most suggestive as a point of departure for analyzing the Soviet case is Crawford Young's effort to situate the problem of ethnic mobilization in a broader economic and political context with his observation that the critical precipitants of ethnic conflict are struggles over domination and resource distribution. Indeed, Gorbachev's political and economic reforms unleashed contestation over precisely these issues, creating the context in which ethnonational mobilization would become a powerful political force.

This volume would have been further enriched by a more extensive treatment of another fundamental question, namely, how to explain differences in the scope and pattern of ethnonational mobilization among different groups. Although Donald Horowitz emphasizes the importance of recognizing and examining different types of ethnic conflict, only two essays come directly to grips with the issue. First, the joint effort by Charles Furtado and Michael Hechter to apply a theory of group solidarity to explain the divergence of the Estonian and Ukrainian cases required modification, in an addendum, to account for their subsequent convergence; the addition of a Central Asian case study might have elicited a more revealing comparative analysis. Second, a provocative essay by David Laitin, Roger Petersen, and John Slocum using a comparative analysis of the dynamics of language policy to refute the idea that the Soviet Union was vulnerable to an "ethnic time bomb" is weakened by a series of questionable assumptions about the nature of the Soviet state. Whether in puzzling over the differences between the treatment of the Russian minority in Estonia by Estonions and of Spaniards in Catalonia by Catalonians or in considering who is organizing the Russians, the authors display insufficient awareness of the very different circumstances of the two migrations and of the role of the military–industrial complex in creating the Russian settlements in the Baltic.

Finally, one of the most distinctive features of Soviet strategy for managing the "nationality question"—the creation of ethnoterritorial units endowed with the formal attributes of statehood—and its impact on ethnic identity and mobilization escapes the attention of most contributors. Indeed, Ernest Gellner's otherwise perceptive essay surely errs in asserting that modern ethnic feeling does not require for its manifestation any preexisting institutions and springs from shared culture in a "structureless mass anonymous society." The fact that ethnic mobilization in the USSR occurred most readily among those groups possessing the array of institutions conferred by republic status and especially among those which had some prior and recent experience of independent statehood (e.g., the Baltic states and Western Ukraine) would appear to challenge that assertion.

Paradoxically, some of these essays may have greater relevance to the dilemmas of state building and ethnic conflict in post-Soviet Russia and other newly independent states, which more closely resemble the multiethnic societies familiar to comparativists.

University of California, Berkeley GAIL LAPIDUS

The Political Economy of Argentina: Power and Class since 1930. By Monica Peralta-Ramos. Boulder: Westview, 1992. 191p. $45.95.

Argentine Workers: Peronism and Contemporary Class Consciousness. By Peter Ranis. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992. 313p. $49.95.

Peter Ranis's book is a valuable contribution to the literatures on Argentine politics and on workers and their consciousness. The book examines Argentine workers' perceptions of a range of interesting questions, including work and labor relations; political parties, socialism, and private enterprise; and democracy and civil liberties.

The working class has been much discussed and often (especially in leftist circles) venerated. Although there is a reasonably abundant literature on the Argentine union movement, few quality works had been published on workers per se. This is true not only for Argentina, but for Latin America as a whole. Indeed, since political science has increasingly focused on elites and institutions, it has been true for other regions than Latin America.

In 1985–86, Ranis spent 13 months in Buenos Aires, where he conducted lengthy open interviews with 110 workers, randomly selected, from seven different unions. These interviews provide the empirical basis for Ranis's observations about workers' perceptions and consciousness. Ranis works with two primary categories of workers—laborers and employees—and shows, not surprisingly, significant differences between them.

Ranis devotes a lengthy part of the book (pp. 17–88) to discussing needed contextual background, but the most interesting material focuses on the interview findings. Even those who have long followed Argentina will learn something new and find some surprises. Among many interesting tidbits are the widespread dissatisfaction with—and hostility toward—unions, the high degree of workers' support for the Radical party, the low degree of party activism, the strong prevalence of centrist political orientations, and the positive views of foreign companies. Workers rejected class-based parties as being too divisive, and a solid majority were receptive to the privatization of Argentina's many public firms. Most workers, especially laborers, saw poverty in terms of individual shortcomings, rather than systemic causes (p. 149). Among the most appalling findings was that 30% of the laborers and 18% of employees condoned the illegal kidnappings and executions committed by the military government of 1976–83 (p. 139). Among the most encouraging was the reasonably strong support for liberal democracy, notwithstanding the failures of the Alfonsín government in offering better economic conditions.

After presenting this portrait of the consciousness of Argentine workers, Ranis analyzes his findings in light of Marxist and socialist theory on class, capitalism, socialism, and related questions. Not surprisingly, Marx and his followers (except for revisionist Eduard Bernstein) do not hold up well. Ranis convincingly argues that workers share many values and ties with the well-off, that class does not form a unified or consistent basis for political action, that workers are not inexorably or even often opposed to capitalism, that workers want better opportunities within capitalism (rather than a revolutionary change), and that they are very dubious about socialism. The discussions about Argentine workers are more interesting than the reflections on Marxist and socialist theory, which are not particularly new.

In the penultimate chapter, Ranis discusses labor's response to the orthodox, private-market-oriented economic program of Peronist president Carlos Menem (1989 to present). Interestingly (and contrary to what one would expect on the basis of "collective action" problems), Ranis claims that most unions and workers have supported measures that resulted in increases in unemployment and public sector layoffs and in increasingly regressive income distribution.

Ranis evinces sympathy and empathy for workers, yet he avoids romanticizing them. The reader senses that many findings surprised the author and pushed him to rethink some of his own initial assumptions not only about workers but also about capitalism, socialism, and democracy.

Although the merits of this book outweigh its shortcomings, some of Ranis's interpretations are debatable. Ranis carefully situates his subjects in historical and political context; but occasionally, he is too sanguine about how much one can *generally* infer from interviews conducted at a given point in time. For example, to a greater degree than he acknowledges, the large number of workers who sympathized with the Radical party was influenced by the moment when he did his interviews: the radicals were then enjoying greater prestige than has been usual over the past half-century, while the Peronists were at their nadir.

Ranis argues that most workers are truly committed to democracy; and in so doing, he usefully points to democratic proclivities in a working class often characterized as authoritarian in the past. Yet the facts that 20% of his sample stated that Argentines should have less freedom than they do (p. 163), that most workers agreed that some social groups might take advantage of too much freedom (p. 162), and that only 68% preferred democracy as a form of government (p. 152) suggest that adherance to democracy was far from uniform as of 1985–86. At times, Ranis excessively praises Peronism, glossing over its authoritarian character, as well as the deleterious impact of Peronist economic policies. He overstates the democratic character and consequences of the current government of Carlos Menem. The empirical basis for his claims regarding workers' reactions to Menem (new interviews in 1990 with eight of those who were interviewed in 1985–86) is not as compelling as that for his observations on the Alfonsín period. But these are minor quibbles with a fine book.

Like Ranis, Peralta-Ramos is an experienced analyst of Argentine politics; and she, too, uses class as a central category. But in other respects, these books diverge. Peralta-Ramos examines Argentina's political and economic developments since 1930 in light of class relations. The book focuses on Argentina's difficulties in achieving democracy and promoting development, particularly in terms of that country's class relations. The second half of the book, which provides an analysis of the 1983–90 period, is the more useful. In general, her original research contribution is limited; and the empirical evidence for some assertions is thin, especially for the 1930–83 years. Peralta-Ramos sees economic policy as being determined by the need for capital accumulation. Although there can be no doubt of the need for capital accumulation in capitalist societies (or, for that matter, any other societies that want to promote economic growth), the way in which this need drives economic policy is more complex than what is presented here.

University of Notre Dame SCOTT MAINWARING

The Limits of Social Democracy: Investment Politics in Sweden. By Jonas Pontusson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 261p. $28.50.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the efforts of a handful of left-wing Swedish intellectuals and their talented allies in Britain and North America revitalized the study of parliamentary socialism. Against the currents of both pluralism (for which class politics was a non sequitur) and neo-Marxism (for which social democracy was a sham), these scholars perceived the contemporary radicalization of the Swedish Social Democratic party (SAP) as signaling its long-awaited maturation. Bold new legislative initiatives to democratize the management of firms and collectivize control of investment promised to move social democracy beyond the limits of party politics and redistributive policies, into the economic arena and a direct attack on the mainsprings of capitalist power.

Ten years ago, Jonas Pontusson, then a graduate student at Berkeley, launched a trenchant attack on these optimists in the pages of the *New Left Review*. Pontusson pointed out that changes in global economic conditions and attendant economic restructuring had altered the material conditions for the pursuit of the social democratic program in ways that the optimists, with their essentially voluntarist conception of political economy, were unable to see. Even if political creativity or will was a sufficient condition for reforming capitalism, there was not enough of it in Sweden to cross the threshold to radicalism. Moreover, Pontusson's ongoing research into how Sweden's existing mechanisms of public steering of private investment actually operated showed that in practice, they functioned very much in conformity with the criteria dominating private capital accumulation.

Despite his vindication by subsequent events, Pontusson's book, a retrospective on Swedish labor's multipronged "industrial policy offensive" of the 1970s, is much more than a victorious "I told you so." Pontusson is conscious of the fact that the empirical record is too untidy to warrant a one-dimensional postmortem. While the transition to socialism anticipated by optimists like Walter Korpi and John Stephens was thwarted, it is nevertheless true that for a time, the SAP's programmatic objectives were radicalized in ways that pessimists like Adam Przeworski regard as incompatible with the structural power of capital and the political dilemmas confronting social democrats. The record shows that the SAP indeed failed to achieve—or even seriously advocate—either a planned economy or the gradual collectivization of capital envisaged in the Meidner Plan. Nevertheless, during the long period of postwar Social Democratic government, the Swedish state did achieve a good deal of control over labor markets, within a regulatory framework in which organized labor was decidedly ascendant. Pontusson argues that these polar experiences should be seen as the ends of a continuum, with two other noteworthy forays into "production politics" (industrial policy proper and workers' participation in management) located somewhere in between. The task that Pontusson sets himself in *The Limits of Social Democracy* is to chronicle what happened to each one of these initiatives and to make analytical sense of the variations in the extent to which they actually succeeded in altering the power and practices of Swedish capitalism.

By focusing upon empirical variation, Pontusson moves us beyond simplistic debates over the "success" or "failure" of reformism. His analytical framework is equally nuanced. The structural power that comes from private ownership and control of investment capital is recognized, but so is the potential political potency for business of collective action and influence over the levers of public opinion. The organizational and political power of the labor complex is afforded due weight; but so are the imagination and determination of labor's leaders, internal cleavages between party and union elites, and the scope for conflicts of interest between workers in different occupations and sectors. The dynamics of state intervention into markets and production are similarly unpacked, with a distinction made between policymaking and policy implementation and due attention paid to how the institutionalized policy commitments of the past shape and limit options for the present. While none of these nuances is especially innovative by itself, Pontusson's contribution is to meld them together into a coherent perspective that preserves a prudent balance between interpretive parsimony and an empiricist demonstration that everything matters.

Six substantive chapters are sandwiched between the introduction and conclusion. Chapters 2–4 chart, in chronological order, the development of social democratic strategies and policies of economic intervention from the SAP's rise to power through the 1950s. The reader is familiarized with the key instruments of economic steering with which Swedish governments confronted the economic upheavals of the 1970s and beyond and with the challenges these upheavals posed for the existing mold of labor reformism. Chapters 5–7 chart both the content and the fate of the three policy "offensives" that represented labor's responses to these challenges: (1) initiatives during the 1968–73 period aimed at facilitating "selective state intervention in the restructuring of capital at the level of firms and industrial sectors" (p. 127), an agenda that failed; (2) the campaign for industrial democracy mounted by the LO (peak organization of blue-collar unions) in the 1970s, a genuine challenge to "managerial prerogatives" that resulted in some heavily circumscribed moves in the direction of codetermination; and (3) the 1971 plan gradually to collectivize share ownership of large and profitable private corporations, the brainchild of a committee led by LO economist Rudolf Meidner, which was enacted in very watered-down form in 1983.

These six chapters are full of meaty information and perceptive observation. In spanning both long-term historical developments and the multiple targets of the 1970s reform spurt, the book has enormous value simply for having furnished the factual record, hitherto largely inaccessible except to Swedish readers and, even for them, fragmented among multiple sources. But beyond this, the rationale for such a wide and deep account is, of course, analytical and political, as a test of *the* limits of social democracy. Pontusson's praiseworthy attempt to sift the evidence by pitting multiple explanatory factors against multiple empirical cases falls short of yielding a clear explanatory hierarchy. What does emerge rather clearly is that Swedish social democracy went about as far as it could in the 1930s, bequeathing a legacy that was expanded and consolidated in postwar reforms but has never really advanced into the realm of "allocative investment decisions." The most interventionist measure of the postwar period—active labor-market policy—worked for a long time because, in conjunction with "wage solidarity" and other measures, it promoted the mobility of both capital and labor on terms that were advantageous to the leading sectors of private industry. The strengths of this type of compromise are also its limitations: it was founded on (contingent) mutual interest, not fundamental alterations to the workings of the capitalist economy; and it was advantageous to both workers and business in certain sectors, rather than to a labor class, in opposition to a capitalist class.

Commenting, in a similar vein, on the fate of later attempts at reforming industrial policy and industrial relations, Pontusson explicitly observes that "in both cases labor's reformist ambitions were implemented through and thwarted or deflected by the politics of class compromise" (p. 184). This observation matches well with others, such as the observation that the progress of so-called pension-fund socialism was stymied by the social democrats' concern to maintain business confidence and their long-standing commitment to allocating capital through efficient markets (p. 93). This is not to say that changes in LO and SAP policies and their origins in altering economic and political circumstances are not without interest. Moreover, the comparative framework of the study does yield some important insights. For instance, it turns out that codetermination was blocked primarily at the point of implementation, while collective shareholding ran aground already at the legislative stage. Whereas the common interests of blue- and white-collar labor and relatively mild opposition from organized business permitted codetermination to become law, reformism was stymied by its own pretensions in the case of the Meidner Plan, which "posed a more direct threat to the systemic interests of business" (p. 229). Different aspects of the same systemic power also hampered labor's adoption of a coherent "alternative model of development" that could have guided its struggle for a farther-reaching industrial policy.

Yet despite the influence of business on labor's strategic thinking and its capacities for mass mobilization and despite the necessity for reformists to offer positive incentives to at least some sectors of business, Pontusson refuses to fall back on a one-dimensional explanation (or political defeatism): "The systemic power of business can be curtailed through legislation, and the politics of legislation contains an important element of indeterminacy" (p. 236)—a judicious conclusion to an important study.

Hebrew University Michael Shalev

Labour and the Political Economy in Israel. By Michael Shalev. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 400p. $69.00.

Many Israelis mourn the collapse of their country's idealism. Once, their national enterprise was characterized by the determination to create not only a Jewish state but also a just society. Now political leaders proclaim their allegiance to economic enrichment and to winning the battle for global competitive advantage. Labor Zionism once provided the vision and social energy to revitalize a culture, resettle a country, and defend its borders. This vision no longer grips the imagination of Israelis, nor is social change central to the political agenda. But Labor acquired significance in Israel's history not simply as the banner of the vanguard but also because of its political dominance. The passing of the old guard and of its idealism has not only occasioned distress, it has also provoked a reexamination of Israel's power structure. How close a correspondence were actions to creed? Did workers control the instruments of political power? Did powerful institutions truly represent workers' interests? Or was the effort to establish a vigorous egalitarian society marred by the external challenges to Israel's existence and survival? In his masterful study, *Labour and the Political Economy in Israel,* Michael Shalev addresses these questions from the perspective of political economy. Not too long ago, the questions that Shalev poses would have raised a storm of debate among scholars, with many likely to dismiss this kind of analysis as an attack on Israel's right to exist. Like many other serious students of Israeli society, Michael Shalev shows that Labor Zionist ideologies did not shape policies. What differentiates this book from other accounts are the reasons Shalev proffers for why the Labor Zionist elite structured society in one way and interpreted it in quite another.

Of utmost importance is the central premise out of which Shalev develops his analysis, namely, that Israel's Labor party is no longer assured of a commanding role in government because it pursued policies that weakened, rather than strengthened, its matrix of institutional supports—foremost among them the Histadrut, the union under whose rubric most workers in Israel are organized. The leaders of the major Israel Labor Zionist political parties (Mapai and the Israel Labor party) have had long and close relationships with their counterparts in the Histadrut. This relationship, Shalev argues, has elevated the institutional interests of party and union over the needs of workers.

In observing the weakening of the Histadrut and the Israel Labor party in recent decades, scholars have searched for signs of weakness in earlier periods. Shalev finds the source of this weakness in the Histadrut's role in Mandatory Palestine. The Histadrut demanded work for Jewish laborers and thus established a priority for pursuing national, over class, interests. This observation, by itself, is not remarkable. But Shalev insists that the national agenda became an essential element in the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Moreover, in Shalev's analysis, the subordination of class interests left its imprint on subsequent political configurations, ultimately constraining Histadrut options and strategies. In Mandatory Palestine, the exclusion of Palestinian Arab workers from Histadrut membership generated ample rewards accepted by the organization in adherence to the principle of "moving from class to nation." That stance joined the Histadrut's viability to the political interests of Mapai. In the transformed circumstances of sovereignty, when it became useful for Mapai to pursue policies consistent with the legal equality granted to Israeli Arabs, the Histadrut organized Arab workers but, as Shalev observes, also kept them in line by controlling access to employment.

This symbiotic institutional arrangement generated temporary advantages for political party and Histadrut in the context of full employment and a rapidly expanding economy but engendered serious damage during economic contractions. In prosperous times, the Histadrut had trouble controlling all its members. The Histadrut's integrating function was increasingly challenged by groups better able to extend their benefits on their own. In times of economic hardship, the coalition of labor and capital was held only by advancing policies that hurt workers. The extreme reliance of both industry and agriculture on government subsidies enabled the leadership to use allocations as an instrument of political control. Recessionary policies bolstered the Histadrut's waning control over labor, but only in the short run.

Eventually, they contributed to the organization's loss of legitimacy.

A sluggish economy took off in the aftermath of Israel's victory in the June War, in 1967. Israel's occupation of the conquered territories and its administrative control over a greatly enlarged Arab population permitted its political leaders to resume their older orientation of providing subsidies to capital and creating jobs for workers. Economic expansion (interrupted for half a decade) resumed but was soon sapped by the costs of continued war and dramatic alterations in world market forces. Israel's labor movement institutions could never fully satisfy its several constituencies. And without substantial economic growth, the labor movement could no longer function as an effective electoral instrument. Failing to mobilize enough votes in the general election of 1977, the Labor party lost its dominant position in the government and its hegemony over the Histadrut.

Labour and the Political Economy in Israel is an interpretive essay, rather than a conventional history; and the book's thesis is complex and controversial. It will draw fire from many specialists who will find some events and developments difficult to fit into an argument that ties economics and politics so tightly together. Readers who are searching for an introductory text on Israeli politics may find the thesis difficult to understand or appreciate. But for those well versed in the conventional interpretations, this book is essential reading. Although amendments, even corrections, may be offered to some aspects of the analysis, Shalev's framework for understanding Israeli political and economic development is likely to retain its vitality.

Smith College Donna Robinson Divine

Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. By Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 316p. $54.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Since the mid-1970s, dozens of countries have become democratic, some for the first time and some after an authoritarian interlude of long or short duration. In each of these countries, many choices about the large and small details of the institutional form democracy would take had to be made. In response to these events, scholars have renewed their interest in the consequences of different institutional choices for representativeness, economic policy performance, and political stability, to name some of the most important. This book, by Matthew Shugart and John Carey, makes an important contribution to the debates over the effects of different political institutions.

It takes issue with an idea that has almost achieved the status of stylized fact: the idea that parliamentary systems are inherently more stable than presidential systems. The two main arguments that support this idea are that parliamentarism prevents the intense conflict that can arise between the executive and the legislature in presidential systems, and that parliamentarism provides a mechanism for removing unsuccessful governments without overturning the regime. Since seemingly unresolveable conflict between the president and congress as well as government failure in the economy have played key roles in many democratic breakdowns, these arguments have strong initial plausibility.

Shugart and Carey do not challenge these arguments head on. Instead, they first show empirical evidence that presidential systems have not broken down more frequently than parliamentary systems. Most of the remainder of book is taken up with demonstrating the enormous institutional variety that occurs in what we commonly call presidential systems, and how different institutional details interact to affect party fragmentation and the likelihood of executive-legislative conflict, factors that in turn affect the quality of government and likelihood of political stability.

In their analysis of the frequency of breakdowns in presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems, Shugart and Carey show that for the twentieth century as a whole, about the same number have occurred in each type of system. Most breakdowns of presidential systems happened after World War II, and they were especially likely in Latin America (the region with the highest incidence of presidential democracies). Most breakdowns of parliamentary systems occurred either in Europe before World War II or in Britain's former colonies (the two groups with a high incidence of parliamentarism). The predominance of presidential systems among more recent breakdowns seems to account for the general perception that presidential regimes are more fragile. Since Shugart and Carey do not provide denominators (that is, they tell us that 22 parliamentary systems have broken down, but they do not tell us how many parliamentary systems over how many years there have been altogether), we cannot tell which kind of system is really more unstable. But one conclusion emerges straightforwardly from their data: newer democracies are more likely to suffer breakdowns than older ones, so whichever form is currently more popular among emerging democracies will appear to be less resilient. During recent decades presidentialism has attracted most adherents and, consequently, more breakdowns have occurred in presidential systems.

Most of the book is devoted to explorations of the effects of institutional variations within presidential systems. Prominent among these is the discussion of the effects of the timing of legislative elections on party fragmentation and the likelihood of conflict between the president and the legislature. Shugart and Carey show convincingly that non-concurrent elections increase party fragmentation. They also show that concurrent and especially honeymoon (that is, within a year of the presidential vote) congressional elections increase the probability that the president will face a supportive legislature; that midterm elections on average lead to a substantial reduction in legislative support for the president; and that a congressional election schedule different from that for the president increases the likelihood of divided government and, consequently, of conflict between the branches of government and immobilism.

Since intense conflict between a president from one party and a legislature dominated by others was a major cause of the political crisis and economic chaos that precipitated military interventions in several countries during the 1960s and 1970s, these conclusions about the effects of the timing of elections have obvious implications for political stability. Timing helps explain the instability of some presidential systems without implicating presidentialism per se. Here and elsewhere, the authors show that features characteristic of some presidential systems contribute to instability, but that presidential systems that lack these institutional features are at least as stable as parliamentary regimes.

Not all of the authors' arguments are as persuasive as the one about the timing of elections, however. The claim that the combination of weak presidents and strong parties increases democratic stability seems especially problematic. It rests on an arbitrary definition of democratic "success" as absence of breakdown since the constitutional or legal establishment of a particular system. This definition leads to counting Venezuela, democratic from 1958 to a 1990 cut-off point (though as of this writing seriously threatened by a coup), as more stably democratic than Chile or Uruguay, democratic according to the authors' unrestrictive definition from about 1900 to 1973. It is really not obvious that Venezuela's 32 years should count as greater stability than Chile and Uruguay's approximately 70 years. Nor is it obvious that Venezuela's 32 years should count as less, since Venezuela may remain democratic for the rest of human existence.

If instead of using the authors' no breakdown rule to define successful stability, we define it as, say, 30 or more years of uninterrupted democracy, we find little difference between cases with strong presidents and weak parties and cases with weak presidents and strong parties. Among developing countries, there are three stable democracies in the strong presidents-weak parties category (Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay) and three (Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic) that have, according to Shugart and Carey, weak presidents and strong parties. In addition, in each category there are some conspicuously unstable countries, some that most would call authoritarian, and a substantial number that have not been democratic long enough to allow a judgment.

Most readers of this book will probably disagree with some of the arguments, and country specialists will find some of the interpretations odd. I suspect, for example, that most Venezuelan specialists will be surprised to find the Venezuelan president called weak, though they may acknowledge that he has few formal legislative powers. Nevertheless, this is a tremendously useful and thought provoking book. No one who reads it will see the debate over parliamentarism versus presidentialism in the same light again. It contains an impressive amount of detail about political institutions in a remarkably large number of countries. Most important, it takes a serious look at the effects of a number of institutional variations that have not been treated carefully by other analysts, and reaches conclusions that go considerably beyond the classic works on the subject.

University of California, Los Angeles BARBARA GEDDES

The Political Economy of Foreign Investment in Mexico: Nationalism, Liberalism, and Constraints on Choice. By Van R. Whiting, Jr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 313p. $55.00.

Van Whiting seeks to illuminate the past two difficult decades in Mexico, the dynamics of foreign investment in industrializing countries, the determinants of policy choices by governments in newly industrializing countries, and the character of adequate explanation of social action. To accomplish this, he draws on case study research by a variety of scholars, interviews he has conducted with corporate and government officials, and a diverse array of theoretical works.

Whiting is interested in exploring how effectively Mexico (or any industrializing country) can steer or regulate foreign investment. After an initial chapter that announces his main concerns, he commences his argument with a demonstration that Mexico has a strong state: only in such a circumstance could failures of state action credibly be laid to structural constraints rooted in the organization of the world economy. He convincingly shows that Mexico has not only a strong state but a "resilient" regime, one that can absorb shocks but persist nevertheless (p. 43).

There follow four chapters providing a comprehensive account of the varied and changing strategies of foreign investment regulation in Mexico during the 1970s and 1980s: import substitution; promotion of manufactured exports; restrictions on foreign ownership; and regulations concerning technology, patents, and trademarks. Case studies of the successes and failures of state efforts to regulate foreign investment in automobiles, computers, and food processing comprise the next three chapters. A final chapter draws the various stands of the argument back together.

For most of the century, Whiting chronicles, a nationalist "metapreference" guided Mexican government policy, which became steadily more sophisticated and differentiated. The 1970s saw a marked increase in initiatives directed toward foreign investment; and by the end of 1980s, a liberal "metapreference" had come to hold the upper hand. Mexican officials had dramatically reversed course to accept judgments of markets, especially internationally organized ones.

In part, Whiting attributes this shift to the failure of nationalist policies "not only by liberal standards but in terms of the very nationalist goals [the policies were] meant to achieve" (p. 53). Most interesting and most compelling here is Whiting's demonstration that Mexico had been unable to develop an adequate domestic capacity for innovation to break reliance on foreign-developed technology. He also outlines the failure of nationalist policy to mobilize adequate financing for development.

Were these failures inherent in nationalist policy? This would be more difficult to show; and on the whole, he does not show it. A similar issue arises in his case study of food processing. Whiting chronicles the ineffectiveness of government policy to contain foreign investment or to maintain competition in the sector. He concludes that "the failure of regulation to change structure helps explain the [subsequent] shift to liberalization" (p. 190). But his account of the failure shows that the government never took the steps that would have been most effective: How can he conclude that a more forceful and savvy policy would not have succeeded? Later, he acknowledges, "My bias is to assume informed choice rather than either irrational change or what Hirschman calls *akrasia*, weakness of will" (p. 227). In food processing, at least, weakness of will appears to be a more compelling hypothesis.

Even more important than failures of nationalist policy, Whiting attributes the overall shift from nationalism to liberalism in Mexican policy to recent changes in the structure of the world economy, particularly to the decline of U.S. hegemony and to internationalization and increasing competitiveness in a range of industrial sectors. This contention is announced early in the book but frontally engaged only at the very end (p. 239). In advancing it, he also means to sketch an explanation for the rise of "southern liberalism," that is, a similar shift in other countries (p. 147).

This is a strikingly novel argument, but he does not convincingly explain why increased international competition in many industries should encourage a shift to liberal policy. It is certainly credible that the internationalization of production has created niches that industrializing countries can occupy. But why does it not also give more bargaining leverage to the countries, like Mexico, with large domestic markets, abundant natural resources, and compliant labor?

Whiting does identify other factors that might also explain the shift from nationalism to liberalism: the sapping of all leverage in bargaining with foreign investors by the pressure of Mexico's severe debt predicament; the capture of the allegiance of Mexico's best and brightest by changing currents of international ideology (the resurgence of market dogma in the Reagan years; and the failure of Mexico's domestic bourgeoisie to sustain investment, thus constraining the government to rely more on direct foreign investment to provide exports and jobs. From the outset, he frames his presentation in terms of hypothesis testing; but he does not provide evidence why these factors should be seen as less important than changes in world industries.

In raising these issues, I mean principally to honor the book's considerable strengths. Whiting never wavers from pursuing large questions of fundamental importance. Any work addressing these issues would be similarly challenged because arguments about what might have happened are essentially contestable. In this regard, I particularly applaud his insisting that these questions are best addressed as ones involving both choice within constraints and the mobilization of power to transform structural constraints. He draws together, coherently, an immense amount of material. The book serves as a grand retrospective on two decades of research by others in several different traditions, and there are skillfully researched and important additions of his own across the broad fabric of his argument.

Finally, Whiting well marks the most important present issue regarding Mexican public policy, now guided by the liberal "metapreference": "The opportunity resulting from the crisis of the 1980s was for Mexico to become a global player, an intermediate power, in an interdependent world economy. The danger of the liberal vision is the failure to see within, to understand the implications of the liberal program for those marginalized by the crisis" (p. 236).

Oregon State University DOUGLAS C. BENNETT

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after 1992. Edited by William James Adams. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. 388p. $39.95.

Singular Europe is a collection of articles dealing with issues of European Community integration that arose out of a series of seminars hosted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1991. The collection includes articles on a variety of topics by 14 different European and American authors drawn primarily from law, economics, business, and international relations. The authors have provided solid analyses of the developments leading up to Project 1992, as well as explorations of the problems and likely trajectories of the policy agenda for the next decade. Despite the innumerable political, social, and economic changes that have occurred in just the short time since the articles were first written, the book remains timely and relevant to current political science scholarship concerned with such wide-ranging topics as democratic theory and federalism, regulatory policy, social welfare, and foreign policy. Even though the book encompasses a wide range of disciplines, perspectives, and substantive foci, the articles in the book are accessible to the nonexpert in a particular field or policy specialization.

William James Adams, the editor of the volume, has thoughtfully organized the book into three parts, each with a useful introduction. In each introduction, he attempts to tie together the articles in the part by relating them to a basic question or two; and he offers brief commentary on key arguments to follow. Although recognizing that Project 1992 was not intended to eliminate social, economic, and regional variations among member countries, part 1 nevertheless addresses questions about what more needs to be done on the path to integration. It contains articles by Joseph Weiler on political union and problems of democratic deficit and legitimacy, Ernst-J. Mestmäcker on German unification and its effect on the development of the community, Tommasò Padoa-Schioppa on the necessity for monetary (though not fiscal) union, Frédéric Jenny on mergers and the nature and adequacy of competition policy, and Stephan Leibfried on the extent of social policy and the need for a more developed welfare state. Each of these pieces makes excellent contributions to furthering understanding of the extent of integration to date and many of the problems which will need to be solved in the years to come. Especially noteworthy in part 1 is Weiler's cogent account of the nature of democratic deficits in the institutional arrangements of the EC and the importance of distinguishing these deficits from lack of political legitimacy. He offers a note of caution about the ironic possibility of the EC's becoming a superstate, promoting nationalism when its historic roots lie in the attempt to solve the problems of excessive nationalism. In addition, the Leibfried article is noteworthy for its helpfulness in stretching one's thinking about the possible parameters of future EC social welfare policy by offering, for consideration, four possible schemes for the provision of social welfare (two incremental reforms and two much more major reforms) that could be developed over the next decade.

Next, part 2 addresses itself to how far the EC, through new legislation, regulatory policies, and administrative actions, has succeeded in altering business behavior in the direction of a more competitive and pan-European marketplace. It includes articles by Alex Jacquemin on the increasing tendency, in restructuring and rationalizing efforts, toward mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures and the role of commission oversight in the area of competition; Bo Carlsson on the increasing tendency toward small business among most industrialized nations (including most of the EC) and its implications for community policy directed at small enterprises; Gunter Dufey on changes in financial markets both predating, and following from, Project 1992; Reinhard Ellger on the effects of EC legislation deregulating the telecommunications industry on firms in various telecommunications sectors; and Severin Borenstein on liberalizing air travel and the constraints posed by political, institutional, and market factors. The Ellger piece is particularly valuable for its extremely detailed examination of specific pieces of EC legislation and how they have been applied to specific firms in different countries. Especially interesting in this context is the discussion of the treatment of state-owned firms. Each of these articles in different ways helps to further understanding of how EC economic policies (especially regulatory policies) have been affecting, or are likely to affect, the behavior of the market. However, with the exception of the Carlsson article, part 2 is heavily weighted toward consideration of the knock-on effects of regulatory policies on business. There is almost no discussion of EC industrial policy initiatives, such as ESPRIT and EUREKA, or European Bank for Construction and Redevelopment involvement in regional policy.

Finally, the articles in part 3 address the relation of the EC to other nations, with a special focus on whether the EC is or is likely to become a "fortress Europe" protecting itself against outsiders. Part 3 contains articles by William Wallace on the changing international context in which the EC is coming to play far more powerful roles in trade negotiations and foreign policy than in the Cold War era; John D. Steinbruner and Susan L. Woodward on the need for both the United States and the EC to involve themselves more directly in Eastern Europe in the interests of promoting political and economic stability in the area, as well as world peace; John Jackson on the EC and its external commercial relations, with a primary focus on rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and problems with the United States; and Gary Saxonhouse on the failure of Trilateral commercial policy and EC trade relations with Japan. The articles in part 3 nicely round out the effort to get a picture of the distance that the EC has come and the distance it still has to go with respect to becoming a major world player, by moving away from the discussion of internal matters to examining some of the major external issues confronting the community. The Saxonhouse article differs from most of the rest of the articles in this volume by virtue of its quantitative rigor. He removes the discussion of barriers to trade on theke parts of the EC, the United States, and Japan from the realm of speculation and rhetoric to a neat empirical examination. He offers a sophisticated quantitative model for determining the extent of trade distortions among the EC, the United States, and Japan and argues that there is a discernible pattern of EC discrimination against Japan.

Not all of the pieces articulate with one another well enough to add up to a well-defined whole. Although authors occasionally speak *to* one another, for the most part, they do not. Because there is overlap in the topics and concerns of the articles, one finds oneself wishing sometimes for more dialogue, sometimes for just less repetition. The book might have been better pulled together by the inclusion of concluding chapters summarizing the articles in each part, which would have allowed the reader to perceive more readily what, if any, general points or themes had emerged in answer to the basic questions posed in each part. This is not, however, to ask for some overarching theory, either for the book or for its separate parts, that would serve to explain past developments and help to predict the future. The authors can be forgiven for neglecting grand-theory building not only because of the wide-ranging topics and disciplines covered in the book but also because most of the articles have presented excellent descriptive and empirical data and perceptive analysis that will help to provide a basis for subsequent theory building.

Besides providing a wide range of audiences with a number of very good analyses of the EC's move to integration, the book may also help many scholars overcome their recent fear of engaging in intellectual projects related to the EC. In the early run-up to 1992, political scientists and members of other disciplines made a mad dash to tackle the intellectual issues and problems involved in the movement toward greater European union. No sooner was the dash fully under way than events such as the reunification of Germany, the ratification of Maastricht, GATT battles, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia appeared to have engendered a crisis of rising expectations among scholars. So certain had political scientists been of the coming into being of a powerful new economic and governmental colossus that at the first signs of trouble, a disproportionate amount of pessimism set in. Political scientists have thus been increasingly reluctant to want to take on long-term EC work. This book stands as a good exemplar of the fact that if one poses fundamental questions and engages in thorough analysis, the staying power of the scholarship is likely to continue.

In short, this book contains well-written, accessible articles that will make it valuable for advanced students, as well as scholars. The articles contain a wealth of background information on the history and institutional machinery of the EC and on the intricacies of economic policies and foreign relations that will allow novices a chance to acquire a great deal of knowledge about this new governmental and economic order. At the same time, this is anything but a primer; scholars interested in the EC, as well as in many other areas of politics and economics, will find the book thought-provoking and quite helpful in their research endeavors.

Rutgers University, Newark CANDACE HETZNER

States and Provinces in the International Economy. Edited by Douglas M. Brown and Earl H. Fry. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1993. 247p. $24.95 paper.

Although federalism in Canada and the United States might seem an obvious topic for comparative research, it has not been a fashionable one in recent years. Canadians, preoccupied with Quebec nationalism and its challenge to the viability of the Canadian state, tend to regard their own federal system as *sui generis*. American scholars, apart from such notable exceptions as Samuel Beer and Danial Elazar, have implicitly and sometimes explicitly reduced federalism, under the less than stimulating rubric of "intergovernmental relations," to a sub-field of public administration. In both countries, furthermore, political science is so structured and organized as to create a fairly rigid boundary between the study of one's own government and the more exotic field of comparative politics.

Despite these obstacles, a Canadian-American Federalism Project has quietly proceeded for several years under the auspices of the Canadian Studies Program of the University of California at Berkeley. The present volume of essays, one of three that have resulted from the project, should interest students of international relations as well as those specializing in the domestic politics of either Canada or the United States. As the title suggests, it focuses mainly on the efforts of sub-national governments to attract foreign investment and gain access to foreign markets. However, their impact on non-economic aspects of foreign policy is also considered, particularly in the last two chapters.

Perhaps confirming the observations made in the first paragraph of this review, few if any of the chapters in this multi-authored book are truly comparative. Four American-authored chapters are devoted exclusively to the United States while three Canadian-authored chapters are devoted exclusively to Canada. In addition there is an introduction summarizing and comparing the findings of the various chapters, a theoretical chapter by Panayotis Soldatos (chapter 2, although it would have been more appropriately placed at the beginning of the book), and a case study by Martin Lubin of transborder regionalism in the northeastern corner of North America.

Efforts by sub-national governments to influence foreign policy, or to conduct their own, are not an entirely new phenomenon. (*The Foreign Relations of the Federal State* by Harold W. Stoke, a neglected classic of comparative government, was published more than 60 years ago.) Quebec conducted extensive relations with France and other francophone countries in the 1960s, to the dismay of the Canadian federal government. Nonetheless, the extensive involvement of North American subnational governments in the international economy is primarily a phenomenon of the last twenty years.

International interdependence is more of a popular cliche than an adequate explanation for this phenomenon. A better explanation is the relative decline of North American competitiveness vis-a-vis both Europe and East Asia, and the resulting scramble for jobs, investment, and markets. The end of the baby-boom prosperity that lasted for a generation after the Second World War also undermined the credibility of demand-oriented macroeconomic policy (which required strong central governments) and shifted attention towards supply-oriented microeconomic policy, which states and provinces could conduct more effectively than governments in Ottawa or Washington. In the 1980s, finally, the conservative governments of Reagan, Bush, and Mulroney were less inclined to resist the decentralizing trend than their predecessors.

The consequences of these developments are effectively described by Brown, Fry, and their collaborators. They include a proliferation of state and provincial offices overseas, not to mention provincial offices in the United States. Provincial governments were heavily involved in the Canadian side of the Canada-United States free trade negotiations. States and provinces have competed against one another to attract major investments, notably from Japanese automobile producers. Texas has sent observers to OPEC meetings and intervened, possibly to the detriment of U.S. interests, in the dispute between the United States and Europe over European restrictions on beef imports. State and provincial governments have boycotted imports from countries of which they disapprove, such as South African wines.

Even apart from Quebec nationalism, which is rather neglected in this collection of essays, some differences are apparent between the two countries. Municipal and local governments have much less autonomy within Canadian provinces than their counterparts within American states; in fact Canadian cities are prevented by law from offering direct financial incentives to investors. Canadian provinces orient their external activities towards the United States much more than American states orient theirs towards Canada. No American state has developed a "foreign office" as impressive as those of Quebec or even Alberta. On the other hand the provinces seem less inclined than the states to adopt political positions on such issues as nuclear disarmament, Northern Ireland, or the Middle East.

Generally speaking, the Canadian contributors to this volume regard the external activities of the provinces as beneficial, while the American contributors tend to have reservations about the desirability of state and local involvement in external relations. Most contributors of both nationalities seem to accept the inevitability of decentralized foreign policy, at least in the economic realm, although Kim Richard Nossal rightly warns against premature obituaries for the nation-state, in Canada or elsewhere.

In any event, the irreversibility of present trends should not be taken for granted. Since the manuscript was completed, Ontario has closed all of its external trade offices as an economy measure. The return of a Democratic administration in Washington, and now of a Liberal government in Ottawa, may lessen the tolerance for sub-national diplomacy on the part of both central governments. Whatever happens, however, this volume will remain a useful source of information on a significant aspect of the political economy of North America.

Brock University GARTH STEVENSON

The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism and Structural Realism. By Barry Buzan, Richard Little, and Charles Jones. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 267p. $40.00 cloth, $15.50 paper.

This is an impressive but also, in a way, a curious book. It is impressive because it represents one the most serious sustained theoretical efforts of the last few years in regard to the structural realist paradigm. It is curious because many a reader might raise the question why the authors, who are leading exponents of the British international relations school, bother (in the words Charles Jones himself) "to continue busily fitting a copper sheath to our man of war while the submarines slink by," that is, try to fix a research program at a time when the era of structuralist theory in the social sciences seems to come to an end.

These initial suspicions are further enhanced by the foil that the authors use to revive the interest in a structuralist theory of international relations. Given their interest in a theory of international *relations*, rather than merely of international politics, and given the mounting criticisms of the rigidities, inconsistencies, and rather limited explanatory power of the predominant Waltzian approach, one wonders why the authors have chosen the *Theory of International Politics* as a point of departure, instead of starting de novo. Despite some of the brilliant insights that Barry Buzan conveys in his contribution addressing the issue of "Rethinking System and Structure," a critical reader is likely to be less than enamored with the long exegetic passages of the tediously familiar Waltzian text. The fact that such exegesis recedes more to the background in Richard Little's contribution on "Rethinking System Continuity and Transformation," and plays even less of a role in Charles Jones's "Rethinking the Methodology of Realism," gives an important clue as to the strategy of persuasion that the authors have used for making their theoretical point that the structuralist realist research program is well and quite promising as soon as the fetters of neorealism (being a particular version of structural realism) are left behind.

The emphasis on persuasion as the appropriate mode of theorizing about human action in general and its various modes (political, economic, action, etc.) is by no means accidental. As Jones indicates, the neorealist attempt to marry structuralism to a largely positivist methodology has misfired and is to blame for the considerable incoherence in Waltz's approach, ranging from the problematic nature of his analogies (in particular, the market analogy) to the difficulty with "testing" his brand of theory or even specifying criteria for application. The careful examination of the contradictory implications of, for example, the pragmatic and representational elements in Waltz's "theory" provides much food for thought and explains the often question-begging nature of the Waltzian enterprise. Given Waltz's instrumentalist stance of theory building (theories are to be assessed not so much by the truth of their assumptions as by their usefulness), this pragmatic stance (imported from Friedman's writings in economics and erroneously accepted as the dominant "scientific" orientation of this field) conflicts with his empiricist position on testing and fails to articulate criteria of usefulness of this "theory" for the practice of states.

It is here that the authors see much value in the "realism" of Carr and realists of the older school; for the latter theories were less like Popper's set of true statements in the "Third World" but rather more like critical discourses on political and social practices, which showed their usefulness in discursive debates (1) in illuminating, rather than hiding, the partial nature of the initial assumptions; (2) in making possible *debates*, rather than pseudoscientific demonstrations; and (3) in expanding a heuristically fruitful research agenda, rather than sacrificing the most interesting questions about persistence and change of international systems on the altar of a mistaken ideal of parsimony.

At this point, the persuasive strategy pursued by the authors becomes clear. Although they start with the established neorealist model, in their subsequent substantive respecifications of the theoretical terms and their inclusion of entirely new elements in the concept of "structure," they open up new avenues of investigation that have been prematurely closed by neorealist theory. This strategy of persuasion engages the reader at different levels. It leads one from the accepted but problematic model of neorealism, via a theoretical reformulation, to some historical case studies. The latter demonstrate the actual existence of anarchies *with functional differentiation* and the generative force of the *internal structure of power*, as well as the unavailability of a balance of power in certain anarchical formations. Taking the agent–structure debate as a point of departure, Little suggests that the problem of system reproduction cannot be reduced to ecologically determined homogenization, as Waltz suggests. Instead, we have to take the importance of constraints imposed by state structures into account.

How useful such an approach can be is demonstrated by the discussion of the demise of Greek city–state system (quite at odds with Gilpin's hegemonic war thesis) and of the Macedonian and Carthagenean Empires. Little also explodes the myth that Rome's decline was the result of the barbaric invasions. Instead, he traces its demise to the increasingly divergent internal economic and social structures within the Constantinian Empire. Such case studies of conceptually informed historical research not only suggest the fruitfulness of the reformulated structural paradigm but indicate that attempts of building theories of international relations—or even of international politics—on the basis of "assumptions" dispensing with historically informed hypotheses often pay the heavy price of irrelevance (due to their impoverished ontology) *and* ideological distortion.

These case studies, in turn, justify both the analytical choice of a system concept that is not limited to the "political" aspect alone (precisely because the changing nature of politics and economics represents one of the most interesting debates about the international political economy) and the important historical dimension of the international system, which, the authors claim, has been "subsystem-dominant" until recently. Finally, the reader is confronted with the epistemological implications of this analytical historical exploration.

It is, of course, impossible to lay out here the analytical and historical arguments in any detail. But it might suffice to say that reader will be richly rewarded by carefully pondering the arguments, which blend historical materials and analytical discussion very nicely. While some of the insights, such as the existence of anarchies with functional differentiation, have not been new since Ruggie's critique and its subsequent debate, Buzan and (in part 2) Little not only show the rather persuasive existence of historical counterfactuals but systematically examine how the functional differentiation of the units affects the character of the deep structure of anarchy. Furthermore, by including in "structure" factors not restricted to the capabilities that Waltz aggregates in a highly problematic concept of power, the English scholars identify important aspects of the dynamics of international systems, as well as sources of change that have eluded traditional neorealist analysis.

In this context the disaggregation of capabilities and the introduction of the systemic factors of technology and of shared norms and organization proves useful, since it systematically elaborates Ruggie's notion of "dynamic density." These two conceptual changes have important implications for the new structural realist research program. The first leads to the conceptualization of "sectors" of the international system that are no longer governed by the logic of politics and its organizing principle of sovereignty. For example, the impact of the economy on politics contradicts the logic of inclusion and subsumption of these separate systems or sectors under the "political system." Instead of this subsumption, prevalent among neorealists, the authors opt for the metaphor of different "lenses" in order to convey the distinctiveness, as well as the "totality," of the different sectors. The British scholars point out that only the wider conception of international relations (rather than international politics) is capable of capturing the interaction effects between different sectors as the conflicting logic of "totalities" inform us about important tensions within the "international system."

The second addition—the inclusion of systemic capabilities of organization and technology, captured by the term *interaction capacity* (of systems)—allows for important distinctions among historical systems and for the nuanced assessment of these factors for the system's reproduction. Since these capabilities are systemwide but are located neither at the unit-level nor at the "deep" level, they escape the attention of neorealists even though the operational logic of the Waltzian system defined as *coaction of units* depends on the types of interaction capabilities. Consequently, the interaction will be very different in two systems that share the same deep and distributional structure but differ markedly on the level of communication and transportation technology and/or the level of institutionalization. It seems, then, entirely implausible to argue that such an increase in "dynamic density" will make the units "otherwise similar" (as Waltz maintains).

After this brief outline of some of the most important modifications of the traditional version of structural realism, one might, indeed, wonder whether, with all the (e)mending that has taken place, there is still anything left of the old sock of neorealism or whether these improvements, piecemeal as they seem, do not, indeed, present an entirely new research program. Whatever the answer to these questions might be (and the emphasis on a rhetoric of persuasion in international relations theory building provides at least one powerful reason why the emendation strategy, rather than a more radical one of replacement, was chosen), there is no doubt that the authors have presented a strong prima facie case in favor of the new program.

On a more critical note, there is some unevenness, weak arguments mingling with strong. One also wonders a bit about the omissions, the most obvious being the failure to utilize—or even mention—the highly sophisticated theory of "world society" developed by Niklas Luhmann. It could have given the emphasis on international relations, rather than international politics, substantially more theoretical backing. But none of these flaws would make me change my assessment that this is a sophisticated theoretical book that will be read with profit by international relations scholars, social theorists, and historians alike. It is a must for anyone who wants to be informed about—and transcend—the current debates in the discipline.

University of Pennsylvania FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL

When the Third World Matters: Latin America and the United States Grand Strategy. By Michael C. Desch. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 218p. $38.50.

This book should more appropriately be titled "When Latin America Matters," for that is its essential concern. Michael Desch examines four episodes in the U.S. relationship with Latin America in order to demonstrate the connection between that region and the pursuit of more vital security interests elsewhere. And, on the basis of this analysis, he posits a broader theory about the relationship between the third world and the "grand strategies" of the great powers.

Whether one can infer such a general theory from a so narrowly-focused set of cases is just one of the troubling aspects of this book. Perhaps a more fundamental reservation stems from the author's prevailing assumption that security policy is rational and coherent and based on self-evident understandings of the balance of power.

Desch argues that in its pursuit of a grand strategy, a great power acts to protect certain "intrinsic values," i.e., those vital to the nation's security. "Peripheral" areas, such as the third world, may, from time to time, take on "extrinsic value" when they "enhance or constrain the great powers' ability to defend themselves and maintain the balance of power" (p. x). He appears to accept without question that these values can be—and have been—determined objectively, unhindered by domestic and bureaucratic politics or by any number of other non-rational variables that impinge on the policy process.

The first case concerns U.S. preoccupation with Mexico just prior to U.S. entry into World War I. Here, Desch makes extensive use of original documents and develops a somewhat unconventional argument. He contends that before Washington could intervene in Europe (an intrinsic value) it was necessary first to take care of the German threat to U.S. security emanating from Mexico (an extrinsic value). According to Desch, the German attempt to divert U.S. attention from Europe to Mexico was successful and converted Mexico from a peripheral interest to one linked to the balance of power in Europe. While this is a convincing argument, its contribution to the overall theory is weakened by the assumption that a country bordering the United States would ever be considered "peripheral." There is also likely to be disagreement over his portrayal of the seriousness of the German intrusion into Mexico.

The U.S. responses to perceived German threats to Latin America during World War II form the basis for a second case study. Although Desch asserts that Washington "integrated" Latin America into its grand strategy for Europe, the evidence falls short of demonstrating how this linkage actually influenced important aspects of U.S. conduct of the war.

In his consideration of the role of Cuba in the missile crisis, Desch provides persuasive support for a) the contention that the Soviets acted primarily to alter the strategic nuclear balance, and b) the suggestion that their backing away from a confrontation was due to superior U.S. conventional forces in the Caribbean. As interesting as this discussion is, however, the case only indirectly supports his general hypothesis about the role of the third world. Again, as in the case of Mexico, Cuba has traditionally held a special place in U.S. security concerns and it was not merely Soviet missiles that raised its status from peripheral to extrinsic value.

Curiously, throughout this entire study there is no reference to the concept of spheres of influence or the literature on that subject. This is especially puzzling inasmuch as Desch draws considerably upon geopolitical concepts to rationalize the distinction between intrinsic, extrinsic, and peripheral values.

The viability of Desch's thesis is stretched further by his contention that what mattered about Latin America during the Cold War was the protection of "sea lines of communication" (SLOCs). Although it is unclear if he is arguing that this *was* the case or if he is suggesting it *ought* to have been, he seems to assume that protecting SLOCs for their contribution to a potential war in Europe was the fundamental strategic interest guiding U.S. policy. He does not address how this shaped U.S. intervention in Nicaragua during the 1980s, for example, but he later recommends against third world interventions aimed at changing local governments. In addition to exaggerating the actual threat to SLOCs during the Cold War, Desch neglects the extensive body of literature relating to a century of U.S. preoccupation with a different set of SLOCs affecting access to the isthmus of Panama.

Desch presents a reasonable case for disregarding the "credibility" argument as a justification for U.S. intervention in the third world. Acting in the third world to send a message to enemies and allies about U.S. reliability, he states, is ineffective and costly. The difficulty is determining whether the author thinks this has not actually been done, despite the rhetoric, or whether he is simply recommending against it because it distorts the search for rational strategic interdependence.

To claim broad theoretical implications from these limited case studies is to ask too much, especially when all of the cases come from one region, Latin America, and when part of that area has had a traditional role as a U.S. sphere of influence—independent of its third world status. Desch's proposition would have been strengthened by consideration of other obvious third world cases such as the Vietnam war. Too often, the author overstates his conclusions; he claims more than the evidence supports and too often allows the compelling logic of grand strategy to take the place of a more modest and useful analysis. The documentary evidence, especially for World War I, provides the basis for a study of Latin America's link to broader U.S. interests, but care should be taken not to extrapolate too far.

Ohio University HAROLD MOLINEU

Doing Good or Doing Well? Japan's Foreign Aid Program. By Margee Ensign. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 198p. $24.50.

Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era. Edited by Bruce M. Koppel and Robert M. Orr, Jr. Boulder: Westview, 1993. 378p. $49.50 paper.

Japanese foreign aid programs merit examination for a host of reasons. Some involve treating them as a window to look into motives and mechanisms of Japan's foreign policy and international role. From this perspective, changes, continuities, and variation in Tokyo's foreign aid can illuminate broader questions of how Tokyo relates to the world and seems likely to relate in the future. How strong are the signs of a strategic pattern at work, and to what extent does it involve more than the pursuit of mercantilist advantage? Foreign aid practices can also throw light on Japan's policy capacity to take timely, proactive, and coherent decisions and adapt to external changes. Is the conventional wisdom that Japan lacks those abilities warranted? Other reasons involve interests in development per se—the impact on recipients, as distinct from the motives and mechanisms of donors. Here, examination of Japan's record can inform us about the consequences of different forms of aid and clarify the development consequences of Japanese behavior.

Finally, analysis of Japan's programs can enrich our understanding of foreign aid as a generic policy instrument—one whose importance is only likely to increase in the post—Cold War world marked by transformations away from autarkic command economies. Foreign aid has been a more important policy instrument for Japan than for the United States, compared with other means to exert influence and manage foreign relations. Accordingly, the Japanese case offers fertile empirical ground for exploring the variety of purposes that the aid instrument can serve.

Margee Ensign's *Doing Good or Doing Well?* and Koppel and Orr's edited collection, *Japan's Foreign Aid* have three things in common: (1) emphasis on detailed information about the particulars of what Japan has done; (2) concentration on the Official Development Assistance (ODA) element of Japanese behavior, as opposed to private flows to recipients; and (3) recognition of the important role of the Japanese private sector in ODA behavior. They differ in other major respects.

Koppel and Orr seek to provide an improved framework for understanding Tokyo's ODA in the context of changing Japanese bilateral and regional foreign policies (including security policies), the influence of those changes on ODA policy and management, and the nature and cause of variation across recipients. They do so by providing a rich set of case studies: ASEAN, Indonesia, the Phillipines, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, China, Bangladesh, Korea, the Pacific Island States, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Asian Development Bank. The cases thus cover the bulk of the Japanese ODA of a bilateral character and do so over the full history of the ODA to the receiving parties.

As a set, the case studies lead to a clear and challenging set of conclusions that differ from much of the conventional wisdom about Japanese foreign aid. The Japanese ODA emerges as a flexible instrument adjusted according to Japan's and recipients' situations and U.S. priorities, to serve purposes that go far beyond mercantilist penetration and dependency. This harnessing of bilateral and regional ODA programs to multiple foreign policy purposes and recipient absorptive capacities is not a new development. Nor is the use of the ODA as a mechanism either to manage relationships with other donor nations or to compensate for friction with donors on economic and political issues. The domestic determinants, in Japan, of ODA actions are shown to be complex (involving different parts of the bureaucracy, politicians, and the private sector) but not disabling.

What emerges is a realistic portrait, in which the ODA serves both foreign policy interests and domestic interests to a substantial extent. The world in which the Japanese ODA exists is a complex one warranting variation in policy practices. Japanese behavior appropriately manifests substantial variation. In part, that is because of a notable freedom from any rigid general ideology about the road to development beyond the view that economic growth is conducive to political stability and democratization. Japan does not lack a development philosophy; but it does recognize situational differences and the role of the ODA in advancing purposes other than the economic growth of the recipient. We are left with a view of the Japanese ODA as less than perfect from the perspective of recipients but open to influence by them in ways that reflect long-run Japanese interests and choices. No systematic assessment is offered of the ODA's economic impacts; but it is clear that many of the major recipients have achieved notable growth performance and increased democratization and have found no available and preferable alternative to Japanese grants and loans.

Ensign focuses on the implementation of the Japanese ODA with respect to the foreign role (especially of U.S. firms) in project selection and receipt of procurement funds from Japan's ODA coffers. Her book is more of an indictment than a systematic analysis. She concludes that in general, the Japanese ODA is selfish in its beneficiaries and adverse in its consequences for recipients. This negative verdict is a consequence of Japanese emphases on capital infrastructure projects, loans rather than grants, and informally tied procurement.

The empirical basis for these conclusions consists of seriously limited information—fragmentary in its coverage both temporally and across recipients. Her information surely does not support arguments that Japan eschews mercantilist benefits. At the same time, it does not suffice to demonstrate that mercantilist objectives dominate the Japanese ODA. That would require attention to a broader range of cases than the six Asian countries and the grant element of aid to Africa and a more extended time period. It would require a more extensive list of variables that might explain Japanese export shifts following ODA commitments. It would have to explore the multiple interests that Japan has in recipients, be they Asian or African.

Ensign clearly has a view of development in which the ODA is best used for purposes other than capital infrastructure projects, a conclusion she rests primarily on a rather old set of evaluative judgments of U.S. aid projects. Aside from questions about the quality of these judgments, it is not obvious that Japan chooses or manages its capital infrastructure projects the way the United States did. Nor is it self-evident from the Asian cases examined that the capital project efforts have been predominantly bad for the recipients. After all, her Asian cases are, for the most part, often cited as examples of development success. The one that is not (the Phillipines) involves the greatest Japanese accomodation to U.S. policy concerns. In any event, the evolution of the Japanese ODA shows substantial and increasing giving for purposes other than capital infrastructure projects.

Finally, Ensign's views on how aid monies should be spent in terms of procurement seem to resemble some

American arguments about U.S. entitlements to some substantial share of the domestic Japanese market for goods. The general argument that untying leads to lower procurement prices in itself does not support the inference that procurement from U.S. firms will lead to lower prices. Nor does she provide substantial evidence that Japan is exceptional in the role played by her nationals as project consultants and contractors.

University of Pittsburgh DAVIS B. BOBROW

The Paradox of Continental Production: National Investment Policies in North America. By Barbara Jenkins. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. 234p. $28.50.

As the political debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) heats up, some insight into the agreement's political foundations provides an important perspective and helps one to evaluate the NAFTA's future prospects. Barbara Jenkins's *The Paradox of Continental Production* provides such a perspective and evaluation. She documents the evolution of national politics, policies, and interests that made the agreement possible. She also explains several political paradoxes that have emerged in the wake of the growing integration of the continental North American economies. The central paradox emphasizes the continued importance of national politics and government policies just when one would expect the increasing scope of markets to make state actors and political preferences of domestic constituencies obsolete.

Why do the strategic capabilities and political preferences of individual nation–states continue to play a key role when market integration appears to have removed more and more policy levers from the hands of national policymakers? Jenkins argues that states need to attend to international economic policy and its linkages with domestic industrial policy because markets, if left unregulated, will cause severe social dislocation resulting in nationalistic "Polanyian" backlashes, thereby threatening moves toward further market integration. In addition, major market actors, if left to themselves, may underinvest in human capital and research-and-development in specific countries if these capabilities exist elsewhere in their dispersed multinational networks.

Jenkins reviews the literature on firm–state relations and finds that it lacks adequate political analysis of the determinants of states' bargaining power in negotiations with multinational investors. She then turns to a discussion of the politics of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) review in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. A major goal of the three case studies is to document the preferences of political actors who have played an important role in IFDI review liberalization in Mexico and Canada and the increase in the stringency of IFDI review in the United States. This careful documentation of the views of both policymakers and interest groups in each of the three countries provides a good political background for scholars new to many of the current political debates going on over the costs and benefits of the proposed NAFTA.

Missing from this political analysis, however, is some reference to the strategic interaction between states and firms, which together comprise states' international economic capabilities. In an increasingly integrated regional and global economy, neither politicians nor scholars can afford to ignore the interrelatedness between state and firm strategies and the implications of this interaction for the interests of domestic political actors. For regional trade agreements to succeed, both state and firm strategies need to contribute to the competitiveness of national economies.

Jenkins begins by demonstrating empirically that regulatory policies that ensure that multinational corporation investments enhance the national economic objectives of their hosts do not discourage the inflow of investment. She concludes from this that there are few costs involved in requiring multinational corporations to meet specific domestic policy objectives. One implication of this argument, in the Canadian case, is that the failure to regulate IFDI results more from a failure in political will than from the economic consequences of such regulation (p. 153). The relationship between the impact of these regulations upon multinational corporations' assessment of the relative attractiveness of the Canadian market and Canada's lack of political will, however, goes unexplored.

For example, Jenkins suggests that because multinational corporations have historically underinvested in research-and-development as a percentage of sales in Canada, Canadian policy, to increase the amount, should "mold incoming FDI to fit national industrial priorities" (p. 151). This could involve "the targeting of both domestic and foreign firms possessing critical product or process technologies and matching them with Canadian business partners" (p. 212). However, studies of cooperative research-and-development projects, including those as visible as Sematech, have found that most firms will cooperate with one another in primary research but typically become less willing to continue ongoing cooperative efforts as a product gets closer to the development process. A Canadian policy to mandate cooperative research-and-development risks alienating potential investors who do not want to risk losing control over proprietary product and process technologies.

How, then, can Canada prevent multinational corporation investors' research-and-development budget allocations from going primarily to the United States when without regulation (as Jenkins points out), few inducements exist for these investors to consider Canada? And if this trend continues, what will prevent a backlash against the U.S.–Canadian Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as Canadian industry loses its technology base and political support for the agreement steadily erodes. Jenkins would suggest that few alternatives exist to state-mandated cooperative agreements that would partner multinational corporations with Canadian firms and, hopefully, increase research-and-development expenditure in Canada. As continental markets continue to integrate, she argues that this kind of regulation of IFDI remains critical to sustaining the political support for the FTA and eventually for the NAFTA.

Some discussion of the kinds of factors that attract multinational investors would be useful here. Only mentioned in passing is a brief reference to Reich's suggestion that government support for the development of human capital may influence the research-and-development location decisions of multinational investors (p. 214). The presence of specific factor endowments still go a long way toward attracting multinational corporation investment, regardless of what extra financial incentives states choose to offer. State subsidies to home firms may reduce their attractiveness as suppliers to, or partners with, multinational corporations, since few guarantees exist to ensure the continuation of this financial support as state policies and priorities change over time. In any case, to figure out the likely success of a specific state policy, some consideration needs to be given to the likely strategic response of foreign investors.

Embedded in her discussion of the politics of American IFDI review policy, Jenkins includes prescriptions regarding American research-and-development policy that take a slightly different tack. As in the Canadian case, she suggests that the United States needs to increase its institutional capabilities to implement technology policy in order to avoid a nationalist backlash. Her argument begins with the intentional ambiguity of the meaning of national security as written into the Exon–Florio amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. This amendment states that the president has the authority to block a foreign takeover of a U.S. high-technology company by a foreign investor if it can be demonstrated that this would constitute a threat to U.S. "national security." Given the perceptions of unfairness on the part of U.S. business regarding foreign competitors' research-and-development subsidies, Jenkins fears that this ambiguity could be turned against foreign companies seeking to acquire U.S. firms as a part of a nationalistic backlash. In order to stave off this possibility, she argues that the United States needs a coherent commercial research-and-development policy run by the Commerce Department that would involve "a centralized agency with its own policy agenda, technical expertise, and ideological legitimacy (not to mention extensive budget)," in order to put U.S. high-technology firms on an equal footing with their competitors and diffuse potential protectionist political pressures (pp. 98–99).

While this kind of institutional framework for technology policy may have been appropriate when a relatively slow rate of technological innovation characterized industrial change, with the increasingly rapid rate of technological change, questions arise regarding the appropriateness of this kind of centralized technology policy. Specifically, the United States government has demonstrated little of the institutional flexibility needed to anticipate the direction of technological innovation. Even the authors of the strategic trade models have argued about the difficulties in picking technologies to subsidize and firms with the managerial capabilities to earn excess returns. If these subsidies slow the innovation process within firms, a coherent U.S. commercial technology policy could detract from, rather than contribute to, U.S. competitiveness. Again, the reciprocal effects of state policy and managerial decision making need to be taken into account to understand the relationship among politics, policy, and national competitiveness.

In the Mexican case, Jenkins argues that the austerity policies and lack of economic growth resulting from Mexico's failed import substitution policies prompted the "technicos" trained in elite U.S. universities to open the Mexican economy to foreign trade and investment. Like Canada, once Mexico began to rely more on export-led growth, the possibility that U.S. administrative trade law could be used to block Mexico's access to the U.S. market and the increased reliance of Mexican exporters on the U.S. market provided sufficient incentive for the Mexican political leadership to pursue the NAFTA. This leadership found political support among the moderate ranks of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), who believed that they would benefit from guaranteed access to the U.S. market. Jenkins suggests that the government's policy to devalue the peso has played a critical role in the competitive success of Mexican entrepreneurs in U.S. markets. She goes on to contend that an unexpected appreciation of the peso would reduce the competitiveness of small- and medium-size Mexican firms in the United States, which, in turn, could alienate this critical constituency for the NAFTA and threaten the future success of the agreement: "The revaluation of the currency or the appearance of vigorous competition to Mexican business in the domestic market would affect capital's attitude toward liberalization and would destabilize the precarious political coalition that is behind the drive toward continentalization" (p. 157).

Recent experience with the European Monetary System indicates that governments acting alone have less and less ability to influence the value of their currency. Underlying economic conditions strongly influence currency traders' expectations of whether a country's currency will appreciate or depreciate. The peso was devalued from 447 to the U.S. dollar in 1985 to 2,379 to the dollar by the end of 1987 because of inflation, the decline in oil prices, and the need to export to earn foreign exchange to allow Mexico to pay off foreign debt (p. 179). The devaluation of the peso may have encouraged Mexican entrepreneurs to seek foreign, especially North American, markets for their goods—but not only because the "technicos" figured out that this would create political support for the increased integration of the North American economies. Given the pressures on the peso, it is difficult to see what the government could have done to prevent the peso's devaluation beside strict rationing of foreign exchange, which it tried with little success. If the peso does appreciate in the wake of the NAFTA, unless it results from an extremely tight anti-inflationary monetary policy that may threaten Mexico's economic growth, this appreciation could reflect the increasing productivity in the Mexican economy and its ability to consume more foreign imports. To respond competitively as the peso appreciates, Mexican entrepreneurs will have to adopt increasingly differentiated strategies and more capital-intensive production processes to ensure the continued appeal of their products in foreign markets. Only if Mexican entrepreneurs stick to low-cost strategies will an appreciation of the peso put them at a competitive disadvantage.

The politics of trade and investment liberalization remain important, and (as Jenkins argues) politicians need to pay attention to adjustment costs to avoid a political backlash to increased regional and global economic integration. Historically, to demonstrate their autonomy, states have been willing to incur significant economic losses, as Canada did with its National Energy Policy when it paid top dollar for foreign-owned energy assets. Yet this kind of expenditure has become increasingly more difficult to justify politically as government budgets strain to cover health care obligations and their other social welfare responsibilities. Increasingly, an understanding of the politics of trade and investment policy will need to take into account the opportunity costs of specific policies. These opportunity costs result from the strategic interaction between governments and firms. In addition, consideration needs to be given to the dynamics of the economic environment in which trading and investing takes place.

Jenkins provides an insightful analysis into the various national politics of trade and investment policy. The paradox that emerges from the analysis, however, is that as the domestic political foundation of continental economic integration increases in importance, political analysis alone may decrease in its utility. Future research may benefit from incorporating theory from strategic management and international economics in understanding the domestic politics of international economic policy.

University of Minnesota STEFANIE ANN LENWAY

Security without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-nuclear Security. Edited by Regina Cowen Karp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 296p. $55.00.

This book, filled with creativity, imagination, and wisdom, moves well beyond most existing scholarship on national security policy. The authors encourage us to think about what has become almost unthinkable among security policy experts—security without nuclear weapons. The contributors directly address many questions that are seldom discussed but profoundly important: How far can nuclear arsenals be reduced before security risks and instabilities will significantly increase? Can people be secure in a world without nuclear weapons? How do the security risks of existing policies, including the accompanying prospects for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, compare to the risks of alternative policies leading toward the abolition of nuclear arms?

Fourteen contributors systematically explore the nature of nonnuclear security and examine the opportunities for, and constraints upon, those seeking to abolish nuclear weapons. Because most of the book was written before the depth of change in the former Soviet Union had been universally acknowledged, a few chapters seem dated, such as "The End of Superpower Arms Control?" by Lynn Eden. Nevertheless, most remain profoundly relevant, because the authors focus on nonnuclear security, not nuclear disarmament. They examine the problems and benefits of deftly moving nuclear weapons into the background of security maintenance.

Regina Cowen Karp leads off with a compelling discussion of why it is intellectually responsible—even essential—to study how the denuclearization of security policies might enhance security. She persuasively sets the tone for addressing the problems of nuclear proliferation in a crisis-prone environment by calling for a strategic debate focused on international security problems, rather than primarily on nuclear weapons.

Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler point out in a highly original essay that such a debate may not be easy to conduct, because the security community's thinking has become far more rigid than most recognize. Most security experts' dismissive attitude toward nuclear abolition reflects their persistent hegemony within academe and policymaking circles, rather than the rigor of their scholarship or the open-mindedness of their reflections. The authors ask for no utopias, only for willingness not to rule imaginative ideas off the agenda before reflection. They then demonstrate that rethinking the nature and purpose of international political *processes*, as opposed to focusing primarily on military deployments and doctrines, could enable societies to implement policies that would genuinely enhance security while allowing reliance on nuclear weapons to decline.

Erwin Häckel, who explores the economic arguments for moving toward nuclear abolition, acknowledges that the nuclear powers and most of the countries near the threshold of nuclear weapons do not consider economic costs to be a decisive argument against nuclear arms. Nonetheless, the utility of nuclear weapons for military planning and combat has declined; and nuclear powers feel the need to maintain sizable conventional forces in addition to their nuclear arms, in order to avoid nuclear combat if war should occur. As a result, Häckel sees practical economic benefits arising from measures that would decrease the security relevance of nuclear weapons.

Julie Dahlitz demonstrates that in addition to economic incentives, international law can also play an influential role in buttressing governments' political will for decreasing reliance on nuclear arms, because governments can give law increased authority by the manner in which they make it and abide by it. In contrast to the particularly hostile environment of the Cold War, Dahlitz argues that a deliberate effort could now be made to create laws that institutionalize cooperative security policies. A wisely engineered evolution of world law, constituting one part of a more general transformation of the world system, could enable nonnuclear security to become a prudential choice.

Paul White, Robert Pendley, and Patrick Garrity explain in their article that depending on governments' political decisions, technological innovations can either encourage or impede steps toward abolishing nuclear arms. In addition, they caution that if governments downplay nuclear arms, strategies for conventional weapons must also be turned away from offensive deployments for security to be genuinely enhanced. The elimination of all wars, not just nuclear war, must be addressed. I wish they had discussed the employment of new nonlethal technologies by international enforcement agencies as one additional means for easing both nuclear and conventional weapons into a less prominent role.

Patricia Lewis explains that enormous potential for nonnuclear security arises also from the recent progress that Moscow and Washington have made in monitoring weapons tests, deployments, and even manufacturing. It is far easier, she demonstrates, to verify the complete absence of a weapons system than to inspect it reliably when maintained at a particular level above zero. Moreover, if states ever intend to move toward nuclear abolition at some point in the future, then the sooner comprehensive international monitoring can begin, the better. Even during the current period of large arsenals, the more detailed the available knowledge of every country's evolving nuclear capacities for military and nonmilitary purposes, the fewer the chances that nuclear activities could be disguised or hidden later on.

Frank von Hippel confirms that uncertainty about the amount of fissile material that has already been produced constitutes a serious problem for verifiable nuclear abolition. Although it may never be possible to prove the existence of a totally nuclear-weapon-free world, absolute proof may be unnecessary as cooperative security arrangements replace nuclear weapons and make any hidden fissile material less consequential than the nonnuclear security mechanisms already put in place. In examining nuclear proliferation, George Quester correctly notes that it has not been as large a problem as many feared it would be.

Harald Müller creatively explores how the elimination of nuclear weapons would affect the traditional function of alliances and hegemonies. He concludes that nonnuclear security can be maintained only in a low-threat environment. In order to achieve such an environment, to move toward a nonnuclear world, and to avoid the major security problem of reversibility once such a world is being achieved, he recommends a series of interlocking security regimes to address adversaries' grievances, reduce misperceptions, and avoid threatening security postures. Moreover, because nonnuclear enclaves cannot survive long in a world of harsh conflicts, nonnuclearism "must encompass the globe, or it will have no future at all" (p. 249).

Nicholas Wheeler explains that the widespread, common objections to a minimum deterrence policy ought not deter movement toward abolition, because (1) increased military transparency and confidence-building measures can provide reassurances that no militarily significant cheating can occur, (2) technological innovation for unilateral military advantage can be constrained by replacing the goal of strategic superiority with policies for common security, and (3) the alleged problem of targeting inflexibility associated with small nuclear forces will not cause deterrence to lose its effectiveness, because of ambiguity about whether cities or other assets have been targeted.

My only reservation about the book springs from feeling that in a few instances, the authors have failed to follow their own bold analytic paths to their logical conclusions. Is it sufficient to explore the benefits of nonnuclear security, or should the exploration also probe more deeply to explain the impediments to reaping those benefits? The analyses could be strengthened by commenting more fully on resistance to building a new code of international conduct even when rational thought demonstrates its prudence. Moreover, the book may give insufficient attention to the need for, and benefits of, structural change in the world system.

Nonetheless, this book is a profoundly valuable addition to the national security debate. Its most original work demonstrates that the risks and costs of a well-developed plan to move the world toward abolition of nuclear arms are significantly lower than the risks and costs of today's world, in which the major powers maintain their existing nuclear arsenals and a double standard on who may possess nuclear arms. Future scholarship, one hopes, will explain why this conclusion is not widely recognized and what must occur to enable more careful reasoning to shape security policies.

University of Notre Dame ROBERT C. JOHANSEN

Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict. Edited by Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 334p. $32.50.

This book represents the collective effort of more than a dozen scholars to understand and describe aspects of modern military interventions. Drawing principally on six case studies developed around a standard analytic framework, the goal is to extract general characteristics of long-term intervention experiences that explain how countries become entangled and disentangled from complex political–military commitments.

The research design features a structured comparison of protracted interventions that took place in diverse settings involving different players, including the United States in Viet Nam; the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; Syria and Israel in Lebanon; India in Sri Lanka; and the superpowers, Cuba, and South Africa in Angola. Each instance is examined in a separate chapter that chronicles the intervenor's policy choices through initial involvement, progression of intensified activity, and withdrawal phases. The case studies introduce key events within the target country and in regional affairs and note various success and failure points. Together, these chapters (roughly two-thirds of the text) offer little new information. The material is important, however; for it constitutes raw historical data for interpretative abstract summaries and conclusions that follow.

The final section of the book provides rich generalities derived from common patterns detected across the cases. The editors organize the analysis by segmented time periods of intervention experience: there is a chapter each on "getting in," "staying in," and "getting out." What fresh insights are offered about intervention? The reader is given a combination of standard themes and ideas and lessons taken from the research strategy, yielding several interesting conclusions.

Why do states intervene? Civil conflicts around the world create ample opportunities for outside state involvement. In foreign military interventions, the objective is to shape the political authority structure through coercion and a local ally who is to be assisted in gaining or maintaining power. Such goals are hard to achieve using conventional military assessment criteria, because they are not easily translated into practical and concrete terms and may incorporate combinations of cross-cutting motives, misread conditions, and ill-understood consequences.

What consequences follow when military troops are directly involved? A military presence poses riskier potential costs, sharpens the meaning of commitment to goal achievement, and affects a greater investment of human and material resources. Yet in the cases examined, military involvement brought to the situation not clarity but ambiguity and murkiness, instead.

Why do military interventions become protracted? Although the editors admit the question cannot be conclusively answered based on this study, some partial responses are presented. Decisions to intervene are arrived at gradually and reluctantly, consisting of small steps and complex interaction of forces. The analysis does not show a slippery-slope idea capturing the progression of involvement. Elites were conscious of the potential magnitude of operations they authorized and were aware that the scope of their commitment could widen; yet they believed that the conflict would be short, with military forces bringing political victory. But policymakers made errors of judgment: they tended to believe that a balance of resolve would favor the intervening state; that local allies would be reliable, strong, and trusting partners; and that intervention would create only intended effects on the political scene. Human failings and miscalculations in intelligence and cost estimates are not overplayed, however. As Downs cautions in his chapter on disengagement, the ease of overestimating human error in ex post facto analysis can be dangerous.

Why do states withdraw their troops? The answer is based on decision makers' perceptions of changes in global politics, enemy composition, resource base, and home public support. In the end, new administrations had to come to power to replace the prevailing intervention strategy and get out. The message is that old leaders continue policy patterns, and only new ones may change the course.

This study rejects the notion that policymakers are universally unwise, motivated by grandeur or ideology, or that they have distinct human limitations. In fact, leaders are judged neither harshly nor favorably. Protractedness is not the result of foolishness of choice but murkiness of the situation. Cohen, in summarizing the progressive stage of interventions, argues that the middle game is hard to evaluate for success or effectiveness. Assessments are muddy, and a general fog prevails, limiting clear understanding.

In the end, conclude the editors, foreign military interventions are unpredictable, complex, destructive, and difficult to evaluate on a cost-benefit scale. Why? Because the cases chosen emphasize these factors, and the framework cannot screen out noise. On a broader note, intervention may continue to be characterized in this way because, as part of international relations conflict, political goals will continue to be advanced by military means, opportunities and incentives for intervention will exist, and international controls marking parameters of acceptable intervention will not be delineated.

An appraisal of this book must rest on the wisdom of case selections and on the theoretical framework used to extract information and build general patterns about protracted military intervention. The emergence of a new era in international relations characterized by intensified, violent nationalist movements, poses problems relating to the balance between self-determination and sovereignty and assessments of security and stability—in short, serious challenges for a potential intervenor. Are there guidelines for policymakers in this book? Do scholars have a better understanding of the process of intervention?

Many questions are still unanswered, yet the book is a catalyst for anyone who wishes to probe the matter further. In these cases, for example, if protracted interventions are costly and less than successful, we might want to know more about the effects of policy planning. Were the intervention strategies essentially random or clearly planned? Were they outlined in both short- and long-term frameworks? Did the introduction of military troops to solve the conflict reconfirm or invalidate policymaker beliefs about force effectiveness? One acquires no real perspective on these points, in spite of the historical detail and conscious comparative analysis presented. The study lacks criteria to measure intervention policy success and failure. What does each entail? What degrees of difference exist? What happens once intervening states begin to realize that they may not achieve their objectives? This choice is essentially one of flight or fight; but since military intervention in this project is conceived as a process composed of small steps, the overarching strategy is hard to unveil. Perhaps including some short, successful interventions as case studies might have sharpened the causal logic developed to identify involvement and disengagement decisions. Alternative design structures are often recommended over a chosen research strategy, but the issue here is whether substantial alteration in conclusions might have been the result. This is hard to say.

The status of intervention as a key concept to understand contemporary world politics is rising. As a tool of influence, it represents overt and covert involvement by bigger states into the economic, social, and political processes of weaker countries. It is a bulwark of power politics. With the end of the Cold War and new domains of conflict eruption, sovereignty and security demands are unlikely to disappear from the international scene. Today, humanitarian and collective intervention are the frequently debated issues in official international circles; but military force is still a significant part of the action. In essence, this book is timely for its emphasis on military force and contributes to our knowledge about dangers behind protracted conflict involvement. This should be useful in the current world environment of multiple conflicts and attendant, ample temptations for intervention.

University of Denver KAREN A. FESTE

Morality and American Foreign Policy. By Robert W. McElroy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 194p. $24.95.

Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992. 353p. $37.50 cloth, $12.95 paper.

Though the contrasts between Robert W. McElroy's *Morality and American Foreign Policy* and Kenneth W. Thompson's *Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy* are both real and apparent, that the contrasts between these two readable and knowledgeable books are not far greater than they are illustrates much of the difficulty with the state of theory in the field of international relations.

McElroy's work is a dissertational effort to clarify the gap between the realist and "internationalist" paradigms in international relations as well as build a "pathway" between them. It is a laudable first book. Decrying the undoubtedly still great distance between ethics (or philosophy generally) and the study of international affairs, McElroy suggests properly if not originally that the consideration of morality is inexorably bound to the consideration if not the reality of international progress. There is more than a hint of purposiveness here, although unfortunately the philosophical clarion to such purposiveness is Immanuel Kant whose notions of the universalization of international norms and a kind of golden rule of international behavior reflect all too vividly the usual Kantian requirement of intersubjectivity. It is no surprise, either within Kant or McElroy, that substantive unanimity imports a methodology of interstate contractuality and that the search for a peaceful and "regular pattern of interactions," therefore, still lacks a convincing pathway. The dialectic, drawn from Kant's "law of states" and Kant's "cosmopolitan law" that would protect citizens within states, is categorically obedient to the classificatory in ways that stifle progress along intellectual and real world pathways.

How, then, to break out? As McElroy far less ashamedly has morality a part of foreign affairs than Thompson, McElroy places responsibility upon the individual actor. It is the "moral politician" (Kant again) who must triumph over the "political moralist," the latter given to expediency and the former given to such departures from traditional realism as a) Herbert Hoover's 1921 Russian relief effort, b) Richard Nixon's destruction of America's chemical and biological weapons, and c) Jimmy Carter's Panama Canal Treaty. By contrast, there is Dresden, although here McElroy is too ready to write of circumstances, the slowing of the Eastward infantry drive in 1944, etc., than he is of the theoretical and actual differences between moral and amoral choices.

In short, the weakness of McElroy's first book is not in its scholarship or its writing. It is in its inability to yet define a theory that would suggest how to propel the moral norm towards intellectual and international progress. Descriptiveness too often subverts prescriptiveness. McElroy settles for explanations of why the clarity of the norm—and why better rates of moral compliance occur when national security is less involved—predict the moral choice. There is a link between the moral choice and the demands of someone's "real" world to be sure, but it is not only involved with, but dependent upon, the underlying linkage of international relations theory with both reality and the deepest intellectual understandings of how both morality and reality are known.

With Thompson, the gap between morality and reality is wider still, Thompson's ambivalence about the place of morality in international affairs being obvious from the start. Substantively, this is a rich book, a bevy of seedbeds for moral discourse being planted in discussions of nuclear security, disarmament, human rights, and the conflicts over values that marked the decisions of Lincoln, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. There are attempts to sew together the morality versus reality threads that weave their way through the book in chapters on history as end point or beginning, national decline, and the openness of history when seen from any contemporary perspective.

But Thompson's problem with perspectives, briefly stated, is his lack of systematic differentiation. His discussions of intellectual contrasts fail to deal with the epistemological, that is the "forms of knowledge," differentiations that underlie all ethical positions. Thompson's oft written-of education, the University of Chicago's morally skeptical Morgenthau sharing top billing with the ethical admonitions of Neibuhr, apparently did not lead Thompson to an understanding of the role of epistemology in theory. Thompson properly decries the lack of continuity among "the seemingly endless repetition of intellectual and philosophical debates." But even his worthy developmental portrayal of the movement from international law, through political, to institutional approaches within international relations studies, does not bind the development to commensurable contrasts between methodological and epistemological approaches. As a result, the thoughtful portrayal of international realism never discovers the roots of the almost static analysis of qualitatively similar variables of human nature, state-to-state relationships, undifferentiated kinds of power, and the like. As a further result, the less thoughtful but still credible depiction of idealism finds the principle intellectual tension in international affairs to lie within the dualism of each human nature, not the differentiation between and among various human natures. Even the description of Lincoln's Sanitary Fair speech contrast between a man's living off the "product of his labor" or "the product of other men's labors" would leave one to think the tension's options equally weighted. Did Lincoln think that? Does Thompson?

What is so frustrating is that Thompson, at least at times, comes so close to seeing things, as they must be seen if theoretical advancement is to occur, from the intellectual top. His marvelous description of the maintenance of tensions within the foreign policy of Richard Nixon, the best segment of the book, credits Nixon's own deep understanding of that tension for the success of the China strategy and other Nixon triumphs. But in Thompson's general discussion of history, his proper scoring of Fukuyama's wrongness about Hegel is dulled by his own wrongness about Hegel. Thompson's earlier attack on Hegel's drive for the imposition of the state on a population fails to recognize the primacy of the ethical state within Hegel's prescription. Yes, there is a deterministic rationality to Hegel, but it is an ascending, differentiated rationality that Hegel strives for, and Hegel deals with it through a dialectic of tension that is epistemologically distinguishable from the dialectic of Kant.

Not surprisingly, Hegel is suspicious of liberalism, more so than Kant, but that squares with Hegel's dialectic dealings with ever more differentiated cognitive variables. Kant's dialectic steadfastly held to the classificatory imperative. Kant's dialectic is a dutiful first cousin to the Categorical Imperative that was at the heart of all of Kant's thinking and, not surprisingly, therefore, Kant saw perpetual peace as growing out of the contractual form that McElroy identified. Hegel's peace is the product of the engrossment of the ever more complex intellectual and ultimately real world variables that somehow reconcile today's reality and tomorrow's thrust of the historical Idea.

Perhaps the greatest dialectic, for international relations theory as well as for the real world of international relations, is the never ending conflict of Kant-like and Hegel-like dialectics themselves. First and foremost, both German idealists dealt with the core epistemological issues of the nature of knowledge, as well as the limits to knowledge. It is on their epistemological writings, not the substantive writings on politics or peace, that international relations theory should be built. Kant did not believe in the synthetic, differentiated cognition beyond the most restrictive notions of mathematics, natural science, and personal morality. As a result, the human purposiveness of his vision of international affairs, like his vision of the improvement of knowledge, was overshadowed by the hand of Providence. Hegel's belief in the human capacity to understand ever more differentiated, or synthetic, qualities of knowledge, along with his belief in the expansion of the limits of knowledge and morality, was the core of his optimism. That Kant would reject the coming into objective consciousness of an ever-improving moral vision, and that Hegel would depict the dialectic as a movement of consciousness towards just such a vision are both understandable and commensurable. That proponents of the realist and the idealist visions of international relations would differ over the cognitive reconcilability of the two very different cognitive entities of reality and hope is also understandable and commensurable. Indeed, it is the essence of the contrast between the realist and the idealist perspectives.

It is this contrast, I would hope, that the later books of McElroy, and even Thompson, would speak to. If they do, the progress of understanding in international relations will be as assured as the contrast between the traumas of the present world and the peacefulness of the world's future.

University of South Carolina WILLIAM P. KREML

Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism. By Miroslav Nincic. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992. 200p. $37.50.

In this book, Miroslav Nincic examines, explores, and refutes a notion promulgated by such proponents of classical "realism" as Hans J. Morganthau and George F. Kennan. The notion holds, in Nincic's words, that "democratic foreign policy suffers from having to accommodate the sentiments of the public and its representatives, sentiments that are grounded in a combination of factual ignorance and emotive drives that clash with the tenets by which international affairs are best managed" (p. 152).

In a nicely-organized and fluidly-written argument, Nincic focuses on the American experience to examine the impact of public opinion, of Congressional consideration, and of electoral politics on the development and conduct of foreign policy. He argues that realist arguments essentially suggest three rules: ideals should not be confused with interests, interests and power should be "brought into proper balance," and "the actual conduct of foreign affairs should proceed in a measured, consistent fashion" (pp. 22–23). He concludes that, in general, democracy does quite well by these (rather mushy) criteria.

Public opinion—"the mentality of the masses"—is really quite reasonable and coherent, he argues. While the average American may not be terribly well-informed about foreign policy, the public is not "particularly disorganized, unstable, or extreme regarding foreign affairs" (p. 45). In general, it appears to be "moderate" and pragmatic, and its "normative goals are actually quite close to the foreign policy preferences of the leadership groups from which policy makers are generally drawn" (p. 52).

He reaches a similar conclusion about Congress. Although he acknowledges that "instances of misguided comportment by the nation's legislators do exist," he concludes that "examples of considerable Congressional wisdom can also be found" (p. 64). And while conceding that electoral politics can sometimes adversely affect the conduct of foreign policy, he argues that there are also positive benefits in elections as they enhance the exchange of ideas and hold political leaders accountable for foreign policy failures (p. 119).

He also concludes that there has often been a tendency in American foreign policy for leaders to exaggerate, for domestic political reasons, the degree to which there is an outside threat. In this, he may be overstating the case somewhat. If the threat was indeed exaggerated, it seems to me that political leaders largely believed their own exaggerations.

In the final chapter, Nincic wades into the decades-long debate—for which the classic realists bear eternal responsibility—about what is, after all, the "national interest." As he demonstrates once again, the more one struggles with this concept, the more one becomes enmeshed in muddled vapidities and "limp tautologies" (p. 158).

He concedes that the concept might have some objective validity if it is very narrowly defined as a quest for physical survival, economic health, and the continuance of the society's basic normative order (p. 161). But even that concession is questionable. The Soviet Union appears recently to have peacefully decided that its national interest lay in its own physical disintegration and in a radical restructuring of its basic normative order. Similarly, many leaders, such as the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, would consider the economic health of their country to be of only very secondary importance. Nincic concludes that, in general, "a national interest emerges only from an authentically democratic aggregation of domestic preferences" (p. 168). That may be about the best way to deal with the issue (apart from abandoning it entirely), though it is not clear why the aggregation has necessarily to be "democratic."

With his intentional focus on the American case, Nincic specifically eschews a comparative perspective (p. 24). In some important respects, however, his argument might have been strengthened with a bit of comparison. That is, while he argues convincingly that American foreign policy has shown a fair amount of moderation, coherence, and wisdom, his case might be stronger if that experience were juxtaposed with the alternative.

While democratic governments have made their share of foreign policy blunders, these, it might well be argued, pale in comparison to the foreign policy disasters non-democratic countries have experienced under such leaders as Hitler, Mussolini, Kim Il-Sung, Khomeini, Nasser, and Saddam Hussein. And one might also look at the quality of the people democracies have generally put forward to run their foreign policy, comparing them to the similar products of non-democratic societies. The overall record for non-democracies, after all, is fairly abysmal. Rebecca West may exaggerate somewhat when she observes in *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (1941) that in 645 years of rule the Hapsburg family produced "no genius, only two rulers of ability . . . countless dullards, and not a few imbeciles and lunatics," but she is not that far off the mark. In such a comparison, it would seem, democracies do rather well. And a consideration of this sort might have served to enhance Nincic's basic argument.

University of Rochester JOHN MUELLER

From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic and Regional Conflict. By Jay Rothman. Newbury Park: Sage, 1992. 231p. $51.00 cloth, $24.50 paper.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s several scholars of international relations developed conflict management training workshops, the purpose of which was to support a process towards peace in the context of intractable conflicts. John Burton, Leonard Doob, and Herbert Kelman, among others, conducted "controlled communication" or problem solving workshops with high-level representatives of groups involved in protracted communal disputes. John Rothman's book presents an extension of those early action/research projects. Applying principles found in the conflict analysis and conflict management field, he examines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to illustrate the utility of a particular conflict management method which he has developed. Rothman is a scholar-practitioner at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who has conducted a variety of workshops in the Middle East with Israelis and Palestinians. His book presents an effort to combine conflict theory and practice and to apply them to the particularly intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with an eye to their generalizability to other similar conflicts.

Rothman's book, however, does more than describe his conflict management method. In an important effort to span what some believe to be an erroneous theory-practice divide, the book discusses the interrelationship between practical methods and theoretical perspectives, both in the international relations and conflict resolution fields. The author challenges the traditional international relations approach which places primary emphasis on national interest concerns, and he recommends turning politics "on its head" in order to study ethnic and other "primary" communities from the inside.

Rothman suggests a kind of bottom-up analysis as a complement to the study of nation-states, and he argues for his approach not so much on a theoretical basis, but primarily as a practical matter. He points to the recent explosion of ethnic and regional conflicts as a clear indicator that the major actors of concern in the world are not only nation-states, but also ethnic identity communities which are seeking to preserve their existence. In order to gain an understanding of these communities, they must be explored "from within," that is, from the perspective of the members of those groups. In response to potential criticism that he focuses too heavily on "low politics," Rothman claims that it is the over-focusing on the "high politics" of nation-states and national interest that has allowed the international relations field to fail to deal effectively with current world events.

Rothman also provides an important challenge to the conflict management field. At first glance, the move away from a confrontational, adversarial process of dealing with conflict toward more cooperative modes as articulated by Rothman will appear as an old refrain to scholars in the conflict analysis and resolution field. However, while many conflict theorists focus on the importance of clearing up parties' misperceptions of each other (which Rothman labels an empirical approach to conflict) and on the potentially transformative effect of having each party "step into the shoes" of the other (labeled a reflexive approach), this book adds a new twist to the process of transformation. The author asserts that parties also misperceive or fail to examine their own underlying assumptions and ontological perspectives. For this reason, an essential piece of the process of conflict management is a stage in which the parties become something akin to critical theorists whose task it is to probe the rules and patterns that determine their own beliefs about themselves, the other party, and the conflict, to critique them, and then to transform the existing terms of the dispute. From this perspective the salient focus of analysis for parties to disputes, as well as for scholars, is less on events or the distribution of resources, and more on transactions and relationships between ethnic or regional communities as key variables. Conflict is rooted in troubled relationships and the failure to meet "universal human needs" of all parties such as security, control, meaning, and identity.

The implications of this position for intervention are somewhat surprising and intriguing. The conflict management method developed by Rothman involves a three stage process which, unlike most other conflict resolution methods, includes a stage in which disputants are encouraged to frame the conflict in adversarial terms. Rather than encouraging adversaries to first vent frustrations and then find common ground, as is the case in many models of intervention, his model calls on parties to first describe the conflict to each other in the very adversarial terms which are presumably contributing to friction. The goal is to provide a comparison for the later stages of reflexive analysis and integrative bargaining. In each of these three stages, the model has participants describe the conflict, identify causes, and generate and evaluate solutions. It is the process of proceeding through these stages and finally of making comparisons among them that the transformative potential lies, according to Rothman.

The structure and content of the book reflect both the "bottom up" type of analysis recommended by the author, as well as his implicit blending of theory and practice. The book is divided into three parts, each of which articulates the themes of the book in a different way. The first of these provides a brief "cultural history" of the development of Israeli and Palestinian nationalism, describes and evaluates four major conflict management approaches, and argues for a model for conflict management, called the ARI (adversarial, reflexive, integrative) Conflict Management Framework, which encompasses all of these approaches. In Part II, the reader is presented with three applications of the model to actual disputes, two of which are workshop applications and a third which utilizes the ARI framework as an analytical tool. The final section of the book presents a set of materials intended for use by conflict management practitioners in the development of training workshops, including an intervention and training script, two case studies, and a conflict simulation exercise. Over 60% of the book is committed to discussion of the applications presented in Parts II and III.

The primary weakness of this otherwise valuable book is its lack of attention to the issue of getting parties to the table. The ARI Conflict Management Framework assumes that representatives of disputing communities have already agreed to negotiate or participate in a cooperative process. One is left wondering whether this method might be used in some way to convince parties to participate in a cooperative process or whether ARI practitioners must wait for the arrival of the right conditions before embarking on problem solving workshops. This is a problem for all such conflict resolution approaches to international and ethnic conflict, and it is unfortunately not tackled head on in this book. At the time of this writing an Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process has resulted in the first agreement on the road towards Palestinian independence. This book raises the question of whether Arafat's willingness to take part in a conciliatory negotiation is best explained from an IR national interest perspective or a Rothman-like bottom-up perspective, or some combination of these approaches. Hopefully, works like *From Confrontation to Cooperation* will encourage scholars to investigate such questions.

This book should be of great interest to both international relations scholars as well as conflict management academics and practitioners. In the post-Cold War era, scholars of international relations are increasingly focusing their attention on entities other than nation states in an effort to understand the often chaotic and virulent ethnic and regional conflicts which have erupted as nations such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have broken apart. This work should provide scholars with a very useful jumping off point for approaching such conflicts in new ways.

Syracuse University TERRELL A. NORTHRUP

China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy. By Chih-Yu Shih. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993. 244p. $37.00.

Shih, of National Taiwan University, endeavors in this book to shed light on why the People's Republic of China does what it does in foreign policy. Shih's argument rests upon the premise that up until the 1980s, the Chinese government based its legitimacy and power on a superior moral vision, which vision explains the contradictions of Chinese foreign policy. As illustration, one interesting inference is that the Chinese had several foreign policy themes, and thereby were able to enact moral dramas in which tangible resources or advantages accrued from the pursuit of one theme could be (in fact, might have been just so that they could be) publicly and virtuously sacrificed for the sake of another theme whose importance was now seen to be paramount.

Shih knows that this approach demands the synthesis of numerous disparate strands of theory in international politics: national role conception, domestic politics, statist theory, political culture, realism and neo-realism. This approach is seen as superior to the power politics paradigm which could never reconcile Chinese power (or, rather, lack thereof) with Chinese foreign policy rhetoric and action. Shih infers the "moral scripts" that China played with the Soviet Union, the United States, Japan, and the Third World. These comprise the bulk of the book's chapters. He shows how China repeatedly eschewed tangible economic and political gains with these nations for the sake of moral purity.

The book only partially achieves its aims due to two interrelated areas of concern: one, the problematic theoretical distinction between Shih's psychocultural model and a power politics model not constructed of straw; and two, the uneven persuasiveness of the "script" chapters. It seems to me that a strong moral vision, whatever its particular merits and cultural origins, is the primary mainstay of regimes that are vulnerable both at home and abroad. What other power resource does such a regime possess? Moral legitimacy first and foremost keeps the domestic wolves at bay. Solid domestic support simultaneously upholds and requires moral dramas to be enacted abroad, which dramas can be seen as successful despite (and perhaps because of) negative feedback from the international arena. I see "strong moral vision" as one possible route to consolidation and balancing of power both domestically and externally, and not as an endeavor separable from or antithetical to such concerns. Shih's approach may broaden the operationalization of what is meant by power, but that claim is extant in the literature that seeks to modify and enrich the straw man version of power politics, for example, that of Etheredge on the dramatic requirements of American national scripts, or the research emanating from Putnam's view of the "two level game" of domestic/international politics.

The "script" chapters often lack persuasiveness because Shih insists on demonstrating that the psychocultural approach is superior to a power politics approach. Thus he contrasts what China did with what it should have done if it were interested in tangible power gains rather than moral purity. However, as discussed above, intangible power gains in international politics can be as real to certain regimes as tangible power gains—and perhaps even more important if one factors in the domestic political scene. Although factions in the Chinese political elite are alluded to, there is no attempt to systematically tie in the resultant domestic fortunes of those who advocated certain foreign policies, or how foreign policy might have been used as a weapon or a carrot in factional politics.

Because of Shih's determination to find a contrast between his approach and power politics, he ends up with very questionable interpretations of certain events. For example, he explains Mao's strident anti-revisionist rhetoric against Khruschev as "the result of a cognitive need for consistency on anti-imperialist logic" (p. 68), though on the very next page he describes China's "furious response to Soviet betrayal" due to Khruschev's "attempt in 1958 to put China under Soviet military control," and later suggests that "they (the Chinese) wanted to be the enemy of the Soviet Union" (p. 79). I think we can explain the stridency of China's anti-revisionist rhetoric as both a function of its need to clearly condemn the moral impurity of the Soviets (thereby enhancing its own purity) *and* a need to protect its more traditionally defined national interests from a nation that had already shown itself hostile to those interests. There is no theoretically necessary dichotomy here. Examples of such painfully contorted reasoning that presumably exclude the possibility of a power politics explanation of Chinese foreign policy abound in this volume, and seriously detract from it. The most persuasive of the four "script" chapters is, in my opinion, the Japanese script, and readers interested in the prospects of closer Sino-Japanese ties should find much of use there.

Shih's final chapter is simultaneously the best and the most provocative. He argues that China, through its own bungling, can no longer act as a moral regime, and now, after the Cold War, finds itself acting as an out-of-step realpolitik regime in a world where neorealism is ascendant. According to Shih, the Great Leap Forward destroyed the Chinese people's faith in the moral superiority of their leaders. This led to a severance of the linkage between internal and external politics, as China's external behavior became irrelevant in judging the domestic political legitimacy of any faction. This severance invited a return to legalist/statist principles which "emphasize the wealth and strength of a nation, not its moral standing in the world" (p. 202). China is therefore eager to join the economically interdependent world, but is not ready to sacrifice national independence and autonomy. The neorealist vision of international cooperation is based upon shared moral and legal norms, which make possible some relinquishing of national autonomy. China is neither capitalist nor democratic, and thus cannot fully cooperate, nor persuade Western powers to fully cooperate with it. The resulting mistrust leads to confrontation (such as over human rights) in which China must show its power—now defined in confrontational power politics terms. And unless China can show its people it is respected in the world for its power—since its moral purity will no longer suffice—the people will respect the regime even less than they already do, which could lead to severe internal crisis. Shih predicts that China will use force in the near term (over the Nanshas or Taiwan) for this very reason. Such a display would also be consonant with the psychocultural Chinese penchant for the dramatic in foreign policy.

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

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

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

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

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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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